
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
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A HISTORY OF GREECE





HISTORY OF GREECE

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE MACEDONIAN CONQUEST

1344

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PREFACE

In writing this short history of Greece, the author has kept in view the requirements of the upper forms in schools, and of the final pass examination at the universities. He trusts that the work may not be without its use, as for a considerable time there has appeared no new school history of Greece, brought up to the level of recent discoveries. He has endeavoured to add as much fresh matter to the book as was possible, without plunging into the mazes of the controversies which have grown up around certain questions.

In his chapter on the geography of Greece, the author must acknowledge his indebtedness to Mr. H. F. Tozer's excellent work on that subject. In many parts of the early chapters he has to express his obligation to Mr. Evelyn Abhott's new "History of Greece," of which the first volume appeared when this work was half written. On the points where Greek and Oriental history touch, he has had the advantage of consulting Professor Sayer in person.

Mr. F. Haverfield, of New College, Oxford, senior classical master in Lancing College, has been good enough to look through the proofs of the book, and has made many valuable suggestions, for which the author hastens to express his gratitude. The plan of Syraouse on page 359 is taken from but is not meant to supersede Mr. Haverfield's most useful relief-map of that city.

In conformity with the practice of the majority of English writers, the author has not endeavoured to transliterate Greek names exactly, but has kept to the received methods of spelling. He has discarded, however, mere Latinisms, such as Jupiter or Agrigantum for Zeus or Agragas.

In accordance with the advice of schoolmaster-friends, an indication of the right pronunciation has been given, in cases where the quantities of the vowels in Greek names appeared likely to puzzle the reader.

The author ventures to ask for an indulgent criticism of any errors of detail that may have crept into his work. The proofs were corrected in some twenty places, varying in latitude from Lerwick to Syracuse, where books of reference were not always readily obtainable.

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CHAPTER I.

THE GROGRAPHY OF GREECH

When we can first discern through the mists of antiquity the race who called themselves Hollower—though we, following the nuclear Romans, know them butter as Greeks—we find them dwelling in the southern region of the Balkan Peninsula. That they must at some remote date have wandered into that Jand from Asta we may surmise, but enough prove.

There is a great mountain range, which whole many names forms the backbone of the Balkan Peninaula. Starting from the Alpa, it runs from north to south forming the watershed between the streams which flow west into the Adriatic, and those which run north-east or south-east to seek the Danube or the Aegenn. Of this great chain the southermost link is a range called Findus. From the broad equator tract which forms the bulk of the penissulatic stange of Pindus strikes out boidly into the Mediterranean, and with its spurs and dependent ranges forms a great mountainous mass projecting for more than two hundred and fifty miles from its base, and almost touching the thirty-sixth degree of Intitude with its southernmost came.

It is this southern extension of the Balkan Peninsula which has been since the carliest dawn of history the home of the Hollenic race. Here alone could the Grack claim that he was the first inhabitant of the land, the true child of the soil. His cities were built on every shore from Gaul to Colchis, but in all lands save this he was a stranger and a sojourner, maintaining a precarious hold on a fertified haven or a strip of coastland won from some earlier possessor.

The Helienic Peninsula-if we may so name the southern pro-

jection of the Balkan region—is not large. It is about equal to

size of Scotland in size, and may be aptly compared to that
country in many other things than more extent.

Both are almost entirely surrounded by the sea; both possess a wildly irregular coast-line, seamed with countless bays and inlets; both are fringed by a widespreading chain of islands great and small; both own a soil not over-fertile for the greater part of its surface; and above all, both are pre-eminently mountain-lands. In Greece, as in Scotland, it is almost impossible to get out of sight of the hills; no spot in the whole land is more than fifteen miles from some considerable range. The three plains of any size which it confains do not together form one-sixth of its surface.

The mountains of Greece, then, give the land its special character.

They are not remarkable for their great height—Olympus, the

The Greek loftiest summit, falls short of ten thousand feet—but
secuntains. are poculiarly wild, rugged, and harron. The sharp

bare limestone peaks and ridges stand out with surprising distinctness in the bright dry atmosphere of the South. Their summits do not reach the region of perpetual snow, nor are their outlines softened by forests; all is clear-cut and hard. Moroover, there is so much sheer cliff and impassable ravino in their structure that they constitute much more effective barriers between valley and valley than might be inferred from their mere height, which generally ranges between three thousand and soven thousand feet above the sea. The paths from one district to another are few and difficult, winding at the bottom of bestling crags or climbing precipitous gorges in their tortuous course. Honce each tribe was well protected from its neighbours; the points at which it could be assailed were well known, and could in most cases be obstructed with case, and firmly hold by a handful of resolute men. Graces was framed by Nature for the home of small independent communities.

Not the least characteristic feature of the Greek mountains is their chaotic complexity. There is no general system or order in their course; synctimes they remind us of the ribs starting from

¹ Spotland contains 29,800 square miles; the modern kingdom of Greece, including the Cyclades and Thessaly, 24,800; Southern Albania, the old Epiras, makes up some 4000 or 5000 more.

a backbone, sometimes of the diverging arms of a star-fish, sometimes of the complicated meshes of a spider's web. Ranges turn sharply at right angles to themselves, or divide into parallel chains, only to meet again; bold ridges, whose height promises a long course, and suddenly in a sea-teaten cliff. Deep, narrow, unexpected gorges, torn open by some convulsion of nature, sunder apparently continuous lines of crest. At one point an upland valley is lest in some recess of the hills, with no natural outlet for its vators; at another an arm of the sea comes croeping up a tortuous cleft far into the heart of the mountains. Everything is present except system, order, and regularity.

Although the summits of the mountains of Greece are invariably have and bleak, their spurs and slepes were in ancient days not entirely destitate of forest tracts. In Northern Greece extensive woods of sab, beech, and pine were to be found on the sides of Pelion and Parnassus, and, in the Peloponnesus, Areadia was renowned for its widespreading oak-groves. But on the whole the land was not abundantly timbered; it had no broad, untroklen stretches of tangled woodband such as formed the primitive boundaries of Germany or England—its wildness was always the wildness of the oliff, and not of the forest.

The character of the mountains of a country determines that of its rivers. Gentle alopes and wide plains produce broad navigable streams; rocks and ravines breed unmanageable The rivers of torrents. The course of the rivers of Greece is so short, and their descent to the sea from the hills so rapid, that not one of them can bear a beat. But if incapable of use they are not incapable of mischief; swellen with the winter rains, they become broad dangerous floods which sweep away all that impedes their passage to the sea, and often spread destruction through the cultivated land along their lower course. The Greeks represented the gods of their rivers as mixed shapes, with the body of a bull and the head of a man; the meaning is not difficult to seize—the figure combines the headlong rush and bruto-strength of the animal with that almost human incomulty for mischief which a stream in flood displays. Four or five rivers in Greece possess a course of some length, and bear a considerable volume of water to the sea through all the seasons of the year. Largest of these was the Achelous, the

king of Grocian waters, which hurries for more than a hundred milesthrough the gloomy gorges of Epirus and Actolia, and code its obscure course opposite the mouth of the Corintians Gulf, Smaller but more famous were Peneds, which drains Thessaly, the one great Greedan plain; and Alphous, the sole river which succeeds in forcing its way out of the mountain barriers of Arcadla, and reaching the Ionian Sea. The other strangs of Greece, though famous enough in story, are little better than winter torrents; for one half of the year they much turnulturously down to the sea; for the other half they show a narrow thread of water burely connecting a chain of itselated poels, or even shrink away altogether and disappear. The bad of a dried-up river has always been during the summer mouths the most obvious, and often the only, read for the Greek wayfurer.

The lakes of Greece are almost without exception the result of the accumulation of water in upland valleys without any natural The lakes of exit for drainage. The Lake of Pambolis in Jopines. that of Copais in Bocotia, and that of Stymphalus in Areadia, are all thir examples of this. There would be no limit to the increase of their extent were it not for the existence of a phenomenon common in all limestone countries. The water, unable to find its way above ground, pierces liself a subterranean passage, a " smallow," which the Greeks called Sepaspar or Tracker, and reappoars in some lower valley. If the "swallow" is cheked, the lake increases and inundates the whole valley. If it is anturally or artificially colonged, the sheet of water many dry up entirely. The ancient kings of Orchomenus turned the large lake Consis into grassy mendows by cutting a tunnel four miles long into the Eubocan Strait; a few conteries of neglect, however, choked the issue, and reproduced a broad expanse of mursh which oxists till this day.

What Grocce lacks in navigable rivers is more than compensated for by her numerous gulfs. These arms of the son run up into the ran greek heart of the land, and make almost every district sea-count readily accessible from the water. The Covindhan Gulf is but the largest example of a long series of land-locked inlets which penetrate Grocce from all sides; so deeply is the count indented that even the immost recesses of Thessely or Arcadis are not more than forty miles from the nearest sea. The depth of

Ler bays and guids produces the surprising result that Greece has as many miles of sea-coast as Spain and Fortugal, though its superficial area is only one-tooth of that of the Iberian Peninsula.

As a land of mountain and shore, Greece possesses a more temperate climate than might have been expected from her southern latitude. The greater part of the surface is upland, The olimate where the summer heat is appreciably moderated by the elevation. Moreover, the sen-breeze penetrates almost everywhere to cool and refresh. So it comes to pase that Thessely, for example, though further south than Naples, has a climate no warmer than that of Lombardy; and that the southernmost plains of Messenia are the only part of the country where anything anurquehing somi-teopical vegetation out be found. The temperature of Greece was probably even milder to andeet days than now, for the hand of man less cleared away the farest tracts which once equalized the minfall and saved the land from drought. Greek held that the excellence of his climate quite componented for the cichoesa of soil which was dealed to his home by nature, and pointed out Hellas as owning the happy mean between the cold of the North and the heat of the South.

Gresce may be divided into three male parts, each separated from the others by an inthmus. The first includes Thessely and Epirus, the lands which lie between the northern boundary of the country, and the Malian and Ambracian gulfs —two land-locked absets of water which cut into the Gresce.

peninsula at the thirty-sinth degree of latitude, and reduce its breadth to exty-five mike.

To the south of these inless Greece breadens out again into its 'middle region, the district to which the late geographers constitutes restricted the mone of "Helias," opposing it alike to Peloponnesse and to the Northern lands. This tract contains the countries of Acemania, Actolia, Doris, Locris, Photis, Bucotla, Attica, and Megaris.

Lastly, beyond the Isthmus of Curiath lies the disconnected mass of Pelaponnesus, a mountainous poniumle only joined to Contral Gausse by a low-lying spit of land these miles and a halfacross.

The northern third of Greece is divided into two widely dis-

similar halves by the great range of Pindus. Westward lies Epirus, a land never fully recognized as Greek, for the inhabitants were alten in race and language, though in the course of time they took upon themselves a vargish of Hellenic culture and civilization. It is composed of a number of mountain valleys, some running parallel with Pindus, some at right angles to it, according as the spurs of the great range strike south or The northern half of its const is sheer cliff, where the Communian Modulinius rum close by the seaside; further south the shore is less impracticable, and shows a nurrow coast-plate and one or two fair harbours. Epirus was divided between three kindred tribes-the Chaorians, Thesprotines, and Molossiens. The lastnamed occupied the inland valleys under the western slope of Findos; the Chaonisus and Thesprotians shared the count-the former holding the more rugged worthern tract, the latter the smaller and southern half of the shore-hands. Epirus only contains one place of importance, the ancient argular sent of Dodous, Here, in a secluded upland valley among the bills of the Molessian, territory, the priestesses of Zeus dwelt in their oak-groves, and gave responses to inquirers from all parts of Greece, Opposito Epirus lies the long and ragged bland of Carryrs, whose ridge runs possible with the const of the mainland, and looks like one more Epirot mountain range parted from its follows by the intervention of a narrow arm of the soa.

Thesely, the land east of Findus, is very different in character from Epirus. It is not divided by mountain ranges, but survived to them, forming a single great plain shut in on every side by hills. To the north, it is separated from Macedonia by the Cambunian Mountains—a chain which rease out at right angles from Pindus, and culminates near the sea in Olympus, the highest of Greak mountains, on whose cloud-capped summit primaceral tradition placed the inaccessible abodes of the gold. The southern shoulder of Olympus turns south and almost touches the Magnesian range, the eastern wall of Thessely, whose highest summit—Mount Ossn—faces Olympus across the narrow gauge of Tempe. Lagends told how the mountains had outer formed a continuous barrier, and how Poseidan had split Ossa assunder from Olympus by a blow of his trident, and opened an

outlet for the land-locked waters of Thessity into the Aegean, Temps forms a picture-spix defile four rules and a half long, buried in folings and bordered by manpart-like walls of grey limestone. Through its midst runs the Feneus, a vigorous stream oven in the heat of summer, for it receives the drainage of the whole Thessalian plain. Southward from Ossa, the Magnesian hills run hard by the sea, rising into a secondary peak in the mell-wooded Pellom, and ending in the surf-besten promothery of Sopias. A claim of islands—Schakhas, Foes, and sermal more—earry the general direction of the range out into the open sea.

the range out into the open see.

Bouthward Thessaly is bounded by Othrys—"the Brow," as its name bytckens—a ridge first thousand feet high, which runs out at right angles from Findus, much in the same way as the Cambunian chain does in the morth. It approaches to within two miles of the southern point of the Magnesian range, and is then broken by a strait, the outlet of the Gulf of Pagnane. This great land-locked short of woter lies along the western base of Pelion, and reaches far inland up to loles, the oldest haven of Thessaly, where the famous ship "Argo" was said to have been built. The region to the west of the gulf formed the district of Phthiōds, one of the Pagnales earliest seats of Greeian life, the home of Hellon, the mythical founder of the Hellonic name, and Achilles, the here of the war of Trey. It is separated from the Thessalian plain by a mixing range of hills, through which the Enipous alone finds its way northward to join the Pengus; the other streams of Phthiōtis way northward to join the Pengus; the other streams of Phthiōtis

Shut in by its four mountain walls, Thessaly forms a little world apart. Its fortile slopes and green water-meadows were studded by more than twenty cities small and greet, whose relations with each other form one of the most obscure chapters of Grock history. Three places deserve mention as more important than their neighbours.—Pharsalus, in the southern angle of the plain; Therae, which lies at the foot of the hills which separate Thessaly from Philliddis and the Papassean Gulf; and Larissa, the largest town of all, which commands the middle course of the Poneus, the choicest intel of the whole country.

seek the Pagastean Gulf.

The saily was even more celebrated for its pastures than its corn-

¹ Narthneige and Titange.

fields. The 'estile which fed in its water-meadows were highly esteemed; but still more so were its houses, which gave mounts to the famous Thessalian cavairy, the one really important force of housement that Greeos could put into the field. The only drawback to which the country is subject is the liability of its lower parts to inundation. After the winter storms the Peneus cannot entry off the rainfall fast enough, and a long backwater, covering many square miles, forms itself in the lowland below the spurs of Ossa. When the mins have ceased, the food shrinks back into the two deepest bellows of the plain, and forms the lakes of Boebe and Messonis, which gradually decrease till they are replenished again in winter by the pext hundation.

South of Others, we come to the second great section of Greece the lands which lie between the Malian and Ambracian gulfs to the north, and those of Aegina and Corinth to the south.

After sending off Othrys esstward, the great range of Pindus loses the comparatively simple character which it has up to that point preserved. It no longer continues a single chain, but breaks up into a quantity of diverging ridges. A mountain-mass called Typhrestus is the centre from which these spurs start. To the south-mast

Astolia. It sends out two ranges whose complexities form the high-ways of civilization that its inhabitants always remained two or three hundred years behind the rest of the Greek races in their development. As hate as the Persian wars there were still Actolian tribes who lived entirely by rapine, always went armed, and ate their meat raw. The lower course of the Achelous—the Epirof river of which we have before spoken—divided Actolia from Acarbanic, another highland country, but one less wild and remote

Assumants. then its neighbour. Its coast presents many havens, notably the groat Gulf of Ambracia, a land-locked sea, not unlike the Pagamena Gulf of Thessaly. It is approached by a narrow strait a mile broad, almost blocked by the prenentary of Actium; then it broadens out and runs inlend for twenty miles between Acarmania and Epirus. At its end lay Argos, the city of the Amphilochi, a tribe closely skin to the Acarmanians; a few miles from its northern share stood the more important town of Ambracia, a Cofetthian colony, whose imbabliants had driven the

Epicots out of the southernment angle of their land. The coast of Ammenia is frieged with islands; those at its southern end, the Echinades, are gradually being absorbed by the mud-flats deposited by the Achelous, which brings down vast quantities of all from its upper course, and bailds up islands opposite its mouth. Further out to see the Leucas, Ithaca, and Cephallenia, three The western rocky crests of a submerged mountain chain. Of islands these Leucas, "the White Island," a tract of grey timestone cliffs, was once mitted by a sandspit to the Acarananan mainland, but a canal cut issues the neck turned it from a posimenta into an island. Ithaca, a narrow and rugged mountain-top, is only famous as the home of the much-wandering Odyssens. Caphallenia, the largest of the three islands, faces the mouth of the Gulf of Corintit; it was broad enough to centain four cities, and possessed some fortile patches on its coast.

The mountain ranges which run eastward from Typhrestus are somewhat less chaptic in their structure than thuse which go towards Actolin and the west. Two main chains can be distinguished. The first is formed by Octa and the heights which continue it. These mountains run close to the share of the Malian Gulf and the Straits of Eulouse. Octa forms the western part of the range, and contains the highest peaks. In the scanty space left between its declivities and the opposite slopes of The Stor-Othrys lies the valley of the Sparchelus, along whose chedus valley. upper course dwelt the Aenianes, while the Malians occupied the narrow coast-plain at its month. Eastward of Malis the cliffs of Mount Callidronnes, a shoulder of Octa, come right down to the water's edge, so that there was only soom for a single waggen to cass in the road which lies between the sea and the overlausing rocks. This forms the colminating point of the defile along the coast known as the Pass of Thermopylas, and is famous for all lime as the spot which Leonidas and his Spartans held for so long against the overwhelming bosts of Persia. After Thermopylao, the mountains retire a few miles from the coast; they are now no longer known as Octa, but bear the names first of Cosmis, then of Ptours, then of Messaphum. After the last-named height, they sink down to insignificance opposite to Chalcis and the narrows of the Euripus. The land between this

mountain range and the Rubsean Steat was hold by the Localana, known cometimes as Hypoconomidian, from the mountain from the mains under which they dweld, sometimes as Opuntian, from the name of their chief town. The qualifying epithet was necessary to distinguish them from their kindred, the Oscilan Localans, who lived further to the south on the shores of the Corietbian Gulf.

Parallel on the whole to Osta and its daughter ranges lies the other great mountain-system of Central Greece. This is the chain of which Parassus, Helicon, and Citherron are the three chief links. It runs along the above of the Corinthian Gulf, to which, however, it never approaches so closely as does Osta to the Gulf of Malis. By far the most important height in this range is Paranssus, a great mountain mass, rising to eight thousand fact above the sea, whose buttersees spread far out on every side, and make an almost impassable barrier between Phosis, the land to its east, and Ozelian Lacris, the country which faces its western slopes.

Parmassus is the most central peak in Greece; the rand Delphi, obtained in the whole country, embracing as it does overything that lies between Thesasty and Arasiia, the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf and the southern heights of Attica. In one of the recesses of the southern face of Parmassus lay the site of the great oracle of Delphi, the spot which the Greeks regarded as the centre of the whole world (Assethr vit). The sanctity of the place gathered round a mysterious cuve, overhung by bestling rocks and with a rugged garge at its feet. Here dwelt the power of Apollo, and here the zichest, if not the most magalifeent, temple of Greece ress in his bancer.

From Paransaus the Phoeian hills run eastward till they rise again into the height of Helleus, a mountain less vost and rugged than Paransaus, though it attains the respectable height of 6700 The Bosottan feet. Helicon was noted for the pleasant groves and mountains springs which diversify its eastern slopes, and its green treesses were fabled to be the favourite hunar of the Muses.

¹ Geographers have erred in distinguishing the Locrians into separate tribes of Hypothemidians and Opentians. The manes were used indifferently for the same people.

The spurs which Helicon sends out rise on the east into the ridge of Cithaeron, a long line of creet which continues the general direction of the chain of which it forms part, but no longer runs along the side of the Guif of Carluth; striking inhand, it forms the boundary between Attica to the south end Rocatia to the nurth.

Pent in between Octa, Coemis, and Ptourn on the one side, and Parnassus, Helicon, and Cithagran on the other, lies the second largest plain of Greece. It is composed of the valleys of the rivers Caphiasus and Asopus, and runs from north-west to southcost, with a length of some thirty miles, and a broadth that varies from two to ten. The Cephiesus valley was held by three different races. At its source among the roots of Octa dwelt the little tribe of the Darinus in their four villages. Its central Darist. course flowed through the land of the Phoclans, whose towns studded the slopes on either side of its banks. Phoels also included the rogged country to the south of the Cephissus valley, taking in Delphi and the spurs of Paranssus, and reaching to the Corinthian Gulf. But its heart and strongth by in the Cephissus valley, the only part of its territory which was fertile enough to support a considerable population. After leaving the land of the Phoesens, the Cophissus valley is contracted for a moment by spurs which run south from Chemis, In the narrowest part of its course, where it is no more than two miles broad and almost deserves the name of a pass, lies Chaptonea, the first town in Boostia; it is almost as truly the gate of Central Greece as Thormopylae, and has always formed the natural spot at which an invador coming from the north has been resisted. Bohind Chaeronea lies the great Boostian plain, divided Bosotin. between the basins of the Cophissus and the Asopus. It is a fertile region, whose soil consists of a rich mould, and pro-

It is a fertile region, whose soil consists of a rich mould, and produces the most abundant crops in Greece. Bosotia could almost compets with Thessaly in the number and size of its cities, of which seven of larger and seven of smaller size 1 formed the national league, a body whose union contrasts strongly enough with the discord that always prevailed among the Thessalians. Therefore

¹ These were Thebus, Orchamenns, Thespine, Tanngra, Halinctus, Corosen, and Lebaden, and the smaller towns of Copae, Pharac, Mycalescus, Actaephium, Anthodon, Chaeronen, and Platese.

the Bosotian League was generally powerful, the Thessalians nearly always weak. Orohomenus dominates in the valley of the Caphiesus. Thebas in that of the Acopus; in early times the former was the most important town in the country; but from the sevently century n.c. Thobes exerted a marked predominance over all her neighbours.

The Asopus succeeds in reaching the sea, but the Cophissus and all the other minor rivers of Bosotia fall into Lake Copais, a broad swampy expanse of water, possessing no natural outlet save some subterranean "swallows" which communicate with the Eulocean Simile. In spite of the labours of the early kings of Orchomenus, who for a while drained the swamp by artificial tunnels, Copais was the bane of Becetia. Not only did it inundate the meadows of Haliartus and Orchomenas, but its marshy exhalations made the air of the whole plain thick and heavy. In summer the climate was saltry and sweltering, for the surrounding mountains nemned in the warm vapours from the lake; in whiter the fogs and mists lay low on the surface of the land, kept off the sun, and caused a degree of cold unknown is neighbouring districts. The feliabitants of the breezy upland of Atties held, probably not without reason. that the unpressive climate of Bosotia under those who dwelt in it dull, heavy, and stupid. Novertheless, the land produced Hesiol, succept only to Homer among early poets. Pinder, the greatest of lyric poets, and Eparainondas, the noblest patriot of Greece,

The ranges of Cithseron and Parnes, which are pragtically continuous, extend right across the peniusula from sea to sea, running due east and west. From their western end projects a bold mountain. mass named Gerenois, which forms the sole barrier between the Gulf of Corinth and that of Aggina, and stands out towards the isthmus, and the Pelopoppese. At its southern and Geronsia sinks suddenly down from five thousand feet to the sea-lovel, and looks across to Onciura, the nearest Poloponussian height, which faces it at a distance of about six miles. Between them lies the low splt of land, three miles and a half bread, which forms the actual Isthmus of Cortuth. On each side of Geroneia there is just room for a read to crawl between the hills and the sea : these two paths, the one overhanging the Corinthian, the other the Aggington Gulf, meet at the isthmus.

From the base formed by the line of Cithaeren and Parens a triangular tract of mountain land runs due south into the sen. It's western side is weathed by the gulf of Angies, its eastern by the Angewa This is the district of Artica, attention.

"the shore-land," the most famous though not the most favoured of the regions of Greece. Its backbone is formed by the ranges of Pontelleus and Hymoticus, but a quantity of minor heights cross it in all directions. Altica is mainly composed of sloping uplands, with a thin ungrateful soil and a great definition of water. All its streams, with one exception, shrink away and disappear in the summer. But the air is dry, fresh, and breezy, and the country includes two coast-plains whose fertility almost redeems the barrenness of the highlands. These are the Thriasian plain in the western corner of the land, and the plain of Athens which lies around the capital, and is watered by Caphissus, the one percental river of Attien.

The little country of Megaris, named from Megara, its one town, is practically a part of Attlea: it was severed from the rost by a political and not a natural boundary; it consisted of that portion of the slopes of Cithaeron and Gerenois Magazia, which was detached from Attien by the Dorian invasions of the

tenth contary n.c.

Before proceeding to describe Peloponnesus, it is necessary to mention the great island of Raboca, which lies like a breakwater in front of Loris, Bocota, and Attica, separating them from the open Aegean. The island is formed by a Baboca: great mountain ridge, which prolongs the range of Othrys beyond the waters of the Straits of Artemisium. Buboca presents to that sea an unbroken line of iron-bound maps without a single larkout; but its inner face has a very different character, containing some facility const-plains, and affording safe anotherage in numerous buys. It was on this shaltered eastern side of the island that Chalels and Eretria, two flourishing commercial cities famed for their activity in colonizing, were situated. Opposite Chalcis was the Euripus, a narrow passage where the width of the Eubean Strait shrinks down to forty yards, and could be spanned by a bridge thrown out from the Bosotian mainland.

From Assis broken shore.

Polopennesus, which the geographer Strato happily described as "the pitadel of Greece," the innormant and strongest of the successive lines of defence which the Helburic lands present to an invader, is very distinct in character from the lands to its north. The barrier which the Gulfs of Cecinth and Aegian interpose between it and central Greece corresponds to an entire change in the

The doubthin system of the country. The isthmus which pions it to Megatis is not a link connecting the main market point. Hence it has been from the carliest days the ambition of origineurs to bridge this neck by a ship-portage or to pieces it by a said.

The two ching mountain chains which give Pelepennesus its shape run at right angles to each other. The first lies close to

its northern coast, and forms the boundary between nountains of Achein on the shore and Arcadia in the upland. The Peloponnesus. longest ridge of this range is known as Erymanthus, but its highest point was Cyllone, which rises to 7700 feet. No common name exists for the whole chain, which we may, however, call the mountains of Northern Arcadia. High up on the southers. declivity of one of its crests was the only important waterfall of Greece, the mysterious Styx. Plunging from an inaccessible cliff into on equally inaccessible chases, it was regarded with womier and awe by the Greeks, who fabled that it fell stealght into the underworkl, and become the river of Hades. Starting from the centre of the North Arcadian Range and running at right angles to it, north and acoth, was the second great mountain chain of Peloponnesus, This forms the watershed between the rivers which flow west to the Ionian See, and these which run cast to the Acgean or lose thouselves in the limestone cirits of the Arcadian plateen. The range is known as Macaalus in its central, and Taygetus in its southern, course. The culminating peak of Taygetus is the highest summit of Poloponaceus; it slightly surpasses Gyllene, and reaches 7900 feet. This range runs far out into the sea, and its final precipies, the rocky promontory of Tacuarum, forms the southernmost point of Peloponnesus.

All along its course the chain of Maenalus and Taygettas is

accompanied by a parallel range not much inferior to it in importance, which faces it at a distance varying from ten to fifteen railes to the cast. The dominating heights of this range are Purthenium and Parnon, of which the latter reaches 6400 feet. Like Tayyetus, this mountain throws out a long headland into the sea, the point of which was Cape Males, whose gusty cliffs were long the terror of Greek seamen.

Three cross ranges join the range of Magnatus and Taygens to that of Parthenium and Parnon at three different points. Each of those cuts off a highland valley, between the main chains, from its natural cut to the sea. Hence are formed the isolated upland hollows of Phencus, Stympholus, and Mantines, whose only drainage is by "swallows" which discharge their waters on to the above above the Augenn.

Pelopeernasus falls into seven main divisions. The first of these, starting from the north-east, is the district just within the lathanus, where the hills are still low, and are only commending to rise up towards the great chain of Northern Arcadla. Corinth, a fown perched on a height just within the isthmus, gives its name to the hilly country around its base; a few miles further to the west, Sieyen and its territory occupy the valley of the little river Asopus. The slopes above Corintals and Sleycein were ewind by two yet smaller states, the cities of Philies and Cleonac, each occupying a mere bellow in the hills.

Southward of Phins and Cleonae, a mountain range running east and west forms the boundary of Argolia. This country falls into two parts: reund the town of Argos, a few miles inland from the Aegest, lies a small coast-plain forming the territory of that place. East of this tract a hold perturbal runs out into the sea, broad enough to hold three considerable cities, Epidaurus, Treezen, and Hermione, which were generally independent of Argos and maintained a vigorous life of their own. Over against Epidaurus, a few niles out in the Saronio Gulf, lay Aegina, a rougged island, but long the abode of a race of hold and enterprising scames who made their usurow home well-night the greatest of the commercial marts of Greece.

South of Argolis lay Leccula, a region completely bisected by

¹ To be carefully distinguished from its Bosotian namesaku,

the range of Pernon and dominated by that of Taygotus. The hardest land between Pernon and the sea is rough hillside, barely fit for habitation; but the valley between Parnon and Taygetus, the basis of the Buretas, the "hollow Lucadamon" of Homer, is of a very different character. It abounds in the constant and plantations of vines and mulberries, and is well-night the most fertile region of Pelepouneous. Spreading over four low mounds in the middle of the plain, lay the straggling and unfertified town of Sparta, before whose citizens the rest of the inhabitants of Lucania bowed in subjection.

The lefty and well-wooded spore of Tayigetus divide Laconia from Messenia, the south-western angle of Peleponnesus. Like Messenia, it consists of a rocky coast-land and a central plain, the river of Messenia, is even more fortile than that of the Buretes; facing full to the south, it bears trees and fruits of at almost tropical character, such as no other part of Greece can rear to maturity. Above it rises the peak of Ithone, the citadel of Messenia. The mountainous subband of the country is majory notable as possessing the only good poet of the western coast of Peleponnesus, the land-lacked bay of Pyles, famous in the Peleponnesia, war, and yet more famous in our own contary for the sea-fight of Nayarino.

A little river called the Neda divides Messenia from the triple region known as Elia. This land consists, firstly, of Triphylia, the

district between the Neda and the Alphens, a tract hat which the hills of Aradia run out weatward, and which served as a refuge to the broken remants of several tribes who had lest their original homes. Secondly, of Fisatis, the plain along the meethern bank of the Alphens, a fertile region which contained the great national sanctuary of Olympia. Thirdly, of Elis proper, the western slopes of Mount Brymanthus and its effected willages, ignorant of the city life which was labitual in sucheed willages, ignorant of the city life which was labitual in Groces. The Eleians at an early data conquered their neighbours of the Fisatis and Triphylis, and in spite of many revolts held them in constant subjection. The coast of Elis is a long and almost harbourless excetch of sand-hill and lagoon, a fact which explains why a people possessing a considerable seabourd never became

somen. Twelve miles from its westernmost cape lies Zaoyathue, a considerable island whose mountains prolong the chain which bud started in Leuces and Cephallenia.

North-east of Ells, and running eastward as far as the boundaries of Sicyon, by Achaia, pressed in between the Corinthian Gulf and the mountains of Northern Arcadia. It was compacted of a number of small const-plains, such

containing its own town. Offshoots of the great range to the south out off valley from valley, so that communication was easier by sea then by land. Nevertheless, the Achaians were a united people; they were bound together by an ancient league, and did not induly in the internecine wars too common in other parts of Greece.

The only Peloponassian district remaining to be described is

Arcadla. This region forms the centre of the reginerals, and is the only part of it which does not own an qualet to the Avendia falls into two halves. Its castern side is composed of the three upland bellows, pent in between the ranges of Magualus and Portheolum, of which we have already spoken in describing the mountain system of Peleponnesus. Of these isolated velleys the southernmost is by far the most important: it contained the twin cities of Mantines and Tegos, famous throughout Greek history for their bitter quartels and constant warfare; they were by far the largest and most civilised of the Arcadian states. The western half of Arcadia consists of a regriber of vallays drained by the tributaries of the Alphaus, the largest river of Pelagonnesus. These streams, separated from each other by a multitude of small ranges in their upper course, run together from all sides to most at Heraca, the westernmost Areadian town, whose territory overlooks the plain of Olympia. The land, drained by them forms a rough hilly platesu, about two thousand foot above sea-level, intersected by wooded hills in all directions. Here dwelt a number of small tribes, some of which had built themselves towns, while others lived scattered in isolated villages. All were equally jealous of their independence, and impatient of any closer union with their neighbours. They were by for the poorast and least civilized of the inhabitants of Pelopounesus, and from an early date are found leaving their mountain homes in bands, to serve as mercenary soldiers in more favoured countries.

Facing the castern coast of Greece, a multitude of islands rise from the Aegean. They are the mountain-tops of two lost ranges, which once prolonged the Eubcean and Attic hills out into the open sea. Andrea, Tenos, and Myconos are isolated continuations of Eubcea; Ceos, Cyphnos, and Seriphos are links starting from the Attic promontory of Sunium. A little further south the two chains become confused, and meet in Naxos and Paros, the most important islands of the whole group. The Greeks called this

nrchipelago the Cyclades, conosiving of them as lying Gralades. in a circle around Delos, an island-sanctuary only less famous than Delphi as a home of Apollo. South of the Cyclades lay the Spondes, "the scattered ones," composed of the volcanic islands of Melos, Them, and Gimolos, with the more distant Astypales and Carpathus. Sporades and Cyclades silke are "mountain-tops affect at sea;" each of them has its peak rising to two thousand or three thousand feet in height, and sinking down into the water in more or less steep slopes. All the islands were devoted to the culture of the vine, and well-nigh all peasessed asfo harbours to tempt the cautious mariner of early times to push on from point to point till he found himself in Asia.

Last of all Greek lands we reach the long island of Crete. It lies across the mouth of the Aegean like a great breakwater, with

creta.

one face looking out on Cyrene and Africa, while the other fronts toward the Cyclades. It is a true Greek land in its geographical character; mountains starting from the central peak of Ida cut it up into countiess valleys, where more than forty independent towns found space to exist. Political union was never established among them except perhaps in the prehistoric empire of Mines; they were always occupied in ignoble civil wars, and when Cretans are heard of outside their own island during historical times, it is always in the character of mercenaries, and generally in that of traitors to their employee.

CHAPTER II.

THE ORIGINS OF THE GREEK NATIONALITY.

Tuzza was once a time when Greece, mainland and ishad, plain and mountain, was peopled by a multitude of small unclvilized tribes, who lived in a state of constant war and anarchy. They had dwelt there for long ages, and inhabitate. no imdition survived to tell from whence they had come. But overwthing leads us to believe that they had passed futo the land from the cast and the porth-east, some of them by according forward along the Hellespont and the coast of the Aeguna, others by coasting from island to island through the archipolago which connects the harbours of Asia Minor with those of Greece, -a way so easy as to termst even the most unskilled and menterprising of senfarers to westward exploration, for the whole space of water can be traversed without lesting sight of land for an hour. Of the life of these primitive inhabitants we know but little either from studition or from the traces which they left bolded them above or below the ground. They were possessed of flocks and hords; they tilled the earth in some primitive fashion; they were acquainted with the use of certain of the metals, notably copper and cold. and bad mastered the rudiments of navigation. But, living in au andless state of war with each other, they knew nothing of trade by sea or land. Their villages were built inland, because the dweller on the coast was always exposed to the phatical incursions. of bis neighbours. Intend, ton, in positions enrefully chosen for their strength, on isolated hills or rock-girt plateaus, rose the citadels of the tribes, enrounded by rude but massive walls of unhown stone. piled up without the aid of mortar. Their religion consisted in the worship of the supreme power of the heavens-a god without a

name, whom they adored at alters erected on the highest hills. Temples or images they had not thought of framing, though sometimes the presence of the divinity was typifed by a massive stone or a sacred tree. The crowd of divinities who in after-days divided the rule of the world with Zeux, the great god of the firmament, were as yet unknown.

Such a state of society can remain long without development. The ceaseless wars in which the tribes were engaged prevented the accumulation of permanent wealth, the source of all civilization. The land, especially the more fertile districts, was continually passing from tribe to tribe by the chance of war; the berds of sheep and owen were always at the mercy of a successful foray. Therefore men lived rudely and sparingly, because they had no temptation and no opportunity to gather round them any store of wealth. Long ages had probably elapsed since the arrival of the primitive inhabitants of Greece, before any tendency to the evolution of a nationality or the growth of civilization become evident. Later still came the time when the name of Hollene became known and accented, and when Hellenic civilization began to develop into a form unlike anything that had gone before itthe unique and unparelleled product of the most gifted nation that the world has ever seen.

In the dim enoch to which the earliest memories or imaginings of the Greeks carry us lack, we learn that the Pelasgi were The Pelearie occupying the land. The name of that mysterious people is found not only in the Hellenic districts of Europe, but spread far and wide in Italy and Asia Minor. The myths in which the Greek embodied his conceptions of ancient history make Pelangua, the eponymous hero of the race, now a king of Argos, now a dweller in Thessaly; but Attica and Arcadia also claimed a Pelasgic ancestry, and the coast-land on the Hellespont and the islands of the north-castern Aegean were full of Pelaszio traditions: even the Messapinas and Oenotrians of Southern Italy were sacribed to the same kinship. So widely scattered is the name, so different were the tribes of historic days to whom a Pelasgic origin was attributed, that it is safer on the whole to believe that the name represents an epoch rather than a nationality. The Pelasgian is the dimly remembered predecessor whose existence

was brought home to the Greek by the barrows and hill-alters which dested his land, by the evelopean walls of probistoric citadels and the unintelligible names of ancient sites. If he was akin to them, he hardly knew. The most clear-sighted of Greek historians held that his ancestors were a certain section of the Pelasef, who had developed into a separate nationality by falling under a special sec of influences, which we oult Hellenio begunso tradition associated them with the name of Hellen the Thessalian. and his sons. But if this was so, it is strange that Atherisa. leggads speak of a time when the Ionian and the Pelasgian dwelt together in Attion, occupying the same land but sharply divided by racial differences. Moreover, the scattered fragments of races with whom the Polasgian name lingured as late as the fifth century, the islanders of Lemnes and Sevres, the Crestonians on the coast of Macadon, the hillmen of the Hollespontine Olympus, were distinctly "Borbarians;" their language and quatoms were unintelligible to the Greek, and yet they had been dwelling beside him for contarios, and experienced the influence of continual contact with him. They differed from the Hellene not as a civilized and an uncivilized member of the same nature differ-not as an Athening differed from an Astolian, for example-but wholly and entirely, as much as did a Thekan from a Lydian.

Taking "Pelasgian," therefore, to cover in a vague way all the races which dwelt in prehistoric days in the Asgent lands, we must conclude that those tribes with whem the name lingered longest were not necessarily allied in blood to the whole of the primitive population of Graces. They rather survived as a sequente people, because they were the least akin to the newly developing nationality of the Hellenes of all the early tubabilizeds of the land. How many and various these inhabitants were it is easy to see, yet by far the larger number of them finally avalgamated

into a single nationality.

Although in many parts of Groces the local lagends claimed that the necessor of the tribe was no stranger coming from near, but "autochihonous," spring from the load itself, the child of one of the gods by some nymph of the neighbouring spring or mountain, yet the uniquity of them bear witness to the existence of the time when the population was not fixed to the soil, and when an

eddying stream of different tribes was constantly in motion throughout the Aegean countries. Some of the restless clans Mixture of were of races which we must recognize as distinctly " Barbarians:" tales reach us of days when the Thracian dwelt in Phocis, and the Carian built cities for himself in the Megarid. Others were of less decidedly alien character. such as the much-wandering Leleges, who, though they dwelt on both sides of the sea, and are found united with the Phrygiana in Asia, are in the West reckened akin to races who were accepted as the ancestors of underbted Greeks. Others, again, such as the Minyae and Telebeans, afterwards disappear from sight by bring absorbed into later tribal unions, but were clearly of Hellonio stock. Comparatively few were the clans who, like the Arcadians. could claim that their ancestors had dwelt on from time immemorial. tilling the same valleys and worshipping the same gods from Pelasgic days down to the clearly known times of the sixth century.

As yet the great names of the historic races of Greece do not appear, for none of the units of later Helienic life had been formed. We hear nothing of Dorian or Acolian, Ionian or Achnian. Some, indeed, of the tribes were nearer skin than others, but they hed not as yet evolved any common names to distinguish between their different groups. When all were strange and heatile, shades of distinction passed as unimportant. There was no vestige as yet of the feeling which afterwards drew such a clear line between "Helleso" and "Barbarian," and the encestors of the various Greek tribes mixed as much or as little with the alien as with each other.

Among this chaos of contending tribes there at last arcse, according to the mest accorded legends, a great family of rulers

Hallen and and unifiers—the children of Hollen the Thessallan.

his even. The Greek mind loved to personify periods and movements in concrete human form, therefore the first steps taken out of the dim Polasgic anarchy are ascribed to a single prince, the founder of the Hellonic name; and the groups of kindred class which at last began to draw together are said to have been called from his descendants, Acolus and Dorus, Ion and Achasus.

¹ See Thue, ii, 29, 4 8.

Similarly a still more transparently mythical son of Hellen, the hero. Anaphictory, was said to have been the first to teach tribe to dwell percefully by tribe, by instituting "Amphictyonies." associations of noteh bouring class for trade and mutual protection. The mames of the four mythical descendants of Hellen of whom legend has most to toll deserve especial notice. Jon seems to typify the union of the markilme tribes who had come by sea from Asia Minor, and who, though they dwelt beside many alien. races. Carions Tyrrhenians and others, may be roughly defined as occurrying the islands and the coast-land of Greece, Dorns is the representative of the telbes of the northern mountains—the latest corners among the wandering races-who were still dwelling in the unlands of Macedon and Epicus. Achaeus and Asolus were the supposed types of the bulk of the Hellenia race, who dwelt scattered up and down the peninsula from Thessaly to Taccarum; but of the two the sens of Adhreus are represented as the more warlike and enterprising: they build up the first powerful states, and undertake the first great national expedition of Helias. The name of Acolus covers a vast number of obscure Polasgie tribes : all, in fact, of the later dwellers in Greece who were neither Ionian. Dorian, nec Achnesia claimed Acolus as their progenitor, and be was ascribed as father to many as distinct as the Theasalian and the Astolian, the Phoeism and the Beectian. All the more backward and uncivilized Helionia tribes were said to be of his kin, though with them were joined some of the most famous clans. the primitive inhabitants of Carinth and Orehomenus, Messene and Sourts.

No less important than the logands which tell of the foundation of tribal unity by the antive-bern sons of Hallen, are another cycle of tales which deal with fereign heroes who passed into Greece from the East. Arges, Athens, and Thobes, the three proudest cities of the land, all ascribed their foundation to Grienful princes.

To the valley of the Inachus, one of the oldest sonts of population in the Poloponness, where a Pelasgic tribe had built their citadel Larlesa or the height above the const-plain, name Daness, the founder of the Achalan state of Arges. Lagend made him an Egyptian, but knowing as we do that the natives of Egypt never settled abroad, we must conclude that his myth typifies Phoenloian rather than Egyptian settlement; and as he is said to have been akin to Belus the Sidonian and Ninus the Assyrian, it is evident that his influence has no distinctly Egyptian character. The kings who descended from Danaus were said to have made Argos the centre of civilization for the Peloponnese: one of them taught the rude tribes the use of the horse and charlot; another brought from the East the first masons who taught the Achaian Pelaggi the use of hewn stone. When the house of Danaus split up into hostile families, the heads of different sections built for themselves the hill-towns of Tiryns and Myconae, the last of which was to be even greater than Argos in the heroic age which is reflected in the poems of Homer.

Quite distinct from the cycle of legends which deal with the house of Danaus is another group, which tells of George, the founder of Athens. Once upon a time Attica was speraely inhabited by tribes of very different race. Granao-Pelasci, who afterwards recognized themselves as being Hellenes of Ionic kin, were mixed with other tribes of apparently barbarian blood, Cecrops, who, like Danaus, is called an Ecyptian. appeared among them and fixed his abode on the altar-shaped rock which rises from the plain above the Phalerle Bay, and was afterwards known as the Acropolis of Athens. His descendants built up a power which soon took the lead among the petty tribes of Attion, though long generations elapsed before it succeeded in absorbing them all. This fereign race of princes taught their Pelasgie subjects to worship Possiden and Athens. The god gave Attien the herse, and the geddess planted the clive-tree, whose cultivation was the first source of wealth for Athens. The Cocropidas received Ion into their house, so that, in the words of Herodotus, " the Athenians became Ionians," and, like the Achainis of Argos, consed to be mere Pelasgi governed by foreign princes. Finally, they subduad or expelled their barbarian neighbours, and at last a king arose who united all the twolve tribes of Attica into a single state, with Athens at its head. This king was Thesens, the last of the great mythical line of Cocrops-a personage who approaches so near the bounds of real history, that the Athenians of after-days fixed upon him as the true founder of

their city, and worshipped him as a far more truly national homethan Courups and his misty line of descapants.

In the plains of Bosotia another cycle of legends was told about a stranger from the East who became the founder of a great city. Cadmus the Phoenician, wandering in search of his Cadvous lost sister Europa, camo under divine guidance to the suring of Direa and the Aonian mosdow, and built there a town long furnous as Thobes. He instructed his neighbours in the art of mining, and taught them how to read and write, whopee it came to pass that the earliest alphabet of the Greeks was known as "the Cadmean letters." Cadmus was the succester of a royal mee celebrated for the misfortunes which degred them for generation after generation. Nevertheless, in spite of their troubles, and though Thebes was more than once taken and sacked by a foreign for the house of Collmus held their own till that great convulsion when all the lowlands of Greece changed masters at the period of the immigration of the Declara.

There can be no doubt that a germ of truth lies at the bottom of all those legends about Eastern horses who settled in Green. In them are enshrined the fact that the barbarous inhabitants of the hand learnt the radiments of civillastion from intercourse with the Phoenicians, the great nation of traders whose vessels were already coasting around the Phoenicians. Augenn at the earliest moment when the mists of antiquity begin to lift. Pushing on by Cypros and Asia Minor to the Cyclades and the Greeian mainland, this enterprising rate searched out every buy and mountain for their natural products. On the cousts of Lucania and Croto they dredged up the shell-fish watch gave them the much-prized purple dye. In Theses they discovered allver, and turned up whole mountains from top to bottom by their mining operations. Where the hand had no mineral riches to develop, they opened up trade with the inhabitants, and exchanged the fine fabrics of Eastern looms and the highly wrought metal work of the Levant for corn and slaves and timber, and such other commodities as the rude natives could produce. To facilitate their traffic they built fortified factories on well-placed islands and promontories. They did not usually neactrate far from the coast, but the legends of the foundation of Thebes seem to show at least

one case in which the Pheenician trader pushed boldly inland, and built his settlement twolve or fifteen railes from the sea. On the coset-line, however, the names of Phoenician trading-posts are found in overy district; the eastern shore of Greece is more thickly sown with them than the western, but even in distant Epitus and at the furthest recess of the Gulf of Corinth we find conclusive proofs of the presence of these ubiquitous merchants. The strongest estilements of the Phoenicians were always on the Islands. Crete was particularly launded by them; the names of its towns, of Kinnes, Lebbo, and Aradus, betray their Bastern origin at the first glance. Cythöre, too, the island which lay opposite Laconia, and formed the centre of the purple-fishery, was entirely in their hands. Ho was Meles in the Cyclades, and Thesee in the northernment bay of the Aegean.

The goods which the Phoenician brought to Greece worn ere long orded by the inhabitants of the land, so far as their ability reduced by the inhabitants of the land, so far as their ability reduced by the inhabitant of the property of gold and silver, the office because heart and armour, the pointed vases and an electronia term-acita figures which the primitive Greek procured from the Sklomian merchant, served him as models for his earliest monufactures. Phoenicis had borrowed her art from Egypt at second hand, but the Egyptian influence is quite traceable. Many contaries were to clapse before the borrowers succeeded in cidding themselves of the stiff and conventional style which they had copied from the work of their instructors.

It was not only in the field of arts and handlefrifts that the Phoenicians left their impress on Greece. The religion of the Phoenician country borns distinct traces of Phoenician influence, destina. The primitive worship of the Pelnagi, with its cuic cult of nature-powers, or sacred stocks and atomes, was ready to bear any amount of modification and addition. To the vague native deities the Phoenicians arided Aphroditic and Hersoles—the goddess of fertility and reproduction, and the god of laborious endeavour. Aphrodite is a modification of the Eastern Ashteroth, Hersoles of Melearth. Greek fable told how the goddess reas from the sea opposite the Phoenician island of Cythem, and how the god was born in the Phoenician town of Thebes. Ashteroth was worshipped

in the East with grossly licentious rites, and the trace of her sensual character was never eliminated from the Greek goodess, who was ever the patroness of lust rather than of love. Motesrth, the cityged of Tyre, a duity who was worshipped as an inventor and civilizer, was turned by the Greeks into an ever-tailing here, who purged the land from wild bases and publish, and wrought mighty works of draheage or read-melting.

How long the Phoenicians were able to keep the whole of the son-going trade of the Accenn in their own hands we cannot tell. But cortainly on early as the thirteenth century n.c. The drap Graph the Greeks were beginning to take to the water. The carliest trace of them which we find in any authentic history comes from a monument of the Revulian king Menephiliah. a Pharach of the eighteenth dynasty, which tells how the piralical fleets of the Akaloushi (Achalaus) and Turshene (Tyrrhene-Pelasei) harried the coast of the Delta. The next mention of them is from a similar monument of Rameses III., which speaks of incursions by sea of the Dansau (Dansi) and Toucrians. We must suppose that after some conjuries of sale possession in the Asgent the Photnicions had first of all to submit to rividry from Greek shipping. and then to see themselves entirely driven out of Greek waters. In the day of Homer their vessels were still well known on the Hollonic coasts, but by the end of the nighth contury they had cassed to visit the Aegean, and had to confine themselves to their native Levant and to the waters of Italy and Spain, where their great colony of Carthage secured them a long monopoly of commerce.

Whether any other foreign influence than that of the Phoenialans affected the early inhabitants of the Hallonic peninsula, it is land to say. The vast Cyclopean walls and domed voults of the prohistoric cities of Greece, such as Myconae, prohibitoric cities of Greece, such as Myconae, influence which was neither Phoenician nor yet of native birth. Many of the objects which are dug up in the ruins of these places are equally difficult to explain. Possibly they may be traced to some independent centre of civilization in Asia Minor with which the

Much has been written to prove that these peoples were use the Administration.

early Heilenes were in contact. It is suggestive to note that the legends of the Angives told of a race of princes from Phrygia who appeared among them long after the first coming of the house of Danaus, and established a powerful kingdom. Pelous was the propenitor of this family, whose capital was not the old town of Arges, but a newer foundation, Myconae, built further inland on the slopes of Mount Argein. From Pelops, we are assured, the peninsula which had meviously no common name was called Peloponnesus. His grandson Againempon established a predominames over all the neighbouring princes, and was newerful annual. to combine all Greece for the famous expedition against Troy. Whether the legend of this great family points to any real connection between the Hellenes and Phrygia, it is impossible to determine. Equally hard is it to say whether the obscure empire of the Hittites in Asia Minor and Syria had or had not any influence on the art, or culture, or religion of the inhabitants of Greece. Further researches may clear up the subject, but at present it is unwise to formulate any notheritative statement concerning it.

CHAPTER III.

THE COMERIC POEMS, AND THE GREEKS OF THE MEDOIC AGE.

Losu before the authentic history of the Mellenes begins, we can eatch gliapses of their manner of life from the evidence of meanmonts and excavations, from ancient customs which survived into later times, and—though ince the grantest caution must be used—from their inexhaustible store of mythe and lagends. But the twilight glimmer which these researches shad upon the prehistoric age in Greece is short darkness compared with the flood of light which is thrown upon it by the immorted works which pass under the name of Homes.

The Hisd and the Odyssey are a pair of lengthy epin poems, which deal with two episodes in a great war. The Greek princes, we read, were once gathered together by Agamemnon. King of Mycenae, the greatest sovereign in the land, to Odyanes. aid him in an expedition to Asia. Paris, son of Priam. the Tengrice, had stolen Helen, the wife of Agamemmon's hepther Monelaus, and borns her off to his father's city of Tray. The Greeks accordingly sailed to punish the seducer, and belonguered Troy for ton long years. But it is not the whole of the war with which the Hiad deals. "Achilles, a prince of Phthiotis, was the brayest and most beautiful of the whole Greek host, but he was proud and headstrong, and was drawn into a bitter guarrel with King Agamemann. He retired from the battle, and sat sullenly brooding in his tent till the Greeks were driven back to the water's edge, and his own bosom friend Patroclus had been killed by the Trojan prince Hector. Then Achilles arose in wrath, hunted down and slew Hector, and shut up the Trotage within the walls

of their city." Such is the plot of the Hiad; for, though abounding in digressions, it takes the wrath of Achilles as its main subject, and it ends when that wrath has been dissipated. Similarly, the Odyssey tells how, when Troy had been taken, Odysseus of Ithaca. King of the Cephallanians was driven from his homo-course by storms, wandered for years lost in the waste of waters, but returned at his to reclaim his kingdom, and save his wife from the horde of suitars who had laid claim to her hand.

For the last century critics have been disputing whether there was ever an individual named Homer; whether the Hind and the The Homerto Odyssey are the work of the same author; whether

each of these poems might not itself be broken up into supporte and independent laws; whether the neers were written in Asia or in Europe; whether their date lies as early as the fourteenth century before Christ, or as late as the sixth; whether editors and communicators have tampered much or little with their text. With these questions we need not toughle curselves to deal at length. The internal evidence of the poems tells on the whole in favour of regarding them as unities, not as patchwork compositions of varying date. Small inconsistencies may here and there be pointed out between two books of the Rind, or between the Hind and the Odresov; but the results in that direction of the assiduous research of three generations of critics are ludierously scanty. Probably additions have been made to the original bulk of the peems, but they were certainly not built up by a desen different poets, of various shades of intelligence and taste, writing separate lays which were than pieced towether.

We are bound to confess that we have no authorisic traditions concerning the biography of Homer; nevertheless, it is quite rational to hold that a single nutber of transcendent genius

Homorio composed the Hlad and the Odyssey. We may composed that the poems were not committed to writing until a very late date; yet, remembering the portentions powers of memory of the "rispecdist" in days ore writing existed, we need not therefore believe that interpolations and gaps are to be found in every section of the two works. Corruptions of the text may exist, but it is not necessary for that reason to give up the whole of the poems as valuable authority for the prehistoric age. Dut

it is most important to arrive at some notion of the date of their composition. Before we can use them as authorities for the life. of early Greece, we must indicate the reasons which tall in favour of their extreme antiquity. It is scancely necessary to demonstrate that they were in existence in the sixth century, though one living critical at least is prepared to put them down to the age of Pericles and the Athonian supremacy! It is more to the point to state that a succession of other noons, obviously written as supplements and continuations of the Riad and Odyssey, were already current by the end of the seventh century. These works, known as the "Cyclic" poems, because they rounded off the tale of Troy into a perfect whole (ninker), were very different in character from their prototypes. They have unfortunately been lost without exception, so that we cannot minutely examine their contonts, but onough is known of thom to show that they were deliberately written to bridge the period between the Blad and the Odvasov, and to provide a suitable melace and enilogou to them. Greak literary tradition placed Lesches and Arctimus and the other " Cyclic" authors between 800 n.c. and 650 n.c.: but though the dates are very probably correct, we have no means of corroborating them. Still, whenever the Cyclic poems were written. we know that their authors had already the Blad and the Odyssey before them as established standards and models.

The internal evidence is, after all, the one safe criterion for assigning a date to the lind and the Odyssey. The authentic stage of Greek history commences with the conquest of reternal religions of the control of course, it would not be absolutely necessary that he should have dwelf upon them largely, if he had lived and written after they had happened. But we may safely say that he would have betrayed himself by some casual allusions which implied a knowledge of them. An unexplicit eated tard singing to an uncritical audience in a primitive time could not presess such a knewledge of the control o

¹ See the proface to Dr. Paley's "Blad,"

tiqually indulged in them. The Greek tragediens, though using the form of composition where it is most important to preserve accuracy of surroundings, were constantly betraying their modern knowledge. Is it possible that Homer alone should have been preserved from this failing? Could be have reconstructed from tradition the political geography of a Greece which had long passed away, and was replaced in his own day by an utterly different orrangement of tribes and cities? "The Homeric mas of Greece," os has been happily observed,2 " is so different from the map of the country at any later time, that it is inconceivable that it should have been invested at any later time." If Mycense, for example, ind not been a very important town in prehistoric days, nothing that ever bemoused to tauxible times would have induced an author to describe it as a seat of empire. Who in any contary after chrenology bagins would have had occasion to use the names Dorina and Ionian only once each in forty-eight long books, while he spoke of Achaians sevon hundred and fourteen times? Who, in describing the incidents of war in the Tread, could have refrained from all indications of the fact that in his own day the Troad was to become Greek territory—the one event in its history that would have interested his hearers above any other? Yet, in spite of this silence, it is now a common thing to say that the Homeric poems were written to encourage chiefe who claimed a descent from Agamemper to persevere in a war against the Trojans of a later age, It is hard, therefore, to believe that the Iliad and Odyssey were written at any date after the great relarations of the eleventh century. Yet already, when the post was writing, the way of Trov. was anciout history, which he might freely adorn with the flowers of his imagination. He does not write as a contemporary, but as a distant spectator. In his own day, as he complains, a degenerate race had not a tithe of the strength of the ancestors whose deeds he celebrated. If there ever was a slege of Troy, than we need not coto Homer for its details. All is too unreal in those posms, where

⁵ Tako as obvious examples Sophoeles, Oct. Cor., 696, which makes Pelaponosaus already Dorina a generation indore the Trojna war; or Euripides, Alo., 286, which note Thessalians in the Penons valley at a still earlier date.

By Professor Processes, in his "Historical Geography,"

the gods walk the earth in mortal force, and a single here can put to fight a whole army.

The real and unique value of the Homeric noems lies in the picture of the social life of Greece which they place before us. The picture may be seen what idealized, but we cannot doubt that it mirly reproduces the general characteristics of the age which preceded. the Dorian migration. For the post of a primitive age, though he may frame from his imagination both his plot and his characters, cannot falsify the social atmosphere in which they move. we strip from them their purely magical and superpatural episodes, romances of the heroic cast such as the "Morte Arthur," or the "Nibelungenlied," or the "Chanson de Roland," are valuable authority for both the thought and the customs of the days in which their authors lived; they may idealize the contemporary morals and meaners, but they do not contradict them. So is it with Homer; he pointed the state of society which was natural and habitual to his honrers, though he may have drawn his tudividual characters to a more kerole scale than the men of his own day could attain.

In Homor's day, then, Grocce was occupied by a number of tribes who recognized each other as kinsmen, though they had not yet found any distinctive national title for themselves.

The name "Hellene" was as yet only applied to the nationality is inhabitants of Phthiotis, and was not employed to Homes. Homes: Homes the whole Greek mas; there is, too, no correlative word "barbarian" to express that which is not Hellenic. The confederate Greeks, if mentioned together, are usually called Achainns, from the name of their most celebrated tribe; much less frequently they are called Argeians and Danna-words properly applicable only to the contingent of King Agamemano. It will be noticed that Achainn and Dannan are precisely the names applied to the Greek invadors of the Delta by the Egyptian monuments.

The most distinguished states in Homer's poems may be briefly montioned. Agameznour, the grandson of Polops, was the greatest sovereign, and possessed an undisputed pre-aminence among his follows: He ruled Argolis, but dwelt not at Argas but at "wealthy Myoune," a newer city on the hills above the Argive Plain. All Northern and Eastern Polopounesus more or less clearly acknowledged him as suzerain. Chief among his vassals was Diomodes, who ruled the old town of Argus and the small district immediately around it. Menelaus, Agamemnon's brother and second self, held a realm composed of Laconia and Eastern Messenia. Nester of Pylos ruled the Caucones, whose state embraced Eastern Messenia and Southern Elia. Northern Elia formed the far less important and celebrated kingdom of the Epcians. Beyond the isthmus the most distinguished state was Phthiotis, ruled by Achilles, tho here of the Iliad. The Codmeians of Thebes and the Minyae of Orchomenus had also a prominent position; so had the Cephallenians of the Western Islands, whose king was Odvesous of Ithaca. On the other hand, some of the greatest Greek states of later days take a very inferior part in the Illad : Corinth and Athens are especially unimportant. Megara, Larissa, Delphi, Olympia, are apparently as yet non-existent places. The Cyclades are not in Greek hands: but Creto and Rhodes contain a wholly or partially Greek population, and form the outposts of the race. We need not, of course, take seriously the names and individualities of the kings of the Ilind; but, on the other hand, there is good reason to believe that their states represent the existing realities of Homer's day.

The Homeric kingdoms were "pairiarchal monarchies with welldefined prerogatives," as Thucydides happily observes. The kingly The Homeric house was always believed to descend more or less

these remotely from the gods, and to derive its power from the gift of Hoaven. So Homer sings of the royal aceptre, the symbol of Agamemnon's acvereignty: "Hephasetus wrought it for Zean, and Zeus gave it to his messenger Hermes, to deliver to Pelops the tamer of steeds, and Pelops again gave it to Atreus the shepherd of the propie, but Atreus dying left it to Thyestes rich in faceks; and from Thyestes, again, it passed to be borne by Agamemnon, that he might rule over many islands and all Arges." The kingly power was not strictly hereditary as in a modern state; it passed from father to son when there was an heir of full age and approved worth to succeed to the throne. But if a king at his death left only infant children, or if the natural inheritor was notoriously incompotent, the succession might pass to a brother

¹ Harpiral Baribeigi tel pereis yepasi-Thuc. i. 10.

or any other near relative. And, again, if a king lived to such a great old age that he could not any longer discharge his functions, he would often surrender them to his heir during his own lifetime: if he did not, there was a considerable chance of his being despoiled of them in consequence of popular discontent.

The king received from the telbe a royal ralace, an ample share of public land, and certain fixed dues and payments. These wout with the office, and were kept distinct from the nacestral property of the royal family. His functions fell into three headshe was leader, prices, and judge. As lander, he hearled the heat of the tribe on all important expeditions; a king who shirked fighting would not have been tolerated for a moment. Arrayed in brasen atmour, he rode out before his army in a light war-charlet, driven by a chosen souice. His pobles attended him in similar guise, while all the freemen of the land followed on fact, armed as each could provide himself. Cavalry was as yet unknown-a feature equally observable on the meanments of contemporary Egypt, and a clear mack of the early date of the Homeric poems.

As judge, the king sat in the market-place with the closes around him, and heard all the cases which his people brought before him. He gave decision, not in accordance with law, for laws did not yet exist, but following the colmowledged principles of right and equity. Each suitor spoke on his own behalf, and brought forward his witnesses: the olders delivered their opinions, and then the king rose, scoptre in hand, and gave sentonco.

As priest, the king was the natural intermediary between his people and Herven. He embodied the unity of the tribe, and offered sacrifice to its behalf as being its representative. Other priests existed, but there was no priestly caste, and they took part like other men in the ordinary business of peace and war. They were attached to the services of particular delties, and presided at the temple or sacred globe of their patron,

The king kept no great state; his personal attendants were few, and no gorgoous trappings distinguished him from his nobility. He might be seen supervising the labours of the harvest-field, perhaps even turning his own hand to a task of curpentry or smithcraft; for manual dexterity was as esteemed among the Greeks of Homer as it was among our own Norse ancestors. The degradetion of the artisan was the development of a later age. As the king might be his own bailiff, so might his wife be seen acting as the housekeeper of the palace, bearing rule over the linen-closes and larder. One of the most olarming opisodes of the Odyssey introduces us to a princess engaged in the homely task of superintending her maids while they wash the solled clothes of the palace. Yet the dignity of the royal house did not suffer in the least from the way in which it shared in the toil of its dependents.

Next below the king in the Homeric state were the nobility, who are often called βασιλήες, "princes," just as was their sove-The Homeric reign. They were composed of the younger branches

nobles— of the royal house and of the great landowners of the tribe. The king summoned them to take counsel with him before any event of national importance; but, though he listened to their advice, he was not necessarily bound to follow it. Still a wise prince, seeing how all his power rested on the general loyalty of his subjects, and not on his own personal strength and resources, would be very chary of running counter to his nobility. When the king and his Boulê of chiefs had come to a decision, the whole body of freemen were summoned to the market-place; the nobles declared their views, and the king promulgated his decree. The crowd might manifest its approval by shouts, or its discontact by silonce; but no either political privilege was in its power.

The main body of freemen was composed of small landowners, tilling their own farms; but there was already a landless class,

The people. The bard, the seer, and the physician formed a pecfessional class, with an established position, and moved about freely from state to state. The wayfarer was entitled to fair treatment and hospitality; the suppliant was harboured and protected—to maltreat him was one of the blackest crimes in the eyes of gods and men. Mublic amusements were simple and healthy; prominent among them appear already the athletic sports which were the delight of historic Greece. Slavery was known, and the kings and nobles possessed a certain number of slaves captured in war or bought from foreign countries; but they were not many, nor was society as yet debanched by the evils that beset a slave-holding state. The class itself seems to have been well treated, and the

most affectionate relations are often found existing between moster and slave.

To complete the general picture of the state of society, it remains to state that in domestic life the samily had become the base of organization. Monegamy was universal. It is only among Trojans and other aliens that polygamy can be found. A high ideal of female virtue had been formed; and the wives and sisters of the horoes come far more prominently forward, are encompassed with greater respect, and play a larger part in life than did the accluded woman of historic Greece.

In spite of the way in which all maks in society share in the same toils and pleasures, a strong aristocratic tone pervades the Homeric atmosphere. It appears in the importance attached to high birth, in the manner in which a single armed noble can drive whole crowds of common folk before him in battle, in the dislike felt to the interference of the masses in politics. Thurstes, the one demagague of the Blad, is represented as a mean and despirable creature, and soundly thrushed as a reward for his importance. But Homer no doubt sang for the banquets of the noble and wealthy.

In contemplating the many pleasing features of the prohistorie age in Greece, we must not forget that all its society was porvaded. with the feeling that might was right. The plumler of weaker neighbours was the habitgal employment obsesses of of the noblest chiefs. We hear of gross brutalities in the treatment of the widow and the orphus even in the highest fumilies. The king's protogetive was often used for the number of selfish plunder. Piracy was so habitual that it was no moult to not a senfuring atranger whether he was a pimte or a merchant. Homicide was frequent, and unresented save by the kin of the slain, and they were usually to be propitiated by a fine paid as the price of blood. Quarter was seldern given in war, and the bodies of slaid enemies were reishaudled with every degrading form of insult. Human sacrifices, if not frequent, were not unknown. It was only a limited number of crimes, such as ill treatment of a suppliant, greas perjury, or the marder of a very near relative, that were held to be really offensive to the gods.

It was, then, no golden ago that Homer painted, but the idealized

picture of the actual political and social life of his own day. Its exact date it does not concern us to determine; suffice it to say that it was long previous to the composition of any of the other existing literary mocuments of the Hellenic race. The Iliad and the Odyssey are as far removed from later works by their antique methods of thought and expression, as they are by their superior excellence.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DELICION OF THE ANOISHT CREEKS: CLYMPIA AND DELPHI,

Horms and Hestod—a poot of a much later age, and a much less lafty flight—are credited with having collected and collided in their works the religious system of the Hellenes. "It was they," writes Herolotus, "who settled the relationships of the gods to each other, and fixed their names, and defined their ratificates and occupations, and described their visible forms: all was vague before." By this we are to understand that, in the fifth contury, man hold that Henser and Hestod had formed the standard collections of myths and logends concerning the gods, to which divergent local beliefs were afterwards assimilated. In all probability there is much truth in this view.

The inhabitants of Greece in the Pelasgio age, as Heredotus continues, were accusioned to offer sacrifice on hill-tops to the god of the sky, whom after-generations called Zeus; Primstree they also believed in many vague nature-divinities satisface for whom they had no individual names, though they called them etcl, or "ordainers." Whether such a state of pure nature-weeship ever existed we have no real evidence, for it is certain that the Greek raligion, when first we eatch a gitingse of it, was already a really of many divergent elements. There were in it, it is true, abundant traces of nature-worship, but many other systems were fused with it. Some of these were low forms of fetial-worship; we find stocks and stones adored, or sacred trees and afrolizes that fell from heaven. The oult of beiled ancestors also prevailed. Moreover, as early as research can penetrate, a strong fureign element, borrowed from the Phoenicians, was already incorporated

with the misty exced of Greece; not improbably other nations too have, unknown to us, left their mark upon it.

The widest divergences existed between the worship of the different tribes. Sometimes they knew the same god by different Diversity of names, at others they gave the same name to two tribal deities whose characters were really distinct, The horse-headed Demeter of Phigaleia had little to do with the wheat-crowned Demeter of Eleusis: the Zons of Arcadia had very different attributes from the Zeus of Crete; Dionysus the winegod, and Dienysus the god of the under-world, were once distinct enough; Possidon the patron of the Ionians, who presided over the sea, had nothing in common save the name with the Poseidon of Mantinea, who shook the world with his earthquakes. The more we inquire into local legends, the more do we find one deity assuming the share and attributes which Homer, and literary tradition following him, have attributed to another. Moreover, in importing foreign gods, the Greeks were often quite reckless in identifying the new-comer with one of their own divinities. When, for example, they came across the great nature-goddess of Asia Minor, it appeared to be a mere matter of chance whether they called her Hern, or Artemis, or Aphrodite. Familiar as we are with "Diana of the Ephesians." we can never cease to wonder at the curious accident that identified Artemia, the virgin huntress of Arcadia, with the many-breasted "Mother of all things" whom Asia worshipped.

The superficial assimilation of the tribal gods must have been one of the first consequences of the growing feeling of nationality among the primitive peoples of Greece. How it came to pass that the Arcadian learnt to call his patroness "Despoins," by the name of his neighbour's deity Demeter; how the Epidatrian came to identify his local Auxesia with Persephone; how the Cretan acknowledged that the Britomartis whom he worshipped was the same as Artemis;—we cannot trace in detail. But the fusion and identification of the local divinities into a limited number of clear, definite divine figures, certainly took place.

By the time of Homer the personal identities of the various gods were growing clearer, and his poems enabrined a version of their obstracters and relations with each other which became the accepted mythological standard for future ages. Even in Homer's poems the personalities of the gods are still not entirely worked out; but Hesiod filled up Hamer's gags in a lengthy "Theogony," which gave a genealogical table of the divinities, and summed up the whole stigle of the universe.

Of course, neither Heiner nor Hesical was in any sense the inventor of the mythology of the Greeks. They mesely codified the creations of the national spirits. Out of a mass of characteristics of the interrupt of them children, some size of Greek hiddens, some immoral, the Greek mind built up the religion. The anthropomorphism which saw a god or a goddess in every grove and stream and hill, the gross worship of stocks and stones, the cruel and licentious cults becrowed from the Phoenician, the orgics of Pivrysia, were all shaped into a beautiful, if complex, whole by the genius of the Hellenic trees.

The gods as we find them in Homer and his successors form a polity modelled to the similitude of an earthly kingdom. Zons is their father and lord, who exercises over his brothern The Olympian and offspring the same sort of predominance that a divinities. mortal ruler enjoyed among his nobles. He summons the gods to council, and promulgates his decrees in their assembly just as Agamemnon did among the princes of the host before Troy. Like the great ones of earth, the gods enjoy the banquet and the winecup, the song and dance. Though they are immortal, and possessed of superhuman beauty power and knowledge, they are but " men writ large," with all mon's passions, ovil as we'll as good, reflected in them. They are liable to jenlousy, lust, and anger; they stoop to deceit and fraud. In short, they are copies on a vast scale of the Greeks who worshipped them. The gods of a primitive ration. always reflect the national character. The peculiar feature of the Greek mind, which expressed itself in the national mythology, was the love of beautiful and noble forms. Egypt and Assyria might worship stronge allegerical shapes, half-man, half-boast; the savages of the North might odore domons and hebgoblis; but the Greek set himself to reverence the perfection of human beauty,

In Homer's time the Greek religiou was still in that primitive stage where frankly immoral conduct can be attributed to the gods without their worshippers being shocked. After-ages, when othics had been developed, were ashamed of the actions of their deities, and explained or allegarized them away. Yet already in the likal and the Odyssey we can trace the beginning of the connection between religion and mornlity. Perjury, parrieds, oppression of the stranger, rejection of the suppliant, move the wrath of the gods, or of some dim power behind the gods which hates evil and makes for good.

The two characteristically Hollenic divinities in the Olympian circle were Athena and Apollo. They are not nature-powers, but

impersonations in the most beautiful human forms of the perfection of human nature. Attena represents the triumph of intellect over chaos. She is the warrier-goldees, who slays the earth-born glants who strove to overturn creation. She is the patroness of the arts and handicrafts which resone mankind from savagery, and surround it with corneliness and comfort; she taught the husbandman to plant the olive, and the weaver to ply the shuttle. As the protector of city-life, she fosters the arts of elequence and good counsel. Unlike the majority of the heavenly heat, who bear about them the stain of Phoenician licence or abortginal gressness, Athena is severely pure and chaste; she is intellect unmoved by fleshly lust, the perfection of sevene unclouded wisdom.

Apollo represents another side of idealized human nature—the moral and emotional, as opposed to the intellectual. He is the

Apona patron of music and postry, the arts which ruise and inspire the soul; he has the gift of prophecy, the intuitive vision into the future which comes to the inspired mind. His vetaries are not guided by keen intellectual Insight, as are the favourities of Athem, but by a divine afflatus which carries them ont of themselves, and fills them with superhuman knowledge. Above all, he is the god of purification; he has the power of healing body and mind. Not only can he ward off disease, but he can cleanse the conscience-strickon suppliant from pollution and blood-guittiness, and send him home purified. As the prophet, the healer, the inspired singer, he represents those aspects of perfected humanity which are omitted in the purely intellectual excellence of Athena.

The presence of the gods followed the Greek wherever he went, Not only were the rivers and mountains and forests among which, he dwelt haunted each by its particular delty, but the occupations of doily life were carried out under the supervision of the gods. To sow or reap, to build or to set sail, to commence a campaign or a languet, without having first propitiated by sacrifice or libetion the proper divinity, would have been both implous and unlusty. A religious sanction was required for the pleasures and relaxations no less than for the tolls and duties of life. House it carae to make that such public amusements as theatrical representations sail. gymnastic contests, which in modern days have no religious connection whatever, were in Grocce under the direct patronage of the gods. The Greek tragedy was the development of the chural dances and recitations which accompanied the worship of Dignysus; the Greek games were established to commemorate some achievement of a god or here in ancient days.

Of these enmes-one of the most characteristic features of the life of Greece-a short account must be given. It was deeply impressed on the Hellenic mind that the display of the The sames of strength and beauty of the human frame in the . Greece service of the gods was emicently pleasing to Henren, came the institution of sympastic contests in the honour of various divinities. Possiden was mostituted by the Isthmian Games at Corinth, Apollo by the Pythian at Delphi. But the greatest of the contests of Greece was that which was hold in honour of the Olympian Zons, the supreme national delty, on the banks of the Alphona, by the sandy shore of Elis. At first the studient of Olympia only witnessed foot-races, he which the youth of Elis and Pieatis met to run over a course of about two hundred yards, and to contend for a simple grown of wild clive. But guidually the festival became more widely known; competitors -first from other districts of Poleponnesus, then from the whole Greek world,-began to appear, and the number and variety of the

games were increased till they included all kinds of running, wrestling, boxing, leaping, qualt and spear play, and contests for the hersoman and the charioteer. From the year 776 n.c. the names and fatherland of the victors were constelly preserved in efficial lists, and at last the dates of the Olympia feativals became the favourite basis for the calculation of historical dates. The games were held in every fifth year, so that the "Olympiad" comprised a space of forty-eight menths. The unit of time was inconveniently large, but as there was no other common Hellente era by which all Greeks could calculate dates, the "Olympiad" was almost universally accepted, and the year 776 n.c. forms the first date in historical chronology. The victor only received from the judges a wreath cut from the sacred clive-grove of Zeus en the Altis, but his native state always hastened to lead him with prizes, bonours, and immunities; the man who had won the foot-race or the chariot-race at the great contest was a considerably more important person at home than most of the magistrates.

It is most characteristic of the Hellenic nation to find that this lestival was held so important that a sacred armistice between states that were at war was established during the month of the games. This suspension of arms (or "truce of God," as the Middle Ages would have called it) permitted all Greeks alike to appear as competitors. The territory of Elis itself was held peculiarly sacred during the hely month, and any armed force which entered it incurred the guilt of gross sacrilege. Nothing offooded Greek feeling more than the two or three armed attempts to interfere with

the games which are to be found in historical times.

The oracles of Greece formed a less peculiar and unique production of the bent of the national character than did the games.

Other peoples have very frequently sought to gain a knowledge of the future by sacrifice and divination, by casting lots, or inquiring of priests and seers. Yet the Greek process are well worth notice as illustrating the development of the Greek mind. "They drow their origin," as has been very happily said, "from that belief in the existence of disembodied spirits around us which almost all races share. Afterwards, closely connected both with the idea of supernatural possession and the name of Apollo, they exhibit a singular fusion of nature-worship with sorrory. Then as the non-moral and naturalistic conception of the deity yields to the moral conception of him as an idealized man, the oracles reflect the change, and the Delphian god becomes in a certain sense the conscience of Greece." It would seem that

¹ See Myers's "Classical Studies," p. &

at first the Hellene sought to gain access to the gods by seeking them in some wild and awesome apot far in the depths of the forests or the beacm of the mountains. Zeus at Dedona geve nous answers by the sound of the wind that meaned through his cell-groves. At Lebadeia the inquirer descended into a long substrument cave; by the river of Acheron he went down into a gloomy gongs to consult the oracle of departed souls; at Deba he stood by a volcanic cleft in the mountain-side.

Delphi, as much without a peer among the oracles of Greece as was Olympia among its homes of athletic contest, may serve as the perfeeted type of them all. It lies emong barren and lonely hills in the folds of Parnassus, shut in hy an amphitheatre of rocks. The power of the god controd in a cave in the clift, where a mophitic varyour arose from a chosm and intoxicated those who becathed it. Scated on her triped above the claft, the priestess of Apollo denak in inspiration, and chauted wild and whiching words which were instinct with prophecy. Her sayings were taken down, and delivered, always in bexameter verses, to the supplients for whom she was making inquiry. At first mon came to Delphi for predictions alone, but ore long they came also for advice on every occupation of human life. The temple, which was built in front of the cave, became rich with the efferings of votaries from every Grecian tribe, and even from the harbarian kings of foreign lands. Statesmen came to consult Apollo about their political schemes; both Lycurgus and Bolon are said to have received his amproval. Arubasanders took advice as to weighty matters of peace and war. Above all, the colonist came to seek from the capele a Proposicas of direction as to the land to which his migration would most profitably be directed. Some of the noblest cities of the Greek world, Cyrone and Byzantium for example, had their sites fixed by the guidance of Apollo, "the god of ways." That the propheties were often useful and intelligent, we may wall believe. The prinsts had an unrivalled knowledge of mon and lands, gained by constant converse with travellers from every known shore. But when the problem was hard, Apollo often took refuge in sounding platitudes or obsours riddles. Every one has beard of the dishenest evasions in which the god indulged in the cases of Orocens and Pyrchus.

But the moral utterances of the oracle were, perhaps, its most

noteworthy sayings. They mark the growth in Greece of the instinctive distinction between right and wrong, and show how Arollo, the god of light and purification, represented the highest aspect of contemporary thought. Typical of them all is the striking story of Glancus the Spartan. He consulted the god whether he might safely dony to the heirs of a deconsed friend the gold with which the dead man had entrusted him. Apollo replied that "if he swere falsely, he would be able to retain the money: but that an awfol vengeance awaited the perjurer and all his line." Glaucus then besought the god to pardon his inquiry : but the priestess cried out that "it was as wicked to have tempted Apollo with such a guestien as it would have been to have retained the gold." The wish was runished like a deed. and Glaucus with all his race same to an evil end. Other answers of the gracle might be quoted inculcating mercifulness to the conquered, respect for the life of slaves, the strict fulfilment of treaties, obedience to parents, the granting of componention to the weak when they have been injured, and other moral obligations, whose recognition marks the progress of a nation's moral being. It is sad, however, to think that the oracle which could at one moment make itself the mouthpiece of the highest and bost thoughts of the age, might at the next sink to the use of unitry ovasions and sonseless jingles, and send the inquirer away with a riddle which was worse than no answer at all.

But the inconsistencies of the oracle are not uncharacteristic of the whole of the Hellonic religious system. If that religion often succeeded in inspiring noble and beautiful tileas, it might as often to found lapsing into mere childishness or crude immorality.

CHAPTER V.

THE GREAT SIGNATIONS.

Is there is any point in the annals of Greece at which we can draw the line between the days of myth and legend and the beginnings of authentic history, it is at the moment of the great nigrations. Just as the frequience of the Tentonic tribus to the Bonan compite in the fifth centery after Christ marks the columnencement of an entirely new set in modern Europe, so does the invasion of Southern and Central Greece by the Durinne, and the other tribes whom they set in motion, form the first hadmark in a new period of Heilleuic history.

Before these migrations we are still in an atmosphere which we cannot recognize as that of the historical Green that we know. The states have different boundaries, some of the most famous stiles have not yet been founded, tribes who are destined to vanish occupy prominent places in the land, royal houses of a fareign stock are established everywhere, the distinction between Hellene and Barbarian is yet ucknown. We cannot realize a Greece where Athens is not yet counted as a great city, while Mycenno is a sent of empire; where the Achaian element is everywhere predegment, and the Derian element is a syst unknown.

When, however, the neignations are ended, we at once find ourselves in a land which we recognize as the Greece of history. The
tribes have settled into the districts which are to be their permanent abodes, and have assumed their distinctive characters.
The old royal houses of mythical descent have passed away; both
socially and politically the Helienes are fast developing into a
people whom we recognize as the ancesters of the men of the great
fifth and fourth conturies.

The original impotus which set the Greek tribes in motion came from the north, and the whole movement rolled southward and The Thesan, castward. It started with the invasion of the valley tian investor of the Peneus by the Thessalians, a warlike but hitherto obscure tribe, who had dwelt about Dodona in the uplands of Epirus. They crossed the passes of Pindus, and flooded down into the great plain to which they were to give their name. The tribes which had previously held it were either crushed and enslaved, or pushed forward into Central Greece by the wave of invasion. Two of the displaced races found new homes for themselves by conquest. The Arnaeans, who had dwelt in the southern lowlands along the courses of Apidanus and Enlpens, came through Thermopylas, pushed the Lourians aside to right and left, and descended into the valley of the Cophiasus, where they subdued the Minyae of Orchomenus, and then, passing south, uttorly expelled the Cadmulons of Thebes. The plain country which they had conquered received a single name. Bocotia became the common title of the basins of the Cephissus and the Asopus, which had previously been in the hands of distinct races. Two generations later the Bocotians endeavoured to cross Cithaeron, and add Attica to their conquests; but their king Xanthus fell in single comhat with Melauthus, who fought in behalf of Athens, and his host gave up the enterprise. In their new country the Bocotians retained their national unity under the form of a league, in which no one city had authority over another, though in process of time Thobes grew so much greater than her neighbours that she exercised a marked prenonderance over the other thicteen members of the confederation. Ocahomonus, whose Minyan inhabitants had been subdued but not exterminated by the invaders, remained dependent on the loague without being at first amalgamated with it.

A second tribe who were expelled by the irruption of the Thessalians were the Dorians, a race whose name is hardly heard in Homer, and whose carly blattery had been obscure and insignificant. They had till now dwelt along the western slope of Pindus. Swept on by the invaders, they crossed Mount Othrys, and dwelt for a time in the valley of the Spercheius and on the shoulders of Outa. But the land was too

narrow for them, and, after a generation had passed, the bulk of the nation moved southward to seek a wider home, while a small fraction only remained in the valleys of Octa. Lagenda tell us that their first advance was made by the Isthmus of Corinth, and was repulsed by the allied states of Pelopeanesus, Hyllus the Dorian leader having fallen in the fight by the hand of Echemus, Klag of Teges. But the grandsons of Hyllus resumed his enterprise, and not with greater success.

Their invasion was made, as we are told, in conjunction with their neighbours the Actolians, and took the Actolian port of Naupacius sa its base. Pushing scross the actrow strait at the mouth of the Cocinthian Guil, the allied horder landed in Pelopornessa, and forced their way down the level country on its western count, then the fand of the Epeians, but afterwards to be known as Elis and Plastis. This the Actolians took as their share, while the Docians pressed further south and east, and successively conquered Messenia, Lacoula, and Argolia, dastroying the Cauconian kingdom of Pylos and the Achaim sintes of Sparts and Arpos.

There can be little doubt that the legends of the Dorians pressed into a single generation, the conquests of a long series of years. When they told how Temorius, Aristodemus, and man Dorians in Cresphontes, the three grandsons of Hyllus, drew lots Feleroanseus for the Peloponnesian lands, and gained respectively Argos, Lacedresmon, and Messenta as their shares, they were simply diagnising the fact that three Dorian war-bands at one time or another got possession of those districts. It is highly probable that Messenta was the first solved of the three regions, and Argos the latest, for tradition spoke of the resistance of that great city as having Insted as long that King Temenus died before his allotted portion was subdued; but of the details or dates of the Dorian conquests we know absolutely nothing.

Of the tribes whem the Deriens supplanted, some remained in the land as subjects to their newly found masters, while others took ship and first over sea. The stoutest-hearted of the Administ of Argolis, under Tisamonus, a grandson of Agameranon, retired morthward when the contest became hopeless, and them themselves on the coast cities of the Corinthian Gulf, where up to this time the Ionio tribs of the Aegialeans had dwelt. The Ionians were werated, and fled for refuge to their kindred in Attica, while the conquerors created a new Achaia between the Arcadian Mountains and the sea, and dwelt in the twelve cities which their predecessors had built.

The rugged mountains of Arcadia were the only part of Pelopoppesus which were to escape a change of masters resulting from the Dorian invasion. A generation after the fall of Argos, new warlands thirsting for land pushed on to the north and west, led by descendants of Temenus. The Ionic towns of Sicyon and Phlius, Eridaurus and Troezen, all fell before them. Even the inaccessible Aeropolis which protected the Apolian settlement of Corinth could not proserve it from the hands of the enterprising Alstes. Nor was it long before the conquerors pressed on from Corinth beyond the isthmus, and attacked Attica. Foiled in their endeavour to subdue the land, they at least succeeded in tearing from it its western districts, where the town of Megara was made the capital of a new Dorian state, and served for many generations to ourb the power of Athens. From Epidaurus a short voyage of fifteen miles took the Dorians to Aegina, where they formed a settlement which, first as a vases to Epidaurus, and then as an independent community, enjeved a high degree of commercial prosperity.

It is not the least curious feature of the Dorian invasion that the leaders of the victorious tribe, who, like most other royal houses,

The northme claimed to descend from the gods and boasted that enather kines. Heracles was their ancestor, should have asserted that they were not Dorians by race, but Achaians. Whether the rude northern invades were in truth guided by princes of a different blood and higher civilization than themselves, it is impossible to say. It has been suggested that the names of the three Durian tribes found in every state, the Hylleis, Pamphyli, and Dymänes, polut to the mixed origin of the invading bords. If the "Pamphyli," as their name would seem to indicate, were a "mixed multitude," who followed the Dorian banner, and the "Hylleis"—who derived their name from Hyllus, the first Heracleid king—were the personal retainers of Achaian chiefs who had placed themselves at the head of the invasion, then the pure Dorian element among the invaders. must have been much more slight than is generally imagined.

In all probability the Dorian invasion was to a considerable extent a check in the history of the development of Greek civilization, a supplanting of a richer and more cultured by a poorer and wilder uses. The runs of the prehistoric cities, which were supplanted by new Dorian foundations, point to a state of wealth to which the country did not again attain for many generations. On the other hand, the invasion brought about an increase in vigour and moral carnestness. The Dorians throughout their history were the sturdiest and most manly of the Greeks. The god to whose worship they were especially deveted was Apollo, the purest, the noblest, the most Hellenic member of the Olympian family. By their peculiar revenues for this noble conception of divinity, the Dorians marked themselves out as the most mend of the Greeks.

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CHAPTER VI.

THE GREEK COLONIES IN ASIA.

THE stir and movement which were caused by the intrusion of Derhus and Antolians, Thesanlians and Bocotians, into their new homes were destined to make their effects felt far beyond the limits of the Hellenic peninsula. There was now a vast body of displaced population seeking a new home; every mountain and prementory was crowded with broken remnants of the worsted tribes, who had escaped being reduced to serficen, and had taken refuge in the remoter corners of the land. In many cases the conquerors had allowed the conquered to depart under a treaty; in others a tribe had fled before the storm, and taken refuge with those of its kinsmen who were still unsubdued. Everywhere there were to be found masses of population which had been cut loose from their moorings, and were ready to drift in any direction to which the current of the times might hear tham.

Gradually this beterogeneous crowd began to show a tendency to move eastward by sea. The North was held by wild and hardy races with when they did not dare to measure themselves; the West was a mysterious waste of waters known only to the Phoenician. But to the East lay Asia Minor—a land with which the emigrants had a considerable acquaintance, whose tribes they had met both in war and in commerce, and whose fertility, as they knew, exceeded by far that of their own mountainous land.

That the inhabitants of the Helienic peninsula had for long ages been in constant intercourse with the people of the opposite shore we can be certain. When the Achaians ravaged the Egyptian Delta in the thirteenth century, their vessels were accompanied by those of Lyciaus and other tribes from the south-west of Asia Minor, When the Danid afflicted the subjects of Rameses III., they brought with them Tenerians and Dardanians from the Trank. The poems of Homer preserve some dim memory of a heatile contact with these same Tenerians in days long before the Hellenes dreamed of settling in Asia. When once they had ransbared the art of navigation, and discovered the natural bridge which the Cyclades form between the two continents, it would have been stronge indeed if the Greeks had refinited from constant visits to the apposite const.

Asia Minor consists of a great central platons with a broad constplain lying telow it, and forming, as has been happily said, "a fringe of a different material woven on to the garment." This seabourd on the Acgenn is, like Greece, a land of gulfs and harbours and promontories, but it possesses a succession of rich plains and valleys to which the more rugged Western land can afford no parallel. At the moment of the coming of the Hollenes the central plateau was part of the widespreading possessions of the Hittles, while the shore was held by a number of tribes of very varying blood. The Tenerians and Phrygians lay to the north in the direction of the Hallespont; the Lycians were in the extreme south; the Carlans and the mines tribe of the Loleges dwalt between the others, in the valleys of the Macander, Horman, and Cayster, and on the islands which He in Front of them. These tribes possessed a civilization of their own, different in character but not very different in degree from that of the Greeks. Polygamy prevailed smeng some of the races, polyandry in others,—both practices abborrout to Greek custom. Most of the peoples worshipped as their supreme deity a great nature-goldens, mother and nonciplier of all living things, whom the Greeks called Artemis (as at Ephesus), or Hem (as at Sames), or Aphrodite (as at Chidus), though, in truth, she and nothing to do with any of those Hellenic divinities. The Tenerians or Carlana did not seem to the Hollenes nttorly alien and savago, as did a Thracian or a Septhian, or poswested of such an utterly different civilization as to be incomprehonsible, as did an Egyptian. They were perhaps not very distant kinsmen, and were certainly near enough to mix readily with the Greek and sclopt much of his civilization,

It was, accordingly, on those of their neighbours with whose land

they were best acquainted, and whose strength and weakness they were best able to gauge, that the expelled tribes of Thessaly and Bosotia, Ionia and Achaia, determined to throw thomselves. Three main streams of invasion can be traced, each drawing the greater part of its resources from a diffarent group of peoples.

The first is that pursued by the emigrants, who called themselves by the general name of Acolians. Their main body was The Asolina Composed of races escaping from the northern parts of migration. Greece, of Magnetes and Minyae who fied from the Thessalians, and of Orchomenians Cadmeians and Locrians, who had been displaced by the Bocotians. But mixed with these were Achalans, who had been driven out of Pelopounesus by the Dorian invasion, and were led by chiefs who claimed to be the descendants of Agamemnon. Not impossibly the name Acolian, "the variegated," was first invented to express the mixed character of this multitude, and only afterwards applied as a common name to the original peoples who had sent forth the emigrants-races who had previously had little to do with each other. The port which tradition pointed out as the starting-point of the Asolian adventurers was Aulis, hard by the Euripus in the Eubocan Strait. Hence it came to pass that Bocotla was vaguely spoken of as the mother-country of the Acolis in Asia Minor, where the emigrants sattled.

The point at which the first pioneers of this exedus made their descent was the great and fertile island of Leebes. They drave out from it an early race vaguely called Polasgic, i.e. aboriginal, and founded on its shores five flourishing towns, of which the chief was Mitylene. These piaces were themselves ere long the parents of new settlements on the mainland. Another band, largely composed of Locrians, but led by Cleues and Malaus who are called princes of the house of Agamemmon, landed in Mysia, at the estuary of the Calcus, and seized a native town, whose name they turned to Cyme. This place became the largest continental settlement of the Acoliana, and was reckened second only to Mitylene among their cities. Gradually, as new settlers came flocking in, town after town was founded, till the coast opposite Lesbes was fringed by a continuous belt of Acolian states. Further to the north in the Troad, the adventurers who landed at Assos and Antandrus had harder

work to win themselves a territory, and were forced to meintain a long and doubtful war with the warlline Tenerians or Dardanians, before they could settle down in peace. At least the natives were driven up into the recesses of life, and the const-hand remained to the Greeke. Altogather, between the mouth of the Hellespont and the Bay of Smyrms, the Acoltans founded more than thirty cities. None of them, however, nave Mitylone and Cyme, became places of any great importance. They key close togather all along the shore, with the exception of the single town of Magnesia, which the crited Magnesses of Thessely built at a distance of thirty miles from the sea in the contral valley of the Hormus.

Another stream of emigration, starting from a different base, affected the Carian and Lolegian lands to the south of Asolls. In this district the invaders were mainly lealers, the Therman tribes who had been expelled from the north coast of migration. Pologonussus by the Achainna, and from Epidaurus Treezen and Philips by the Dorlans. These exiles had taken refuge with their kindred in Attica, but that borren peninsula could not long support thorn. To Alties, too, had wandered broken retonants of other tribes-Cadmeinus Euboraus and Pheciaus from the north, and Pyllans from Pelopounesis. Bome of these strongers stayed in the peninsula, and the Pylian house of Melanthus even became kings at Athens when the descendants of Theseus died out. But the large majority joined in the migration, and were merged among their Innian commiles. Their leaders were cometimes Athenian princes, sometimes exiled chiefs from Pelopounosus. The Ionio migration differed from the Acolian by being more military and less untional. The invaders did not, we are told, bring wife and child with them. but were inther bands of adventurers uncommissed with usaless mouths. Hence we find them, after the first moment of struggle, taking wives from the conquered, and mixing freely with the Carlans and Leleges whom they found on the spot. "Those who say that they started from the Prytancium of Athens, and claim to have the purest blood of all Ionians," says Herodotus, " ignore the fact that their amounters took to wives the Carina women whose fathers they had slain," There was, therefore, from the first a large Asiatic and non-Hellenic element in the blood of the Ionian colonists of Asia-an element which had a large above in making

them the least tenacions and most inxurious of the Greeks. The Acolian invaders of Mysis and the Troad had on their way to cross the Acgenn at the point where it is least thickly studded with islands. The Ionians who started from Attica, on the other hand, found their path lying through the midst of the Cyclades. Many of the emigrants halted by the way and settled down on these islands, where they must have found a scattered Ionian population already existing, mixed, it would appear, with Carlans, Cretans, and Leleges. The new-comers so far medified and influenced the population, that for the future nearly all the islands named oblefs of the migration as their cekists, and looked to Attica as their mother-country.

Ways after wave of Ionio adventurers swept on by the Cyclades to the sparious islands of Chies and Samos, the broad peninsula of Mimas, and the fertile valleys of the Cayster and the Macander. To Phocaea in the north, hard by the Acolian Cyme, the Athenian Philogenes led a mixed band in which Phoclans predominated. Further south, Chios was occupied by settlers who were mainly of Euboean race: Amphiclus of Histiaea, who was their commander. after defeating the Carians and Leleges of the island, allowed them to quit it under an oath never to return. In Samos Procles, who led the exiled Ionians of Epidaurus, was yet more merciful to the natives, and incorporated them with his followers as a single community. Nelsus, son of the Athenian King Codrus, who seized the territory at the mouth of the Masander, was more ruthices, and slew off all the Carians who dwelt about his city of Miletus, whence it was said that the Milesians were less tainted with aboriginal blood than the other Ionians. At Rphesus, however, which held in the valley of the Cayster the same predominant position that Miletus enjoyed in that of the Macander, a Grock town founded by the Codrid Androelus rose side by side with an ancient Carlan settlement, that controd round the temple of the great nature-goddess whom the Ionian new-comors chose to call Artemis, After a time. the Hellenes and the aborigines blended into one community.

Between Phocasa on the north and Miletus on the south there
The Ionian grew up, in the course of a few generations, a conclaise tinuous chain of ten Ionian cities; the island states
of Chios and Samos made their total number twelve. In spite of

their difference in origin and population, they were sufficiently akin to unite for the common worship of the Ionian Possiden at a sanctuary on Mount Mycale, which they falled the Paniculum. After a time, religious union led to a certain political connection, and a loose confederacy was formed, whose delegates met at the Paniculum to discuss their common affairs. But for into the fifth contury the ethnic difference between the several towas was shown by the fact that four distinct dialocts were still spoken in Ionia.

It was not only the conquered moss of Greece that were to take part in the great movement toward Asla. After a time, the conquerous too found themselves under the same impulse, the conquerous too push across the Aegean. The Dorina interaction of Peloponnesus, everflowing from their new home, sent out several swarms of colonists. Their largest band made for Crete, where, if legends can be triasted, Minos had long age built up a powerful state. But the island was peopled by various recess without cohesion, a Dorina element was already to be found in a corner of the island, and no common resistance was offered. The new emigrants reduced to villeinage the other moses of the Saland, Adlaiaus Carisms and possibly Phoenicinus, and organized themselves under a strict discipline as a military aristocracy summer a neousle of serfa.

Moles and There among the Spotteles were colonized by Dorlans from Laconia, mixed with their subjects from the same land, whem they brought with them and admitted who Dorlans in to a slarge in the colony. Further to the east the Asia Minor, specious Rhodes—equalled in size by Lesbos only among the Asiatic islands—was compiled by three groups of softiers from Argos, who built the towns of Lindus, Inlyses, and Carneirus. In the south-resstern corner of Caris, where two long perinsulas jut out into the sen, the Laconiaus founded Coldus, and the Trocassiaus Hallearnassus. Finally, the large inland of Cos, which lies off the preimsula of Halicarnassus, was also settled by emigrants from Truczen. The people of Cos Cuidus and Halicarnassus, tugether with those of the three towns of Rhodes, formed a Doric "Hexa-

One was poculiar to Samos; one was spoken at Chica and Erythrac; a third at Ephseus, Colophon, Lebedus, Tous, Claromanno and Phoenes; a fond, at Miletus, Myus, and Prime.

polis," who joined in a common worship of Apollo at Cape Triopium. The power and organization of their league was a faint reflection of that of the far more important Ionian confederacy which united to reverence Posedden at the Panionium. The Hexapolis, together with a few neighbouring Dorian settlements of smaller importance, Myndus Nisyrus and others, was often called Doris, just as the larger groups of colonies to the north were respectively known as Ionia and Acolis.

What was the exact date of the establishment of the easternmost group of Greek colonies, those which were founded in Cyprus, The Greeks in it is hard to say. Tradition ascribed their settlement

to the heroes of the Troian War: but we may safely conclude that Cyprus was not approached by the Greeks till the nearer lands in Asia Minor had already been seized. That the emigration to Cyprus, however, was at an early date may be judged from the fact that the Cypriot Greeks are found using a more primitive form of writing, borrowed from the East, than any other branch of the Hellenic race. While every other tribe used the "Cadmeian alphabet," the Cypriots employed a complicated syllabary which would not have been adopted by any one familiar with the much more convenient Phoenician symbols which the majority of their countrymen knew. It is, at any rate, certain that the Greeks were thoroughly rooted down in Cyprus long before the eighth century before Christ, as the Assyrian conquerors of the island in that are name several Greek kings among their vassula. The chief Greek colonies of the island were Salamis, Paphos, and Curium, which maintained a constant struggle for supremacy with the older Phoenician towns of Amathus, Citium, Golgos, and Tamassus. The founders of the Greek towns were of very various descent. We hear of Achainns, under Toucer of Salamis the brother of the here Ajax, of Argives, Laconlans, and even of Arcadians from the inland of Peloponnesus. The mixture of races would certainly seem to point to the period of the colonization of Cyprus as being the same as that of Asia Minor, for at a later date some of these races had ontirely ceased to go on maritime expeditions.

What were the centuries which saw the migration of nations in the Hellenio peninsula, and the colonization of the Asiatio shores, it is difficult to say with accuracy. That the movements lasted through a considerable number of generations we may be certain. But the genealogies which the later Greeks constructed and usud as a basis of calculation for the dates of this period are quite workless, and any deductions drawn from them are useless for chronology. If any limits must be given for the longth of the oge of migration, it may perhaps be said that the period between 1000 and 950 n.c. must have seen the greater part of the wanderings of the Great races.

CHAPTER VII.

THE DORLANS IN PELOPONNESUS-THE LEGISLATION, OF LYCUROUS.

For more than three hundred years after the probable ora of the Dorian migration the history of Peloponnesus is obscure, and its chronology vague and inaccurate. The Greeks themselves did not pretend to give exact dates till the first Olympiad (776 n.c.), and even after this great uncertainty exists, and we cannot be said to be moving in a really clear and historical atmosphere till the commencement of the sixth century. For the first two centuries our only landcarks are the lists of Spartan, Argive, Messenian, and Coriathian kings, most of whom are more names to us, while others have connected with them stories that are utterly impossible. Still, royal genealogies are undoubtedly the first things that a nation cemmits to memory, and, in default of written history, are not without their value.

Of the three greater Dorian states which were established in Pelopounesus by the Heracleid chiefs who led the invasion, that The Argus of Argos was for a long time the most important.

alliance. Including its dependent states, it may be defined as holding the whole eastern coast of the peninsula. The descendants of Temeaus held as their own domain the coast-plain of the Inachus and the slopes above it. Here they would seem to have admitted part of the old Achaian inhabitants to a share in the citizenship, for besides the three Dorlan tribes of Hylleis, Pamphyli, and Dymänes, the Argives were divided into a fourth called Hyraethians, who seem to represent the Achaian element. Outside the immediate territory of the city of Argos were other communities both Dorian and non-Dorian, which acknowledged the supremacy of their greater neighbour. Of these some were solutally

rassal states closely bound to Argos as to a mistrees. South were the Achsians of the little town of Ornece and the Tomiuss of Ornece, who inhabited that rocky stelp of coast, between Mount Parnon and the sea, which runs down as far as Cape Malon and even includes the island of Oythorn. Less closely connected were the new Decian states of Epidaurus, Trocsen, Phlins, Gleenae, and Sieyon, whose conquerous had started from Argos, and were bound to pay a certain deference to their mether-city. The ence-famous Achaina town of Mycenne prolonged an obscure existence on its billade under the same conditions.

The first nine kings of Argos are more names to us. All that has come down to us concerning them is a series of dim legends about their wars with their kinsmen of Sparta, which sound like a reflection back into an early age of the real wars of the sixth and seventh contraits. The first Argive sovereign who is more than a name to us is King Pholdon, of where deeds many tales are related. He succeeded to a kingly power which had become weakened owing to the encronchmouts of the Dorian oligarchy on the rights and preconstives of the crown. But by armed force he put down this oligarchy, and freed himself from all constitutional restraints. Then he turned to enlarge the housels of the empire of Argos: not only did he reduce Sieven and his other Derian neighbours to a closer dependence, but he added to his client states the important towns of Corinth and Acgina, which had already become the greatest marie and searcets of Southern Greece. He is even credited with the design of reducing the whole Pelenonnesus to vassalago; he repressed the Spartans, and, marching into the west of the peninsula, alded the Pisataus, who were in revolt against Ells, and supported them in their claim to colebrate the Olympic sames, of which we now find the first nutbouble mention. Photogram was, moreover, a legislator; he fixed a new standard of weights and measures, which was almost universally accepted among the Dorign and Applian states of Greece, and had coined for him by his Aggington vassals the first silver money which was ever known west of the Aegean. He consecrated, we are told, in the temple of Flera at Argos, samples of the rude currency of long silver nedls which his round obols and drachman superseded. Pheidon died in battle, luving first, however, seen his scheme of empire frustrated. Under his son the royal power was at once brought back to its old insignificance, though Argive sovereigns continued to rule in name down to the sixth, perhaps even to the fifth, century. The sole permanent result of the great king's reign was to break down the Dorian oligarchy at Argos, so that democracy became possible in that state before it was established in most other communities.

When so much is known of Phendon, it is strange to realize that his date is uncertaint. While the received text of Herodottes ¹ tells us that the Olympic games which he assisted the Pisatans to celebrate were the eighth since the commencement of those contests (i.e. those of 748 a.c.), there are other facts which seem to bring Pheidon's date much lower, and it is on the whole probable that his real date was about 675-665 a.c. When the reign of a king whose name was the most celebrated of his age cannot be fixed within a hundred years, regular history can hardly be said to have begun.

While Argos was holding the primacy in the Peloponnese, her sister states of Messonia and Laconia were going through two opposite courses of development, which brought them first into rivalry and then into a life-and-death struggle.

In Messano, as in Argos, the Dorian conquerors had not altogether expatriated or extermined the earlier inhabitants of the land.

Logends speak of Cresphontes, the brother of Tomenus and first Dorian king of Messenia, as having granted full citizenship in his new state to those of the Pylian Caucones and the Achaians who did not emigrate, and as having married, not one of his own race, but the daughter of a neighbouring prince of Aradia. His anti-national tendencies provoked the Dorians to revolt and murder their king; but his son Aepytus revenged his father, slow Polyphontes the leader of the rebels, and brought back pence to the land. Under the rule of Aepytus and his line, Dorian Caucon and Achaean became thoroughly fused, and Mussenia, though ruled by a Heracleid family, retained few of the characteristics of a Dorian state.

¹ It is probable that the text of Harmdons has been corrupted, and that Phoidea's Clympied was the twenty-eighth not the eighth—608, not 748 n.c. This view is corroborated especially by the recorded fact of his striking money; for the internal evidence of the Greek coinage seems to fix about 693—659, as the date of the earliest Asympton stater.

In Loconia the condition of things was onlirely different. The band of Darian invadors that had settled round Sparts in the Europas. valley was weak, and the territory which it had seized Tecomio was narrow, bounded to the north by the Arosdian hills, and to the south by the Achaian fortress of Amyolae, which stood only three miles from the capital of the invodors, and completely blocked their way down the valley of the Europas, just as Fidenae, in a later day, blocked the Remons from the valley of the Tiber. The Derings of Sparta enjoyed the constitutional anomaly of having two kings to roign over thom. Two royal houses, calling themselves Anidae and Eurypontidae respectively, were seated together on the threne, and from the first date of their appearance distracted the state by their quarrols. The Spartans said that Aristodomus, the original leader of their hands, had died, leaving tivin some and that an practe had bilden them "to take both as kings, but to give greater horour to the older." Modern historians, discontentual with the legand, have tried to prove-with very doubtful success—that the consistence of two royal houses represented the analgamation of the conquering Dorina with the conquered Admian, or of two separate Dorlan bands settled one in the valley of the Europea, and the other in that of the Counce. It may be so. hat proof is impossible; the double kingship must be taken as an

The very weakness and isolation of the Derlans of Sparta account for the fact that they retained their national identity to a fire greater depre than their beethers of Argos and Messens. They were not strong or numerous mough the britan to conquer and incorporate their neighbours, but were compelled to fight hard with them for every foot of land they wen. Just as the Angles and Saxons in Britain retained their language and their customs because they could not sweep over the whole island and subdue its inhabitants, but had to push forward slowly, rooting out the Britain; so the Spartans remained uninfluenced by the chier people of Laconia. On the other hand, the Argives and Messenians in Greece, just like the Franks and Lomberds in modern Europs, were strong enough to win a broad result at a single blow, and were ere long either absorbed or at least largely influenced by the prepondetaling mass of subjects when they suddenly nomined.

recepted fact, whose explanation is beyond our power.

All authorities agree in describing the state of early Sparta. as one of weakness and anarchy. Her dominion did not extend; her two royal houses were incessantly at variance; her wars both with hor Dorisa neighbours of Argolis and with the Arcadians on her northern frontier were usually disastrous; her people were discontented. Such was the condition of things when her great legislator Lyourgus appeared, to rescue her from horself, and send her forth armed for the conquest of the whole Poloponness.

Of the existence of Lyourgus we need have no doubt, though modern writers have reduced him, in common with most other great men of early history, to the inevitable sun-

myth. He bolonged to one of the two royal houses, and in all probability lived about the year 800 a.c. We need not accept, unless we choose, the legends which tell how he was the younger son of King Eunomus of the Eurypentid line; how he exiled himself from Sparts in order to avoid the suspicion that he would usurp the throne of his infant nephew Charilatts; how he travelled in Grocce, in Asia, in Egypt, and perhans yet further afield, and finally returned, full of wisdom and experience, when Charilans had grown up to manheed, only to find the state in a worse plight than over. The kings were quarrelling with each other, and at the same time striving to cast off constitutional checks and rule despotically. Charilatis is even called one of the "tyrants" Meanwhile a disastrous war was proceeding; the of Gronne. Arcadians of Teges had just inflicted on Sparts the greatest defeat she over know, taken one of her kings prisoner, and set hundreds of Spartan captives to work as slaves on their upland farms.

In this emergency the Lacedacomonians, we are told, were ready to accept any sacrifice necessary to preserve their state. Their eyes turned to Lycurgus, and when he came out into the market-place, followed by twenty-eight of the wisest and noblest of the citizens, and laid his schemes before the people, they met with high approval. The legend adds that, after a time of violent opposition by the minority, which resulted in brawls and riots, during one of which the legislator had his eye atruck out, the new code was accented.

What the institutions of Lycurgus did and did not include it

is difficult to define with accuracy. But some general results can be obtained by carefully excising from the reports The Comstrucof posterity those so-called parts of his legislation for which we know that he cannot possibly have been responsible. That he did not, for example, forbid the committing of his laws to writing or the use of coined money we may be certain; neither written codes nor current cash were known for more than a century after the latest possible date at which he can be placed. Nor can he have legislated about Helots, for the serf problem did not come before Sparts so long as she was a small poor state, pennel in the valley of the Upper Eurotas. Neither did be invent the Ephoralty, which first appears during the Messenian wars, nor institute an equal division of property. But legend loves to rile all the details of an early constitution on to a single legislator; and, in crediting Lycurgus with every distinctive usage of the Spartan state-system, the Greeks were but Illustrating the same tendency that made our own ancestors say that King Alfred invented trial by jury, or divided England into shires.

The constitution of Lycurgus was primarily intended to define the position of the different parts of the state. Sparta-like all Greek states of the Homeric age-possessed kings, The Rhetra of a council of nobles, and an assembly of freemen. But Lycurgus. it would seem that the nobles were now trying to deprive the kings of their proregatives, while the kings were endeavouring to get rid of all constitutional control. Monnwhile the general assembly of freemen may have begun to assert a claim to something more than a right to acquiesce in all that was laid before it, Lyeurgus bade the Spartans, in the curt language of his "Rhetra," "build a temple to Zeus Hellapius and Athena Hellapia; arrange the people in tribes and in obes, thirty in number; establish a Gerousia, including the two kings; and summen the people from time to time to an assembly between Babyes and the Chacion; the people shall have the determining voice." I What was the exact political meaning of the particular worship to be paid to Zons and Athena we do not know; perhaps the Dorian Apollo had till then been the sole god of the state. But the other clauses of

¹ For a good commentary on this, see E. Abbott's "History of Greece," i. 200.

the Rhetra are clearer. The ancient polity is to be systematized; the Boule of nobles is to be transformed into an elected senate of thirty olders, among whom the kings are always to find a place; the assumbly of freemen is to have a real part in the conduct of affairs, and to give a decisive vote when the Gerousia is divided. The general tendency of the laws, therefore, would be to suppress the unruliness of the aristocratic council of nobles by cutting down its numbers and restricting is to elderly men; while the kings, on the other hand, are mulcted of their power of premulgating laws on their own authority, and incorporated as individual members of the Gerousia. The people are to be included with a share in the constitution, though probably they were only given enough to serve as a salve for discontent, and not enough to enable them to interfere to any effect in politics; no one ever accused Lyoungus of being a democrat. What were the alterations made by the new ordinances in the tribes we cannot say; at any rate, the old Hylleis, Pamphyli, and Dymanes were not abolished. The obes, again, are mysterious-whether they were grouped by families or by localities is unknown; we can only say that they were subdivisions of which ten went to each tribe.

The Gerousia consisted of thirty elders, one for each obe. The kings were co-officio mombers, apparently representing the obes to which their families belonged. The other Gerontss were elective; they held their seats for life, but as no one was eligible for the poet till his sixtist year, the average tenure of office cannot have been very long. Like the old council of nobles, which they replaced, they sated as assessors to the kings in the discussion of all public affairs. But they had this advantage over their predocesors, that the king's voice only counted as one of their own and was no longer canalpotent, for everything was now decided by numerical majority

decided by numerical majority

The assembly of freemen, which was known at Sparta as the Apella, was composed of all citizens of thirty years of age and over. It met between the bridge of Babyon and the The Apella Charlon, the ravine of the Oenus, once a month. As the old Homeric Agera had only been able to shout its assent ex dissent, so the Spartan assembly, though given a real part in the constitution, could only vote by acclamation. The uncertainty of

this method of decision must have thrown much power into the hands of the presiding official, especially when such business as the election of one of the Gerontes or other manistrates from among several candidates was in hand. As Arlstotle observes, " the rian was too childish." We are even assured that at some elections the matter was settled by shutting up the returning officer in a room out of sight of the assembly, and compolling him to decide which of the shouts that he heard without was loudest! But this device must safely have been invented by a sarenstle neighbour. The assembly had brought before it the subjects of debate approved by the Gerousia: declarations of war, treaties of alliance, depositions of kings, and all such weighty matters were to be within its cognizance. No one could speak in it without the invitation of the regarding officer-a feature, it is to be remarked, which was also to be found in the Roman Comitla. In bistoric times the sphors mesided, but in Lycurgus's day the kings and Geroutes must have convened the meeting, as they would have done with the Homeric Agora.

The privileges which the new constitution left to the kings ore shortly summed up by Herodotus. In peace they had the highest seat, and a double portion at all feasts, sacrifices, and banquets. Public rations of corn and wine were issued to them twice a month, and for meat they might claim the chine of every animal sacrificed in the city. Its hids was also their perquisite. They were hereditary priests of Zeus Lacedaemonius the god of the land, and Zeus Uranius the god of heaven. were charged with choosing envoys to consult the oracles (Pythii). and with appointing consuls (*poteros) for foreign states. They had also the right of giving away the hands of ornhan heiresses. and of sanctioning the adoption of sons by the childless. In wartime they were perpetual commanders-in-chics. When the army went forth, they marched out first, and on its return they entered the city last. A hundred chosen warriors guarded their persons. They might direct their expeditions against any fee they chose, and the Spartan who strove to turn their purpose was held accursed. When in the field they might requisition sheep and cattle according to their good pleasure. At their death, adds Herodotus, "women go round the city beating kettle-drums, and, when the sound is

heard, two persons in every house, a male and a female, put on mourning apparel, and cut off their hair. Horsemen take the tidings round Laconin, and, on the day of the funeral, a vast multitude of the subjects and serfs of the Spartans come flecking in to join the townsfolk in the wailings which accompany the procession."

A Spartan king, then, was left by the Lycurgean legislation a position of honorary distinction in the state, a high priesthood, and the command of the army in time of war. He had become a great

hereditary state official, and ceased to be a sovereign.

If these constitutional reforms had comprised the whole work of Lyeurgus, it is probable that we should not have heard very much of Sparta in coming years. A limited monarchy and quasi-representative government are excellent things in themselves, and bring vast relief to a people who have been suffering under anarchy; but they do not suffice to found a great and victorious military state. It was his social rather than his political legislation which made Lyeurgus a legislator unique of his kind.

The Spartass were a poor and rough people, maintaining, among hostile neighbours, a constant armed struggle for existence. To survive they had to be continually prepared to fight supertor from at a moment's notice; for their enemies dwelt at their very gates, and no point in the land was a day's march from the border. Lyaurgus determined to secure them victory by sacrificing every public and private end in the state to the one object of making his countrymen irresistible in battle. To do this he turned the whole social system of the state into a hateful and releatless military machine, which setzed on the citizen body and soul in early boyliood, held him emmeshed all his life, and only let him loose when he was no longer fit to bear arms. This machine was the famous Spartan 4yez6, or training and discipline, of which he was the perfecter, if not the inventor.

Lycurgus was fortunate in having to do with a very primitive and uncivilized people. No race which had stored up much the spartan material wealth or mental culture would have contractions. Sented for a moment to adopt his system. But the

Spartans were a rude, perhaps almost a savage, people. We find surviving among them practices which mark a very low grade in civilization—the form of marriage which consists in the fiction of capturing the brule by force from her parents, the separation of the sexes at meals, the hateful practice of polyandry. Even after their advance into Puloponnesus, the Dorians were only just beginning to come within the radius of civilization. It is a sufficient comment on the Lyourgean training to say that the nearest parallel to it in history is that strange military discipline which King Chaka introduced among the Zulus in our own times.

The moment a Suartan was born, the state began to take cornizapec of him. The infant was carried before the elders, who decided on his fate: if healthy, he was given back to his parents to be reared; if weakly, he was taken away and cast out on Tayretus. to perish by exposure. At the age of seven the boys were removed from the homes of their parents, and placed in the public traininghouse, where they began to undergo the series of tolls which were to make up their lives. They went barefoot, and were allowed only a single garment winter and summer; at night they were compelled to sleep on beds of rushes, which they gathered with their own hands from the bed of the Eurotas. They had to cook and cater for themselves; the ration allowed them was deliberately made small and unappetizing, in order that they might be encouraged to add to it by hunting or even by theft. We are assured that it was habitual for the boys to eice out their meals by spoil from neighbouring gardens and larders, and that they were nunished when caught, "not for the stealing, but the clumsiness in being found out." Any symptoms of weakness or complaining were treated us the severest of offences; Stole insensibility to pain was inculcated by continual floggings, tortures, and privations, till the most incredible callousness was produced. Every one has heard of the omnivorous youth who stole a young fox for dinner and hid it under his shirt, and how, when detained in company, he allowed the beast to tear open his stomach rather than to cacape and betray him.

The training of the Spartan boy was almost entirely confined to gymnastic and military exercises. Choral music was the only refining influence of any kind which came within his observation. The central incident of his year's life was the feetival of the Gymnopaidia, when he contested with his peers in exercises of music, datcing, running, and wreetling.

At eighteen the Spartan lad was called a Mellelren (Merrefore); at twenty be became an Elren (Egrey), or young man, and left the social metres training-house for the burrack. He was now drafted team off into one of the public messes, which formed a peculiar feature of Spartan life. These messes (Xevertla) were formed of fifteen men each, new members being coupted when a vacancy occurred. They were held in public, and consisted of fixed rations; for no citizen till he reached the age of sixty might take his messes at home, and custom dictated the uniformity of viands. Each member was responsible for sonding in his share of the food menth by month; the messe consisted mainly of barley-meal, cheese, figs, and the unpalatable "black broth" which was considered the characteristic dish of Laconia. Meat was only tasted on days of sacrifice.

The girls of Sparta received a training similar in kind, to, but less severe than, that of the boys. They were not taken from their mothers, but were formed into closses, and set to compete in running, wrestling, and other gymmestic exercises, so that their bodies might be feetified by exercises. Though they stripped for the contest, their sports were freely witnessed by the men. As might have been expected, this training bred a race of buxom, coarse-minded boydens. If the wives and daughters of the Spartans rese far above the secluded women of the rest of Greece, not only in physical beauty and vigour, but in courage and ability, they were, on the other hand, utterly destitute of all modesty and womanly feeling.

A man at thirty, a woman at twenty, were expected to marry, and grave political disabilities were inflicted on the Spartan who

did not enter wedlock, and take his share in rearing children for the state. Marriage, however, did not end the man's borrack-life; he still dwelt for some time apart from his wife, and only visited her by stealth when his presence was not required at the Spatila, the drill-ground, or the gymnasium. It was only after many mouths that he was allowed to set up a house of his own, and remove his wife to it; even then he was not freed from his attendance at the public meals. Spartan wedlock was a duty owed to the state rather than a voluntary union, and it is not to be wondered at if the sanctity of the marriage tie was lightly regarded.

All these unnatural restrictions on the freedom of the individual were directed to the sole end of turning him into a good soldier, hard in body, callous in mind. Undoubtedly they had the desired effect. As a sarcastic contemporary minimary system.

once remarked, "The Spartan's life was made so unpleasant for him, that it was no wonder that he threw it away without regret in buttle." But the victories of the Lacedsemonians were due not less to their organization than to their unflinching courses. While the hosts of the other Greek states went out to war in untrained masses, and took their orders from a single herald, who hawled out the commander-in-chief's directions, the Spartans had a well-arranged system of drill and a whole bierarchy of officers. The army was divided into bodies known as the more and the lockes, corresponding to our battalions and communies, and was commanded by a surles of officers, ranging down from the polemarch, or colonel who commanded a mora, to the enomotorch. who was a sergeant with twenty-five men under him.1 The commands which were given by the king were passed down by the polemarchs and other officers with such order and rapidity, that a Spartna army could managere with a speed and accuracy that no other Greek force could approach. This, as much as their courage, exulains their constant successes.

Life was deliberately made more pleasant for a Spartan when he took the field; his rations were improved, his discipline somewhat relaxed; even jests and jokes were encouraged around the campfare. Everything was done to make him look on war-time as a relief from the borrors of reace.

Such were the chief features in the legislation of Lycurgus. It is probable that the training received many developments after his death; and it is certain that, in spite of Greek behef to the contrary, his constitutional scheme suffered many alterations in later years. The chief of these came from the introduction of the Ephoralty, an effice unknown to his political system.

The Ephora came into being during the period of the Messenian wars, largely—as we read—in consequence of the

continual absence of the kings in the field. As their name shows,

1 There were several divisions below the loches, for which we cannot supply exact modern equivalents.

they were primarily intended to act as overseers or police-magistrates, but they soon became the irresponsible ministers of the state. They were five in number, and were elected by the Apella for the term of one year. During that period they were the executive of the community: they received foreign embassies, and became the convening officers and presidents of the assembly. dealing with that body as freely as did the Roman tribunes with the Comitia. On their own initiative, without the sanction of either Gerousia or Apella, they could arrest, imprison, and fine any one whom they chose, without any legal process. Even the kings were subject to their arbitrary power; they threw Cleomenes into prison, and made Ariston divorce his barren wife. In historical times, two of them accompanied the king when he went out to war, so that his authority was constantly under their supervision, and became at last almost nominal. Hence it may be said that Sparts had two kings and five irresponsible despots. Owing to the ridiculous form of voting in the Apella, the ephora could mactically return whomsoever they chose to act as their successors in the casuing year, and thus socured-except under very exceptional circumstances—the continuation of their own line of policy.

It is now time to see how the machinery which Lyourgus constructed proceeded to work after his death.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ESPABLISHMENT OF THE SPARTAN SUPREMACT IN PELOPONNESUS.

Austed and organized by the legislation of Lycurgus, the Spartane went forth conquering and to conquer. Before the death of Charilaüs, the king whose reign covers the period of reform, they had already fallen upon and sublued the weak conquest of Arcadian tribes who dwelt about the sources of the Eurotas, in the district of Aegys. A few years later King Teleclus succeeded in taking Amyelas, the Achaian town at the very gates of Sparta, which had blocked the progress of Dorian conquest down the valley of the Eurotas. Within the next fifty years all the dwellers in Laconia, save the Cynurians of the eastern coast, had become the subjects of Sparta. From the mountain borders of Teges down to the southernmost points of Tacnarum and Males, all was now here.

For reasons to us unknown, the conquerors dealt out very different measures to the various districts which they subdued. While some were only reduced to vasselage and retained their local customs and certain rights of soil-government, others were utterly crushed and spoiled. The inhabitants of the more persect and favoured places became "Periocci," those who "dwelt Helota around" the central Dorian community of Sparta. Those of the less fortunate communities were reduced to the condition of "Helots," a title which the Spartans derived from Helos, the name of a city close by the sea-const which withstood them stubbornly, and had to take the consequences of its obstinacy. By these conquests the Spartans became masters of a district so large that they themselves formed only a small fraction of its population. The Periocci seem to have been about thrice as numerous as their Dorian lords; the Helots formed an even larger body.

The condition of the Perioeci was very tolerable. Their only obligations were to pay a fixed tribute, and to send a contingent of heavy-armed troops to the Spartan army. Hence they remained loval to their suserain throughout all the vicissitudes of history. With the Helots it was otherwise; they were reduced to a condition of absolute serfdom, and tied down to the soil. Their land was portioned out among Spartan proprietors, who dwelt in the capital, undergoing their barrack-life, and received a fixed portion of the produce of the land. Though the individual Sparten could not sell into slavery the Helot who farmed his estate, the Spartan community could do apything that it chose with its serf. The enhors could slay Holots without trial; and we are even told that a secret police called the Cryptein, existed, whose whole purpose was to go through the land, privately making away with any Helot whose open discontent or great influence with his neighbours made him an object of suspicion to the government. The Helots were not kent continually under the eyes of their masters, nor were they ground down to starvation point by exorbitant remts; but they were so entirely at the mercy of the most arbitrary caprices of their rulers, and so utterly destitute of all political rights, that their life was spent in constant fear and dread. Not unnaturally they hated the Sportune with the hitterest hotred, and were always ready to revolt when a fair chance offered. Nevertheless, their masters so much despised their resentment that they armed them in times of war, and took them into the field to act as light treeze. Nor do we hear of any occasion on which the Helots deserted the Lucedacmonian standard on the actual field of battle.

The conquest of Laconia was hardly completed before the Sparrhe Messenian taus fell to blows with their neighbours to the west—
wars. the mixed race of Dorians, Caboones, and Achaians,
who dwelt beyond the rauge of Mount Thygetus in the fortile
valley of Messenia. Some atories say that the war arose from the
cattle-lifting which always prevails on the frontier-line of two
primitive tribes. Others say that the origin of it was the shying
of the Spartan king Teleclus in a sudden brawl within the temple
of Artemis Limnatis,—a border-shrine where Laconian and Messenian met with equal rights of sacrifice.

The Messenian wars extended over a period of some ninety

years, though a long interval breaks the continuity between the two struggles. The first war seems to have begun about 743 n.c., the second ended about 645 p.c.

We are unfortunately destitute of any continuous narrative of this period which commands any credit whatever. Authorities for The only contemporary records of any kind which have survived are the fragments of the Spartan poet Tyrtaeua. In which he exhorts his countrymen to persevere in the second Measenian war, encouraging them to envulate the deeds which "their fathers' fathers" had wrought in the first struggle. The details of the history of the period which Pausanias collected from the annalist Myron and the opic poet Rhianus are quite valueless. Those authors lived in the third century n.o., separated by five hundred years from the events they described, and were hopelessly contradictory as to their facts. Myron, for example, placed in the times of the first war Aristomenes, the great national hero of Messenia, while Rhianus insisted that his exploits were performed in the second war, which was divided from the first by not less than fifty years! It is obvious that Rhianus used to the full the licence of the poet, while Myron cannot have had anything better to guide him than Messenian folk-songs, for the Spartans never wrote the history of their wars. We may imagine, as a parallel, what sort of a history of the Anglo-Saxon conquest of Britain could be written if we had to depend entirely on Geoffrey of Monmouth and the legends of King Arthur. According to the tale which has come down to us, the Mossenians did all the deeds of daring, while the Spartons were nevertheless victorious-a manifest impossibility !

If we can extract any truth from the legends, the Spartans began the war by pushing across the ridge of Taygetus, and seizing the fortress of Amphea on the Messenian side, which they presidence employed as their base of operations. From this point war, they harried the open country, and kept the towns of the Messenians in a chronic state of bluckade. After two indecisive battles, the Messenians abandoned their minor fortresses and concentrated themselves on the central post of Mount Ithome, the strongest citadel as well as the holiest canctuary in their land. Memwhile

¹ The tradition which makes Tyrtaeus an Athenian settled in Sparta is probably valueless.

the plain of the Parnisus was abandoned to the ravages of the enemy. Although the cliffs and walls of Ithome were strong, the party that was continually upon the defensive, and never took the initiative in the war, was bound to grow weaker and weaker. It was in vain that the Messenian leader Aristodemus offered up his daughter as a human sucrifice to secure the favour of Zeus Ithomates, the national god of Messene. War and famine thinned the ranks of his followers; and after holding out in his fastness for twelve years, Aristodemus slew himself in despoir. Shortly after Ithome fell, and the Messenian resistance collapsed (723 n.c.).

After the termination of the war, the majority of the noble families of Messenia went into exile, some joining in the colonization of the town of Rhegium in Italy, while others retired to Ionia. The bulk of the population remained behind, and became counted among the Periosei of Sparta, though they seem to have had much more unfavourable terms granted to them than most of that class, being compelled to pay half the produce of their lands as rent to

the conquerors.

Two constitutional erises occurred in Sparta in consequence of the first Messenian war. The continual absence of the kings in the field led to a block in public business, which

apartan conattention. When the wift official heads in the place of
the distant monarchs. When the war ended, the Herachidac were
unable to do away with the Ephoraity, and the new "oversors"
rotained their power. The wife of King Theopompus taunted him
with leaving the royal preregative to his children less than he had
received it, but he is said to have replied that "it would be the
mere lasting for being the more limited." The second trouble arose
from the fact that too constant thinning of the ranks of the Spartan
youth by the long-continued campaigns led to the marriage of many
women, who could find no husband of equal rank, with members
of the class of the Periocci. The Spartans, when the war was over,
refused to recognize the offspring of such unions as legitimate, and

Partheniae, brunded them with the name of "Partheniae," or hastards. The young men were numerous enough to unite under one Phalanthus in a conspiracy to overthrow the constitution of Lycargus. Their plot was discovered in time to

prevent its outbreak, but instead of taking a bloody vengeance on their half-brothers, the Spartans compelled them to leave Lacquia in a body. They sought Italy under the direction of the Delphic oracle, and Phalanthus became the founder of the great and wealthy city of Tarentum (708 n.c.).

The possession of Messenia brought Sparta into contact with the affairs of the Western Peloponnese. She is found ero long allied with Elis, and therefore as the enemy of the Pisatans, who were constantly striving to preserve their autonomy against the Eletans. Sparta also began to oneroach on Western Arcadia, and got possession of Phigaleia, the southern border-town of that country. She seems to have been involved at the same time in struggles with Teirea and other Arcadian states.

But the next important crisis in the history of the Spartans came about when Pheldon of Argos strove to extend his supremacy over the whole Peloponnesus (probably circ. 675-660 n.c.). We first hear of this struggle between Argos and Sparta when, in 600 n.c., the Lacedaemonian army was utterly beaten at Hysiae during an attempt to invade Argolis. The next year, if our date for Pheidon can be trusted, the Argive army appeared in the Western Peloponnese, and assisted the Pisatans to celebrate the Olympic games, having first defeated the allied Spartans and Eleians in battle.

It must have been about the same moment that the Spartans were startled by a desperate rising of their vassals in Messenia. The fact that Lacedaemon was engaged in an unsuccessful war aroused the mountaineers of the northern senian war border, and seen all the country was up in arms. The Messenians found a leader in Aristomenes, a young here of whom the most impossible exploits—all betreved from the epic of Rhianus—are recounted. He slew, we read, three hundred enemies with his own hand; he visited Sparta by night, and hung up a shield in the temple of Athena by way of bravada; he was thrice taken prisoner, but always escaped; once he was even thrown into the "Ceadas," or jet of execution at Sparta, but escaped uniajured, and found his way out by a subtertaneen cleft in the rocks.

This second Messenian war seemed for several years likely to result in the liberation of the land. The Lacedaemonians were oppressed with many enemies, for besides the Messenians they had

to fight Argos and her subject states, together with a league of Arcadian tribes under Aristocrates, King of Orchomenus. As allies they could only count on the Corinthians, who were anxious to throw off the hegemony of Argos, and the Eleians, who are invariably found on the opposite side from their neighbours of Pisa. It is, therefore, not surprising that Sparts suffered heavily; she saw the valley of the Eurotas itself ravaged, and suffered at least one great defeat in the open field. But the institutions of Lycurgus were strong enough to stand the strain; heaten but unconquered . the Spartans deggedly held on till the tide turned. At their darkest hour they were put in good heart by the poems of Tyriacus, who sang how the spirit of lovalty and military honour must finally triumnh over the fitful energy of revolved seeks and the disunion of jealous allies. At last the league against Sports broke up. Pheidon of Argos full in battle; Aristocrates the Arcadlan betraved his allies, and cost them a decisive defeat by withdrawing his troops in the midst of the conflict; Aristomenes was driven into the hill-fortress of Eira, just as Aristodemus in the earlier war had been pent up on Ithomo. It was to no purpose that he maintained himself therein, and pushed his raids far afield when the blockade grew slack. After gleven years of resistance, the death. agony of the Messenian nation came to its close. The Landsomonians forced their way into Eira by escalade, and the remains of its garrison were lucky in obtaining a safe conduct to retire from the land. Legend ascribed the full of the fortress to treachery: but the conquered race always consoles itself with some such cry. and it is evident that Eira had long been doomed. Aristomenes wandered away to Phodes, and died there: many of his chiefs found new homes in Arcadia; but the bulk of the nation were degraded to the position of Helots, and lay prostrate at the feet of Sparta for two hundred years ere it could nerve itself to another movement (eirc. 645 B.a.),

The last echoes of the Messenian war did not die out till a few years later. The Arcadians, who had stoned their treacherous king Aristocrates, and abolished the kingship of his house, joined the Pisatans in a last attempt at resistance. In 644 R.C. they even scized Olympia, and celebrated the games in defiance of Elis and

¹ See Grote, il. 484, note 8.

Sparta, but shortly after their enemies fell upon them with crushing force. The Pisatsus became the vassals of Ells, a position which they retained for half a century, till a revolt in 581 n.c. gave their masters an excuse for utterly destroying the city.

Sparta now turned on Areadis and Argolis. The history of the century which follows the second Messenian war is in Pelopounesus merely the tale of the subjugation of the whole of the setupple with poninsula by the continual encreachments of the Arses Lacedasmonians. The successes of Sparta were not, however, any longer followed by the extension of the limits of Laconia. The victors contented themselves with reducing the vanquished to the condition of subject-allies, bound to follow their standard in war. With their internal affairs they hardly over interfered, and therefore the hegemony of Sparta was a comparatively light burden, and might even be said not to disturb the desire for "autonomy" which returned in overy Greek breast.

Teres bore the first brunt of the Spartan attack; its desperate resistance were favourable terms for its citizens, who, on submission, were restored to full control of their local affairs. Teges served as a base of attack equally against Central Arcadia and Argolis. Of the gradual subjugation of the Arcadians we have few details, but the history of the struggle with Argos is better known. That state had been terribly sufcebled by the death of Pheiden.' Corinth had completely established its independence; and Sicyon had also fallen away from the Argive empire, and, under the tyrants of the house of Orthagons, was rising to power and importance. Even Epidaurus, in the very peninsula of Argolis, had become . completely autonomous before the oud of the seventh century. Argos was therefore overweighted in the contest with Sparts, yet she held out vigorously, and did not finally lose her hold on Cynuria, the land along the Laconian coast, till as late as 547 B.C. In that year was fought the famous battle of the three hundred champions, the prize being the district of Thyren, the last external peasession of Argos. Legend declares that the conflict was so fierce and bloody that only two Argives and one Spartan survived. The Argives hastened home to carry the news of their supposed victory, for they had overlooked their sole surviving enemy. Othryades the Sparian stayed on the battle-field, and set up a

trophy of the arms of slain Argives. Each nation, therefore, considered itself victorious, and the dispute was only settled by a general engagement, in which the Lacedemonians won the day. Othryades slew himself on the battle-field, disdaining to appear in Sparta as the only one of her three hundred champions who had escaped the chances of war. Henceforth Cynuria was entirely in the hands of Sparta; Arges was too malmed to be able to stir for another whole generation.

The influence which would seem to have retarded the complete conquest of Peloponnesus by Sparta in the first half of the sixth century was the alliance of the towns of its northern parts in an anti-Dorian league. Between 600 and 650 a.c. Corinth and Sieven experienced revolts which cast out the ruling Dorian oligarchy. and placed tyrants of Ionian race on the throne. houses, the Oyneelidae and the Orthagoridae, as they were called from the names of their founders, were strongly anti-Spartan in their policy. It was not till they were overthrown, the Corinthian family In 682 n.c. and the Sicyonian about 500 n.c., that Sparta became as sunreme in Northern Peloponnesus as she was already in its southern and central portions. Corinth and Slevon, their tyrants expelled, loined the Laconian alliance, and became some of its firmest supporters. Argos alone, now reduced to a small state in the valley of the Inachus, held alcof in sulky discentent, hiding ber time. All the rest of the peninsula acknowledged the begemony of Sparta.

Such, after two centuries of constant war, were the fruits of the legislation of Lyourgus. A body of Spartans, never more than ten thousand strong, had succeeded in reducing to their vascalage the whole of the status of Peloponnesus.

CHAPTER IX.

THE ACE OF COLONIZATION.

THE eighth and seventh centuries, the period which saw Sparta lay the foundation of her supremacy in Peloponnesus, witnessed in the greater part of Greece a revival of those migratory impulses which had first made themselves felt at the time of the Daring invasion. But the cause of the movement was now changed; it was not external pressure, but internal expansion, that sent the emigrants afield. The patriarchal constitution of the prchistoric Greek states had never recovered the blow which was dealt it by the widespread transference of populations in the eleventh century. The gradual decay of monarchy and rise of oligarchy was the main feature of the centuries which immediately followed the great migrations. The misgovernment of which the oligarchies were usually guilty made life at home intolerable for men of spirit, and set them dreaming of escape to a freer atmosphere. Men of wealth who were excluded from a share in the government of the state by their mean birth, and men of family who were kept back by their poverty, were alike ready to depart. The lower classes were no less eager to escape from misgovernment and oppression. But this disposition of feeling might have found its vent in more civil broils, if the time had not been propitious for emigration.

Not only were the Greeks gradually becoming more adventurous seamen, but the Phoenicians, the rivals who had long divided with them the trade of the Eastern Mediterranean, becline of were now receiving a series of blows at home which Phoenician enfeathed their resisting power further afield. The ninth century saw the extension of the Assyrian empire across the Euphrates, which brought it into hestile contact with Phoe-

nicia. The eighth century was a time of continued trouble for the great scaports. Aradas was captured by Tiglath-Filterer in 742 n.c., after a stege of three years. Shalmaneser V. compelled Tyre by force to resume a homage which she had endeavoured to cast off. Both Tyre and Siden were constantly revolving, and as constantly being reduced to rey tribute, during the reigns of Sargon and Sannacherib (726-651 n.c.). The latter town was sacked and almost completely destroyed by Bearbaddon in 680 n.c. All these wars weakened the grap of the Phoenicians on the great trade routes which they had so long shared with the Greek, and by the seventh century they had been completely driven out of the Aegean and the Jonian Sea.

The first Greek cities on which the impulse towards emigration

Colonies in were situated in well-protected harbours on the Chalcistee. Bubean Strait: Chalcis lay on the Euripus, and 600-750 B.C. looked north; Eretria, separated from Chalcis by twelve miles of fertile plain, looked south towards the Cyclades. The colonial energy of both these towns was stimulated by oligarchies founded on wealth, for the Ionic states seem generally to have drifted into the hands of a plutocracy, while in the rest of Greece the eligarchies reached on birth. The point towards which

fell were the two Ionic seaports of Chalcis and Eretria. Both

the first awarm of emigrants from Chalcis and Eretria directed themselves was the north-western angle of the Aegen. Here a bold peninsula runs out from the mainland of Macedonia, and divides into three long headlands which stretch for into the sea. The region had the same mixture of promontory and gulf, mountain and shore-plain, which prevails in Greece itself. Moreover, its rocks were rich in silver ore, and the Eubceans (who had long been working coppor-mines in their own island) were both eager and able to turn it to account.

Within the first fifty years of the eighth century Chalcis and Eretra had planted more than thirty towns along the three headlands of Chalcidics, as the posinsula was ere long called from the Chalcidians who formed the larger half of the settlers. Some of these places were mere mining settlements, but others grew into important towns with considerable stretches of territory. Such a place was the Bretrian colony of Mende on Pallene—the westernmost and least mountainous of the three headlands—a town long famous for its rish vineyards. Of the colonics of Chalcis Terone and Sermyle were the largest. Speaking roughly, it may be said that the Eretrians gravitated towards the western part of Chalcidice, while the towns founded from Chalcis occupied its central and eastern regions. The original inhabitants were "Pelaegic," and seem in many cases to have amalgamated easily with the Greek settlers. After the Eubocaus had for some time been established in Chalcidice, colonies from other places came to extend the area of settlement; the Ionic islanders of Andres planted towns on the Thracian coast, north-east of Mount Athos; the Doric Corinthians established the important city of Potidaca, northward of the Eretrian settlements in Pallene.

While Chalcis and Eretria were acting as ploneers to the Grocks of Europe, Miletus was playing the same part for those of Asia. A few centuries had sufficed to build up the acttlements which the Ionians had planted on the Lydian and Carlan shore into great and flourishing cities, fit to be themsalves the mothers of many colonies. Miletus, the port at the mouth of the Macander, took the lead in maritime extension. The city had lost its royal line in the early part of the cighth century, and fallen into the hands of a plutocracy. The race for wealth became the sole occupation of its citizens, and a sea-going life was the easiest course to arrive at the goal. So numerous did the Milesian sea-traders become, that they formed a party in the state known as the Asinautae, " the men never off the water." The first energy of the Milesians was turned to the north-east angle of the Aegean, as that of the Eubocons had been to the north-west. Pushing beyond the Aeolic settlements in the Troud, they endeavoured to seize the Hellespont and the route towards the Black Sen. The Phoenicians were already in possession; their factory The Wilesians of Lampaneus commanded the passage into the Sea in the Euxine. of Marmora, and their vessels had sought out the furthest recouses of Paphlagonia and Colchis. There must have been a struggle in the straits for the menupoly of trade, but its details have not come down to us. The base 768 BO. from which the Milesians operated was their first settlement Cyzious,

a town placed on the neck of a peninsula which runs out into

the Propentis. When once firmly established within the Hellespont, they preceded to spread far and wide to the north and east. The mysterious sea which had only been known as Axeinos. "the inhospitable," and whose shores legend had peopled with wonders and perils, was ere long fringed with Greek factories, and changed its name to "Euxelnos," as its harbours became known. It would seem to have been the inexhaustible wealth of the fisheries of the Black Sea which first tempted the Greeks forward; but other and not less valuable sources of wealth were soon discovered. The mountainous southern shore of the Euxine was rich in timber. iron, conner, and red-lead. The flat northern shore was a vast corn-land, whose breadth surprised even Ionians accustomed to the fertile valley of the Macander. Gold was to be found in Colchis. and also came down a trade route from the Urals, which ended on the shores of the "Masutic Lake," which we know as the Sea of Azov. Between the middle of the eighth century and the end of the seventh the Euxine had become a Milesian sea. On the most Strope circ. projecting headland of Paphlagonia the rich colony of

720 R.C. Shope's had supplanted an old Asiatic settlement, and become the mart of Northern Asia Minor. To right and left other Milesian factories formed an unbroken chain between the Bosphorus and Colebis. Less than a century after her own foundation, Sinope was able to plant, on a table-shaped rock far to the cast, her flourishing daughter-town of Trapezus (Trebisond), destined in ages then far distant to supplant her as the centre of the trade of the Euxine.

Settlement was harder on the eastern shore, among the barbarous Thracians, than it had been in Asin. But it began in onessus, circ. the seventh century, and after a time a "Pentapolia" e00 h.c. of five allied towns—Odessus, Calintis, Tomi, Apoilonis, and Mesembris—rose between the month of the Danube and the entrance of the Bosphoros. Of these places the first four were colonies of Miletus.

Beyond the Danube to the north the Greek explorer found the plains of Southern Russia hold by the nomadic tribes of the Scythians—a race who dwelt in tents and waggons, and wandered

² The dates usually given for the foundation of Sinope and Trapozus are obviously too energy. They must be considerably posterior to Cyziens.

at large on the steppes with their flocks and herds, without possessing any fixed abode. They made no objection to the settlement of the new-comers on their shores, for they had enough and to spare of land, and had never thought of utilizing the bays and lagoons of their coast. In return for metal-work, cloth, linen, and wine, they sold to the settlers the hides of their oxen, and the gold and furs which came to them from the tribes of the far North, Nor did they object when the Greeks took to tilling the soil, and made the lower valleys of the Dnicper and Bug the great wheat. field of the world. Some of the Scythians were even influenced by their visitors enough to make them turn their attention to husbandry. The chief towns in their land were Olhia, near the mouth of the Borvethenes (Dniener), Panti-

capacium, on the strait which joins the Buxine and Fanticapacium, the Macotic lake, and Tanals, the last outnost of circ. 600 a.c. Greek civilization, which lay far off to the north-east, at the estuary of the Don. All these were colonies of Miletus.

Where the Miletians worked on a grand scale, other Ionio states followed with more timid steps. Phoenen was the only town which sent a colony to the Euxino, and her settloment of Amisus was not founded till 586 n.c. But colonies in Thrace. in the north-eastern Access and on the Propontis soveral important places were established by the neighbours of Miletus. Perinthus, on the Thracian coast of the Propontis, was settled by Samos. The lorger and richer town of Abders, hard by the mouth of the Nestus, was founded by Claromenae. Marones. also in Thrace but further cast, was a China colony. The islanders of Paros seized the great Phoenician stronghold of Thases, and established a flourishing state on the resources of its silver-mines.

But it was the Dorlan state of Megara, in European Greece, which most nearly approached the achievements of Miletus. The misrule of the oligarchy of birth, which governed The Meserian the town in the seventh century, seems to have been the fruitful source of emigration. Megarians founded Astacus and Chalcedon, in Bithynia, and a little later seized the Chalcedon and all-important haven of Byzantium on the Bosphores, Byzantium -a spot so pointed out by nature as the site for a 675-608 B.C. great town, that the Delphic oracle bade the settlers " build opposite

the city of the blind." This saying was a reflection on the discernment of their brethren, who had preferred to occupy the far less eligible site of Chalcedon, on the opposite shore. Some years later the Megarians found their way from Byzantium into the Euxine, and built Mesembria, in Thrace, and Heracles-Chersonesus, in the Tauric Chersonese (Grimca)—a town which, twenty-five centuries later, was to be famous as Bebastopol. A second Heracles, on the Bithynian coast of the Euxine, was also a flourishing Megarian colony.

While the Aegean and the Enxine were gradually being surcoloaise in rounded with a ring of Hellenic cities, a not less the West important inovement of colonization was taking

place in the West, along the sheres of the Ionian Sea.

At how early a date the Greeks had begun to visit Italy and Stelly, it is hard to say. Even in the Odyssey there seems to be some dim knowledge of lands to the West, and tradition claimed that Cumae in Campania, the first Greek town in Italy, was founded so far back as the eleventh century. This date is probably erroneous, for no other city can show an origin extending beyond the middle of the eighth century. At the same time, Cumae was undoubtedly founded earlier than any other city beyond the Ionian Sca, and may have existed by the year 800 n.c. Chalcis and Erctris were the ploneers of exploration in the West just as they had been in Thrace. Seeking for opportunities of trade, their vessels coasted round Malea and Tacan-

The Obsticitions in the rum, and up the western coast of Greece. The west foundation of Coreyra, on its island opposite Epirus, by an Einstrian colony, is the first landmark in this chapter of history. To cross from Coreyra to the Inpygian promontory, the head of Italy, is only a matter of a few hours, and then the course lies clear along the Calabrian coast.

Italy and Sicily, at the moment of their discovery, were mainly occupied by a number of tribes—Messapians and Ocnotrians, Steels and Sicanians—whom the Greeks, vaguely recognizing a distant kinship with themselves, called "Pelasgic." But the remoter regions of both countries were held by more alien races. The Phoenicians of Carthuge possessed the western extremity of Sicily: the mysterious neonle who called themselves Rasena—

though the Greeks knew them as "Tyrrheni," and the Romans as "Etruscens"—were to be found in Northern and part of Central Italy.

The Italian and Sicilian coasts must have been well known to the Greeks before they ventured to settle on them. It was probably the result of an extensive comparison of sites that the Chalcidians planted Comac on the most favoured spot of Italy, the Bay of Naples. But Cumae long remained isolated in the north : the earliest groups of cities were established not on the Camranian but the Occeptrian and Sicilian sheres. The first place whose foundation-date has come down to us is Naxos in Sicily, a city set between the alones of Mount Actna and the son. Here Theceles of Chalcis, the pioneer of all settlers in Sicily, set up the altar of "Apollo the Guider" in 735 s.c. In the very next year, Archias of Corinth, an aristograf exiled for turbulence by the eligarchy of his native place, discovered a splendid harbour fifty miles south of Naxos, and laid on the island of Ortygia the foundations of the great Darian city of Syracuse. Before ten years were

passed, the space between Syracuse and Naxos had been filled by the foundation of the Chalcidian towns of Catana and Leontini, and the Megarian settlement of Megara Hyblaca. Next the best harbour of the Stellion 789-728 R.C.

Struit was occupied by Coalcidians and Cutassaus, and became

Strait was occupied by Coalcidians and Cumasans, and became the port of Zoncle, better known in later days as Messens.

Meanwhile another group of colonles in Occubria was arising.

Its central points were the slater cities of Sybaris and Croton, both founded by Achaian onigrants from the north of Peloponnesus. We know nothing of the causes which set these Achaians wandering, nor did their country, either before or after, display any similar taste for colonization. But Sybaris in the rich lowlands of the Cruthls, and Croton on the breezy Lacinian promontory, were alike the settling-places of strong awarms of Achaians. They grew and flourished, reduced to russalage the Oenotrian tribes of the inland, and established little empires which stretched right across the instep of Italy, from the Ionian to the Tyrrhenian Sea. Sybaris planted on the western waters Latls and Postdonia opposite her own

position on the eastern sea; Croton, in a similar way, settled Terina and Tember.

Of the other colonies of Italy, Tarentum owed its origin to the sedition of the Partheniae at Sparta, as we have already liad to

relate. Locri, called Epizeubyrii to distinguish it Tarentum_ 706 B.C. from its mother-country, was the fruit of a similar Losei. civil discord among the Locrians of Central Greece. 700 R.C Rhegium, the town which faced Zanels across the Rhegium. 715 B C. waters of the Sicilian Strait, drew the bulk of its population from the Messenian oxiles who fled abroad after the fall of Ithome and the death of Aristodemus. All three were large and flourishing towns, but Tarentum so far exceeded the others as to rival Sybaris, and became after her fall the first Greek city of Italy. Besides the places we have mentioned, many other Greek colonies studded the Osnotrian and Calabrian coasts, so that the whole district gradually sequired the name of " Greater Greece" ('H prydly 'Ellir, Magna Grascia).

Meanwhile the Greek colonies in Sicily were advancing westward, both on the northern and the southern coasts of the island. Dorians from Rhodes settled Gela, Dorians from Megara Selinus, on the shore which fronts towards Africa; while the Chalcidians of Zancie established Himera on the central point of the coast which looks out on Italy. Syracuse, a contary after her own foundation, planted Camarina at the southern angle of the island, and Gela shortly after founded Acragas (Agrizentum), which ere long colipsed its mother-city, and became the second place in Sicily. By the sixth century a continuous line of Greek colonies encircled the island, except at its western corner, where the Carthaginian strongholds of Lilybasum and Drepanum and the native town of Segesta maintained their independence. The Sicels of Eastern and the Sicanians of Western Sicily became the vassals of the new-comers, just as their Occorrian kinsmen in Italy had fallen a prey to the Sybarites and Crotoniates. Syracuse alone ruled over several Sicel tribes, and extended her influence for into the faterior of the island.2

¹ Dates of the Greek colonies of Sicity not given above: Geln, 650 n.c.; Himsen, 648 n.c.; Selinus, 628 n.c.; Cumarina, 689 n.c.; Acragas, 580 n.c.

Both the Italiot and Siceliot 1 Greaks owed the wealth which they soon accumulated to the raw produce of the virgin lands they occupied, rather than to commercial or manufacturing activity. The corn of Metaportum, the wool of the flocks of Sybaris, the timber and pitch of Oroton, the oil of Acragas, the horses of Syracuse, the fisheries of Tarentum, became famous throughout the Greek world for the mighty fortunes that they bred-fortunes so large that the millionaires of the West surpassed the wildest dreams of the plutocratic oligarchs of the mother-country. Sybaris for example was, at the height of her career, probably the largest Greak city in the world, and the tasteless luxury of her wealthier classes kept the inhabitants of the older lands supplied with a nover-ending series of good stories. Miletus was the only town to the East that could vie in size or prosperity with the Western colonies; Argos and Athens, Thebes and Sleyon, would have anneared poverty-stricken in comparison with thom.

Two groups of colonies in the West which lay outside Italy and Sicily deserve mention. The first was the sole creation of the Phocasans of Ionia. Instead of turning their main The Phocasans attention to their own seas, these caterprising traders at Massellas, sought out the far West. Braving the competition of the Phoenician and the Etruscan, they felt their way along the codist of Europe even to the Straits of Gibraliar. Their trade with Tartessus, the port of Southern Spain, and with the Celts who dwelt about the Rhone, brought them great wealth. About the year 600 n.c. they resolved to furnish themselves with a secure half-way house to Spain, and built the town of Massilia just heyond the most easterly of the mouths of the Rhone. After many struggles with the natives, the place was firmly established, and became the centre of a number of smaller factories on the coasts of Catalonia and Provence, of whitch Emporiae was the most important.

The second line of colonies which deserves record was as purely the creation of Cerinth as those of Gaul were of Phoenea. Corinth had occasionally planted colonies both in the Aegean and in Sicily; Potidaea and Syracuse have already been cited. But the great

¹ Note the distinction between ²Irahês or Zirahês, a barbarinu native of Italy or Sicily, and ²Irahiérns and Σirahiérns, a Greek colonist settled therein.

field of her energy was the north-western coast of Greece, and the Illyrian shore opposite Italy. Here, both while corintains in also remained as oligaroby and when the oligarchy North-Western had fallen before the tyrnat Cypselus, her settlements Greene. continued to increase. At Corcyra the earlier Eretrian colony was swamped by the incoming, in 708 n.c., of a swarm of Corinthians under the exited oligarch Chersicrates. At Corcyrs. 708 B.C. Along the coast of Acarnania a line of forlified ports drawe the natives up into the hills. These towns-the only Greek colonies whose site was taken by force from another Greek tribe, though a barbarous one-were Sollium, Alvzia, Astanta, and Acadorium. Leucas, the feland off the coast, was also taken Assermantan from the Assertaniaus and received a Corinthian population. Similarly, the southernmost district of Epirus was conquered and became the territory of Ambracia. Finally, Corinth and Coreyra foined to plant further north, in Hlyria, the

towns of Apellonis and Epidamuus.

White her Acarnanian colonies always kept up a close alliance with Corinth, and followed her political leading, Coroyra from the navorate of first tooks an apposite course, Perhaps the Eubogan Coroyra.

Best tooks an apposite course, Perhaps the Eubogan Coroyra.

Use Continting from its allegiance. At any rate, within forty years of her foundation Coroyra set herself up as a rival for the Hyrian and Halian trade of Corinth, and engaged in war with the mother-city. The first naval buttle known to Greek historians was fought between Corinth and Coroyra in 664 n.c.

After maintaining her independence for the best part of a century, Coroyra was conquered by the tyrant Perisader, but after his

death she shook off the Corinthian yoke for ever, and remained the hitter and mischlevous enemy of the older city.

Only one more sphere of Greek colonial activity remains to be catalogued—the northern coast of Africa. The legends which tell

opress.

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contary are feelish inventions, for the Achaians of prehistoric days had already met the Libyans as allies in an attack on Egypt. But the dread of Phoenician civalry kept the Greaks from settlement ill about the middle of the seventh century.

Then the Dorian islanders of Thera in the Cyclades,

strengthened by Pelopornesian exiles, sailed agrees to the land conceite Crete, and, after many trials and privations, succeeded in fulfilling a decree of the Delphian Apollo, which bade them establish a city in Libya rich in fleeces." Cyrene was the fruit of their expedition. Here the emigrants mixed more freely with the people of the land than in any other Greek settlement. Aristoteles, the Theracan lender, was taken as king by the Libyana . of the district, and received the royal name of Battus. His family intermarried with the natives, and his comrades followed their example, so that the blood of the whole community grew to be but half Hellenic. Cyrono became the mother-city of Barca and Russperides-towns rather more to the west. For two centuries she continued to flourish under kings who, from father to son, alternately bere the native name of Battus and the Greek name of Areesilade. She grow tich on her flecks and herds, her cornfields and her export of eliphium, a plant found in no other part of the Hellenie world.

Egypt had been known to the Greeks long before Greek history begins. Achoian descents on the Delta are chronicled on Egyptian monuments, and their ochose are heard in the Homeric The Orenke peems. But trade with Egypt was not established for many contuntes. The Egyptians were the Japanese of the ancient world, and kept their kingdom absolutely sealed against Western merchants. Only the Phoenicians were allowed to trade to the mouths of the Nile. It was not till the downfall of Egyptian greatness, when the empire of the Pharnolis had sunk into a cluster of principalities sometimes subject to and semestimes free from the supremey of the kings of Aethiopia and Assyrin, that the Milesians ventured to approach the Delta and open a precations trade with the natives. No safe traffic was possible till the Pharache of the twenty-sixth dynasty reunited Egypt, and, favoured by the decline of Assyria, made her once more a strong kingdom, Pearmoreichne, first of these Saits Phamola, had mised himself to empire by the use of mercenaries bired from among the Isulans and Carians. He retained them about his person, and allowed their countrymen free access to a mart on the Canopic channel of the Nile. The Mileslans and other traders from Greek Asia flocked in orowds to the new emporium, which they named Nancratis.

Fre long it grew into a flourishing Helleuie town, and served Noncesatia, as a starting-point for numerous explorers, who size, 600-flo. wandered over Egypt, and brought back such reports of her immemorial antiquity and countless monuments as completely puzzled the Greeks, who had no conception of any history that run back more than some five or six hundred years. Indeed, Egypt so impressed the Greek mind that it imbibed a notion that craything ancient must owe its origin to that country—a bellof which caused much confusion in the bistorical ideas of later days.

It is necessary to remember that a Greek colony was by no means similar to the colonies of our own days. The Greek emigrants character of formed new states of their own, which owed nothing except a filial respect and certain honorary dues to ealpates. the mother-city. Instances to the contracy are very rare. Cerinth alone seems to have retained some authority over her colonies; she used even to send out annual magistrates to Potidoon, while her Acarosnian settlements were bound to her by a strict commercial league. But in the vast majority of cases a sentimontal tic plane connected the parent state with her offenring, The political development of the polony was often on very different lines from that which the mother-country would have dictated: por was this numatural, for it was the classes which were discontanted at home that set out to find new abodes. From this fact, too, it resulted that the constitution of the colonies were often unstable; there were no old local traditions to keep man steady, while the population was often composed of discordant elements, and always contained a very integ proportion of men of stirring and adventurous dispositions. Hence the greatness of the colonies was brilliant rather than solid, and their power was liable to sudden changes from vigour to absolute collarse. Wealth was so exclusively their aim that the rigid political discipling, which formed the character of the citizen in the states of old Greece, was allowed to disappear. Individual interest became far more powerful in proportion to patriotic impulses than in the mothercountry.

We have already mentioned in an earlier chapter the preminent

part taken by the oracle of Delphi in colonization. It was always customary for the cokint, or offical leader of a swarm, The colonies of settlers, to ask for guidance from Apollo the god of ways, as to the best situation for the town he totended to found. Sometimes the answer given was raque, at others it was disastrous; such was, for example, the oracle which sent the Spartan Dorious and his followers to plant a colony on the Cinyps, a position too close to Carthage for safety. The endeavour had to be abandoned after rainous losses in war. But, as a rule, the advice of Apollo was abrowd and practical. No doubt the Delphio priestbook had unrivalled opportunities for acquiring geographical information from the countless pilgrims from all parts with whom they came in contact. Probably, then, the would be settlers were merely dealing with a well-trained emigration agency where they thought they were consulting an infallible prophet. Yet still the discrimination which the omele showed in recommending situs for colonization was so great that we cannot wonder that it sequired thereby a high reputation. Inspiration was in this case only the perfection of penetration and common sense, and it was the practies! wiedom of the pilasthood which won them a position of insportrace to all Helicaic lands such as they could not have acquired

in any other way.

CHAPTER X.

THE AGE OF THE TYRANGS

In the seventh and sixth centuries before Ghrist nearly all the Helicetic states went through a parled of internal disorder and strife, one of whose symptoms was the widespread emigration which has been described in the last chapter. The phenomens of violent change and revolution are found no less in the colonial states of Asia Minor and Sicily than in the older cities of European Greece. The causes were not quite similar in the colonies and their mether-countries, but the symptoms were the same. Everywhere old constitutional forms were disappearing, and before the state could attain to a stable form of government several genera-Gous spons themselves in actition and civil war. In most cases the period of disorder culminated in the establishment of a "Tyranny," that is, in the estate of power by an acconstitutional and despetic severalge.

The name "Tyrant" in Greece was applied sololy with reference to the way in which a ruler gained his position, not the way in which he used it. It does not imply grees personal

the word depravity or political misrale; indeed, many of the "Tyrante." "tyrante" were mon abounding in good qualities, who used their power to the advantage of their country. The ward simply implies that the ruler enjoyed an uncountrilled despoted power, not acquired by constitutional needs. In the strictest sense of the word, a king who tild away with all checks on his personal power, and ruled autocraftcally, became a "tyrant;" and thus we flad Phoidea of Argos given the name, though he was a legitimate monarch of the old stock of the Hernethiae. So also a diceave shosen by the people in time of stress, and entrusted with absolute

power, might be styled "tyrant," though he owed his elevation to the will of the state itself; such was the case with Pittacus of Mitylens. In these instances it was the abnormal method in which the power was acquired, and its unlimited extent, which won for its holder his unenviable name. But in the majority of cases the typant was one who had no rights, either by hereditary succession or by election, to the position which he ecoupled. Sometimes he was a military advecturer; sometimes on ambitious aristocrat: still more frequently was be the champion and leader of the proletariate ground down by an oppressive eligarchy. But whatever was the origin of his authority, or the manner in which he used it, the name clung to him if only his position was unconstitutional and his nower unchecked.

A certain uniformity can be traced in the political enteer of most Grook states, after they had got rid of their old patriarchal kings. In the panjority of cases the royal power passed. into the hands of an eligarchy of birth. Sometimes chigarchias the direct line of the old herolo house died out; and, instead of chaosing one of their own number to take the scoptre, the princes and objets who had formed the council and restricted the authority of the late king divided the power acrong thomselves, and transmitted it to their heirs; so that the rights and privileges formally possessed by the menarch became the property of a limited number of great familles. In other cases the kingly line continued to exist, but its head was gradually stripped of all his power and prerogatives by the great families, and became a more puppet in the hands of the oligarchy, only useful as officially representing the people in roligious ceremonies or state pageants. "Kings" of this kind, who were little better than priests or public nensioners, existed in some cases down to the fifth century.

The close eligarchic rings of noble families, smoon whom the royal power came to be divided, solden succeeded in maintaining

themselves for many generations. Their government was usually oppressive and ill-managed, and their mont of the fouds with each other never-unding. They could never

gain for themselves the respect and reverence which had appertained to the old patriorchal kings. The mountaby had in its fayour its immemorial antiquity; when it was replaced by oligarchy, the new government had no traditions on which to rely, and stood or fell on its own merits. These were usually small enough, and, for the bulk of the citizens, the extinction of the royal house was an unmidigated misfortune. The great families are, in the traditions of every state, accused of everweening arrogance, open uminiministration of justice, and lawless violence in dealing with their inferiors. The old lings had had every interest in holding the balance straight between the various classes of their subjects; their successors, on the other hand, ruled entirely for the advantage of a small section of the population, and showed the most evokal disregard for the rights of the remainder. appressive character of their rule was, of course, oven more marked then usual to these cities where the ruling classes were different in blood from the main body of the people, such, for example, as these states of Northern Poloponnesus in which a Dorina aristoerney dominested over an Achaian or Ionian ropulace. But even where a race-haired did not embitter the situation, the relations between the rulers and the ruled were always unsatisfactory.

A fair example of the history of a Greek state in its progress from kingship to tyrauny through oligarahy and civil strife is prethe tyronte sented by Corinth. That city had, like so many of of Certain, the Peloponnesian states, been conquered by a band of Dorlans, who did not expel the former Acolle inhabitants, but merely reduced them to a state of juferiority. The descendants of King Alôtes, the Herocloid prince who had led the favoders, held the throne for some centuries; but about the year 750 a.c. the reigning sovereign was deposed by an oligarchic conspiracy. Two hundred Derion families, all of whom claimed a descent from Bacchis-one of the earlier kings of the house of Alètes-soized and kept possession of the government of the state. They continued to hold the reins of power for about ninety years-a period of perpetual strife and unrest. Body after body of the Corinthians sought refuse from the misgovernment of the Bacchiadae by departing to found distant colonies. Corcym and Syracuse, for example, each owed its origin to an emigration led by a prominent citizen who had quarrelled with the oligarchs. The state was fost lansing into anarohy when a final explosion of popular wrath broke the power of the oppressive caste. It was led by one Cypselus, a Bacchiad on his mother's side.

though lils father Betion was one of the unurivileged multitude. His mixed descent of course excluded him from poll-orneous. ties! life, but he had enough of the blood of the Bac- ess-ess n.c. chiadae in his veins to make him resent this disability. Accordingly he took advantage of the sectling discoutent of the city to place himself at the head of the populace and overthrow the Bacchiadae by force. For thirty years he reigned as "tyraut" of Cerinth, basing his power on his popularity with the multitude, and not even keeping an armed force at his back to guard against revolts, so firm was his position. Against the remains of the oligarchy he was stern and releatless, slaving some, barishing many, and heavily taxing all. But with the bulk of the people the relief of being delivered from nanreby made him not unpopular, his autocratic government being for better than no government at all. If the contributions which he levied from the state were large, the use which he made of them-especially the magnificent offerings which he presented to the Delphian Apollo-was not much to be blamed; and the splendour of his court reflected glory on the city. Cypselus died on the throng, and was succeeded by his son Perfonder, who developed all the avil sides of his Perioudes, father's character, but otherwise only resembled him 628-585 n.c. in the masterful activity of his nature. Been in the purple, and remembering nothing of the popular origin of his father's power, he showed bluself a hard master to the Corinthians. He built himself a fortress-palace on the Acropolis, and surrounded himself with a body of foreign mercenaries, for whose support he levied vast sums from the citizens. But his interference with the private life of his subjects was the worst point of his rule. Misrole of He set himself to isplate man from man by breaking Perlander. up all apportunities for intercourse. He closed the Gymnasium to prevent the young men from meeting, and prohibited the public banquets which Derian custom had made one of the most prominent features of city life. His spice were always abroad, seeking to discover the elements of possible combinations against him; and when any citizen made himself too prominent in wealth or popularity, he was driven into exile or slain without trial by the tyrant. A legged told how Perlander had learnt this policy from a brother despot, Thrasybūlus of Miletus. Soon after his accession, it was

soid, he sent to sek the advice of the Milssian as to the best way to conduct his government. Throughdlus sent no verbal answer, but led the Cortathian messenger to a natch of corn, and then walked round it, outting down with his staff any ears that stood above the rest of the srop. His action was duly reported to Pariander, who took the hint to heart, and carried it out by relentlessly destroying any man whose property or personal influences reised him above his follows, and made him a possible leader of revolt. These murders, and the occasional freaks of epiteful insult towards the whole body of citizens in which he indulged, made Perlander the best-hated man to Greece. His private life was miserable; he was the author of his wife's death, and lived at cumity with his only surviving son, who died before him, so that the tyrangy passed at his death to a nephew. Yet the laviele magnificence of his court, the crowd of poets and artists whom he maintained, his firm hand and subtle policy, won him a great name among the sovereigns of his time. The curt anylogs which ambadied his views of life even caused him to be reckened amount the "Seven Sagas" of Grocce. He conquered Epidagras and Acgina, recovered Careyra, and reigned for forty years in unbroken power. But the main result of his life had been to make byzanny impossible for the future at Corintle. Periander's arbitrary violence, his ororosalvo taxation, and still more his insulting contempt for his subjects, were remembered for centuries, and made the Corinthians

Foll of tymony at successor Pseumotichus hardly held the sceptre for derlath.

a year, and fell by the deggers of conspirators at the moment that he was attacked by the Spartans, who were received as liberators, and wen the eternal gratitude and alliance of Curinth by doing away with the last traces at the rule of the Cynselidae.

The slory of the rise and fall of this house of tyrants is eminently typical of the time; all over Greece similar events were taking

Type place. In town after town a popular leader delivered the people from an oppressive oligarchy, made himself and cre long were driven from their threnes by the same force which had created them. In many case the typenia lest their authority in the second generation; in a few a single life

sufficed to show all the vicissitudes of rise, prosperity, and fall. Sleyen was the only town where the tyrany lasted for more than a century, and where the sceptre was handed from father to son for four generations. But at Sieyon the circumstances were peculiarly fivourable to the tyrants. The house of Orthagores (600-560 n.c.), represented a national rising of Ionians against Dorians, and moreover its members were man of moderation as well as of ability, and committed none of the atrocites which disgreed the tyrants of most cities. Tet even they full at last, and left no patherents behind them. At Megara the lintery of the one tyrant Theagones sums up all the changes which took three generations of Oprinth and four at Siczyon to work themselves out. At Atheas the Pessistratides ruled for two generations; at Symouse the three sons of Doinomones complet only twenty years. At no place was appthing approaching to a permanent dynasty founded.

Is must not be sumposed that democratic leaders were the only men who ever asnired to tyranny. Phalaris of Agrigentum, perhaps the most cruel of all his class, was an oligarch, who succeeded in ntilizing his tenure of office as mogistrate, and seized the supreme nower. Aristodemus of Curane was a successful general, who had saved his state from an Ricuscan invasion. Photdon of Argos, as we have already mentioned, was an hereditary king, who cast off the limits of constitutional authority, and made himself absolute. Still, in the majority of cases, tyranny was the way from eligarchy to democracy, the inevitable penalty Tyrannya which a state had to pay for ridding itself from the ovils of government by the great families. Con- development. sidered in this light, the tyrauny was not an unmitigated svil. crushed the pride and ended the reckless fends of the oligaraha, and taught thom to live with their fellow-citizens as equals, even though the equality only consisted in servitude to the same tyrant. A state which had once gone through the stage of tyronny never fell back again into the worse forms of family eligarchy

If we proceed to inquire into the internal administration of the tyrinits, we find that their government had many involvable points. It was the stock complaint of the disposessed oligarchy relieved to that the tyrinit was a lavish spender of money; but the tyrinits objects on which the money was laid out were usually great public works of high advantage to the state. The real key to the despot's financial policy was that he atrove to keep the poorer classes quiet, by finding them employment on works for which the price was paid by the rich—a scheme not unknown to statesmen of our own day. It may be noticed that the tyrants were the first to lend public patronage to art and letters, and that their reigns were

everywhere a period of rapid intellectual development.

Abroad they distinguished themselves by the close relations with foreign powers into which they entered. Periander was the close ally of the King of Lydia; and his successor's Egyptian name's seems to point to an equally intimate connection and alliance with the Saito Phatachs. Polyerates of Samos was bound by an affensive and defensive alliance with Arnasis of Egypt. Militades of the Thracian Oberseenesse married into the royal house of the neighbouring berlavian tribe. Pelsistiatus "strengthened bimself by men and money drawn from the lands by the Strymon," that is, by Thracian mercennaise and gold. The tyrants, in short, tought their subjects to enter into more friendly relationship with "the barbarian" than had formerly been esteemed possible. The moin result of this connection was an homediate increase in

All the accounts of the tyrints which have come down to us are coloured by the hatred which the dispossessed digarchies here them. The tales of their currenties should therefore be received with the grantest caution. There is no doubt that they numbered many cruel and unscrapulous men among them; but when we remember the evils from which they delivered the mass of their countrymen, it does not seem too much to say that a perpetual freedom from the worse hourers of oligarchy was cheaply bought at the price of forty or fifty pears of rule by a tyrant.

the facilities for the expansion of commerce.

l'assimetichus.

CHAPTER XI.

THE EARLY HISTORY OF ATTICA.

The greatness of Athens in historical times has produced an impression that in early days also she must have been a considerable cists. In real fact, however, the reverse would seem to have been the case: down to the sixth century Athens was a city of very recond-tate importance, and her history was obscure and uninteresting. It has only been rescued from obtivious because the brilliancy of her after-career led men to trace back as far as possible the origins of her success.

That Attica was, at the epoch of the Bosotian and Dorlan migrations, shooled by fogitives both from the north and the Poloponnesus, we have already related. But the bolk of the refugers passed on to Asia, and built up the cities of Ionia. When the omigrants had departed, Attica relapsed into her previous obscurity; the only trace of the stirring times of the Ionic migration which remained was the fact that many of the great Athenian families of later days drew their origin from one or other of the crited races that had sojourned in the land. It is not impossible that the full Hellenization of the "Pelasgic" tribes of Attica runs no further back than the time of the migrations, and that the legend which told how the Athenian kings "received Ion into their family" merely means that the influx of Ionians from Pelaponnesus absorbed the Atticans into the Hellenie rationality.

When the swarms of emigrants cleared off, and Athens is again discernible, the crown had passed from the old royal house of the Georopidae to a family of exiles from Peloponesus.

Melanthus, a Caucon from Pylos, had fought in momenty as single combat—so legend tells—with Xanthus the Athens King of the Bosotians, when Attlea was invaded from the north,

and slain his enamy. Thymostas, the aged and childless King of Atheos, made the champion heir to his throne, as a mark of the gratitude of the nation. A generation later the Dorian invasion, which had everwhelmed Corinth and torn away Megara from the Attie dominion, swept up to the very gates of Atheus. An oracle declared that the city would never full if its ruler perished by the hand of the invaders; therefore King Codrus diaguised himself as a pensant, ast out for the Dorian camp, struck down the first man be met, and was himself slain by the second. The foreston fulled, and the Athenians, to perpetuate the memory of their monarch's patriotism, would not allow the title of "king" to be borne by the descendants who succeeded him on the throne, but changed the name to "archon," or "rules." Twelve Codrids here the title; then, two centuries later, the archonship became an office not tenable for life, but only for ten years.

These legends evidently cover some obscure changes in the internal history of Attles. We may surmise that it was not entirely by adoption that the Poloponnesian family of the Melachtidae obtained rule in Attlea. Nor, again, is it likely that the national gratitude to Codrus would have taken the form of depriving his house of their royal (litte and the proregatives which

it implied.

Be this as it may, we find that in the eighth century Attice had diffed into the same stage of constitutional development as the majority of other Greek states. The supreme magistracy was at first confined to a number of families who defined to descend from Cedrus; but about 710 n.c. these houses had to take into partnership all the Attio noblity, and the office of archem was opened to every member of the class of "Eupatridae." When, thirty years later, the powers of the single archem were divided among a board of mine colleagues, all hearing the old title, the Athenian constitution assumed the characteristics of the ordinary ofigurally.

Oligarchy at Athens showed all the features which marked its rule elsewhere. Misgovernment was notversal, the administration of justice fell into contempt, the non-noble freeman was excluded from all share in the administration of the state, and was continually expended to the lawlessness and insolvance of the more recklass

members of the governing costs.

When Attic history becomes clear and continuous, somewhere about the middle of the seventh century, we find the government composed of the nine archous and a council of nobles The Athenian called the "Arcopagus," from the place ("Aprile rdyes, oligarchy. the Hill of Area) at which it met. This council was exclusively Empatrid in its composition, and included all ex-archons. It was the sugreme deliberative body of the state, exercised control over the applions—for an oligardly never trusts its magistrates—and was also the supreme judicial court for homicide.1 Of the board of archons, the senior member, the Auchon Eponymus ("Aggar everyone) gave his name to the year, and excreised on honorary presidency in the state; the second, or King-Archen ('Apxan, Securets), carried on the old position of the monarch as religious head and representative of the state; the third, or Polemarck, was minister of war and commander-in-chief; the remaining six junior archous were called Thesmothetas, and were charged with the administration of the different branches of justice,-everything but hemicide was within their competence.

Below the Eupatridus lay the bulk of the population, divided from very early times into Geomori and Demiurgi, or husbandmen and actions—a rough distinction, which had The factions come to have little meaning in later days. The real of Attiondivision by the seventh century had come to be local, and everything turned on the feelings of the parties known as Pedias, Diagria, and Paralla-the Plain, the Upland, and the Shore. The men of the Plain were the rich Eupstrid landowners who occupied the lowlands of the two fertile tracts of Attica, the Thrinsler and Athenian Plains. The "Shore," the const-slip of Western Attion. was the dwelling of a population supported partly by fishing and partly by commerce, who formed a class intermediate between the aristocratic landowners and the Diagricus of Northern and Eastern Attica. These Uplanders occupied the atil bills of the interior; they were mostly shepherds and herdsmen, and formed the rudest and poorest class in the country.1

¹ Is hose been much debated whether the Areopagus and the primitive council were the same body; probably they were.

Those who wish to study the dry and obscure question of the exact meaning of the Mountaries, Trittyes, Phratrys, and other primitive Attle divisions of the people, are referred to purely constitutional histories.

The first recorded outbreak of troubles between the oligarchy of Repatricae and the nation that it oppressed turned on the question

of legal penalties. The people were driven to despeir by the arbitrary and unequal incidence of punishments. No one could over foresee the end of a suit, for the archons varied the judgments at pleasure. Hence there was a universal ery for the publication of laws which should fix some proportion between the offence and the populty. The demand of the citizens was at last met by the nobles consenting to the promulgation of a written code of laws. It was drawn up by the Arolega Draco, and came into course in the year 621 B.C. Tradition asserts that the godo was que of Counitiented severity. An Athenian of a later day exclaimed that "the laws of Draco scemed to have been written with blood rather than with ink." It is highly probable that the aristocracy chose to leave themselves a power of applying very severs punishments, and stated the penalty of each offence at its possible maximum; but we need not believe the legends which assort that Drace affixed the punishment of death to almost every crime. The one fragment, indeed, of his legislation which has come down to us deals with a mitigation of the law of murder, and provides that involuntary homicodes should not be trepted as outlaws liable to be slain by every one who mot them, but be almost under the protection of the state till they could make compensition to the family of the slain man,1

Whatever was the exact bearing of the legislation of Deace, it proved a very inadequate palliative for the evils which were conspicant toubling the state. Within a few years of its proved 198 30.0 political faction teck place. Oylon was a noble of great wealth and distinction. He had been a victor at the Olympic games, and boasted of a numerous troop of friends and dependents. Moreover, he had married the daughter of Theogenes, tyrant of Magna, and had the excuer of his father-in-law constantly before his eyes. Counting on the weakness of the oligarchic government, and the universality of public discontent with it, Cylon determined

¹ If a homicide kept away from markets and games and festivals, and yet was sought out and slow by the kinsmen of his victim, the men who slow him were to be held themselves guilty of murder.

on a hold attempt to make himself tyrant of Athens. On a concerted day bis friends were joined by a band of mercenaries from Megara, and seized the Acropolis. But he had not troubled himself to ensure the goodwill of the populace, and the majority looked on while he and his faction were blockaded in the citadel by all the forces that the government could muster. The chief conspirator escaped by night, but his followers were ere long starved out. They sat down as suppliants at the alter of Atliena, and threw open the gates to the besiegers. Megacles, the archon in command, induced them to quit their sanctuary by a promise that their lives should be spared; but the moment that they had left the Acropolis he caused them to be put to death. Hence a deep stain of sacrilege and perjury was held to attach to Megacles and his descondants, the house of the Alemaconidac, Again and again. in later times the cry was mised that the "family under the curse" ought to be expelled from Athena.

CHAPTER XII.

SOLON AND PERSTEATUR.

A rew years after the Cylonian conspiracy we find Albens engaged in a long and doubtful war with Megara. Perhaps the tyrant war with Theagenes may have commenced it to avenge his regard, etc. con-in-law; but long after Theagenes had passed 400-800 May the strife continued. The weakness of the Athenian eligately is shown plainly enough by the fact that they were quite unable to cope with the smaller state to the west. Even Salamis, the island which lies full in view of Athens, and is divided by less than a mile of water from the Athie shore, fell into the hands of the Megarians; for Athens had as yet no ships to put in line against the flourishing newy which had planted the many colonies of Megaran.

It was during a critical period of the Megatian war that the name of Solon is first heard. He was a Eupatrid by birth, a men

setem. of high personal lategrity and attractive character, who had won from the people a respect which they paid to few of his caste. He was a practiced outlor and a poot his stirring verses played at Athens the same part that the warsongs of Tyrtheus had played at Sparts, and induced his desponding follow-citizens to persevere to an expectably hopeless contest. "Rather would I be," he saug, "a man of Phologandres or Sichnes' than an Athenian, if I am to be pointed at as one of those who abandoned Balamis to the enemy." The savesam told, and the war was continued. Solon himself was put at the head of an arpedition which can the blockade of the Salaminian Strait, hastily landed on the island, and succeeded in driving out the Magarian

¹ Obscure islands in the Cyclades.

garrison. He even carried the Athenian arms up to the very gates of the heatile city, and seized for a mement its harbour of Nisses. The war had still many vicissitudes, and Athens was ere long reduced to the defensive again; but her citizens nover forgot the exploits of the soldier-poet, and continued to regard him as the one possible saviour of the community. Probably he might have become tyrant of Atties had he wished, but he was a loyal

servant of the state, and bad no personal ambition, After some years the war with Megura was ended by the arli-

tration of Sparia, and Athens retained normancht possession of Salarnis. We need not attach any importance to the legand which states that Solen influenced the Lacodsemonians in favour of Athens by quoting to them a line which he interpolated in the Hind, to the effect that Alax of Salamis ranged his ships on the Typian beach beside those of Atheus. The argument would lanva been worthless, and Solon was not a furger. A little later Solon nonnired favourable notice throughout Greece for the prumineut part which he took in behalf of the Dolphia umale against its oppressors. The Phoclans of Crissa and Circha had been molesting the pilgrims who came to make lequiry of Anolio. Solon took up the cause of the injured, premiled a crusade against the wrong-doers, and, in conjunction with Claisthenes, tyrant of Sleyon, succeeded in subdaing the gullty towns, which received destruction as the reward of their sacrilege.

About 505 p.c. the internal troubles of Athens, which had been growing worse since the time of Oylon's conspiracy, came to a head. The particular grievance which brought matters to a crisis was the question of the law of question at debt. It was the same problem which, a bundred years lates, was to tax the ingenuity of the statesmen of Rome, in the days of the struggle between the patricians and plebeings. A series of years of war and bad harvests had brought down the neover landholders of Attion to a condition of abject misery; to propure sustenance for the moment they mortgaged their little holdings to Eupatrid capitalists. Many had even borrowed money on the security of their own persons—an act which, under the legislation of Drace, made them liable to be sold as slaves by their orgditors if they failed in due payment of the debt. Attlea was

threatened with the total extinction of her yeoman class; the inarched pillars, which witnessed to the mortgages, stood in nearly every field; the bankrupt debtor might even be seen dragged off in chains to be exposed in the slave-markets of Lydia or Egypt. Either the rain of the state or a bloody revolution was obviously at hand.

Scared at the results of their own usurious greed, the Eupatricks were induced to entrust power to Solon, as the one man whose integrity was acknowledged both by rich and poor, and who could still stave off a collision. In 584 s.a., if our chronology is correct, Solon was elected archoo, and entrusted with the duty of drafting a new constitution for the city.

The first part of Solon's legislation was directed to the practical and of alleviating the misurable condition of the debtors. He

Science forbade the lending of money on the security of the security of the seaschteels, become "The state honoured itself by abeliating the possibility of cost citizes solling another into slavery." A limit was placed to the amount of land which one capitalist should be allowed to accumulate, and the rate of interest due on horrowed money was fixed at a moderate amount. The state renounced all dobs owing to it from the power oldizens, whether due as arrears of taxes or as fixes. These measures beingth about a perceptible improvement in the condition of the community; the mortgage-pillars began to disappear from the fields, and the growth of prosperity supplied some ground for hoping that a crisis of the same kind would not recurrence.

A further relief to debtors was brought about by a measure of Soloc's which was primarily commercial in its character. Athena solomized the had down to this time been using money struck on

restrates the Phoidonian standard, such as circulated in Peloponnesus or Boootia. Solon made a sweeping change by striking ocine
based, not on this standard, but on that known as the Rubcin,
which was employed in the great commercial cities of Chalcis
and Eretria. This made the currency of Atheus interchatageable
with that of her wealthy Ionio neighbours, though it somewhat
complianted exchanges with Aegins or Thebes. Both politically
and commercially this was an excellent move. But Solon also

enacted that his new money, of which the dractum weighed only sixty-seven grains and a half, should be taken in payment for debts continued in the older currency, whose unit had weighed about ninety-two grains. This was equivalent to letting the debtor of 27 per cont. of the sum which he owed, for, although the number of dractums regaid to the lender was the same, their value was so diminished that a hundred only weighed as much as seventy-three of the Pheidenian coins that had been lent.

The constitutional reforms of Solon are even more important than his economical legislation. They were the starting-point of all political liberty in Atlana, and their importance The constitutions in the importance of the constitution of impressed on the chizens of later years that won of solon all early have were put down to him, just as all Spartan regulations came to be ascribed to Lyoungus. Solon was a mon of just and liberal soul, and a sincere friend of the people; but he was also a noble, with a rooted dislike to democration methods of government. His aim was to construct a constitution which should give the proletarinte an ultimate control over the administration of public affairs, without allowing them the power to interfere in matters of detail. The nobles were no longer to govern at their own good will and for their own benefit; but they—reinflowed by the richest of the non-noble classes—were to continue to administer the state, under due control and for the benefit of the whole contrunity.

Abolishing the political distinction between the Eupatridae and the unprivileged classes, Solon divided the people into ranks according to their weath. He substituted a "time-craey" for an "aristocaney," and made wealth, not characteristic, the test of digitality for office. The first of the four Solonian classes was called that of the Pentelexiomedicasi, and included, as its name shows, all citizens whose annual income from land was equivalent to five hundred medimal of corn, or exceeded that amount. The second class, that of the Hippers, or heights, comprised every one whose income ranged between five hundred and three hundred medimal. The third class, the Zeepise ("owners of a yoke of oxan"), included those whose income was more than a hundred and fifty medimal, and less than three hundred. Finally, the fourth class, or Thire, was composed of all whose income fell short of a hundred and fifty medimal. Landed

properly only was assessed, not commercial gains or hearded wealth, so that to qualify for the three higher classes a morehant or artisan had to invost in a smaller or larger plot of land.

This arrangement placed the majority of the Espatrides in the first two classes, while the bulk of the yeomen of Attion fell into the ranks of the Zengitee, and the artisans were cearly all Thites. But a fale proportion of wealthy merchants who had bought had, and a certain number of rich yeomen, were mixed smean the Pentokesiomedium; and Hippois, while a few ruined Espatride, we may suppees, saak to the status of the Thites.

When Solou, therefore, restricted the archomable to these who were Pentekesiamedianal, he practically left the supremaringlistracy of the state in the hands of the nobles. To other minor offices the Hippois and Zeugitae were eligible, but the Thötes were excluded altagether from the public service; as a compensation, they were size excluded from all taxation. In time of war they were to serve as light troops, while the Zeugitae fought as heavy-armed infantry and the Hippois as horsemen.

The constitutional referees of Solon had as their main sim the oc-ordination of the archons and the Arcopagus with two new continuous into own, the Sounte and the public assembly, so that such was to have its share in the guidance of the community. The archons retained their old imposions, but were in fature to be elected by the whole body of citizens, not morely by the Enpatridae. Moreover, they were, at the end of their year of office, to pass a public examination (\$\$\prec{\psi}{\psi}\pi_1\$), at which they were reade responsible for all their acts during their tenure of power. The Arcopagus ceased to be the sple deliberative council of the state,

The Boula and ceded the greater port of its functions to the now Boula or Senate of Four Hundred. This body was composed of a hundred members chosen from each of the four tribes fute which the Athenians (like other Ionic communities) was divided. Whether they were depicted by the public assembly or by the heads of the families of each tribe, we do not know. Their duty was to prepare and sanction all measures, political or administrative, which were to be brought before the Assembly, and to act as a council to assist the hone of greekons.

¹ Hopletes, Galconton, Argodes, and Augleoreis were their names,

If we may compare Solon's Rould to the Roman Senate, tho Arcopagus, as reformed by him, may be likened to the Roman Censouship. It was to undertake the moral supervision of the state; on its own initiative and without Arespegus. incoming any responsibility it might inquire into the public or private life of any citizen, and inflict fines and forfeitures on him if it considered his conduct obnexious. Profigney insolence and idleness were punished by the Arsonagus, no less than crimes which fell under the letter of the law. In addition to this new oursocial nower, it had the function of trying all cases of intentional homicide—a charge which it had expressed from time immemorial, ever since (so Attle tradition mp) Ares had been indicted before it for slaying Halirzhothius, the son of Possition. The court was requited from ex-archous, as in earlier days, and therefore remained a centre of Eupatric influence, for the uniquity of the erchons were still chosen from the old houses. It was, no doubt, intended to curb all citizens who showed any signs of practising demagagin acts, or aimed at establishing a tyranny.

The Eulesia, or public resembly of Athens, if it was in existence at all before Solon, can have been nothing more than a perpetuation of the Homeric Agorn, a body convened to hear the promulgation of such decrees as the orchons and ollegrehy chose to publish. Solon, if he did not institute it, at any rate was the first to make it of practical importance. It was entrusted with the right of cleating the magistrates, and of investigating their actions at the end of their year of office. Thus it was secured that the archous should owe their power to the people, and be kept in view of their responsibility to their constituents all through their tenure of power. The assembly was also, as we must conclude, entrusted with the supreme decision in such matters as treation or declarations of war, and gave a flual vote to favour of or against such measures as the Boulé put before it. This was as for as Solon wished to go in democratizing the constitution; be and no intention of handlug over either administrative or legislative business to the Ecclesia.

To sum up the constitution of Solon, we may say that the state was to be administered by such of the Eupstridee as the people thought worthy; that its metal supervision was entrusted to the Arsopagus; that the Boulé guided its foreign and domestic policy, while the Ecclesia exercised an effective but indirect control over the whole of the machinery of government. The legislator himself claimed that "he gave the people so much power as was sufficient, neither defrauling them nor awarding them more than was their share; while as for those who had wealth and positive, he was careful that they should suffer no wrong. Both classes were protected, and neither was allowed to nodust the other."

Besides the constitutional conciments, a large number of laws of all kinds were to be found in the legislation of Solon. They Miscallansons ranged over all provinces of life, and to a great laws of Belon, extent did away with the provious code of Dance. A. few of them are worth mention. He first gave the right of disposing of property by will to citizens destitute of children: previously their kinsmen loherited everything, and the owner could not divert his property from them. He relaxed the harshness of the control which old usage bad given to the father over his some; he forbade arbitrary disinheritance; and even enacted that a father who had not taught his our some useful trade had no claim to be maintained by that son when he arrived at old age. A number of sunsptuncy laws directed the attention of the Arcopigus against luxury. Trude was favoured by the permission given to foreigners to take up the citizenship, after solemnly disavowing allegimes to their old country, and swearing fealty to Athens. But perhaps the most noteworthy clause in the whole legislation was that which imposed disfranchisement on the citizen who, in a time of civil strife, did not take one side or the other. Solon fenred that the existence of a body of timid and cautious neutrals would be fatal to public spirit, and favour the growth of that apathy which makes tyrannics possible.

The laws of Solon were inscribed on wooden pyramids, called Kurbeis, some of them three-sided, some four-sided, and all about the height of a man. They stood on the Acropolis till the Fousian wars, when they were removed for safety to Salamia. Afterwords they were placed in the Frytaneum, and fragments of them were still on view in the time of Plutarch (A.D. 120).

Many legends grew up around the later life of Solon. We are told that he exfled himself for ten years, in order to avoid the

importunities of those who arged him to supplement his legislation with further clauses. His travels took him far afield -to Oyprus, Egypt, and Asia Minor. Everywhere Drawnin. that he went takes grew up to illustrate his profound wisdom such practical ability. In Cyprus he fixed the site of the fourishing city of Soli. In Lydia it was fabled that he risited King Crossus, and viewed unmoved all the splendours of an Oriental court. Then, when his best asked him who was the happiest man in the world, expecting to hear himself named, Solon first mentioned a worthy but obscure citizen of Athens, who had fallen gloriously in battle, and then two young Argives who had mot their death in the performance of an act of filial picty. Crossus was offended at the moment, but learnt by bitter experience "to call no man happy till he was dead." Unfortunately, the legend of the interview is rendered quite impossible by the dates: it is merely one of the moral apologues with which the Greeks loved to illustrate the instability of mortal happiness.

When Solon returned to his native city, he had the disappointment of discovering that his constitution, in spite of its formess and its ingenious system of checks on the various Recoval of members of the administration; had not sufficed to siviletsite. reduce the state to order. The local factions of the Plain the Shore and the Upland wore still engaged in political strife. As early as 566 p.c. an archon had tried to maintain his office for more than his legal year, contrary to the fundamental law of the constitution. The populace, having once got a taste of power in the new privilege of electing the anglistrates, was enger to extend its rights. The Eupatridae were still yourning after the old days of oligarchy. The commercial classes found that the exclusion of all property except land from the assessment which settled the status of citizens, bindered them from taking the part in public. affairs which they regarded as their due. No one was onthuslastic in defence of the Solonian constitution, for it satisfied no one.

While the Eupatridae of the Plain were headed by Miltiades of Hallmus, a kinaman of the Corinthian tyunds, the merchants of the Shore found a leader in Magacles the Alemanonië, grandsom of that Megacles who had murdered the adherents of Cylou. The poor usen of the Upland had placed themselves under a young and suggestio leader, one of those men of eligatohic birth who in every Greek city were found ready to desert their class and take up the dareer of a demagague. It must have added to Solon's grief to find that this adventurer was his own kinsman, Pensistratus the son of Hippocrates. The last years of the legislator were spent in univaliting warnings to the democracy of Athens that they were "treaking in the footsteps of the fex," and preparing the way for a tyrminy by attaching themselves to the train of the ambitious young tone.

Solen's donunciations of demagagic arts were quite useless.

When Pulsistratus personned the people that his life bad been
detempted by assession hired by the men of the Plain,

Poststratus, the assembly voted him a body-guard of fifty clubmen, in suite of the opposition of the Bouls: The olab-men were one long armed with dendlier weapons, their numbers increased, and one marring Athens woke to find them in occupation of the Acropolis. It was just fifty-two years since the similar attempt of Cylon; but the times had changed; unlike Cylon, Pelsistratus had a strong following among the people, while his adversarios were divided into two hostile camps. Megacles left Athens: Miltiades accepted the offer of a barbarian tribe in Thrace, who wanted an experienced leader in war, and departed to take over the sovereignty of the Thracian Chargoness. Pelsistratus became tyrant of Athens without opposition, and when Solon, in 558 n.c. died, full of years and honours, he died as the subject of a despotic manarch. The list mouths of his life were not embittored by oppression, for his kinsman treated ldm with every mark of respect; but the old man shut himself up in his house, and refused to be comferted. The work of his itle seemed to have long entirely wasted.

Poisistratus phowed himself an able and moderate ruler: Its did everything in his power to promote the material welfure of the vicisitades power classes, who had rendered his rise possible, and its beste at did not slay or banish the rich. This mitidases rescouraged the men of the Shore and Plain to combine to desbrone him; the exited Megacles and the Beijnitch Lyengue headed a rising, and the tyrant was driven out. But the Athenian factions were not yet taught wishout; the increhants and the

nobles could not learn to work tagether, and Megacles, enroged with Lyonegus, entered into treascaphic negotiations with the ex-tyrant, To spite the Plain, the Shore consented to join the Upland. This costroid the return of Poisistratus. The manner of it requires a word of notice, as one of the most characteristic and extraordinary events of the age. Megacles found a tall and stately woman named Phys, arrayed her in semont, and conducted her to the city in a chariot, giving out that Athena, the tutelary goldens of the city, and appeared in person to command the restoration of Pelaistratus! The people obeyed, the gates were thrown open, and the tymnt was once more master of Athens. If this tale is true, the Athenisas, as Herodotos remarks, instead of being the wisest of the Greeks. deserved a prize for credulous simplicity. For a short time Magazles and Peislatratus held together, and the alliance was comented by the typnul's marriage to the Alemaconid's daughter. But ere loos they quarrelled, and Megatles once more led over his followers to join the men of the Plain. After a short struggle, Pelststratus was for the second time expelled from Atlica. He retired to Eretris, and wnited for the factions of Athens to give him a third oppurtunity for action.

For no less than ten years he watched for the times to become rine, keeping up communications with his party in the Upland of Attion, and looking out for men likely to atd him in an expedition. At last (541 a.c.) he landed in Attlea at the head of his own following, strengthened by a band of Argive mercanstles and by a body of Maxion exiles under Lygdamis, once tyrnet of that islead. The Athenian army marched on Marathon, where Peisistratus had landed. They faced the invaders of Pallene, and a bottle appeared intrinent, but the tyront at first avoided an action. however, the Athenians had broken their maks and retired to take thoir midday meal, Pelelstratus unexpectedly fell upon thom, and routed them without trouble and almost without slaughter. His sons rode after the fugitives, and shouted to them that all who dispersed homewards should be granted an amnesty; after this the leaders of the citizens found themselves so deserted by their followers that no further resistance could be offered. The tyranic re-entered the city without having to strike a second blow.

During his third reign Poisistratus showed himself a more strict

and cautions, but hardly a more oppositive, rules than in his previous The rule of tenures of power. He kept up the forms of the : Pelsistratus. Scionian constitution, though he always took care to have some one of his own family at the head of the bound of arubons. An income-tax of 5 per cent, was the only extraordinary burden which he imposed upon the people, and the proceeds of this were used to strengthen and adore the city, and not to pile up a private treasure or support private luxury. The support which he gave to the state religion was particularly marked; he increased the apleadour of the Panathennes, the festival of the tutelary goddess of the city; he justituted a new feast in honour of Dionysus; and he commenced a temple to the Olympian Zeus on such a grand scale that it was never completed till the reign of the Roman Emperer Hadrian, six hundred and seventy years after. He gathered literary men from all parts about his court, though the legend that he employed them to collate and edit the text of Homer is probably without foundation. His foreign policy was one of peace; he strengthened himself by alliances with the houses of tyrants which still survived in Greece and Asia Minor. but at the same time courted the favour of Sparia, the implacable enemy of tyrminy in Pelopounesus.

Pelsistratus died in pance thirty-three years after his first, and fourteen years after his last, seizure of Athons. He was succeeded by his sone Hippies and Hippanebus, who ruled in

Rippierous and great harmony, unlike most brother-kings. They 6978.6. persovered for some years in the benevolent despatism of their father, and only left his stops in foruign policy, where they followed a holder line. The town of Plataen, having left the

Pleases. Bocotian league on account of a feed with Thubes, and not conved the protection of Athens, and obtained it, though this alliance involved the Peistatratides in a war with their neighbours. They carried it to a victorious end, and seemed likely to reign long and successfully. But ore long a catastrophe occurred to change the course of Athenian history.

. Hipparchus was theroughly immoral to his private life; he was folled in a disreputable leve-affelr which concerned the honour of a noble family, and revenged himself by a public issult. Harmodies the Gephysosa, the victim of the tyrand's anger, was driven to a

reckless revenge, and organized a conspitacy against the tives of the brother-kings. He and his friend Aristogeiton joined marmothes with a few others to fall on the Penistratides at Aristogeiton of the Panathemaca. Owing to a mere fed and continued their dishunce they made their dishunght too soon, and struck down Hipparchus before Hippins had arrived on the scene. The guards slew Harmodius on the spot; the rost were cought and executed. Aristogeiton suffered fearfully before his death, as Hippins tried in vain to wring from him by totture the names of all involved in the conspiracy. This teckless act of private vengence was the indirect ceuse of the overthrow of tyranny at Athens, and for that reason the names of Harmodius and Aristogeiton were held in other undeserved veneration at Athens down to the latest days of the republic.

Maddened by his brother's death, and his own narrow escape from assassination, Hippias changed his whole system of government. He crowded the city with mercenaries, began to make away with every one that he suspected of discontent, taised arbitrary taxes, and commenced a series of petty vexations which drove the Athenians to desperation. This led to an open rising; quantum Cleisthenes the Alemaconid, son of Megacles the old at Delphileader of the faction of the Shore, returned from exite, and headed an abortive rebollion. It was crushed by the tyrant's mercenaries, but Cleisthenes then set diplomacy to work. He was in high favour at Delphi, where he had wen the gratitude of the priesthood by the munificent liberality with which he had restored the great temple after a disastrous fire. Instigated by him, the Delphie priestess would give no answer when the state of Sparts sent to inquire of Apollo, except that " Athens aught to be liberated." A series of such replies screwed the superstitions Spartage up to the necessary nitch of reverent obedience. Disregarding their old friendship with Peisistratus, they invaded Attica. They were beaten in the first engagement by a desperate charge of the tyrant's Thessalian cayalry. Then their vigorous and able king Cleomenes was sent to take the command; he defeated Happins, and shut him up in the city. The Acropolis would have stood a long siege, but fortune interfered to exast the tyrant. His children were captured by the Spartage as they were being secretly conveyed out of Attlen, and to

and a new ora began.

preserve their lives Hippins consented to surrender the clindel if he and his were allowed a safe conduct to Asia. The Hippins. Sportnes consected, and in the seventeenth year of his 500 P.d. reign the tyrunt evacuated Athens, and sailed away with his braily and his meromanies, to seek refuge at Signum in the Tread, a small town which Peisistratus, foreseeing some such catastrophe, and got into his bends many years before. Here he settled down, paid homoge to the Persian king as overlord, and awaited the return of better days, much as his father had done at Electric forty years before. Manuwhile at Athens the republic was restored.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE GREEKS OF ASIA, AND THE LYDIAN MONABORY.

Down to the commencement of the seventh century the Greeke of Asia had pursued their career of expansion without meeting with arry dangers from the inland. In the north the Acolians had driven the Tenorians and Mysians away from the coast. In the south the Iopians and Carians had arrived at a modus viscendi, and were often to be found joining together in expeditions such as that which, in 656 s.c., placed Psamuetichus on the throne of Egypt. In the centre, filling the upper valleys of the Herman and Cayster, buy the kingdom of Lydio, the westernmest extension of the old omples of the Hittiess, governed by a race of princes whose origin the Greeks astribed to some Asiatic god whom they identified with Herseles. For many generations these klugs seem to have had no hostile relations with their Greek neighbours on the coast, and were content to serve as middlemon in the great line of commerces. which can through their capital of Sardia, and connected Ephosas and Miletus with the Euphrates and Assyria. The Asiatic Greeks went through much the same constitutional

developments as their European brothron, with the exception that their eligarchies were usually founded as wealth characteristics rather than birth, as was inevitable in cities where of the August the population had from the first bean much mixed. Tyrants appeared, in Asia no less than Europe, to sweep away the monopoly of the aligarche, and when history becomes continuous in the seventh century, we find the states of Ionia and Acobis governed some by still-surviving oligorchies, some by tyrants, some by democracies which had rises when tyrants had been awept away. The universal opinion of Greece pro-

nounced the femines and their neighbours to be the best merchants but the worst soldiers of the Hellenic world. Their feats of exploration and their activity in colouizing were unrivalled, but they did not pass as good fighting men. Their European brothron accused them of indolence and luxury, and asserted that the softpess and languor of the ellmate of Asia, and the admixture of Oriental blood which had resulted from the Carian marriages of the early settlers, had combined to weaken and demoralize them. Civilization and luxury developed among them long before they reached Greece. The arts of music and lyric poetry were especially their own; the Leablan postess Sapuho sang of love in passionate tones which no other Hollonic poet could ever squal; her countrymna Alescus was equally colebrated for his praises of wine and beauty, and for his political poems. Annerson of Toos was a mero joyinl voluptuary, a had specimen of the worst Ionian type, but made himself a great name by his songs. It was in Asia Minor also that philosophy—the product of a self-conscious civilization which too often marks the decay of civic virtue-made its carlins appearance among the Greeks. It took at first the compaintively barmless form of inquiry into the phonomena of enture, and speculations as to the physical basis of life and creation; which some philosophers sought in the primary principle of air, others in that of fire, others again in that of water. Thales of Miletus (circ. 640-550 a.c.) was the best known of the early philosophers; in spite of his speculative bent, he was a man of great practical ability, and worked out a plan for the federation of the Greek cities of Asia, which would have saved them many a "disaster if it had been engried out. There would appear to have been less political intercourse between the Greeks of Asia and these of Europe than might have been expected, when we remember the The Lelentine narrowness of the Aegean. The chief occasion on war, 700 s.c. which they are found in contact was the Lelantine war (circ. 700 s.c.). This was nominally a struggle to settle whether Chalcis or Erejrin-should own the plain of Lolas, which lay between their walls. But in real fact it was a commercial war between two bands of silied states who were bound together by their trade interests. Eretrin was aided by Miletus, Chalois by Sames, and the war raged over the Asiatic as well as the European shore of the Asgam.¹ In the West Chalcis would seem to have had the better of her neighbour, but in Asia Samos was never able to shake the commercial predominance of Miletus.

About the year 685 n.c., the period during which the Asiatic Greeks had been able to earry out their great schemes of colonization, and so light out their civil broils undisturbed by interference from without, suddenly came to an end. The new factor introduced into their history was the aggressive policy of the kings of Liydia.

Gyges, a noble of the house of the Mormnodae, after slaying his master Candonles, the last of the old royal line, had usured the

throne of Lydia. He at once abandoned the peaceful policy of his predecessors, and set to work to attack the Greek eities of the coast. The Lydians were sensor a bold warfike race, the best horsenes of Asia, and the Ionians could offer them no resistance in the field. The wer became one of sieges; Gyges took Colophon, though he failed before Smyrna and Miletus. In the midst of his caveer he was summoned home by a crisis which freed the Ionians from fear for another generation. A wild race from the north, the Cimmerians, had been pushed into Asia Miner by pressure from yet more unknown tribes in their rear. They swept over the land, burning and devastating all before thom. The Greek city of Shope and the native monarchy

of Phrygia were completely destroyed by them. Gyges, in spite of his energy, only succeeded in saving his kingdom by becoming the vascal of Assurbanipal, King of Assyria. This protection was withdrawn when he revolted a few years later, and the Cimmerians almost made an end of Lydia. Gyges was slain in battle, the valley of the Hermus harried, and Sardia, save its citadel, taken

by the barbarians in 660 n.c.

Ardys, the successor of Gyges, was many years on the through before he could get free from the Cimmerians. When this danger was over, he renewed his father's policy of attacking the Greeks, and captured Priene. But again the largeds of the barbarians came to the rescue of the Ionians; about 627 n.c. naother Cimmerian invasion, whose westernment foray resulted in the sack of

¹³ scems probable that the two allineers were (1) Cholcis, Samos, Thessaly, Corinth; (2) Eretrio, Mileton, Aggian. Details are wenting.

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the wealthy Asolica town of Magnesia, called Ardys off to defend the limits of his own kingdom.

The successors of Ardys, his son Sadyattes (622-610 n.c.), and his grandson Alyastes (\$10-569 n.c.), continued the traditional Warrant Lydla policy of their race by attacking the Greek cities, and Mileton more especially Miletus, the great stronghold and bulwark of Ionia. The Milesians were easily beaten in the field, but their wells opposed on impossible barrier to the Lydlan cavalry. Alyantes resolved, we are told, to starve the town into submission. Every midsummer, when corn and fruit began to ripen, he marched into the Milesian territory, and heat down the corn and felled the trees to the sound of military music. After several years of assiduous miding, he had occasion to send an embassy into Milatus. The envoys found the Milesians feasting and trafficking as if the ruln of their country-side was a perfectly ludifierent confirmed. A seapert town can never be starved out by an enemy who is destitute of a fleet, and this fact Alyakes new realized. He made peace with Miletus, and turned to less hopeless enterprises. The Chreek town of Smyrna fell into his hands, but his great conquests lay inland, where he subdued Phrygia, Bithyois, and all the lands up to the river Halys. Here he met the equally aggressive armics of the Medes, and, after a drawn hattle with King Oyazares, made a peace which laid down the Halys as the boundary between the two empires. Alyattes died in 568 p.c., and was buried in a great borrow which he had caused his subjects to pile up on the Plain of

Crossus, the san and successor of Alyattes, was by far the most powerful of the race of the Mermundae. His optorprises against

Sardis during the last years of his life.

Excession, the coast-land were crowned with a degree of success see-excit. which had never been granted to his auceators. Epheens, the succent town of Ionia, foll into his hands in the very conneamement of his reign, and as the various states were too jedous to unite in a league agricult him, one after the other was compelled to de him homoge. Miletus, which had so successfully resisted his father, had now souk into a state of deeny consequent on wild civil strife. It had just got rid of a tyrant, Thrasybulus, the friend soil advisor of Perinader (see p. 97). To celebrate their freedom, the Milesians fell to blows with each other, and the

proletariate vied with the oligarche in deeds whose Oriental atrocity shocked the whole Greek world. The mob beat the children of the rich to death with fields on threshing-floars; their opponents replied by burning their prisoners alive in pitch-coats. No help was found in Mijotus to sustain the other states, and one after another the Isale and Asolic cities of the matched submitted to Crossus, and began to pay him tribute. The king crea dreamed for a measure of building ships, and of attacking Chies, Lesbes, and the other islands off the coast.

This idea he had to abandon in face of the strong fiests of the island states, and the entire ignorance of naval matters which his own warriors displayed. But on the mainland he was undisputedly supreme from the Hellespont to the Halys. The tributes of the states that owned him as everloy, and the connecreial profits which flowed into Sardis, now that the great trade-route between Asia and the West was entirely in Lydian bands, made Grossus wealthy beyond the wildest dreams of Gross awartes. A whole cycle of legends illustrate his boundless resources and avarweening self-confidence; such is the well-known tale of his interview with Solon, which we have had to relate elsewhere.

Crossus was no stellid Oriental, but a great admirer and patron of Greek civilization. He was porticularly well known for his devotion to the Greek god Apollo, whose temples at Branchidae near Misbus, and at Delpht in distant Phosis, he crowded with gifts of natonishing magnificence. He gladly received Greeks at his court, mel went out of his way to do favours to the more important states across the Asgen; Sporta, in particular, he bound to his alliance by a manificent gift of gold.

But while Crosses appeared to be at the height of wealth and power, a cloud was arising in the East which pottended rain alike to him and to his Hellenic subjects.

CHAPTER XIV.

ribr of the achievenian empire—cylor and dabids—commercement of the persian wars, 549–520 n.c.

The outbuy which lay between the years 620 and 620 a.o. was frought with changes of a more rapid and sweeping kind than had ever before been known in the East—changes, too, which were to have a direct influence on the history of Greece, such as no provious eyents in Asia had over exercised. That contary saw the rule of five great empires—those of Assyria, Media, Babylon, Lydia, and Revot-and the rise of a sixth, which absorbed not only all lands that had obeyed the kings whom is supplanted, but yest additional tracts to east and west, regions which owe their first appearance in history to this conquest. Finally the new monarchy came into collision with the Greeks. Backed by the forces of all nations which dwelt between the Indus and the Aegeun, the "Great King" of the Mast marched on to deal with the Helleges of Europe as his producessors had dealt with the Hellenes of Asia. But in the Strait of Salamis and on the heights of Platasa his projects came to wreck. Greece was saved, and with Greece the future of European civilization. The West repelled the invaring East so thoroughly that for eleven hundred years no Oriental conqueror again approached the Hellespont to seriously threaten the Balkon Peninsula with annexation to an Asiatic realm."

The one considerable Oriental power with which the Greeks down to the sixth century had any prolonged contact was, as we have already seen, the kingdom of Lydis. Behind that state lay

Battle of Salamia, 480 n.c.; sloge of Constantinople by Chasroes of Perils, 020 A.D.

the great empire of Assyria, which for three hundred years had formed by far the strongest power in Asia. With the Assyrian kings the Greeks had not many direct relations; the chief occasion on which they had touched Helianic history was whou, in 708 p.c., the conqueror Sargon had received the homage of the Greek princes of Oypens. But though it was only the outlying cities of that island which experienced the weight of the hand of the kines of Ninevel, yet the power and wealth of Assyrie were well known to the Greek. Wild toles of the all-conquering "Ninus" and the luxurlous and overweening "Sardanapalus" have been preserved to attest the impression which the kings of Asshur left on the minds of their Hellenic contemporaries. At last, in the fourth quarter of the seventh contary, the door House, of Nineveh came. A long course of successful or etc. 810 M.s. partially appreciated revolts began to strip Assyria of her outlying provinces, and to wear down the strength of her comics. Revolted vassals joined with wild tribus from the north to attack the falling monarchy, and Ninoveh collapsed under the weight of their onset. The details are lest; we only know of the Greek legends which tell how the last king of Assyria, when his enemies had buist within the wall, collected his transures and his reds. his wives and his some, on a rest pyre in the court of his palace. and gave himself and them to the flames, to balk the victors of their spail. Of an Oriental despot, and with rage and desput, such a tale need not be false; but, be it false or true, we know that in some not less dreadful seems of blood and fire the Assyrian monarchy ussed away.

Two princes but led the attack on Ninoven, and profited by its fall. Nabopolassar, the rebel vicercy of Babylon, anaexed the southern and western dominions of Assyria. Cyanares, King of the Medes, seized the northern and castern provinces. Of Naborolness and his more famous son, Nebuchadnezzar, we need not speak at length. Their victories and conquests in Syria, Elam, and Enynt have no bearing on our history.

With the Medes It is otherwise. They were a new race and a

[&]quot;Ninus" is an enonymous here manufactured for the Minevites on the ordinary Greek system. " Sardanapalus" is a correption of the real come Assur-boni-pol-

now kingdom, but they are important to us as being the real The Mides founders of that empire-" Persian" as we call it, and Persians, though the earlier Greeks knew it better as "Median" -which came into such violent contact with the Hallenge. The Medes were a portion of that great body of Ayran tribes which migrated from the north-east, out of the land which was then known as Bactrin, towards the borders of the Assyrian kingdom. Various allied claps of this race acattered themselves over the whole of the areat table-land of Iran, from the Caspian to the Indian In some districts they drove out the previous inhabitants-Turanjan tribes of low civilization-in others they dwelt among them; in others, again, they mixed with them. The most southern section of these invaders were the tribes of the Persians, over whom religiond a house descended from a certain unknown king Ashnemence. The more northern clans were the Medes, who had dwelt apart in weakness and disunion till Commuce, in the third quarter of the seventh century, united them late a compact monarchy. The Modes were much more mixed with the previous inhabitants of the land than were the Persians, and had adopted in a large measure the customs and religion of their predocessors. The Porsians, a more vigorous but redor and loss numerous race, kept themselves free from such intermixture in their mountainous bornes on the coast of the Erythmean Son. They were a poor and hardy race, rough leather-alad shephents and ploughtnen, who dwelt in a land which seemed scanty and ragged to the richer inhabitants of the plains. The ten tribes which composed the nation dwelt apart, only connected by a loose subjection to the house of the Achaemenidae, and by the national religion which they had brought with them from Bactria.

While the common ancestors of Medes and Persians were still dwelling by the Oxes, they had adopted a religion called Zoro-


astriaulem, from the name of Zoroseter the great sage and preacher who is said to have converted his countrymen to it.

This faith is a "doublato" system, which refers all the changes of the world, moral and physical, to the constant and unending struggle of two opposing dolles. Ornuzd, "the spirit of wisdom and light, the very great and very good, the lord of perfection and activity, of intelligence, growth, and beauty," was the creater of the

universe, and endeavours to rule it with wisdom and bonevolence. But his offects are being continuelly hampered by the evil god Ahriman, "the spirit of darkness and matice, of crime, tin, and upiness." The whole life of a pions Persian was a crussde against Ahriman and all his works, and an endeavour to work cet the purpose of Ormozó, to whem sacrideo was made, not in temples or shrines, but on lefty heights, where a sacred fire was kept ever burning in honour of the god of light. The Medes had pervected Zorcastranism, by nodeavouring to consiliate Abriman and his angula rather than to help Ormozd; and their religion had thus become a kind of "deril-worship," in which their priosis, the Magians, pretended to word off the spirits of evil by sacrifices and incap-

The empire which Cynxarus the Mede had founded after the full of Nineyeb, strotched from the conlines of Bactris to the Lydian frontiar on the Halys, where it had been fixed since the indecisive struggle with King Alyaites. Both Cynxages and his contemporary Nebuchadaessar, the great King of Babylon, had long been dead when a new conqueror arose to shutter both their empires. Between Babylonia and Persia by the land of Blam. which had long born a vassal state to he Western neighbour. But after the death of Nebuchadnessar it had apparently fallen into subjection to the Modes, under Astynges, the successor of Cyanares, Blam was now ruled by a prince of the house of the Achaemenidae. not sprung from the same line as reigned in Persts, but from a family which claimed cousinship with the older brauch, and must have migrated into Elam from Persia a few generations back, Cyrus, "son of Combyses, son of Cyrus, son of Teispes, son of Achnemenes, of the nuclent seed-royal," now dwelt at Sum, and reigned as a vassal of Astyages the Mede.

So many legends have grown up around the name of Cyrns that it is disappointing to comember how little is really known of him. The Greeks believed that he was the grandchild of Astyages the Mode, by a daughter who had been married to a Persian of middle rank, in order to avert a prophecy that threatened harm to the Median king from an over-powerful grandson. But we know that Cambyses, the father of Cyrns, was a migning king, and have no proof that any relationship existed between Cyrns and Astyages.



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In 549 n.c. Media and Babylon were at war, when the King of Elam anddenly attacked his susceals from the near. Astyages was defeated in battle, after which his army revolved, put masset prouted their master in bonds, and delivered him up to Cyrus. 548 B.C. Apparently the fact that the conqueror was an Aryan of the royal blood, and of a race nearly altied to themselves, inclined the Medes to submission. They became the followers rather than the subjects of Cyrus, and the transference of the seat of empire from Median Echatana to Elamita Susa was well-nigh the only mark of the change which had taken place. The Greeks saw so lattle difference that they continued to call the great Asiasiio power Median, as though Astyages had still been on the throne.

After his first victory Cyrus received homoge from the vassal kings who laid served the Mode, including his own relatives in Persia. Then he turned against nations whom the Mode had left unconquered. For twenty pears he was continually passing from west to cost and from east to west in his extent of conquest, and soldern did he fall to add to his empire the district against

which he mambed.

The dangerous power which Cyrus and built up brought about an alliance between the three states who were most likely to suffer from his growing strongth, Crossus of Lydia joined Way of Groups to himself Nabonadius of Babylon and America of and Greene Egypt, who in a common fear suspended the incessant wars which had mged between their empires since the full of Ninevels. Besides his two royal confederates, Croesus is said to have hoped to callet the Spartane in his cause, as he was their good friend and ally. But whether it be true or not that he replaced on Grock troops to sid his army, it is certain that he wont to war buoyed up by promises of victory from Greek oracles. His lavish gifts of massive gold ingots and vessels constand long after at Delphi, to show the benour to which he held the gods of the West. and the importance which he attached to their silvice. Apollo, we are told, answered, whon convalted by the Lydian ambassadors, that "Croques, if he crossed the Halys, would destroy a great empire." Forgetting that the cautiously worded oracle would apply to his own realm as much as to that of Cyrus, the Lydian king declared war, and invaded Cappadocia at the head of the farces of the Lydians and all the tribes subject to him between the Halys and the Aegeon (546 n.c.).

The dominions of Oyros lay to a central position between Babylan and Lydis, and he was thus able to prevent his two chief membes from joining. The Egyptians were too far off to be promptly on the scene, and Croesus along had to face the brunt of the contest. Neglecting Naboundius for the moment, Cyrus threw himself on the Lydians. In the Cappadoeian district of Pteria the two armies fought a bloody but indecisive combat, which recalled the similar engagement when Cyazares and Alyatics had met on the same sput some sixty years earlier. The troops of Cyrus retired a flow miles after the battle, and Crossus, who had suffered too beavily to pursue them, concluded that the campaign was over. Accordingly he dismissed his alies and marched home, determined to mise a larger army before committing himself again to the changes of war. But Oyrus, though checked, was not beaten. When he heard of the break-up of the Lydian armament, he turned on his way and followed hard on the steps of Grossus. So mpidly, did he pursue, that his enemy was compelled to turn to fight in front of his capital, the strong fortross of Bardis, long ere the dispersed contingents could rejoin bim. Droesus, crushed by pumbers, was routed and compelled to shut himself up in Sardis, which fell quite unexpectedly before a sudden assault, only fourteen Pall of Ground, days after the siege had commenced. Greek legend had much to say of the fate of Crossus; it told how the victor condemned him to death by fire, and how, as the flames began to mount, Cyrus reflected on the vacisaltudes of human fortune, and repented of his cruel orders. When no human

how the victor condemned him to death by fire, and how, as the flames began to mount, Cyrus reflected on the victssitudes of burnet fortune, and repented of his cruel orders. When no burnan intervention could have stayed the fire, Apolto, it was said, interfered to save the man who had so richly endowed his temple at Delphi, and a mirusulous shower of rain extinguished the blazing pyre, and enabled Cyrus to show a tardy clemency towards his prisoner.

The spectacle of a powerful and wealthy state deshed down in the midst of its glory prefoundly affected the mind of the Greeks. No such catastrophe had proviously taken place so closely before their eyes, or ended with such dramatic suddenness. Their theory of Newssir, the inevitable retribution which follows on pride and over-prespectly, found in Crossus a striking illustration. A bundred takes were framed to show how his self-confidence, his wealth and counge liberality and ambition, contrasted with his sudden and complete full. Thus the outlines of his real character and the details of his real fifty, come down to us blurred and exaggerated, though still recegnizable, through the haze of logend which approunded him.

The vanishing of the Lydian comire brought the Grooks of Ionia and Acolis into direct relations with Cyren. The Milesians at once did homage to bim, accepting the same semi- conquest of independent position which they had streety snjoyed Tosts by the under Crossus. The other states of the coset made 448-544 5.c. a stand, and endeavoured to win back their freedom. Although the Legedremonians refused them help, they found allies in the warlike Cerians and Lyclans, and in Puctyas, a Lydlan chief who endeavoured to muse his newly conquered countrymen to revolt. Cyrus, who was set on greater projects than the subjection of a few rebellious towns, turned off to attack Babylou to person, and left behind him an army, under a Median noble named Mazarez, to complete the conquest of Asia Minor. This chief put down the Lydian revolt, and then moving against the Ioulana captured and sucked Prione, and wasted the whole plain of the Massades. At this innoture he died, and was succeeded by Harpagus, another Mede, who had played a great part in the deposition of Astvaces. and was much trusted by Oyrns. Harpagus besieged Phoeses and Texts, whose inhabitants, when their position beens to grow desperate, escaped by sen, and betook themselves to distant shores beyond the reach of the Great King's arm. The Teines migrated to Abdom in Thrace, which ere long became the largest town on the north share of the Aegean. The Phoceeans, sailing into the far West, landed at Alalia, a harbour in Corsica, and endeavoured to deal with that island as their Ionic kinsmen, two hundred years before, and dealt with Sleity. But Alalia was not to be to Corsica. what Naxos had been to the larger island. After a hopeless struggleof five years with the united puvies of Carthago and Etroria, the Phoeseans were constrained to abandon their new settlement, Some of them sailed north to join the old Phocasan colony of Massilia in Gaul, which grow loggely in importance from this

sudden increase of population. The rest founded the new town of Hyele (Velia) on the Lucanian coast, south of Possidonia.

The remaining Greek cities of Asia showed no such desperate determination to avoid the Persian yoke. After a certain amount of ill-combined resistance, they opened their gates to Harpagus. The labanders were no less impressed with the futility of further resistance than the inhabitants of the mainland, and Leahee and Chies, as well as Ephrana and Smyrna, acknowledged Cyrus as their superain. Polygrates, tyrant of Samos, alone maintained his Independence; he owned the largest navy on the castern shore of the Aegean, and as the Persian king had not yet become master of a fleet, hoped to retain his laland and his " thalassocropy " undisturbed. His independence was no great benefit to Hellas, for his piratical galleys kept the whole eastern Aegean in swe, and had succeeded to the old maritims predominance of Miletus. Polygrates lived and flourished by plander. He was wont to say that "he made a rule to rob every one althe, because he found that his friends were happier at getting their stelen wealth restored, than they ever would have been if it had remained undisturbed in that possession."

Harpagus did not impose operous terms on the Greeks of Asia. They were bound to pay an annual tribute, and to supply armed contingents when the king called for thom, but the internal governments of their cities were left unmolested. The state where a tyrant ruled remained under that tyrant's power; democracies were still democratic, and oligarchies no less oligarchie than in the days of full autonomy.

Aided by Ionian and Acclian troops, Harpague subdued the Greeks of Doris, and their barbarian neighbours the peoples of cyrus takes (lards and Lycin. Meanwhile Cyrus litmesif was 38932.6.) and in a series of campaigus brought his frechier up to India and the borders of the great contral plateau of the Pennir. He even penetrated to the far north-cast, and suddued many of the wild states who dueld in the extreme limits of 'Cartary. In 538 no.

penetrated to the far north-east, and subdued many of the wild Sacas, who dwelt in the extreme limits of Tartary. In 538 n.c. he turned back again to deliver on attack on Babylon. Crossing the Tigris, he defeated King Nabonadius in a pitched battle; a few dars later Singars, the account town in the kingdom, fell by treachery. Then Bubylon itself yielded without fighting, and its empire was at an end. The king, who fied with the remunnt of his army, was pursued and taken prisoner, and Cyrus reigned with undisputed authority in Chaldaca, Mesopotamia, and Syria.

It might now have appeared natural for Cyrus to tern his arms against Egypt, the last surviving power of those which had allied themselves against him in 546 n.o. But of such an endeavour we hear nothing. On the contrary, the remaining plue years of Cyrus's life and reign would seem to have been comparatively penceful. It is certain, however, that he continued to extend his borders eastward, and occupied the upper valley of the Indus, and wide tracts beyond the river Oxus, in the region of Sogdisea and Chorasmia. At last, in 529 n.c., he led an attack on Doubled Syras. the Massagetae, a nomad tribe who dwelt beyond Sondiana, in what is now the south of Siborla. While ongoned in

battle with this race the old king was slain. His army turned back and brought his body to be buried at Pasargadan, among the sepulches of the royal house of Achaemenes,

Cyrus was a favourable example of a great Oriental conqueror. That he was brave, persevering, and full of resource, is evident; it is even more to his gradit that we find connected with his name. none of those wholesale acts of cruelty and massacre which mark the career of a Nebuchudnessar or an Attila. But he would seem to have been more of a general than an administrator. He could form the motiley tribes of Asia into a conquering army, but he made no attempt to bind them into an organized ampire. Accordingly disruptive tendencies furked in every province, which only awaited the removal of the master's hand to display themselves in full vigour. Cyrus, like his Median kinsmon, had not remained mithful to the ancient faith of his race; he was not a wholehearted worshipper of Ormusd, but had learnt from his Elemito subjects to worship other gods, and notably Meroduch, the patron of Babylon, in whose honour he was ever zealous.

Cyrus was succeeded by his son Cambyses, a cruel and reckless but strong-handed tyrant, whose rule contrasted most Gambress conunfavourably with that of his father. His reign of quere Boyst. eight years (520-521 p.c.) is mainly memorable for the conquest of Egypt and its dependencies. Phoenicia and Cyprus submitted to him when he marched against Amasis, the Egyptian king. He was therefore able to bring up a strong feet of Phornician, Cypriot, and Ionian vessels to aid his land army. In a decisive bettle at Palusium he overthrow Pasamentiques II., who had just succeeded his father Amasis. Many thousands of Greek increasaries had been serving in the analis of the Egyptians, and the fact dist they had proved utterly unable to resist the troops of Cambyses made a deep and discouraging impression on the mind of the Hellanes of Europe, who feared era long to seffer the fats of their Asiatis brothers. Egypt needed no second blow, and its subjection was fullowed by that of the Lybians and choir neighbours the Greek colonists of Cyrene and Paros.

Cambysos tarried long in Egypt, winning an uncovisible rejutation. He may have conciliated the Egyptians to a certain extent by the entimetatio worship which he gave their gods, for his predilection towards polytheism was no less marked than that of his father had been. In among his own subjects he grew to be hated more and more. He wasted his soldiery in distant expeditions of the moddlest character, while his savage and suspicious treatment of his nobles and courtiers, whose lives he was continually taking on the pretext of imaginary treasure, filled his painted with enemics.

Cyrus had left seen named Bardes, a whole-brother to Cambyses, who was regarded with hatred by the young king. Before starting on his Egyptian expedition Cambyses had his brother searcity slain. This was not generally known, and an ambitious Magian prices named Gomates, who chanced to resemble the transfered prince, resolved to take advantage of the searct clime. Knowing that Cambyses was generally detected, he gave himself out to be

Death of contrast of the missing Barder, and claimed the throne. A general-rearmed the missing between took place in Persia Media and all the neighbouring provinces. Combyses etarted off to suppress it, but while passing through Syris was so discouraged at the universality of the payoft that he committed suicide (521 n.c.).

The Magian impactor now reigned for a few months under the name of Barnes. But his suspicious behaviour, and the anxioty with which he preceded to seek out and skay all who had known

All the stories about Cambyers's crusado against the Egyptima gods seem to be peers inventious.


the prince whom he personated, provoked remark. Then Darius, son of Hystaspes, a prince of the royal honse of Persia, with only seven followers to back him, sought out the impostor, and slew him in the fort of Sichtachotes, by a sudden attack in the night-time.

Darius was not of that beanch of the house of Achanneues which had ruled in Elam, and had produced Cyrus and Cambyees. His progenitors had borne away in Persia Proper, and name. had been distinct for thron generations from the 821-185 B.C. Elamite branch of the family. It was not unnatural, therefore, that the subjects of Cambyses refused to see in Darius their late master's heir. The whole suppire brake up in hopeless anarchy. Babylon and Media asserted their independence under princes who elsimed to represent the lines of Makonadius and Cyazares. Armonia, Parthia, Sarragia, and well-nigh at the provinces of the East, followed their example. Where a native rebellion did not occur, the governors showed signs of wishing to make themselves as little dependent as possible on the control power. But Darius was a man of genius—a greater than Cyrus himself; for in the East is has always been far more easy to build up a new empire then to reconstruct an old one which has gone to pieces. By emseless activity and long-continued struggles, he succeeded in crushing the eight pretenders who had dismembered the sastern provinces, and in removing or destroying the disobedient satraps. Among Darine's victims of the ascond class was Orostes, governor of Lydia, who had during the snarchy played a foul trick on Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos. Polycrates. was a keen lover of money, and held no act mean and undignified which filled his treasury. Oroctes sent word to him that he was about to fly from the wrath of his mester, and besought him to take his money and himself across to safety in Sames. When Polycrates come to meet the supposed wealthy fugitive on the shore of the mainland, he was kidnepped, taken inland, and ormalfied. Thus ignomialously ended the man whose fleet awayed the Aegean, who had repolled the Lacedaemonians, preserved his independence from Cyrus, and won a reputation for wealth second only to that of Crossus himself (? 520 B.c.).

His realm once mastered, Darius set to work to reorganize it (616 n.c.). As recast by him, it can now for the first time be called with accuracy the "Persian Empire," for his professions had not been kings of Persia, nor had they professed the national faith of that country. Durins was not only hereditary chief of Persia, but also a zealoun Zoronstrian, and a fanatical for to the debased and heretical creed of the Medos and their Magi. He called it "the Lie," and traced all the cells through which the empire had passed to its providence. "All that I have done," he wrote, "I have done by the help of Ormuzd; and Ormuzd brought me help because I was not heretical, nor a believer in the Lie, nor a syrant." But although he broke with the religious traditions of his predecessors and recent their administrative system, Darius was in every true sense their heir. He continued to make Susa, the Elamite house of Cyrus, his capital, and did not remove his sent to his native Persepolis or Francischo.

The system on which Durius reorganized his empire was that of extraples. Instead of allowing his dominions to remain a hetero-

geneous mass of vassal states and fully subjected dissecreptes, tricks, he distributed the whole into twenty-three provinces, each governed by a satran, or civil governor, a military commander, and a myal secretary. The satrap had full anthority in all things save the disposition of the troops in his territory, the one privilege which could have rendered him a dangerous subject. The general received his orders from the king, but had to look for the pay and maintenance of his troops to the satrap. The secretary was specially charged with the daty of informing the king of the conduct of his two colleagues, and all the exters of the satmp had to pass through his hands. The three rival powers created a balance which left all things ultimately depending on the king, if only the king had the industry and mental grasp required to keep the system in order. The vassel states of the empire were now placed directly under the satura, and though they retained their internal institutions, were compelled to obey him with as much penotuality as if he had been the king himself. Under Darius's new system the empire began to flourish in an unexampled manner; his care was especially rewarded by the rapid increase of his revenue-a fact which so pleased him that the Persians observed that "Cyrus had the woul of a father, Cambyses that of a master, Darius that of a shookeener."



CHAPTER XV.

DABIUS AND THE CREEKS-THE BONIAN REVOLT.

When Durius and reorganized his empire and established pence and quietness within it, he showed blunself to less enamoured of the delights of foreign conquest than his predecessors. North and south of his dominious lay only deserts and steppes, or tracts of sea. But to the east and west were lands worth comparing. Darius's first foreign expeditions were pushed in the direction of India; he not only subdued the whole "land of the five rivers," which we now call the Punjaub, but built a fleet on the Upper Indea, and sent is down to the mouth of that river, and along the shores of the Erythmean Sea and the coast of Arabia, right round to Sues. His admiral, the Greek Seylax of Caryanda, wrote an account of this adventurous veryage.

In about 510 B.a., however, Darius turned his attention to the west, and the Greeks of Hellas heard with terror that an expedition

marine in the last independent Greek island off the coast of Asia, sice as and bad already fallon into Daring's hands, the tyrent Macandrius, who had succeeded the murdered Polycrafes, being in no condition to withstand the Persian attack. But, on first crossing the Hollespoot, Darine set himself a more unprofitable traft than the conquest of Hellas. After receiving the homage of the Greek towns of the coast and the numerous Thursian tribes in the valley of the Hebrus, the king did not properly westward in the direction of Macadon and Thessaly, but set his face towards the wild north. He crossed the Balkaus and arrived at the Danube. There he mooved his fleet, which had followed him up the coast, in the form of a bridge of beats, and threw his army across it into

the mulancholy tweeless waste of the South Russian stoppes. The Soythians were the for at whom he struck, moved, it is said, by a familful desire to may off on them the lumble of invasion which they had inflicted on Asla for the reign of Cyanares the Mede, The named horsemen of the steppes made no attempt to withstand the great king to battle. They drove off their heads into the futerior, and dogged the steps of the Persian array without attacking it. For more than two months Darlus marched through a desolute hand, seeking an enougy who was always in sight but never in reach. At last it was evident that nothing could be done against the Soythians; the provisions were well-nigh apopt. the strength of men and snimnle was giving out, and Durius gave the signal for retreat. The Scythians burned and followed hard on him, picking up all his stragglers, and many sick whom he had to abandon on the way for want of transport. Thus the king returned to the Danube without any great disaster such as has oftended other invaders of the Bussian plain, but disgusted with an utturby fruitless and abortive excedition.

It was well for Darius that he found his first, with its stores of provisions and material, where he had left it. When his absence had been so long protracted, many of the Greek mustinger and captains of the armament schemed to abandon their the bridge. post, and draw off the fleet to their homes. For Daries, of whom they had no news, might, for all they know, have perished in the waste; and if not, that consummation might yet befoll him if he were abandoned, bridgeless and foodless, on the forther bank of the impassable river. Miltindes the Athenian, tyrant of the Thracian Chersonese, - who was one of the new variants acquired by Darius since he crossed the Hellespout,—was set on sailing away; and he would have led off the whole freet with him, had he not been resisted by Histinean, tyrant of Miletus, who polared out to the rulers of the Ionian towns that their interest was bound up with that of their master, since the fall of the Persian rule would infallibly be followed by a democratic revolution is overy Greek town. The bridge, therefore, was preserved, and by its menua Durius and his array came safely back into Thrace. As was not unuatuml, the king took Histiaeus into high favour, and made him one of his council. But when he showed such esteem for him that he traisted on the Greek remaining permanently with the court and dwelling at Susa, far from his Mileslan home, Histiasus was anything rather than contented, and set his wits to work to find

some device for getting himself seut down to India.

When he returned home after the Soythian expedition, Darius left Megabasus with eighty thousand men in Thrace, to complete the conquest of that country, and to push the Persian border as far westward as he could. The general proved equal to the task; he took Porinthus and several other Greek towns which refused to open their gates, subdued the Thracians of the coast, and the Passing of the lower Strymon valley, and reached the frontier of Macolen. Amyntas, king of that country, made no endeavour to preserve his freedom by force of arms. He did homoge to the King of Persis, by sending him the symbolical gifts of earth and water. A tribute was imposed on Macedon, and by its submission the Achaemenian empire was brought to the borders of Thessaly, the frontier state of Greece Proper. It seemed as if the next campaign must commence with an invasion of Hellas, and so successful had the Perstan arms been to their attacks on Greek states, that no one was free from the fear that invesion must necessarily mean conquest. But this was not to he; nearly a anarter of a contury more was to clares before the heats of the Great King forced the passes of Tempo and desconded into the Thessalian Plain.

While Megahazus was threatening the Greeks of the mainland, Artaphornes, anteap of Sardis, was carrying out another expedition against the Greeks of the islands. Sedition was raging at the time in Naxes, the largest and most fertile and 501 B.C. populous of the Cyclades. Aristneeras-cousin and son-in-law of the expatriated Histingus-who new ruled at Miletus as regent for his kinsmap, thought to gain credit with his Persian posters by winning the Island for thom. He persuaded Darius to authorize an expedition against Nexes, and received command of a fleet of two handred vessels to effect the conquest. But Artaphernes, out of distrust of the Milesian, procured that Megabates, a Persian noble, should be given him as second-incommand. This man, like Aristagoras bimself, was of a fiery temper, and a hot dispute broke out between the two admirals

concerning a private matter, ere yet the fleet had sailed. Mogabates, who had the worst of it, revenged himself by sending secret intelligence of the expedition to Naxos, and when the fleet arrived It found the city so well garrisoned and stored that it could affect nothing. Aristagoras bad staked all his credit at Sardis and Susa on the success of the expedition, and had rendered himself liable for large debts in equipping it. He was at his with end, and ready to adopt any desperate measure, when he received a massage from Histiagus, who implored him to use any means which would lead to his own recall, even if it must be by raising revolt in Jonia. Of this message a qualut tale is told. It is said that Histiacus had so great a fear that spice would discover may letter which he sent down to his cousin, that he had the incriminating words tattoced on the chaven head of a confidential slave, and sent him down to Milotus, when his hair had grown again, with the verbal message that his head required shaving.

The private interests of these two despots fell in with the best of popular feeling, which, as in all Greek states at all times, was set

on the assertion of autonomy. The tyrant had been the element in the state which represented acquiescence in the Persian rule, and when he declared for revolt

Proposit fet

Miletus followed him. Azistagoras did more than revolt : he declared that he laid down his despotic power, and received book from the people a commission as a constitutional magistrate. That he led a crusado against the tyrants all down the Ionic coast: in every town when the Milmians appeared, a revolution ensued, and the local ruler was slain or banished. Internal freedom as well as external was proplainted, and the revolt for the moment premised well. Of the Greeks of Asia, bardly a town, from Byzantium to the Lycian border, refused to proclaim war on Porsia. Nor was this the full measure of success obtained by Aristagoras in the first moments of his activity. He went over in person to the western show of the Aspenu, and begun to stir up the states of old Greses. In Sparta he obtained no success, for Spartan Meas were well-nigh bounded by the limits of Pelopounesus, and the one expedition the Lacedaemonians had sent out by sen, that directed ngainst Polycrates of Samos, had not been so fortunate as to encourage them to repeat the experiment. King Cleomenes told the Milesian that "he was mad to propose that Sparta should attack a memarch whose residence lay at Suan, three mouths' journey from the sea," and bade him depart home. But the rising maritime state of Ionian blood, which men already asteemed the second power in Greece, gave Aristogoras a very different reception. Touched by an appeal from the daughter-cities to the mother-city of the The Attendans Ionian race, destrout too of keeping the Persian sed front—omployed for from their gates, and willing to prove the efficiency of their newly formed navy, the Athendans reactly listened to the ex-tyrant, and granted him a fleet of twenty ships. To these the Erstrians added five more, moved by their old fellowship in arms with Miletus, which had endured since the remote days of the great Lelantine war.

The moment that this squadron arrived at Ephesus, the troops it earried were joined by the levies of the neighbouring towns, and

executed a sudden and daring attack on Sardia, the Budicat. residunce of the satrap of Lydia, and the centre of Bertin. 400 H.C. Persinu influence in Asia Minor. The Greeks drove Artaphernes into the citadel, and sacked and bornt the town. This recoved a fatal mistako. The blow told more on the Lydians than on their Persian masters. Enraged at the plunder of their shief city, and especially by the burning of the great temple of Cybels. the halicat annothery of the land, the provincials rose in arms and injured Artenhornes. When the Greeks commoniced their retreat to the sea, the whole country-side set on them, and a running fight onsped, in which the invaders had greatly the worse. Their army resched its ships in a very maltreated condition, and afterwards dispersed, while the Athenions and Erestjans returned home in a state of great discouragement (499 a.c.). The chief result of the sack of Sardia was disastrous; it moved the court of Suga to energetic action. Darius redoubled his armoments, and yowod vengeance not only on his revolted subjects, but on the rash states beyond the Aegean, who had called down his wrath by interfering in the affairs of Asia. For the mamont, however, before the full meaning of the events was known, the tidings that the capital of the Lydian satrapy had been destroyed told in favour of the Ionians. They were now leined by most of the Carian tribes, and by all the cities of Cyprus, Greek and

berbarian, with the single exception of the Phonuccian colony of Amethos.

Darius now called out against the rebels not only the disposable troops of all the western satraples, but the full naval force of his Phoenician and Cilician vassals. Fleet and army together fell first on Cyprus, the most isolated and outlying of the revolted districts. By sea the Iouians and Cypriots defeated the Phoenician squadron; but the land force, which the beaten fleet had previously thrown on shore, completely crushed the Cypriot army, and the victory was followed by the submission of the island.

Then the Persians pressed on against the original authors of the revolt. Three great armies came down from the central plateau of Asia Minor, and began to harry the coast-land. The Persiana One sacked city after city along the Hellespoot and lavour fanta, Proporties; the second merched from Sardie against the midmost towns of the Greek confederacy, and took Cyme and Clazemenae, while most of the Ionians looked on in helplessness, afmid to venture on another land composen; the third entered Caria, but after two victories was annihilated by the Carions and Milesians. at the hattle of Pedasus. In spite of this isolated success, Aristuguras conv lost heart, and despaired of the enterprise he had so lightly begun. He called together the Milesians, and proposed to them to emigrate in a body, as their kinsmon of Toos and Phocasa. had done forty years before. They refused, but the ex-tyrant was so set on saving his own neck, that he got together his personal adherents and rothingers, and deserted his country. Sailing to the Thracian coast with the intention of establishing a new settlement, just as the Telans had done at the neighbouring Abdem, he haded at Myrcinus, and was premptly out off with all his followers by the savage tribe of the Edordans, on whose territory he had tresposeed (497 p.c.).

Such was the condition of affairs when Histingue, the original instigator of the revolt, at last appeared in Inch. His influence with Darius had not proved so compotent as he had supposed, now had the great king sent him, down to stay the movement of insurrection the moment it broke out. Three weary years had passed, and the backbone of the rebellion had been broken when Darius at last found some business for him at Bardis. He prived there only

to be taunted with his sphemes and their failure by the satesp Artaphernes. "You stitched this shoe," said the Persian, referring to the royolt, "and Aristaguess only put it on." Alarmed at the Persian's knowledge of his plans, Histinean escaped to Chics and joined the robols. He found himself deeply suspected as an extyrant, and a confident of the king. No city offered to place him in the position of command for which he had hered. The Chicas imprisoned him for a time. Miletus refused to admit her old master within her walls, and he considered himself lucky when at last the Lashians gave him eight ships, and allowed him to sail for the Hollespoot, with a commission to reorganize the revolt in the towns which had gone back to their allegiance. Instead of doing so he stationed himself at Byzantium, and levied extertionate tells on the merchant-ships which passed through the Bosphorus, without making any vigorous attempt to attack the Persians.

Meanwhile the end of the war draw near. Neglecting the smaller towns, Artaphenes draw together all his land forces for an attack on Miletus, the heart of Ionia. At the same

Navel were time a great Phomician fleet rounded the Triopian Cape, and cast anchor opposite the mouth of the Massader. From the nine towns which yet kept up their hearts and hoped agalust hope for the retention of their autonomy, the Lonians and Acclians mustered for the final conflict, till at the little island of Lade, in front of Milatas, three hundred and fifty-three thremes lay moored to face the six hundred vessels of the barbarians. It is greatly to the dismedit of the Atlantase that not a single ship of theirs appeared to all their kinsmen and allies in their death-struggle.

The confederate states placed their fleet under a single admiral, a certain Dionyabus, one of the few strangling survivors of the popurate of lation of Phoeses who had drifted back to their old

The name of Lodge. home and set up an insignificant town among its rules.

1948. He was an excellent captain, and kept his men well to their duty, till his rigitance and strict discipline provoked the listless Ionians. They refused any longer to cley a man who had no strong squadron of the ships of his own city at his back, and, at the Persians delayed their attack day after day, fell into a perilous carolessness and security. At last the coomy came down upon them, and they hastily formed a line of battle to meet him.

The honour of the day was very unequally distributed. The Samians field at a very early hour, with a precipitancy that suggested treachery rather than cowardion. The Lashians gave way no long time after. The Chians, bowever, maintained the fight after their untrustworthy allies and all the rest of the field had abandoned the fray, and only succombod after the larger number of their own ships had been sunk or taken (496 s.c.).

The battle of Lade was decisive in its results. The wrenk of the defeated float dispersed, and each city had to await its docum without deriving aid from its allies. Mileton was the first

out deriving no from its allies. Milesus was the neat to fall: Artaphernes sat down before it, and took it after a protracted siege. He burnt the city and re-

Sack of Mileton, 495 B.C.

after a protracted sings. He burnt the city and reduced its inhabitants to slavery; so thoroughly was the work done,
that Miletus never appears ogain as possessing anything like its
furmer importance. The pre-eminence among the lonian towns fell
to Ephesus, which had disarmed the weath of Persia by a prompt
and tame submission. The full of Miletus causal bitter grief and
self-represent at Athens. When the people realized that they had
allowed their best-allies against the Persian to persia unaided, they
could not restrain their sarrow and shame. Next year the tragio
post Phrynichus exhibited on the stage a play called "The
taking of Miletus" (Marirow danar). At its production the whole
theatre was plunged in tears, and the author was fined a thousand
drachunge for recalling the unwelcome subject.

After Miletus had succumbed, the turns of Sames, Chine, and Mitylene arrived. Each was subdued after more or less resistance. Their fates, though bard, were not so crushing as that of Miletus, Heavy fines were laid on them, and many of their inhabitants were deported to Asia, but no wholesale ruin or massacre ensued. Internal freedom was allowed to remain, and it was noted that the Persiaus, discontented with the way in which the Ionian tyrants had failed to be a support to their masters, showed themselves more favourable to democracy than could have been expected. Last of all, the few scattered towns on the Proportis which still held out were subdued one by one. In that part of the world magnetic factors and ciratical existence, a plague to Greeke no less than precarious and ciratical existence, a plague to Greeke no less than

Persians. He now fell into the hands of Artaphernes during no

insignificant skirmish near Atameus, and was promptly impaled by his ceptor, much to the displeasure of Darius, who still cherished a feeling of gratitude to the preserver of the bridge on the Danube (494 R.c.). With the exception of a few fugitives who fied to the West, all the king's subjects had now fallen or returned to their allegiance.

The great Ionian revolt was now at an end, after six years of desultory warfare. Its course had brought thron facts into prominence. The first was the lacapacity of Greek states

the failure of for combination into a close federal alliance. the rising. jeal ousies between city and city, and the nurrow patriotism which made men comparatively indifferent to the fate of the Hellenic race provided their own town was flourishing, were sufficient to prevent any efficacious common action in war. A Greek alliance, in short, could only be kept together by the power of some one state overawing the rest, as was afterwards the case during the existence of the Confederacy of Delce. And even when such a consummation had arrived, the desire for complete local automoray was so keen that all the weaker members of a federation would be secretly longing for its disruption, in order to free themselves from the leagement of the leading state. The second chameteristic of the Ionian royalt was the slow and inefficient working of the military machinery of the Persian empire. To subdue the revolted towns of a single sattapy six years of war had been required. Unless the king himself were present in person, to compel all his satesps and commanders to act promptly and in loyal combination, there was a tendency to slackuses and sassmodic effort on the part of the Porsian officers in Asia. Thirdly, the prompt conclusion of the war after the battle of Lade proved that a fleet was more important than an army in attacking the Greek world. When the command of the sea had passed to the barbarian, and each state on its island or peninsula was out off from communication with its fellows, a complete collapse of resistonce followed. We shall see all these tendencies illustrated again, though with a different relative importance, in the greater strugglo between Persia and the Greeks of Europe which began a few years after the end of the Ionian revolt.

. The share which Athens and Bretria had taken in the sack of

Sardis had not escaped the memory of Darlus. When his revolted subjects were once subdued, he was determined that there should be no delay in punishing the more distant enemy. A legacd, which is true in the spirit if not in the letter, tells us how the great king bade his cup-bearer to repeat to him thrice at every banquest the words, "Master, remember the Atheniaus," lest the insult wrought at Sardig alsould ever vanish from his mind.

The year after the end of the revolt was devoted to the proparation of an expedition to chastise the objects of Darius's quality. In 492 s.c. Mardenius came down from Buss to take the command-He sent a fleet to coast round the north short of the Aegean, and himself led an army parallel to it by the great road which rous between the sea and the spurs of the Bhodope. But fortune fought for Athens. A hurricane strowed the rocky shores of the peninsula of Athes with the wreeks of three bundred Persian galleys. A few days later a desperate battle with the wild Thracean tribes so thinned the ranks of Mardonius's army that, although victorious, he halted, and shrank from a further advance. The attack on the king's enemies had to be put off for another year.

Before proceeding to relate the results of the first Persian expedition which touched the shows of European Greece, we must explain the condition of affairs in that country.

CHAPTER XVI.

EVENUS IN CREEKE APTER THE PALL OF THE PERSENTATIONS—THE CONSTITUTION OF CLEISTHERES (510-9 s.c.).

Or the numerous tyrants of European Greece the sen of Peislstratus had been the last to fall. Even before his expulsion the zeal which had led on the Spartans to attack tyrants wherever they found them had cooled down; and it had been with a half-hearted effort that they had east out the ruler of Athens. The danger of an anti-Dorian movement led by a league of tyrants had been removed long before, when Carinth fell; and in crushing Hippias the Spartans had destroyed a useful ally merely to satisfy a rollgious secuple—a scruple which, as they soon heard, had been dollberately played upon by an unscrupulous politician and a mercenary priesthood. Apolle must have been in had odour at Sparia when the bribery of his oracle was discovered, and his balests were never again obeyed with the single-hearted loyalty of old days.

When Cleamenes had drawn off his troops, and liberated Athens was left to herself, it seemed for a moment as if the old factions Traisperate had learnt no tesson under the strong hand of the Athens. Pelisistratione. Civil strife at once broke out; the opposing leaders being Cleisthouses the Alemaconid, chief of the newly returned exiles, and Isagoras, the son of Tisander. The matter was at first a personal rivalry between two powerful nobles, but ere long it took the shape of a political struggle; for when Isagoras strungthened binnelf by organizing a new oligarchic party, Cleisthenes at once assumed the rive of leader of the populace. "He took the democracy into partnership," says Herodotus, "it having been previously excluded from all authority." Thirty

years of the rule of the Reisistrations had weakened the oligorahia tendencies in Athens, by breaking up the traditions of authority and influence which had belonged to the old houses. On the other hand, it had been favourable to the growth of democratic feeling; for under the tyrants all men had been equal, though equal in slavery alone. Accordingly it was found that Isagorsa had summoned to his aid a waning nower, while Cleisthones was backed by the rising sentiment of the majority of the nation. The cligarch was easily worsted, and fled to Sparta, while the democrat was left in possession of the field (510-9 n.c.).

Few statesmen have found themselves in such a favourable position as Cleisthenes enjoyed at this moment, and few baye ever made a better use of their opportunities. In the citetethenes, short time of his ascendancy-a time to be measured

by mouths rather than years—he completely rerigidlied the Athenian constitution. A taste for political reorganization, indeed, seems to have been innate in his blood; for his grandfuther, Cleisthenes of Sievon, from whom he derived his name, had been famous for the manner in which he recust the institutions of his native town; and his brother Hippolochus was the grandfather of the yet greater reformer Perioles.

The results of the work of Christhenes were not to be ophomoral; they made thomselves falt through the whole of the subsequent history of Athens, and were the foundation on which all succeeding legislators built. For their plan was so well suited to the needs of the times, that it admitted with cuse and safety of all these additions and medifications in a democratic direction which Aristoldes, Perioles, and other statesmen afterwards devised. At the base of the new constitution lay the idea of the supreme authority of the whole body of oisizens gathered in their assembly; and this being once granted, all now developments of the functions of that body were logical consequences of the original conception of its omninotence.

Cleisthenes began his reforms with the most simple elements of the state, completely recentling the whole of the local and tribal divisions of the citizens. He could not, of course, Constitution interfere with the ancient ties of the veres, the clan of Olescheres. brotherhood of families who owned a common hearth and altar, a common burial-ground and common festivals, and were bound by ioniprocal caths to aid and cherish each other. But the associations larger than the clan he was determined to dissolve, Noither tribal exclusiveness nor local joulousies should keep the Athenian recoils from blanding into a homogeneous whole.

Cleisthenes accordingly abolished the four ancient Ionic tribus, whose distinction was supposed to descend from the four mythic

The new tribes and Asgiceres. For the four tribes he aubstituted ten, which took their names from Attic kings and herecs. The new tribes men were to reverence their eponymous patron, but they could make no pretone of being descended from kim. To be a member of the tribe Cecropis did not imply supposed connection with the sanks-footed king, nor did all who worshipped Ajax thereby claim a Salaminian pedigree. The units which compared the new tribal divisions were local, consisting

of demer. The deme was a small township or parish -to use English torminology-whose origin could be some cases be truced back to one of the old Attie boronglys, such as Rhammuna or Sphettus, or Rieusis, which Theseus had united into the one Athenian state. In others it was the settlement of a clan, the home of the real or separated descendants of a single ancestor; for the deme of Echelkine or Philaidae was the settlement of the children of Echelus or Philasus, just as in Saxon England the township of Oddington was the settlement of the children of Odda. Utilizing these previous divisions to a great extent, Cleistheass brought the number of the demes of Attica up to exactly one hundred, of which he gave ten to each of his new tribes. Now, if he had given ten neighbouring demos of the hill-country to the tribo Antiochia, or tou sen-coast demes to the tribe Cesropia, be would have simply been opening up again opportunities for the reconstruction of the old local factions of the Hills, the Plain. and the Shore. Accordingly, he took exactly the opposite course;

¹ The name of the tribe Ainotts was probably devised in order to except the fact that Salamis, the following of Ajan, had become completely part and parcel of Aities, to that Athens might claim its heroes as her own, the names of the tribes were Compair, Paudionis, Erectlein, Aegeis, Accountals, Hippotheducis, Anticchis, Alamis, Laonia, Ossels.

no two dames of the same tribe touched each other. Oenče in the extreme north-west belonged to the same tribe, Hipputheontis, as did Azenia in the extreme south-east. The town of Athens itself was split up into eight domes, belonging to six different tribes, while the other four were represented in its suburbs. So well did this schome work, that mover again in the course of Attic history do we find local associations giving trouble to the state. Within a few years the union of the domes of the north-east into a faction of Diacrii, or of these of the south-west into a faction of Panilii, had exaced to be conceivable. While the dome, with its demarch and local judges, dealt with the details of local administration and justice, the tribe was made the unit for all state business.

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Into the demes and tribes Cleisthones swept almost the whole free population of Attica, and many porsons who could not even he called wholly free. He enfrenchised not only such " metics" or resident aliens as desired to take up the citizenship of Athens, but even servile clients, or devian persons, as they were called. This class consisted of slaves who dwelt apart from their masters, and possessed property of their own, though they had not yet been completely freed. By becoming citizens they were of course rolloyed of all their disabilities, and raised to the same status as their ex-promietors. The new citizens went, at Cleisthones had no doubt intended, to swell the forces of the democracy. It must have been no small blow to the pride of the old digarchic houses to find themselves enrolled in the same tribe-perhaps even in the same deme-as their late dependents. But we do not find that the strength and vigour of the state was in the least decreased by the influx of the newly enfranchised; ladeed, for a city which was just about to step forward to compete for the legemeny in Greece, the accession of thousands of willing same was on unmixed blessing-

The tribe organization was made by Christhenes the basis of a reorganization of the Bould, or Senate. That body was for the fature to consist of five hundred members, of whom The Bould. fifty were closted from each tribe. Solon's old number of four hundred senators therefore now vanishes. The Senate formed a permanent deliberative body, charged with the daty of discussing all matters of public import, and sending down recom-

mendations dealing with them to be voted on by the public assembly of the whole body of citizens. These recommendations, or reasonactuars, had no validity in themselves, and only assumed force after they had been satisfied by the Ecclesia. In this they differed from the Roman "Benntus Consultum," which, acquiring by usage an independent authority, made the Senate at Home a power practically co-ordinate with the assembly of citizens. Basides agting as a body for preliminary deliberation, the Athenian Senate supplied presidents to the Ecclesia. The year was divided into ten periods of thirty-five or thirty-six days each, and one of these was given, in a rotation settled by let, to the sounters of each tribe. The period was called a Prytany (represent), and the fifty senators who were in office during its continuance were known as Prytaneis. They were bearded and ledged in a public building, named the Prytanelum, at the expense of the state. Thus they were always on the spot, ready to not as a committee of the Senate at the shortest notice. Each Prytany was divided into five bodies of ten men each (Profdri), and each ten presided for seven days at all meetings both of Senate or Ecclosia which occurred during their term of dignity. They chose from among themselves. every day a chairman called the Epistates, who was, during his twenty-four hours of office, supreme president alike of Senate and public assembly. To him were handed ever every morning the koys of the Acropolis and the treasury, together with the great seal of the republic, all which the ephemeral dignitary resigned to his successor at the part dawn.

By the wholesale additions which he made to the roll of fully qualified citizens, Cicisthenes largely increased the numbers of the

Pale public assembly—a body which is now known as Ecotesia. "Ecclesia" when it meets for political purposes, "Hollsen" when it has judicial business in hand.\(^1\) Anything which the assembly may have but in authority by becoming annanogeably numerous was more than compensated by its increased privileges and new opportunities for interference in all state business. Instead of being convoked at bregular intervals.

It will be observed that Cirtius has been followed rather than Grote in this account of the legislation of Cleisthenes. The Inter places many of these changes at later faces.

according to the caprice of the magistrates, the Ecclesia was now given one day of meeting in each Prytany, so that it would not be summoned less than ten times in the year. But, in addition, it might be convoked at any extraordinary crisis by authority of the Senate or of the Strategi. These extra sessions grew more and more numerous, till at last, by a new arrangement, the number of muetings during a Prytany was increased to four, the power to hold additional ones when necessary being still retained in spite of the multiplication of ordinary days of assembly. The Ecclesia could deal with any business, legislative, administrative, political, or diplomatic. It heard foreign ambassadors, and after due discussion decided on questions of war, peace, alliance, or treaty. It received at the end of the year an account of his stewardship from every magistrate who served the republic. It could supplement the constitution by passing new laws of universal application, or special decress to meet special elecumstances.1 It could exercise by its votes full authority over revenue and taxation. tributed honours and rewards to deserving citizens or strangers, In short, it passessed the control of the executive and legislative departments of government, as in another form and under another name, that of Heliaso, it had also full possession of the judicial functions of the state. After the introducer of a measure and the ncivileged presidents of the assembly, the Epistotes and Prosdri, had spoken, it was open to any citizen to rise from his place, mount the Bems, or speaker's platform, and address the people. This much-valued right of free speech [mappoois] was the recordest boast of the Athenian. Its possession led a very large number of citizens to qualify themselves as public speakers, so that oratorical power and councity for debate were not confined to any class or profession in the city. Of course the Ecclesia had its well-known favourities, who could almost be called professional contors, but their barangues might be interspersed by those of any farmer or artisan whom onthusiasm, indignation, or impudence stirred up to speaking-point. Bud contory found its check in the boots and hisses with which the crowd were ready to silence the

¹ Of decrees at Λέβανα, ψαρέσμα is one passed on its own initiative by the Becleria 1 προβούλουμα is a recommendation of the Seaste sent down to the Egolesia for ratification 1 νόμος is a chapte in the constitution.

windbug or the bore, for the Ecclesia was more celebrated for liveliness than for decorum. On days of an important debate the whole Payx would be commed with citizens, but when the agenda were of an uninteresting mature a small muster was often seen. If it was too menty, the presidents could send out public slaves, armed with a rope smeared with rad paint, to sweep the neighbouring streets of their loungers. Thus even a dull day in the Ecclesia was not destitute of its humours. Any one who, while endeavouring to evale the rope and escape the meeting, received a touck of the point was liable to fine.

The Heliaes, like the Ecolesia, was at first composed of the whole body of full oltizons, or, at least, of all full citizens over thirty years of age. Its history is less exactly known than that of The Helicea. the Eccisein, but it would appear that its function as settled by Cleisthenes was to try parsons accused of crimes against the state, such as treason, riot, or embazzlement of public funds. The cases between two private persons were still decided before the archous or other individual magistrates, while the court of the Arcopagus retained its jurisdiction in cases of homicide, and its general censorial power of supervising the lives of citizens. It was probably not during the lifetime of Cleisthener, but at some subsequent date in the first quarter of the fifth contary, that the Six thousand citizens of Helinea was divided into dileasteries. over thirty years of age were chosen out of it by lot, six hundred from each tribe. Then, of these, five thousand were divided into ton bodies of five hundred each, named dikasteries, while the remaining thousand were kept in reserve to fill up the casual vacancies of the ten panels. When a case came on for decision. the dikasteries cast lots to see which should try it; while the gix junior erchons, or Thesmothelus, also cast lois to settle which of them was to sit as president of the dikastery. These elaborate precentions were directed against the possible use of bribery or intimidation. For since a criminal would not know till the last moment which archon would be the presiding judge, or which dikastery would be the jury at his trial, he could not set to work to exert influence or corruption on them. Moreover, the great. size of the dikestory itself would have made it difficult to try bribery. Justice at Athene, thou, might be perverted by prejudice

or party strife, but never by the coarser means of corruption. In this the Athenian courts compare very favourably with those of Rome, where during the last contary of the republic bribery seems to have been the rule rather than the exception.

Having discussed the Ecclesis and the Heliaca, we must now turn to the nugietropy. It was perhaps the most striking feature of the reforms of Christhenes that he introduced the The archenextraordinary practice of choosing magistrates by let. ably and the For the future the problem were selected, not by the majority of votes in the Recleais, but by the cast of the die. this measure was not so wild at it appears at first sight. Bolonian constitution had still been retained by Cleisthenes as far as the exclusion of the poorer class of citizens from the higher offices was concerned, so that there was no chance of an archen bolug a papper subsidized by some wealthy wire-paller. Moreover, the lots were cust not between the whole body of Athenisus, but only between those who came forward to stand as candidates. It was fair to assume that any man who offered blusself for an office which was inhorious, responsible, and unremanerative, would be presessed of energy and public spirit. That he would not be a notorious evil-liver was seenzed by the process called "Dokimasin," or examination into the character and past life of candidates, in which all who were esteemed disreputable were struck out of the competition. Moreover, the archonship was no longer all that it had been; the new assertion of the supreme rights of the Reclesia had shore it of all its more antecratio and irresponsible authority. And there was nothing in the routine of administration and fudicial business which remained before the arginea, to require saything more than everego intelligence, probity, and decision. But nevertheless men of the highest political standing continued for some time to present themselves to encounter the hazard of the let. As long, in fact, as no one but statesmen of some weight engaged in the struggle, there was enough probability of success to encourage a runn who had some regard for his dignity to enter for it. Themistocics, for example, was archen in 493 n.c., by the chance of the die. In 499 n.c., when Aristoides came forward as a candidate, all other competitors withdrew, as a testimony to his worthiness. It was not, in fact, till the archonships had been thrown open to all classes by the subsequent reforms of Aristetles, and mon of no weight or steading had begun to put themselves forward for it, that the office and into a mere ornamental figure-head of the ship of state, while all real administrative power passed to the elective Strateri.

The existence of these officers was a consequence of Cleisthenes's new armugement of the tribes. Carried into the province of The strategic military affairs, that measure had resulted in the division of the national army joto ten hodles of approximately equal strength, one drawn from each tribe. command them not only were inferior officers created-Taxiarchs for the infantry, and Phylarche for the cavalry-but ten generals were elected annually. These Strategi, each of whom headed the hoplites of a tribe, supersocied the Polemarch, or third archoo, who had till the time of Cicisthenes acted as ex-officio commanderin-chief. He now became a more honorary colleague and president of the Strategi, having equal nuthority but no special command over tim huplites of any tribe. As the generals were chosen by yoto in the assembly, and not subjected to the action of the lot, they were always leading men, if not aspable officers. As representing the choice of the people, they naturally came to be regarded as more serious personnges than the archons, who were now the races children of chance. House they came are long to assume some of the functions which had been peculiar to the erchonate; they gained power to convoke the Ecclesia, and habitually conducted diplomatic relations with foreign states, before they were submitted to the Reclesia for ratification. After the whole body of citizens had been rendered eligible for the office of archen, by the subsequent reforms of Aristeides, the Strategi completely overtopped the old chiefs of the state, and became the real heads of the Athenian administration. They cannot, however, be considered as a ministry. In our modern sense of the word, for men of the most adverse political eminions, and even the bitterest personal enemies, were frequently chosen by the people's vote to serve as colleagues, so that there was no guarantee that they would be able to act confinily together as oblefs of a party government. That form of administration was accordingly unknown at Athens, and the theory of utilizing at once for the state's good all the state's

best men, without leaving any individual of weight in opposition, always prevelled. As might have been expected, this arrangement did not tend to unanimity or harmonious juint action among the Strategi, who, though they were generally good men, were often anything but good colleagues.

There remains for consideration one more provision of importance in the Cleisthenic constitution-the extraordinary device called Ostracism. The personal and political rivalry of great party leaders had been the curse of Athens; it had led to the usurpetion of the Peteletratidae, and had reasserted itself again the moment that the Peisistratides had been driven out in the conflict between Cleisthenes and Imgoras. The reformer cast about for a menus to prevent it for the future, and found one in the institution of honoumble banishment, which men called Ostmoism. He provided that at any political origin a special meeting might be held, in which the people could declare by their vote that the presence of any individual to Athens was projudicial. to the state. If six thousand votes-estrado, as they were called, from being written on an oyster-shell (Arrence)-were cast into the ballot-box against any one name, that statesman wont into exile for ten years. This busishment implied no necessary slur on the personal or political character of the sufferer. He did not lose his rights of citizenship, or incur confiscation of property. When his enforced travels were ended, he re-entered the city with the some property and status as he had presessed before his departure. His exile had not been intended for a punishment on him, but as a means of ending a political dead-lock, or of removing a personality which was inimical for the time being to the interests of the state. or of averting the consequences of an honest but injudicious statesman's personal influence on the people. If we examine the list of persons estracized, we find that not only Hipparchus, the advocate of the return of the Peinistratidae, and Damon, the overzenlous friend who was suspected of featering autocratic views la the mind of Pericles, are included in it, but also the blameless Aristoides, who incurred his fate merely because he staked his political career on a persistent opposition to the views of Themistooles, which were in favour with the people at the time. Cimon

1 Not to be confused with his relative, the tyrant skin by Harmodius,

and Thuoydides son of Melesias, also suffered from ostracism, provoked by the necessity put before the Reclesia of choosing between their policy and that of Pericles. But Cleisthenes forgot that it was possible that there might arise more than two parties in the state, each with its fival policy. The final disuse of Ostracism, after an employment of about a century, came about from the discovery that it was powerloss to remedy the confusion which arose from the consistence of were than two factions. For when the intburnal of estracism, in 418 n.c., was called upon to decide between the leaders of the war party and the peace party, Alcibiades and Nicias, the partisans of those statesmen combined to black-ball the demagence Hyperbolus, chief of a third party, the extreme democrate. Thus the two statesmen, whose policies were autogenistic, still remained to divide the city with their rivalry. After this failure optracism was never again employed.

Such were the chief points in the constitution of Cleisthones, whose establishment marks the commencement of Athonian greatpeas. It was the most thoroughly democratic scheme of legislation which had yet been seen, and particle of the nature of a ginentic experiment in political science.

No previous constitution in any Greek city had given the assembly of the full body of citizens such untrammelled power to away the state. Instead of the restricted privileges which it had been granted by Solon—the right to elect rangistrates and to call them to account at the expiration of their office—it now enjoyed almost unfettered central over the foreign and berne policy of Athens, and also had the supreme judicial power in the state. The partisons of eligarchy foretold the speedy min of the city which had placed the conduct of affairs in the hands of on untried and fickle populace. But the notual result of the adoption of democracy at Athens was an outburst of viggur, unparalleled before or after in any Greek city. The town, which had been looked upon as a state of the second. class, lying off the main road of commerce, and exercising little laffgence in international politics, suddonly started up as a great navel and military power, and went forth conquering and to conquer. Its hoplites, alone and unadded, faced and flung back the hitherto unvanguished armics of the king of the East; its tricemes, after leading the united flests of Hellas to victory against the common enomy, established an unquestioned supremacy at sen which at once-famed squadrons of Corinth and Afgina were not able to dispute. An outburst of literary nod artistic energy made itselffelt at the same moment, and rendered Athens the intellectual as well as the commercial centre of the Helloubraco. For from being directed into material channels by the for-reaching political interests of the day, the gentus of Athense art and literature was atimulated by those rate higher flights, and its fullest development was contemperaneous with the zenith of the imperial greatness of the city.

How far was the glory of Athens in the fifth century the result of the constitutional reforms which had marked the end of the sixth? It would, no doubt, be casy to exaggened the extent of their connection, and to forget the inspiring effect which the victory over Persis, won twenty years later, exceeded over the whole Heilenic mee no less than over Athens. But the records of the years which preceded submissionable to great which preceded submissionable to great the final defeat of the Eastern invader. In the history of the struggle which she waged in order to maintain her now constitution, when her neighbours banded themselves together to crush her rising greatness, we shall see the signs of the arms spirit which afterwards enabled her to withstand the Persian and to found an empire of the sens.

CHAPTER XVII.

EVENTS IN EUROPBAN GUERGE DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF MARATHON, 508-490 B.C.

Wirmour depriving Cleisthones of the credit due to him for his constitution, it is necessary to bear in mind that the originating cause of his actions had been his rivalry with the oligarob Isagoras. Personal antagonism to that statesmen had combined with patriotic feeling to urge him late the framing of his all-important referres. And now the workings of the hatred between the two men were to make themselves seen. Smarting under personal as well as political defeat, Isageras called in foreign ensuries in order to worst. his rival, reckloss of the evils he was thereby bringing on his country. Flying to Sparts, he stirred up his personal friend King Cleomenes, to expel Claisthenes from Athena by force. So easy was the task in the king's estimation, that he muched on Athens at the head of a few hundred personal retainers only, without asking for or receiving the national army of Sparta, or the contingents of the numerous Pelopannesian states which looked to that city as their bend. He sent before him a herald to bid the

Charmenes Athenians "expel the accursed family," using the old takes Athense scruple concerning this hereditary blood-guilfiness of the Alemaconida for their sacrilegious slaughter of the Cylonian conspirators, in order to discredit the Alemaconid Cleisthenes with his fellow-citizens. The reformer had either overrated the strength of the Sparton army, or resolved to do his best to deprive Cicomenes of his nominal casus bells. Immediately on the arrival of the hemid he withdrew from Athens. Deprived of their leader, and not yet realizing their own or their adversacies' strength, the Athenians threw open their gates to Cicomenes and

Isageras. The Sparian's retainers garrisoned the Aeropella, while the oligarch installed himself in office as archon, and mustered his partisons to everthrow the new democratic constitution by a facilities rate of the people. Then Isageras declared the Cleisthenia "Sonate of Fire Hundred" dissolved, and replaced it by a body of three hundred oligarchs named by himself. At the same times well-nigh a thousand men of the democratic party were expelled from the city, and sont to join Chalsthenes in exile (508 n.c.).

Meanwhile the people of Athens had the time to count up the numbers of Cleomones' hody-guard, and to gauge the strength of the native partisaus of Lagoras. The result was a Gleomorea sudden and apontaneous insurrection, which broke candidates. the nower of the oligarchs in a few hours. Isagorns and his followers were driven pell-mell within the gates of the Acropelia, the only snot which his Spartan friends were able to hold for him. The Senate of Five Hundred reassembled and assumed its old functions, recalling Cleisthenes and all the other exites, and setting the full armed force of Attica to blockade the According The crowd to the fortress was great, and no stock of provisions had been laid in, so that in a very few days the carrison were approaching a state of starvation. They were soon compelled to surrender at discretion. The Athenians, loth to drive Sparts to a war of vengeance, spared the lives of Cleamones and his hopfites. and allowed there to depart. The king succeeded in smuggling off Improvae in the ranks of his troops, but the rest of the oligarchs. full into the hands of the people. So great was the rage in Athens at their detestable attempt to destroy the national constitution by the aid of the foreigner, that all the prominent men, many scores in number, were put to donth. The rest of the gailty party were sent into exile.

Far from feeling gratitude for the preservation of his life, Gleomenes had no other sentiment in his heart, when he returned to Sparts, than latted for the people who had brought his overweening confidence to such an ignominious fall. News soon arrived at Athens that the hing was straining every nerve to organize a second and more formidable expedition against those who had worsted bin. So large was the Spartan contingent in the new army, that King Demaratus, the colleague of Gleomenes,

was joined with him in command; while the whole of the Pelopounesian subject-allies had been ordered to send their troops to the Isthmus, though no information was given them as to the destination or object of the expedition. Terrified at the impending storm, the Athenians sont ambassadors to Sardis, to beg for aid from the satrap Artaphornes and his Arthochornes. master the Great King. This embassy showed an amount of unwindow and a want of Pan-Hellenic patriotism. which were rately to be found in the actions of Athens. We are told that it was sont at the suggestion of Cloisthenes himself, a fact which touds to strongthen that view of the statesman's character which represents him as an adrest party-lander rather than a wholly unselfish patriot. The satrap of Sardis offered hard terms to the Athenian onvoys. He could conceive of no relation between the Great King and a foreign people other than that of master and subject. Accordingly he refused to pledge the armed aid of Persia to the Athenians, unless they should make the typical offerings of earth and water, and acknowledge Darius as their suzerain. So great was the dread of Sparta which filled the ambassadors' minds, that they actually accepted the satrap's conditions, and andertook, in the name of Athens, to do homege to the king. On their return, however, they were astenished to find thronselves met with the wildost indignation. Even in the worst extremity the Atheniaus had not dreamed of surrendering themselves to the barbarian, but only of forming an alliance with him. The engagement was repudiated, the treaty disavowed, and the advocates of the embrasy as well as the ambassadors themselves, fell into discredit. From this moment Cleisthenes, in spite of all his undoubted services to the state, is never again found acting as the director of the assembly; he seems, indeed, to have been compelled to retire altogether from public life.

Athors would have been left wholly unabled to face the attack of the Poloponuseian confederacy, if it had not been for one feeble ally whom she possessed—the little Busciina town of Plataca. We have related in a previous chapter how the Poisistratidae had undertaken, in behalf of Athera, the protection of the Platacaus ognizes their Theban neighbours, and now the alliance was still preserved. But the friendship of Plataca ensured the counity of

Thobes, and when Cleomenes was mustering his army the Becotian League thought that the opportunity had come to reclaim its one reculcitant member. The Thobans drew into alliance with themselves the people of Chalcis, the great moritime town of Euleon, who were jealous of the rising commercial and maritime power of Athene, and were not everse to crush a city which was beginning to supersede older marts as the emperism of the Central Aegast. Cleomenes, therefore, found it easy to concert a plan of operations with the Becetians and Chalcidians, who undertook to full on Attica from the north as soon as the Spartan army should have passed the Isthmus.

It was, accordingly, with every prospect of success before him that Cleomenes led his army through the Megarid into the plain of Eleusis. Once arrived there, the allies learnt the commence purpose for which they had been essembled-n pay-lavades action. pose which many of them viewed with the highest disgust. For Cleateness now proposed a plan far more iniquitous than that of overthrowing the democratic constitution of Athens; he openly avewed that he would make his irlend Imperes tyrant of Attica. Such an act would have been a formal regudintion of the policy which Sparts and Litherto pursued, that of expelling all the tyrants whom she met. King Demaratus, who was joined with Glacmenes in the command of the army, was not unnaturally provoked. into setting bimself in opposition to his colleague, and found himself supported by the majority of the allies. The Athenians, who had mustored in full force on the castern skirts of the Thrissian. Plain, were surprised to find that the enemy made no movement of advance. Everything, Indeed, was in confusion in the Pelopouamian camp. The Corinthians, who remembered the ills they had suffered under the house of Gypselus, took the lead in refusing to fight merely that a tyranny might be established at Athens. Many of the contingents of the smaller states showed a similar disposition, and Domnostus backed them with his authority. At last, after a stoomy council of war, the army breke up; the allies reformed to their homes, and Cleamenes was forced to retrace his steps towards Sparta without having enjoyed his revenge.

While the Athenian army had been concentrated in front of the main body of invadors, the Buectians and Chalcidians had ravaged the north-eastern demas of Attica without meeting with resistance. But the moment that the Peloponnesians had departed, the Athenians hastly turned northword to check these incursions. They marched first against the Chalcidians, but, bearing that the Thobans were harrying coastwards to join their confederates, threw themselves between the two forces and attacked them in detail. In one day they fought two battles. In the morning they fell on the Becotters and nuted them, taking seven hundred prisoners; then, crossing the Euripus into Eubose, they encountered the Chalcidians in the afternoon and wan another victory.

So decisive was this second engagement, that Chalois itself fell into the hands of the conquerors. Expelling from the city the The Athenians families called Hippotenae, who had ruled it as a strict mate Chalois alignrichy, the Athenians divided their confiscated estates into four thousand farms, and bestowed them on proof edizons of Athena. This was the first of their many Observables, or "lottings-out" of conquered territory. Although the lower classes in Chalois were left unharmed to dwell among the new settlers, the state was in reality transformed into a more dependency of Athena, as all political power rusted with the permanent gardson of Clarucles. A comparison at ones suggests itself between this softlement and the system of "colonies" which the Romans found so effectual in holding down newly conquered districts in Italy.

In spite of the defeat of their alice, the Bocotian confederacy continued the war, but they met with no success in it. Sending

War between for advice to Delplit, the Thebans received from the Athense of concle the commend to "ask aid of those nearest to Assins them." This dark saying could not apply to their neighbours of Coronus or Tanages, who were already sorving in the army of the league, so was interpreted,—as no doubt the oracle had designed,—teto a hint to form an alliance with the Asginetans. Thebé and Asgins, it was remembered, were, according to the old myths, sisters, daughters of the river-god Asopus; hence their descendants might be regarded as the "nearest relatives" of each other. An unbassy was therefore sont to ask the side of the powerful island state.

The same commercial jealousy which had influenced Chalois made Itself felt at Aegina with reducibled force. Athens was a possible rivel before the fall of Chalcis, but after she had swallowed up the trade of the great Eubaean town she had become doubly formidable. If we add that as Doriaus the Aeginetana despised their Ionian neighbours, and as aligarche dotested their democratic constitution, we cap easily understeed their frame of mind. They still possessed the largest many in European Greece, and determined to use it one Athena had time to grow yet greater. Accordingly they commenced to awage Phalerum and the other sea-cosed democ of Western Attion, and by these attacks, which the Athenian fleet was not strong enough to resist, draw off the pressure of the war from the Bosotiaus (500 p.t.).

Meanwhile Clearnanes had returned to Sports, and in spite of his second failure found himself able to atlr up his countrymus to new projects against Athons. They tackly threw blame on Demaratus for having opposed blacolleague's plans by massing a decree "that the two kings should never in future go out in the same army." Moreover, they summaned a congress of delegates from the whole of the allied states to assemble at Sparts. for they apparently considered that although the confiderates had refused to march against Athens when the order was suddenly and arbitrarily laid before them, they might be induced to reconsider their determination by argument and debate. The Spartans also took the strange step of sending for Hippins from his refuge at SigBurn, and offering to restore him to the tyranny. Finding that Impores' party had failed to help them, they hoped that the faction of supporters of the Polsistratidae, which still survived in Athena, might be attreed into activity by their aid, and used to break up the power of the new democracy. Progetting the old gradge of his expulsion from Athens by Spartan hands, the ex-tyrnat repaired to the congress, and joined Cleomones in plying every argument on the assembled allies. The Corinthians, however, remained obdurate, and the majority of the members of the Peleponnesian league evidently facilized to non-intervention. Nothing could be done to convince them, and Hippine returned in diagnet to his place of exile in the Troad. For the present he abandoned the attempt to make any capital out of the internal politics of Greece, and set himselt instead to win farour with the sateup Artaphernes of Sardis, who was already ill-disposed towards Athens on appount of the uncaremercious way in which that state, two years before, had repudiated the helf-ratified treaty which had bound it to Persia. An attempt to conciliate the offended magnate which the Athenians made, when they beard of the intrigues of the ex-tyrant, had no other effect than to draw from Artsphernes the declaration that "they could only secure their safety by receiving back Hippins, and giving the Great King earth and water." From that mannest the Athenians regarded peace with the great Eastern power as impossible, and resigned themselves to the necessity of adding the Persian to the already considerable list of their encouncies (505 n.c.). At a moment when the armics of Magalaxus was slowly making their way westward through Tirace and Macodon towards Greece, the consequences of offending the Great King must have seemed likely to be fatal. But rather than give up their electable constitution the Athenians resolved to brave them.

After the unfruitful congress at Spartn, in which the Peloponnesians had refused to crush Atheus for Cloomenes' gratification, the Atheusans were freed from the fee whom they most dreaded. The pasce party at Sparta was not only headed by King Domarntus, but favoured by the ophors, who dreaded lest Gleonomes should attempt to win back the old royal power of the Heraclidan. Accordingly the Lacelanmonians and their allies no longer appear among the onemics of Atheus, and when next a Spartan king is beneful of in connection with Athentan affairs, he appears in a benevolent rather than a location aspect. It is probable that the continued neutrality of the Peloponnesian powers was fine some degrees secured by a desperate war which

Argon about this time broke out between Specks and Argos (edgs. 606 p.c.). The Argives had nover forgotton the ancient supremacy which their city had, in the days of Pheidon, enjoyed over all the lands within the Isthmus, and selesed their opportunity when Sparts was estranged from the majority of ber allies. Instead, however, of being able to molest the Lacedaemonians, they were obliged to fight on the defensive, for Olecanenes advanced at once into Argolia. After trying unsuccessfully to attack Argos from

¹ The date of this war is deabtful. Some place it as early as 517 n.c., others as late as 404 n.c. The date given above seems probable, however.

the west, the king compelled the Augmetans and Eleyonians to supply him with ships, and lauded in the neighbourhood of Tirvns. Here he found the Argive army occupying a defensive position at a place called Sepata, between their capital and the sea. By gross carelessness the Argives allowed themselves to be surprised, and repoived a grashing defeat. Nor was this all: the unijority of the fugitives sought refuge bard by, in the sacred grove of the here Argos, where they were completely surrounded by the Sparton army. Clopmones might have received them to surrender, and obtained any terms he thought 5t to ask for their release; but he chose instead to commit an atreetty which has few panillels to Greek history. He blocked all the outlets with troops, and then set fire to the grove. Not an Argive escaped from the flames except to fall by the sword. In this buge diseater the vannetabed lest six thousand more, two-thirds of their citizens capable of bearing arms. Gleernones might have taken the city had he chosen, but instend of doing so returned home, only colchenting his victory by forcing his way into the great temple of Hara, which stood outside the walls of Arges, and doing solome sacrifice though, despite the priests, where he caused to be slegged for their remonstrations. On being attacked at Sparta for his remissances, he gave the ophors the curious snawer that the Delphio cracle had foretald that he should "destroy Argos." When he found that this was the name of the grove which he had burnt after the battle, he saw that the prophecy had been fulfilled; moreover, the sacrifice which he made at the temple of Hem had not been so propitions as to premise complete success, and he had therefore returned. Whether convinced or not, the cubers desisted from their represents. The main Importance of this compaign was that it took Argos out of Greek politics for more than a generation. Its reduced population saw their subject-allies of Ornese Choone and Mycenes in successful revolt, and were even reduced to siruggle for existence with their own agricultural surfs, who rose and maintained a vigorous war ugainst them for several years.

We must now return to Athens. That state, though free from fear of Sparts, had a war with Thebre and Aegins still on her hands, besides the prespect of another with Persis Impending. Of the details of the former struggle we unfortunately know nothing; but then not have been unsuccessful, since, when the revolted Lornane seat Arisingores to beg for aid in 500 n.o., Athens was

ten to Sarche. In a condition to spare a squadrou of twenty slelps for 480 M.O. distant operations on the count of Asia Minor. This was the expedition which to operated with the Ecctrions and Milesians in that unfortunale attack on Sardle which roused such wrath in Darius. Probably the violestoudes of the war with Augina account for the fact that, except on this one occasion, Athons sent no help to her Eastern kinsmen; for it is impossible to find any other reason for her descrition of the Lonians, when that people were fighting her battles by keeping her enemy employed at home. That the Athenians realized the meeting to themselves of the failure of the Lonia revolt is sufficiently shown by their conduct in

the matter of Phrynichus's play, "The Full of Miletus" (see p. 145). For six years, however, the revolt in Asia Minor left the Persian. no space time for interference with states beyond the Auguean, and the respite was very precious to Athens. It allowed a whole generation to arise which had been educated in a free and demooratic cley, where the traditions of tyramny and seditious party strife were yearly growing less dangerous. Nothing, indeed, could have been more fortunate for Athena than the course which events took in the period 510-490 u.c. The memory of the deeds of Hippins and Isagona was enough to make oligarchy or tyranuy impossible, willle the violent interference of Sparta had made men associate in all their thoughts the autonomy of Athens and her comporatio constitution, which had been allke threatened by foreign arms. Finally, the long war with Acgina hindered the Athenians from relapsing into their old party quarrels, by the continual state of tansion in which it kept them, and at the same time drove them. to become more and more of a navel power.

Public opinion, not only in Athems, but smoog calightened men throughout Greece, laid the prosperity of the city to the credit of the constitution of Cleatchenes. "In this whole course of events," writes Herodotus, "it was plainly evident what an excellent thing is a democratic constitution. For while Athens was ruled by tyrants her citizens were no more fortunate in was than their neighbours, but when they were freed they proved themselves for the best soldiers. This evidently came from the fact that they

were shock while they worked for a master, but gow sealous when every man was fighting to defend his own liberty,"

The twenty years 510-480 a.e. were the training-school of Athenian greatness; and the turn which the history of the subsequent half-centary took is only to be explained when we realize their meaning and importance. Nothing can illustrate their effect better than the influence which they exerted on the character and position of the three great near whom Athens produced during this

epoch.

Miltiades, son of Cimon, was a man who, in an earlier generation, would have proved either an aspirant for tyrangy or a bitter oligarchic partisan. He sprang from one of the oldest mustades at Attio families, the Asacidso, who claimed descent from the Salaminian Ajax. The wealth and influence of his father were so great that it had drawn down on him banishment at the hands of Poisistratus, and assassination from the more reakless Hippias. Militades himself had withdrawn from Athens to escape a similar fate, and had succeeded to a curious inheritance in the Thracian Chersonese. His ungle and namesake had, thirty years before, become king of a small tribe of barbarians narrowl the Dolonei, who dwalt upon the shere of the Hellesport (see page 114). These people, being oppressed in war by their neighbours, had, by the advice of the Delphie emole, taken a Greek for king. The older Miltindes not only reigned over them, but subdued by their aid several small Greek cities in the Thracian Chersonese, so that he was at once a Dolonoian king and a tyrant over Cardia and its Hellenic neighbours. In this double capacity he was succeeded by two penhews, of whom his more famous namesake was the second. The younger Mitiades has already met our notice, at the moment when he endeavoured to persuade the other Greek resals of Darius. to destroy the Danube bridge, at the time of that monarch's expedition into Scythin. When the lonic reveit took place he joined in it heartfly, and, after driving out the Porsina gardsons from Justices and Lemnes, took his countrymen at home into partnership, and aided them to establish their second great Cloruchy in the conquered islands (499 s.c.). When, however, the Hellespontine towns were recovered by the armies of the great king in 497 n.c., Militades was compelled to by from his own little dominion in the Thracian Charsonese, and, after a hairbreadth escape from a Phoeniulan squadron, which chased his galleys across the Aegean, thought himself fortunate to beach Athens in safety. The people were not ungrateful for the services he had done them in the matter of Imbres and Lemmes, and ere long chose him as one of the ben strategi of the year. That an ex-tyrant and a member of one of the old oligarchic families could be elected to the highest office by the democracy proves two things. The constitution of Chisthough must have obtained such a firm hold on the esteem of the Athenian people that they had grown to regard it as invulnerable to the assaults of pay interest caceny; even a man of the most undemocratic autocodents could not burm it, though he hold one of the chief magistractes in the state. Secondly, Miltiades himself must have pessessed no small share of that power of adapting one's self to circumstances which formed such a prominent feature in the Attic character. For on independent sovereign to become a republican official, and to wie bigh renswn in that capacity, was indeed a marvel. Novertheless, Miltindes had not been brought up under the training of the constitution of Cleisthenes-the Athenians nover fult that he was quite one of thomselves-and, in spite of his many excellent qualities, he could never make himself so thoroughly the people's here and champlon as two younger men who came into prominence at Athens about the same time as himself.

These two were Aristeides son of Lyshmolius, and Themistocles son of Neocles. Both were spring from undistinguished families of the middle class, and the second was not even of pure Attice parentage, his mother having been a Chrian roman. Bach, therefore, owed his position to his own ability, and only rose to prominence through the convicte occurrie care talents which the demonstic constitution opened to bitm. But, except in age and station, the two unen were as dissimilar as it is possible for human beings to be. Aristeides won the confidence of the Atlenian people by his possession of those virtues which were most wanting in the national character. Themistocles, on the other hand, rose to renown because he reproduced in their highest possible development all the features, good and had allies, of the Athenian disposition.

The son of Lysimochus displayed two great and excellent traits.

He was rigidly just and honourable, and he was gifted with the most importurbable cool-headedness. The faults of the Athenian demonstracy were precisely the reverse of these good qualities. Their folble was over-hasty action, the tendency to be led astray in matters both of right and wrong and of expediency and incapadiancy by the impulses of the moment. Hence they learnt by experience to respect the one man who was never moved by passion or projudice, but always summed up clearly on the side of honour and justice. But one he fully won the confidence of his countrymen, Aristeides had to undergo a rough probation. Often his advice was scorned, and once he was even estracized for his uncompromising opposition to the policy which had the momentary approbation of the people. Every one bas heard the story of the projudiced and ignorant voter who, on that occasion, gave his voice for expulsion, " because he was tired of always hearing Aristoldes called 'The Just." True or false, the anecdote brings into relief the pettiness of human nature and the stupid jestousy which Aristeides had to surmount before his position graw unquestioned.

The sen of Neecles was a man of a very different type. The respectable talents of Aristeides were thrown into the shade by his genius, but to his rival's moral virtues in had Themistocles. nothing to oppose. The characteristics, ovil as well as good, of the Athenian people seemed incarnate in him. Of all statesmen that Greece ever knew, he was incomparably the most versatile and ingenious. Thusydides says that at unpremeditated action there was no one to compare with him. With the shortest notice given, he would always lift on a happy expedient, and bis forecasts of fature events were wonderfully accurate. Nor did his successes proceed from study and long forothought; they were the fruits of the untaught quickness of his intellect. But Themistocies' ready brains were employed to benefit his country only so long as, while so doing, he benefited himself also. If he you patriotic, his natriotism was merely a larger kind of selfishness, which embraced his country as a thing necessary to his comfort. Above all, he was hopelessly corrupt in munoy matters. He made politics a paying trails. Laft a patrimony of three talents by his father, he was found to possess more than ninety at the moment

of the suddou end of his causer in Athens, and this large fortune had been mainly accumulated by taking bribes from foreign states. That he was nothing more than an a trascrupulous adventurer was sufficiently shown by the fact that, when expelled from his country, he promptly went over to the Persians, and died in the receipt of a ponsion from King Artaxerxes. All the vices of the Greek character were indeed embadied in him—selfishness, double dealing, want of political principle, malevolent jenkousy, and that love of ostentation which drives mou to the acquisition of wealth by any means, whether dishonourable or fatr and open. Yet, ore his faults were discovered by his countrymen, he had done them benefits whose effects were unparalleled. For in the earlier days of his life, when in working for Athens he also worked for himself, his sorvices to the state were ande as so statesman, not even Pericles, was ever able to surpass.

It was the necessities of the war with Aegine which first brought Themistodes into preminence. He had obtained the archorship Portideation by the hexard of the lot in 493 p.c. and, while holding of Palencia. that affect, persuaded his countrymen to factify the Pelmeus and make it their maral present. Previously the Athenian harbour had been the open roadstead of Phaltrum, whose only advantage was that it lay on the spot at which the sea approached the city most nearly. The Poirnous had been merely a recky waste positionals, undefended and unemplayed. Themistocles saw its especities, and at his instigation it was walled off, and made the naval station of the Athenian fleet. For this purpose it was admirably fitted, presenting as it did one large and two smaller harbours, all deep, enough to receive the largest ships, and yet so narrow at their mouths that they could be closed with chains and booms so as to be perfeatly innecessible to an enemy. The Peiragua was inconveniently distant indeed (four ntiles) from Athens, and did not lie so thoroughly under the eyes of all who dwelt in the city as did the Day of Phalerum; but for safety, strength, and commercial use it was so incomparably superior, that it superesded the older station at onco. In a few years it became a considerable town, the head-quarters of the most democratic section of the Athenian people; for the haddless class flacked down in crowds to the port, where employment was easy to find, either on shipboard.

or in connection with the small industries which were called into existence by the necessities of the seafating population. The near-inos 523as of the Pirones grew ere long to be a prominent factor in Athenian politics; for the events of the years which followed the founding of the new port were such as to bring forward in every way the importance of the newal side of the city's strength.

In 493 n.c., the very year of Themistocles' archonship, the hands of the Parsian satrage of Asla Minor were once more entirely free. The last throes of the Ionic revolt were over, and the great king might now send forth his armies to renew that Westward progress which had been interrupted by the rebellion. To give an opportunity for prompt submission to any states which might choose to do homage without making any attempt to defend themselves, Darius sont heralds to every city in Greece to demand the enetomory "carth and water." After the affice of the burning of Sardis, the Athenians could not hope for favourable treatment at the lands of Persia; but their indiguant rejection of submission might have taken a less ferocious form. They cast the unfortunate herald into the Barathenra, or nit into which orininals were thrown, and bade him take earth therefrom. Themistocles is said to have instiguted the act, nor is it out of keeping with his character. It is more surprising to find the same deed repeated by the self-contained Sportans. Indignant that the first state in Greece should be held so lightly by the king, they gave his herald water by tossing him into a well. These two desperate defiances proclaimed that it was well to the death between Persin and the two most resolute states in Greece. But la other cities the summous did not meet auch an auswer; many dismissed the bemiles with scorn; but some gave the necessary pledge, and notable among these were the Arginetana. who were probably impelled as much by dislike of Athers as by mere dread of Darius.

The submission of Aogina had an unexpected result in reconciling Athens and Sports. Hearing of the line which the Locednemoniaus had taken up, the Athenians sent to thom, ignoring quarents of old grudges, and appealed to them to hinder the cheensens and descrition of the cause of Greedon freedom which Demantes, the Aoginetaus meditated. Nor did they appeal in vain. King

Clearnques had lest the memory of his old weath with Athens while ongoged in the subsequent struggle with Arges, and in a long course of wrangling with his colleague Demoratus. He took up warmly the grievance against Augina, all the more so that Demaratus did the reversa, Going in person to the island, he declared there his intention of coercing any traitorous attempt against the common weal of Grosse. Asting under private advice from Domeratus, the Anginetane took no notice of the threat, and Cleamanes returned in high duckgoon to Sparts. There he at once put into action a long-meditated scheme against bis colleague and enumy. If e laid against him a charge of illegitimacy, and when on appeal was made on the point to the Delphie Applle, a heibed crucle replied that Domaratus was no true son of King Ariston. He was dethroned and superseded by Leetyckides, who had been Cleonenes' confederate in the plot. Demaratus fied to Asla, and resalted to the court of Darins, whose favour he won. From that time forward his return at the head of a Partish army was a constant source of dread to Cleomones and every other Sparken, and its prospect did much to keep them from in their resistance to the great king.

When he had thus provided himself with a subservient colleague, Gloomones sivesped down on Aegins. So irresistible did he now appear, that the Aeginotans submitted to him without a straggle. He bound them to peace with Athens, and, to secure it, took from them ten hostages of the highest rade, whom he handed over to the custody of the Atheniana. Thus when the armies of the Made presented themselves on Attle sell two years later, there was no hostile power ready to distract the defence by attacks in the rear.

We have already related how the expedition which Mandonius launched significated Grocco in 452 n.c. was shattered against the rocks remainstance of Athes, and the stubborn resistance of the Thrucken and B.C. Significan months were complayed to gather a second army and feet, but in the summer of 400 n.c. all was ready. Phoenicia and Louin had furnished six handred wargalleys, while the land contingents of the western summiss mustered at Tarsus under Artapherucs, son of that satrap of Lydia of whom we have so frequently heard. Datis the Mede brought down from

Suss a select force recruited in the far East. Thirty-six nations were represented in the combined sumy, from the Greeks of Louis to the Sakao of Eastern Tartary. They may well have numbered the hundred thousand foot and fen thousand horse which are ascribed to them. Nor were they without guidaner, besides comy other Greek exiles, there saided with them the aged Hippins, who now for the last time led a hostile force against his native country, that he might win book his long-lost tyranny. The Peisistrutidne still numbered a few partisans at Athons, and the ex-tyrant hoped great things from their co-operation.

It was rather lets in the summer when the expedition went forth to carry out the behests of Darlus by subduing all the Greeks who had not given him carib and water, and more expecially by bringing before him in chains those Erettlans and Atheniaus who had insulted his unifesty by crossing the Argent and burning his city

of Surdis.

CHAPTER XVIII.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE INVASION OF XERXES, 490-480 R.C.

WARKED of the dangers of the Thracian coast by the great shipwreck of Mardonins's fleet in 492 n.a., Datis and Artaphernus steered The Persians straight across the Aegenn through the Cyclades. take bratrie. Their great armament turrified the islanders, most of whom bastoned to give earth and water to the great king. The Maxians, after refusing submission, took refuge in the hill-tops, abandoning their city to the spoller. Apparently they had forgotten their own successful defence against Megabates and Aristagoras just twelve years before. Passing the hely island of Delos, which they left unstaked, and treated with all respect, the Persians come to Euloca, and landed not far from Eretria, the first goal at which they nimed. There was panie in the city, and although the Athenian "Cleruchs" of Chalets come to their aid, the Erstrians dared not take the field. They shut themselves up within their walls, but, to the dismay of all freedom-leving Greeks, tile town was betrayed by malcontents from within ofter a siege of only six days, and its citizens made prisoners on masse. Placing them on shipboard in chains, Datis and Artaphernes coasted down the Euripus to Attibu. Hippins guided them to the pinios of Marathen, the spot at which he himself and his father and landed fifty years before, on their last and most successful expedition against Athens. It is not quite certain whether the intention of the Porsian corremanders was to march straight on Athons across the spars of Mount Bellessus, as Peisistratus had done, or whether, after attracting the Athenian array to the extreme north-cast limit of Attica, they proposed to send troops yound the fleet in order to fail upon the

wity when stripped of its defenders. The latter schome, at any rate, is suggested by the fact that the few traiters who existed in Athens had promised Hippias to give a signal when there was a favourable apportunity for attacking Athens, by raising a bright shield on the sammate of Mount Pentelions.

The sudden fall of Eretria had set Athons fu a ferment: there was no thought of surrender, but very little of success. The first measure taken was to said for instant aid to Sparts. Philippides, a farmous rannor, took the message, and sped along with such good will that he reached Sparts in two days, though he had no less than a hundred and fifty miles to cover. A legend of the time tells how when, dazed and weary, he breasted the last Arendian mountain which apparated him from his goal in the vale of the Eurotea, the ged Pan suddenly appeared before bire, speke words of chemine import for Athena, and then vanished away. But there was no encouragement to be drawn from the lumediate effect of Philippides' mission. The Spartans were honestly ready for the fight, but the summons unfortunately reached them on the ove of a great featival. and such was their reverence for tradition that they dared not move before the full meen and come. Not till five all-important days had passed did their army set out, and then the crisis had passed.

Miltindos, as we love already mentioned, was one of the ten strategi in the year 400 s.c., and his rank, military experience, and hatred of Persia gave him an undisputed pre-eminence among his colleagues. When the enemy's hasting towards of

had been reported, there was high debute among the Assistangenerals whether they should dose to take the field, or should trust,
as the Eretrians had done, to the strongth of their walls. Militades chose the belder plan, but five of his conduitors voted against it.
It was long remembered how, at that council of war which practically decided the freedom of Greece, Militades selemnly rose when
the votes seemed going against hire, and adjured the archon
Callimachus, who, as palemarch, had an equal voice with the ten
generals, to take the side of countage, pointing out the opportunity which delay would give to domestic initions, and the splendid
results which immediateaution would scours. It seemed a desperate
moment at which to forcept success, but the enfaustam of

Militades won over the polemarch's vote, and the army marched on Marathen.


The site of the coming battle was a bare open plain, ax miles long by less than two broad, which lies between the lower spure

The Boy of Mount Pentolicus and the see. A fine bay gave Maratum room for the numerous ships of the Persians to be drawn on shore; but it was not at every point that access from the beach to the plain was possible. Two marshes, of which the more northern is a full mile long, his between the hills and the sen. Between them was the camp of the invador. Opposite him the Athenians were posted on the steep slope of the mountains, guarding the two roads which climb up from the level ground and lead to Athens. Their head-quarters were in a secred enclosure dedicated from time immemorial to Heracles, a position from which they easily averlooked the hostile camp. They mustered about nine thousand hoplites, besides a considerable number of slaves equipped sa light-armed troops. When, however, they had already reached Marathon, they received an unexpected accession to their strength by the arrival of the whole disposable force of the little town of Platana, a thousand hoplites more. Athens had twice taken arms to defend Plateen from being swallowed up by the Bacotian League. and now, with a gratitude care in all periods of history, but especially in Greek, the smaller state sent out its full contingent to share the fite of the Athenians in their apparently hopeless strugglo with Persin.

It is probable that Miltiades expected at first to be attacked by the Persians in bis position; but when the enemy stayed four or

nates of five days without an advance, probably awniting marethon, the premised signal from the partisans of Hippies in Athens, he determined to take the offensive himself. He qutetly got his men into order and prepared for notion. The Atheniana were ranged in a line, of which the centre was only a few filts deep, while the wings were composed of deep heavy columns. The polemental Callimanhus headed the right wing; Aristotics took the weak centre, which was composed of his own tribe, for Anticchie, and the Leontis; while the Finneans formed the extreme left. Then, at Militades' word, the whole started down the hill at a run. There was a mile to cover before the Persian camp was reached.

and though the slope added momentum to the charge, the long distance must have disordered the ranks. Probably, as in all cases where a line advances in leasts, the fanks gained ground on the centre, so that the army must have assumed a crossent shape ere the moment at which it crashed into the Persian host. Datis and Artaphernes lad not been expecting a battle at that moment; it would seem that their cavulry was on shipboard, ready to start for the projected attack of Athons from the west, and that the rest of the army was preparing for cusharkation. But they had not



neglected to keep watch while in presence of the enemy, and despite of the suddenness of Millindes' attack, were able to form up some acrt of a line in front of their camp. The Persians and Sacao held the centre, the post of honour, the subject tribes the two wings. All, however, must have been still in disarray when the moment of the sheek came. At the first the enemy last regarded the Athenians as maximen, when they came storming down the hill to attack in the open a force of ten times their own numbers. But when the barbarians found the line of pikes relling form upon them with all the momentum of a mile's run downbill, while they

themselves were caught harrically farming their army, they must have recognized that there was a method in the madness.

What the decisive shock would bring no one knew. The Persian had so often worsted the Grook in battle, that the Athenians must have felt that their charge was little less than despointe. But they did not shrluk from it, and they had their roward. The heavy columns which formed their wings casshed through the barbarian multitude as if it had been a flock of sheep. The light-armed Orientals were riven asunder and trodden underfoot by the mailed. hoplites. The Persian right wing was thrown into the swamp at the north and of the beach, where many perished; the rest fied with the left wing to the ships, and begun to thrust them out to see, In the centre, indeed, the battle was for a time doubtful, and the native Perstans began to push back the thin line where Aristoldes commanded. But the Atherian wings turned to gid their overmatched countrymen, and when the barbarians saw themselves Victory of the attacked on both flanks they gave way, and retreated seawards like their fellows. Messawhile most of the ships were alleat, and the rest were being lannched on the fiving troops sprong on board. A sovere struggle now raged along the bench, for the Athenians strove to capture the belated versels, and the barbarians to get them out to sea. Here fell the polemarch Callimanius, and with him Cynegeicus, brother of the spet Asschylus, whose hands were backed off as he clung desparately to the peop-staff of a galley which was just being thrust off from the shallows. At last the contest was ended by the escape of the fleet, which left, however, seven vestels on shore in the power of the Athenians.

Just at this moment the bright shield was hoisted on Pentuleus by the traiters in Athens, who had promised to give Hippias information when there was a freewards opportunity for attacking the city. It was seen by Datis and Artaphernes, who in spite of their defeat resolved to make the proconcerted attempt. But Milliades also had observed the signal, and divined its meaning. When, therefore, the Persian fluct appeared off Pholorum, after rounding the south point of Attien, it was found that the Athenians who had fought at Marathon had already returned by a faxed march, and were drawn up ready for a second battle in the slope outside the southern wall of the city. They were plainly visible from the sen, and, with a routed and cowed army, Datis and Artenbermes did not care to venture on another disenterestion. They turned back and salled for Asis, utterly chandoning the expedition. Their Bretrian prisoners were sent up to Susa, where they served to prove that the Greeks from Leyond the sea had not gone altegether unjumished. Darius treated them more kindly then might have been expected, giving them lands in Elam, where their descendants were long afterwards to be traced.

The battle of Manthon was more notable for its moral effect than its carongs. Of the Perstans, 6400 had fallen, no very great loss out of an army of 100,000 men. The Athenians counted up 192 hoplites who had been slain, besides some of the Plataeans and of the light-armed slaves. Three great tunnili were reared over the Judies of the victors, on the largest of which—the one which covered the Athentic hoplites—were creeked ten pillars, one for each of the tribes, bearing the names of the follon.

To the Persians the battle had seemed nothing very extraordinary; the armies of the great king had received many more crushing defeats, yet everything had been remired Moral effect of afterwards. But to the Athenians their victory was the victory. a new revelation; like all other Greeks, they had been accustomed to regard the Persian power as invincible, and to look forward to almost certain disaster when facing it. Their unfortunate expedition to Sazdis had confirmed them in this opinion, and it was only a desperate resolve to defend their charished freedom which had norved them to resistance. When, therefore, they looked the danger in the face, and found it so much less than they had supposed, the revolution of feeling was encounable. They had measured themselves with the conquerors of the East, and had found that, man for man, and army for army, they were for superior. Such a victory, coming at the end of the series of strangles against odds which they had lived through since the expulsion of the Poisistentidae, nerved the Athenians to exertions such as few states have ever known. It was the enthusiastic self-confidence which Marathon gave, that enabled them to bear so cheerfully the trials of the investor of Xerxes, and afterwards to strike so boldly for the empire of the seas.

The immediate consequences of the battle in Greek politics were incalculable. If the Athenians had been beaten at Marathon, there is little reason to doubt that Bocotia, Aegiun, Arges, and other Greek states, whose national traditions made them hostile to Spatta and Athens, would have submitted to the Persian. Nor can we feel any certainty that the Lacedaemonians would have been able to make a successful resistance in the Poloponnese. The freedom of Greece, therefore, had depended on the bold resolution of Miltiades and the steady onset of his devoted army.

We have already mentioned the foolish superstition which had prevented the Sparlans from activing in time to join in the battle of Marathon. When the fateful full moon came, indeed, they sent out two thousand citizens, with their usual contingents of Periosei and Helots—a force considerable enough to have been of the greatest aid to Millindes. But though they marched the hundred and fifty miles in three days, the Spartane came too late for the battle, and after viewing the field strewn with the bodies of the shain barbarbas, they were constrained, as Herodotus says, to praise the Athenians and their deeds, and then to betake themselves home again.

The result of the battle mised the man who had so boldly prophesisd success, and won it, to a pitch of popularity such as no other Athenian over knew. Unfortunately Miltindes

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with her by night without the wolls, he was startled, and as he hastily made off, disabled himself by tearing open his thigh on a stake. The armoment returned to Athens, where Miltisdes was received with wild anger for his semi-paratical expedition, and still more for the way in which he had abused the confidence of the people. He was tried before the Heliace, though he had to be brought into court on a litter, dying from his wound, which had gaugrened. His accusor was Xauthippus, the father of Pericles, who demanded that the penalty of death should be nestant inflicted. But, mindful of Marathon, the people contented themselves with inflicting a fine of fifty tuents, which Millindes did not live to pay, for he died within a few days. His son Cimon, however, afterwards discharged the debt, in order to clear the reputation of his father so far as he was able. Thus a man who seemed destined to play a great part in the affairs of Greece was suddenly removed from the seme, within a few months of the splendid achievement which has for ever preserved his name.

There is little doubt that the expedition which killed so egregiously at Marathon, would have been followed up by another and a larger armoment, if the hands of King Darlus had been free. The first disappointment, indeed, had irritated him, without inducing him to reconsider his purpose of destroying Athens, and he determined to lead the whole force of his empire against her himself. But in 467 B.c. a revolt broke out in Egypt, which obliged him to turn his areas in that direction. After nominating as his colleague his favourite son Xerxes, the old king est out ngainst the rebels; but died on the way, after a reign of thirty-six years (521-486 n.c.). The disturbances at the end of his reign and the fruitlessnoss of his expedition against Boythia must not lead us to undervalue blus. He preserved and made permanent an empire which seemed on the evo of disappearing; he showed a genius for organization unparalleled among Eastern conquerors, and was, in addition, no mean general. Considering his position as an Orlantal monarch, he must be prononnesd moderate, just, and merciful; the history of his son sufficiently shows the frenks of cruelty and arrogance which were natural to a Persian autocrat, but from such faults Darius was

conspinuously free. With his death the expansion of the Achaemonian mouserly came to an end. In an Oriental state everything depends on the character of the covereign, and for the maxitwo centraies Persia was cursed with a succession of tyrants or
weaklings, who gradually retined the excellent administrative
system which their ancester had established. Nothing, indeed,
save the ingenuity of that system could have preserved their
complex for the long period which intervouse between the death of
Datius and the invasion of Alexander the Great.

Monuwhile the Egyptian war and the decease of Darlus gave Greece ten years of respite from Persian invasion-years which were all-important as covering the period during which Athens transformed berself jute a predominantly naval power, during the second great struggle with the Aeginetans. This war was brought about by the full of Cleamenes at Sparts, and the consequent cessation of the anti-Accineton policy which he had imposed on his countrymon. It was apparently in 490 p.c. that his bribory of the Delphic cracle in the matter of Demaratus came to light; as a consequence of the discovery, he found bimself forced to quit Sports, like the colleague whom he had reined so shortly before, But no such distant prospect of vengennes as was afforded by taking refuge in Persia satisfied Chromones. Pussing into Arcadia, he began to feem on anti-Spartan league among the numerous cities of that district. The success with which he met frightened the Ephors, who offered blue restitution of his kingly office if he would return home. He accepted their terms and appeared again in Sports, but within a few months perished in a somewhat mysterious manner. His conduct had often been eccentric, and this gave the Ephors an excuse for charging him with madness, and placing blue in the steeks as a raving lumitte. One day he was

neath of found dead, horribly mangled with a knife; it was given out that he had committed suicide, but considering his celetions with the Ephons, his end appears decidedly suspicious. Throughout his career he had displayed vigour and capacity, but his character was so fickle and wrong-headed that his talents brought him no final success. He is obtelly noteworthy as being the last King of Sports who fought on equal terms with the College of Ephons, and made his own

personality a more important element in state matters then their desires.

Oleomenes was no sooner dead than the Asginetans claimed their hostages who had been interned at Athens. The Athenians. however, refused to give them up, though Leotychides, who had joined Cleomenes in the original delivery of the prisoners, came in person to plead for their release. This conduct on the part of Athens was unjustifiable, but it was mee by a still more flagrant breach of international law. An Agginetan squadron law in wait off Sunjum, and cartured a vessel which was entrying a sacred ombassy from Athens. This led to a declaration of second was of war, and a lively struggle at sea for the mastery of Attenuaged the Saronio Gulf. The Athenians endeavoured to funcent civil war in Aegina, entering into a conspirate with a prominent citizen named Nicodromus, who had fermed a plot to overthrow the oligarchy which ruled in his antive place, as it did in all Dorlan towns. They were still too weak to face the Accinetan fleet unalded, so sent to ask for help from Corinth, where a traditional batred of Aegina prevailed. The Corinthians did not openly engage in the war, but helped the Athenians by selling them twenty was makers for the ridiculous price of five deschases apiece. On a preconcerted day Nicodromus relast a democratio revolt, and endeavoured to seize Asgina at the head of his partisans; but the Athenian fleet which he expected came too late to bring him ald, and his followers were completely defeated. A frightful massages followed, seven hundred of the democratic party being put to death in cold blood after they had surrendered. Next day the Athenian fleet, seventy vessels strong, come up, and had the better in a nevel engagement with the Aeginetan aquadron, but ou approaching the shore found no supporters, on account of the extermination of the party of Micoliromas

Acgine now sought sid at Arges, and obtained much the same kind of informal assistance which Athens had found at Corlath. Arges was still too weak, after the frightful disaster she had sustance at the hands of Cleomenos, to engage in open war with a first-class power. But a thousand Argire relunteers joined the Auginetan neary, without any objection being mised by the Government. Shortly afterwards the Athenians made a second attack on Aegine, but though their army won a considerable victory on shore, and siew off well-nigh all the Argive volunteers, their fleet was decidedly worsted, and was compelled to pick up the land force and retire to the Pelmene. A way of irregular descents followed, in which each party saw its coast districts rayaned, but suffered no worse harm at the hands of the enemy.

This indecisive prolongation of the contest was the cause of much dissatisfaction at Athens, and led to a vigorous attempt to Thomistories put down Aegins by swamping her navy by force and the navy of numbers. Themistocles was the author of this scheme, as he had proviously been of the fertification of the Peirsons. It happened one year that the state had realized a very considerable surplus from the silver mines of Lauriero, which were public property. Two hundred telepte lay in the treasury, and were about to be dispersed in a very primitive way, each abilt Athenian citism having been promised ten drachman. Themistocles stood up in the Ecclesia, and boldly proposed that the money should not be distributed, but applied entirely to the building of new chips of war, till the national fleet should number two hundred vessels. His choquence persuaded the people to this piece of self-denial and far-sighted policy. Now keels were at once laid down, and the richer citizens yied with each other In the rapidity and completeness with which they equipped the vessels whose construction had been imposed as a "littingy" on them. The energetic work of a few years tripled the Athenian mays, and ere long Themistocles was able to view within the barbours of Peireous a number of vessels as large as the com- . bined fleets of Aggins and Corinth. The policy which aimed at turning the whole of the energies of Athens towards the seadid not mes without opposition. A considerable party in the state, headed by no less a personnes than Aristeides, held that naval supremany was a thing so fleeting and uncertain, that it was unwise to snorthes all other ends at which the city might aim, in the endeavour to secure so problematical an advantage. It was urged that the skill of the seamon was a less firm basis for the state than the valour of the hoplite, and that the influx of foreign population and foreign manners, which would follow on a perseversion in Thomistocles' designs, would introduce an element of

corruption and weakness in the city. The lavish expenditure of public money and heavy transion which were now commoning, in spite of the surplus from the mines, frightened the more cautions of the citizens. Aristoides set himself to check it by repeatedly challenging the accounts of the public efficers through whose bands the money was passing; he succeeded in proving several instances of embezzlement, and its said to have molested even Themistocles himself. At last the straggle between the two statesmen and their policies grow so bot that recourse outcomes of was had to the estracism. A decisive majority Arcteroles, decreed the honourable exile of Aristeides, and the

advocate of a quiet and conservative policy was compelled to go

into banishment (454 p.c.).

Themistocles had now a free hand, and was able to direct the crurse of the state without meeting with any opposition. Under his guidance the works by the sea were carried out with the greatest energy; the Peirneus, though but ton yours since it had been a more barron headland, was already growing into a considerable town, where the sen-golug and mercantile interests reigned supreme. Its population formed a body of no inconsiderable importance in politics, and a fertile field for the democratic propaganda of the party in the state which was opposed to the old aristocratic doutrines of class-privilege and unaggressive foreign policy. The two hundred triremes had been built, and Athons was already in the possession of the strongest navy which any single Greek state had ever owned, when once more clouds began to arise from the East. The young King character of Xerxes had now been sitting for five years on the throne of Persia; he had successfully put down the Egyptian revolt which bad vexed the last days of his father, and was free to turn the undivided strength of his empire against any fee whom he might choose. The traditions of Porsia pointed to foreign conquest as the noblest occupation and truest glory of the Great King, and Xerxes was not insensible to their influence. Personally, indeed, he was but a medicority. The fair and stately face and form which seemed to mark him as a king of mon, were belied by his intellectual feeblences and moral instability. His whole character was that of the more harens-bred Eastern despot, and no spark of his father's genius inspired his actions. Vain and laxurious, indolently good-natured, but capable of sudden and savage outbursts of cruelty, easily swayed by a courtier or a sudden, by no means foul, of exposing his sucred person to the basards of battle, he soumed actromely unlikely to lave his name associated with erro of the greatest events of history. But though the man was week, his position was strong; if no better motives could stir him to action, his vanity could not suffer him to full behind the actioners of his predecessors. A wachier see of subjects expected him to lead them to now conquests; an enemy who had routed his father's armies stood before him inviting chastisement and rowenge; Donarstus of Sparts, and other extles from beyond the Acgam, through his court, and were continually pointing out the weakness and divisions of their had a saudt wonder, then, if this arrogant deepet was led into his funces comparing against the Greeks.

Greek legend addrawd the story of the commencement of the design of Xerxes, with many striking details, tuto the credibility of Recreapions which there is no need to make inquiry. But this much is undoubted, that by the spring of 461 p.c. all Asia was astir with preparations for the invasion of the lands beyond the Aegeen. The king had declared his intention of leading the arturnent in person, and the whole scale of the undertaking was to be very different from that of the comparatively modest expedition of Datis and Artaphernes. Not only the Western satraples, but the remotest provinces of inner Asia were ordered to provide contingents; every maritime town in the Levent that corned the authority of the Great King had its quote of ships appointed. The cities of the Hellespont and Thrace were directed to collect magazines of every kind of provision on the largest scale for the army. The whole Persian empire had for some time beat ringing with preparation, and the runnour of the coming storm, must have already reached Greece, when Xerxes desputched his heralds, to make the formal demand for earth and water which was to serve him as a cases belli. Only to Athons and Sparta was no summous sent; the brainl treatment which the Persing messengers had received in those towns, ten years before, had put them beyond the pale of reportance. To all the other states the heralds went. nor was their mission altogether without affect.

With the certain prospect of an invasion by the incumerable Lordes of Asia before them, the Greeks drew together with an unwonted unaulmity. The idea of a Pan-Hellonic Union had already been dimly shadowed forth in the predominance of Sparts in the Peloponnese; and sound. Sparta, as one of the two states against whom the Persian attack yes more especially directed, had now every motive to encourage her confederates to bind themselves more closely to her. Athens had even stronger reasons for endeavouring to bring about a union against the invader; she was not only destitute of allies, but was still engaged in her protracted war with Aeging. Accordingly it is not strange to find that Themistooles was the statesman to when, in conjugation with one Children of Teges, the convocation of delegates from the greater number of the states of European Grocce was due. These representatives met, late in the summer of 481 p.c., at the Isthmus of Corinth, under Sporton presidency. The gathering was larger than men of a drapouding found of mind could have hoped to see. It is true that two powers of the first magnitude, Arges and Thebes, had failed to respond to the numericus-notunted, the one by her ancient rivalry with Sports, the other by her lealousy of the rising power of Athena. But wellnigh all the other states of continental Greece appeared by their delegates on the appeinted day. From the Cambunian mountains on the north, where the last free Greek district touched the Persian vessal-kinguism of Macedon, to Tagantum in the extreme south, the Hellouic states had, with the two exceptions before mentioned. answered to the appeal. It was no extinary crists that could cause old openics like Athens and Acgine, Thessaly and Phoels, Topon and Mantines, to forget their foods and remember that all were sons of Hellen and lovers of freedom. But under the stress of the attack of Porsia reconciliation had become possible. Some came to the meeting determined to resist at any cost; others were so deeply impressed with the reight of the careening energy, that comparatively little confidence was to be placed in their steadfastness; but even these last had not vontured to neglect the summors.

The first step of the congress was to mediate between those of its members who were at foul with each other. In consequence of this action, Aegina and Athens, as well as sundry other states, were induced to suspend their hostilities. Next, a selemn appeal was made for assistance to all the outlying sections of the Greek race boyond the sens. This idea deserved greater success than it obtained; the Cretane excused themselves on the ground of a probablica from the Delphic ornelo; the Cureyraeans promised aid, but by starting their squadron late, and ordering it to delay on the way, enused it to arrive long after the crisis of the war was over. Gele, the powerful despot of Symonse, made most liberal offers of posistance, promising twenty thousand hoplites and two hundred trippings, but only on the proposterous condition that he should be made generalisaime of the whole confederate army, a demand which he must have known would be refused by Spartan. pride. Indeed, it is most unlikely that he ever dreamed of sending help nerces the lonion Sea, for he was at this very memont threatened by a formidable invasion of the Carthaginians from Africa, which was in all probability concerted to synchronize with Xerxes' ottnek on Greeca.

Although they had now assertained that they would have so rely on themselves alone, the delegates of the confederate Greeks resolved to issue a bold manifesto ero they separated. Accordingly they published a selemm warning that any state which submitted to Xecxes without having been compelled by force, should, after the termination of the week, be attacked by all the confederates, and that one tenth of the booty obtained from it should be dedicated to the Double Acadlo.

It was now too late in the nuture to allow the Persian attack to be delivered in 481 m.c. The crisis was avidently to take place in the spring of the following year, and four mouths of suspense lay before the confederates. To this period belong the numerous appeals which the different states, in their feverish anxiety to know the unknownlife, rando to the Delphic oracle. Much to his discredit, Apollo showed no elight tendency to "Medize," or take the side of the Great King. No doubt the Delphians, then as always in the possession of excellent information as to foreign parts, but fully realized the strength of Xerxes, and foresaw his success. At any rate, the coacle teld the Spartnus that "not oven if they had the strength of bulls or of lions could they resist the

Persian, and that either Sparts or a Spartan king must perish."
Athens resolved an oven more disusal reply: "She was rotten in head and body, hand and foot—fire and sword in the wake of the Syrian chariot should destroy the city of Palhas;" while but poor consulation was given by a supplementary rhapsody, which stated that "safety should be found in the worden wall, and divine Salamis should destroy the children of mon." Args, on the other head, was opecuraged in her policy of safiah industion by the advice to "keep her head within her shell" like the torteise, and let events take their course.

Betwixt hopes and fears, the winter of 481-80 a.o. slipped by, and the approaching spring made the commencement of warlike operations possible.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE INVASION OF XERNES-THERMOPPLAY AND ARTEMISION.

As eachy as the spring of 481 tac, the orders of Xerxes had set the contingents of the distant saturales of the East in motion, and The hoss of by the autumn of the same year the whole land ferce of the Persian empire had gathered at its appointed meeting-place, the pinin of Critalia in Cappedocia. In summoning it, the king had thought more of his own personal dignity than of my other consideration. His following was to be worthy of his greatness, and when he went forth to war he did not consider it fitting that any of his subjects should claim an immunity from its dangers. Accordingly he had demanded contingents not only from the peoples whose military virtues were known, but from every tribe, great or small, brave or newarlike, whom his decotations contained. It naturally resulted that his army was more fitted to serve as an otherological museum than as an efficient machine for conquest. His own Persians were gullant and loyal, but side by side with them marched worthless hordes drawn from ustions destitute of military reputation, half-naked savages dangers from the ends of the earth, and Aslatic Greeks desputched against their will to subdue their own brethren. The muster-roll of the host of Xerxes has been preserved for us in the pages of Herodotas. His contents go far to justify the boast of the Greeks that they had feeed a whole world in arms, but at the same time explain why the seeming miracle was possible. There were, indeed, in the great king's army, beside his own ten thousand "Immortals" of the hody-guard and the other native Persians, numerous contingents of value. The Bactrian herse and the archers of the Sacas could be trusted to do good service; the Lycians and Carlans were armed

after the Greek fishion, and had one now faced Greeks in battle; but countly numerous were the masses of savages who had not even learns the use of motals or the value of defensive armour. "The Acthiopians from beyond Egypt," for example, as we read, " were clad in loopard-skins, and carried bows made of the central rib of the palm losf. Their arrows were reads tipped with sharp fragments of stone, and they were armed in addition with spears pointed with gazelles' horns or knotted clubs. They painted half their body white and half red before going into battle." The Susportion horsemen came bearing no weapons but a lasso and a long knife. The Lybians bad no better arms than staves with their points hardened in the fire. The wild tribes of the Caucheus tried to guard their heads with wooden, bats, but had no form of protection for their bodies, and only short darts and knives as offensive weapons. It can easily be imagined how utterly useless were these half-naked barbarians when Greek hoplites had to be faced in the narrow frontage of a Greek pass. But they were even worse than useless, for they increased the line of march to an unwieldy length, consumed vast quantities of provisions, and in the moment of conflict were certain to enfeable the steadier troops who were mixed with them in the line of buttle.

How many fighting-men, good bed or indifferent, Xerxes took with him it is impossible to say. Report swelled their number; to two millions, and the least exaggerated accounts speak of eight hundred thousand—a figure which does not seem utterly impossible when we remember the vigour with which the king lead urged on the armament, and the years he had speak in proparation. But if we consider the quality of the best, its quantity becomes a matter

of comparatively little importance.

After meeting at Critalla, the army moved westward to Sardia, and went into whoter quarters in that city and the neighbouring Lydian and Louisa towns till the spring of 480 n.c. arrived. It was during this interval that spies sont by the Greeks worn detected in the Persian camp. Xerxes thought that he had averything to gain by the full number of his army balag known across the Aegenc, and hastead of slaying the men, had them conducted through every part of his cantorments, and then dismissed them is safety to tell all that they had seen.

Early in 480 a.c. the Persian army was joined by its fleet, which safely rounded the Triopian promontory and cast anchor at Samos.

The meeter The marine conscription had been no less rigorous Xerxes than that on land, and every marktime people in Xerxes' dominious had been composed to put forth its full strength—even nations, like the Egyptians, who were little habituated to the son. The most trustworthy portion of the fleat was composed of the ships of the Phounioian cities; the kings of Tyre Sidon and Anadus each appeared in person at the hand of his contingent, and together these amounted to more than these hundred vessels; the Egyptians Cypnicts Cilicians and Greeks of Asia Minor contributed nine hundred more, so that the whole armada mustered twelve hundred vessels of war, in addition to numerous tenders and transports. Each trivens carried, beside its native crow, a deleachment of thirty Persian soldiers, who were destined to serve as marines.

Before floot and army finally started on their way, the king had commanded the execution of two works of great magnitude and The Heller- little utility, which he imagined would facilitate their yout bridged progress. Lest his ships should suffer at the eformy headland of Mount Athon a disaster similar to that which Mandonius had experienced twelve years before, he had the sandy isthman, which convects the peniusula of Acts with the mainland of Chalcidice, pierced by a canal. This saved the fleet a few miles of sea at the cost of an inushedable amount of labour and expense, But the second engineering work was even more uscless. In order that his army might be able to move straight on from Asia into Europe, without being delayed by the necessity of crossing the Rollespont on shipboard, he determined to bridge over that strait, Six hundred and thirty-four morehantmen, moored in two rows side by side, and fastened together with strong cables, spanned the space of somewhat less than a mile in width which lits between the continents, and connected the European shore most Sestes with the Asiatic heights above Abydes. A continuous fleering of planks was laid on the vessels, and earth cammed down on top of it, while hourdings were creeted on each side of the gangway to hide the view of the sea from the houses and baggage animals. Not long after its completion the bridge was shettered by a storm; thereupon

Xarxes asserted his authority by ordering the engineers who had designed it to be beheaded, and, if we may believe tradition, by tufficiting fifty haltes on the temperatures are, and canaling chains to be east into its robellions waters. The officials to whom the robuliding of the bridge was entreated took variety by the fate of their predecessors, and, by doubling the strength of their fastenings, produced a more durable work, which endured the stress of all weathers for nine months. Over this structure the whole Persian land force defiled in safety, while Xerzes, acated on a marble throne on the Asistic shore, watched the interminable line of march as it pressed forward into Europe. At the sight of such countless myriads of men even the reckless despot was touched by a feeling of common humanity: he burst into items when he reflected that of the whole heat not one man would be align a landard years below.

Immense magazines of provisions and been collected during the past three years at four points on the Thrashn coast-Leuce Aste. Tyrodiza, Doriscus, and Eica-so that the expedition was capited to much on westward without suffering any privations. At Doriscus Xerxes beld a review of all his forces by land and sea; the fleet sailed by under his oves, while the army was numbered by the primitive method of finding how large an enclosure would bold exectly ten thousand men, and then sending the contingents one after the other into the states. till all had been measured by it. Pressing on from Dorlsous, the king reached the frontiers of the vassal state of Macadonia, where he was joined by the whole force of the land under its prince Alexander. In the Pangasan hills his baggage-train suffered much molestation from the lions, which then abounded in that part of Europe, though they have since onlirely disappeared. Meanwhile the fleet passed through the canal on Mount Athas, and rounded the capes of the other two Chalcidle peninsulas, finally rejeining the army at Thoram, the town which later generations know as the great harbour of Thessalonica. From this point Nerzee had full in his view the towering heights of Olympos, the only barrier which now intervened between him and the plate of Thessely. There were exiled Theseslian princes of the great house of Aleuas in his camp, and from them he was able to gain information as to

the disposition of the first free Greek people with whom he was to come into contrast.

The moment that the news of Xerxes' passage of the Hellomont reached Greece, the delegates of the preceding year had resessabled at Cortoth. The Thesadisos, on whom the storm was first to brook, spoke out in no hesitating terms. They placed their whole force at the disposition of the confederates, provided that adequate assistance from Southern Greece was granted there, but they insisted that they should not be left along to face the first shock. If no array came to their aid, they would not undertake to fight alone in bonelf of absent allies, and would make what terms they could with the Great King. The confederates had no thought of allowing the rich and populous Thessallan plain to pass into Persian lands without a blow being struck, and promptly collected a contingent of ten thousand hoplites and a considerable squadron of shing. The service was considered so important that Themistocles was placed in command of the Athenian troops, though the Sparten Eusenetus took charge of the whole army. They embarked atthe isthmus, rounded Soutum, and passing up the Euripus discrabarked at Halus, in Philitis, where the first remained, blocking the strait between Eulmen and the mainland. The full force of the Thesasilan cities, including their fornous and formidable cayalry. joined the confederates in the valley of the Paneus, and the whole advanced to the mas of Tempe, the narrow defile at the paputh of that river, through which the main read from Macedonia passes. The position was excellent for a small army designing to block the road of a much superior force, but it had the disadvantage, to which well-nigh all pesitions are liable, of being able to be turned by a long finals murch. The Greeks had been only a few days in Tempo

The Greeks abandon Macedon, who passed for a well-wisher to Greece, though Macedon, who passed for a well-wisher to Greece, though he was a Possian vassal, to the effect that Xereas was about to use not only the main read, but also the upland passes which lead from Western Macedonia to Gonnus and the other towns of North-Western Thussaly. If these were once forced, the army in the defile of Terripe would be compelled to retire, and would probably be eaught and trodden anderfoot in the plain of Thessaly by the luminustable hosts of the Great King. Strategically this was

true, but the danger was not yet imminent, and the political reasons for endeavouring to keep up a show of resistance on the Thersellan border were manifest. If the example was once set of deserting aliles because they did not possess a thoroughly defensible frontier, there was no saying where the tetrent would end, as all confidence in the action of the confidence must case. Novertheless the nerve of Enametus and his collectures seems to have fathed them; without writing for the Peculum to develop an attack, they hastily hocke up their camp, desected their Thersellan contrades, and hurrying down to Halus took ship back to the Isthums.

It instirally followed that the Thessalians, with all their dependent tribes—the Magnesians Matinus Accinues and Dulapes—less not a mannest in sending centh and water to Nerves. It was not yet too late to propitiate him by a prompt submission before they bud been attacked. Thus the largest Greek land in the whole perhands was

lost to the confederates before a klow had been struck.

There was much wrangling and recrimination at Corinth whon the fruitless expedition returned. The cyll was now at the very doors of the states of Contral Greece, and, to make the matter worse, it was known that Thebes and her dependents in the Becolian League were ready to follow the example of the Thesenlians, not morely from fear, -us bod been the case with the latter people,but from an active dislike to their neighbour Athons, and a wish to crush her newly risen power. The only doubt which could influence the confederate award was whether the next stand should be made at Thermopylas or at the Corinthian Isthmus. latter position was cheson, Athens Phoels and Euboen most besacrificed, as Thessaly had already been. It was, therefore, not difficult to foresee that the more advanced post would be occupied, in spite of the reluctance of some of the Peloponnesians to fight at such a distance from their homes. Accordingly it was determined to seize next hold Thermopyloo with an army, and the straits of Euboca with a fleet, before the Persinas should have crossed Thousaly, Luckily Xerxes tarried long at Therma The conbefore resuming his march, and the scheme turned selecate neet. out to be feasible. A fleet of 271 ships, of which as many as 127 were Athenian, met in the Saronic Gulf and passed up the Euripus. It was commanded by the Spartan Eurybindes, for the Corinthians

and Aeginelans refused to serve under an Athenian admiral. although Athens contributed by far the largest contingent to the fleet, while the Athenians were equally averse to yielding precodence to any one save a Spartan. Eurybindes was a man of narrow mind and hopeless obstinacy, and it required every blandishment of his able subordinate Themistocles to keen him from ruining the cause of Greece by his continual blunders and vagaries. The land force was placed under the command of the Spartan king Leonidas, who had succeeded his brother Cleomenes after the latter's untimely death. The space to be traversed by the land force in its march to Thermopylae was greater than that which the fleet had to cover, and the time required to collect the contingents far longer; there was, therefore, no slight danger that the army might arrive at Thermopylae only to find that it was already in the hands of the Persians. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Spartans were on the evo of celebrating their great festival of the Curneia, and were troubled by the same ridiculous scruples as to marching in the hely senson which had caused them to arrive too late at Marathon ten years before. Leouidas was unable to lead


March of out the full force of Laconia, and had to depend for Leonidas. the moment on his personal following. Recognizing that he had a service of great danger before him, and, moreover, having the prophery that "either Sparta or a Spartan king must perish " ringing in his cars, he chose as his body-guard not the three hundred youths who usually accompanied him to the field. but the same number of men who had sons living, and whose families would not be extinguished in the event of a disaster. Without delay he set out at the head of this small force, and of the usual contingent of Helots, who in all Spartan expeditions accompanied their masters in the proportion of eight or ten to each of the citizeus. From the Areadian towns which lay directly on his route he hastily collected something more than two thousand hoplites, while at the isthmus seven hundred Corinthians. Phlinsians, and Mycenaesus joined him. With this force at his back he suddenly presented himself before the gates of Thebes, whose citizens had not yet accomplished their meditated defection to the Persians. As they were unprepared for resistance, Leonidas was able to overawe the ruling oligarchy, and to draw from its

ranks a contingent of four handred men, who, though their hearts. were not in the cause, still served as hestages for the fidelity of their countrymen. From Thespine, on the other hand, the town which had always taken the lead in opposing the centralizing policy of Thebes, came of their own accord a body of seven hundred. hoplites, who proved in the subsequent operations that some at least of the Boootians were true to the cause of Hellas. Giving out that his force was but the ranguard of the full lovy of the Poloponneso, Lecuidas pressed forward to Thermopylae, and agricult there long before the Persians had ecosed Theasnly. The troops of Phoels and of the Lections of Open joined him in the pass, and mised his total numbers to nearly ten thousand men, a body quite sufficient to occupy the narrow defile. The first step for the defence of Control Greece had been successfully carried out, but it was rendered of no avail by the delay of the Peleponassian confederates in bringing up their main body. It is impossible to ascelbe this merely to diluteriness, negligence, or religious scruples; there can be no doubt that selfishness played a larger part in causing their dolay than did any other mutive,

The pelebrated pass in which Leanides took up his position consists of a narrow slip of level ground between the sea and the oliffs of Mount Callidramus, one of the numerous off- The passor shoots of the range of Ceta. It looks wastward into Thermopyste. the little plain of Malis, while behind it to the east lies the coast-land of Louris and Phoels. As the space between the mountajus and the water contracts, the defile becomes narrower, till at its culminating point there is barely room for a carriage-way. The whole passage, from the river Asopus on the Malian side to the Locring village of Alpani, is about two miles in length. In the middle of the defile lay the hot springs which give the place its name. In front of them the level ground expands for a few furlongs, so as to leave room for the temple of Demeter, at which the Amphic route deputies used to meet. In rear of this spot there lay an ancient fortification, a wall which the Phociens had once redsed to restrain the incode of their Thesselian neighbours; it was now half-rained, but still served to mark the line on which resistance

At the western and of the pass, near Anthela, was another lost spring and contraction of the road, which has been called "the False Thormapplan,"

to an invader coming from the north-west would be easiest. Here, then, Leonidas and his men fixed their camp; to their right lay the strait, some five miles broad, and beyond it the mountains of Eubeen. To their left were inaccessible rocks rising in many places to sheer cliffs eight hundred feet high. So regged was the defile, that in its whole length not one path led down from the mountain to the shore. But from Trachis, beyond the Malian end of the pass, a wholing track, curving far inland over a ridge called Anopaes, reached Alpani in the rear of the Greek position. This was the



only route by which the pass could be turned, without making an enormous detour of several days' march into the upper valleys of Mount Octa. To guard it, Leonidas placed the whole of his Phecian allies on the hills, while his Peloponnesian forces held the pass.

Meanwhile Eurybindes, with the confederate fleet, took post at the promontery of Artennisium, a point on the Euboean Strait considerably to the north of Thermopylae, so that it was impossible for the Persian fleet to pass by the position of Leonidas in order to land troops in his rear. Of this, as it happened, there was little danger. With the instinct of a barbarian utterly unused to the

sea, Xerxes never sooms to have reflected that his fleet could be used to explore the way for bis army, or to take the enemy in the reac. It was rather the army which pushed ahead to explore the way for the fleet. Not till twelve days after the Persian restgourd had defiled through the gates of Therasa did the armsda set sail on its southern voyage. Coasting down the rocky shore of Magnesia, the ships reached Cape Sepies, where the resestant of range of Pelion abruptly ends in a sea-beaten pro- Caro-Septes. montory. Here the fleet bested, a single row of vessels being drawn up on the narrow beach, while the rest-seven deep-rode at anoher off the harbourless coast. At midnight a sudden storm from the north-east swept down on the dangerously crowded army. and threw all late disorder. Some exptains made for the open sea, while others onderwoured to beach their vessels on the already . crowded strip of thingle. The hurricane lasted three days, and, at its end, no small part of the king's first was found to have been destroyed or disabled. The recky coast for miles to the north was strewn with wrecks, and many scores of ressels were struck from the nouster-roll of the Persian armament. The Greeks, meanwhile, who had remained safely moored in the harbour of Histines, exclaimed that Boress-kinsman, according to a stronge myth, of the Athenian kings of old-had come to the help of his relations, and sailed out to destroy the king's fleet, which was said to have been uttorly shattered by the storm. They found, however, that the Persians were still nearly The Greeks at four times as numerous as themselves, and at Artemelum. once the Poloponnesian admirals proposed to fall back on the Isthmus, and gather reinforcements there. Eurybindes was only induced to remain by a large bribe which his colleague Themistucles administered to him. That astute statesman had just received thirty talents from the cities of Euloga, who, being covered while the fleet remained at Artemisium, were most reluctant to see it depart. Making over about a third of the sum to his colleagues, Themistocles pocketed the rest. The talents which he spared for the Peloponnesians did their work, and the fleet kept its position. Meanwhile the Persian admirals had got their armada again in hand; they sout two hundred ships down the eastern coast of Euleen to round the southern point of the

island and block the exit of the Euripus, and prepared with the remainder to crush the Greeks at Artemisium. A day's fighting in the strait brought no decisive result, but on the next night another storm arose, not less dreadful than the one of the preceding week. Not only did it damage the king's fleet, which now lay in the Thessalian harbour of Aphetae, but it caught the detached squadron as it sailed down the iron-bound eastern coast of Euboca, and dashed it to pisces on the rocks of Geracetus; it seemed as if the gods were working to bring down the Persian fleet to an equality with the Greeks. Two days more of indecisive fighting in the strait followed, in which the weaker party held its own. The enemy was still too numerous to be crushed, but though he spread his vessels out in an enormous orescent, and endeavoured to envelop the confederates, be suffered far more damage than he

Battle of inflicted. The Athenian ships were always to the Artemistum. front, and suffered a proportionately heavier less than their allies; but their numbers were more than sustained by the arrival of a reserve equadron of fifty-three triremes, which came up the Euripus in time for the third day's fighting. Nothing decidive had yet occurred at Artemisium, when, on the fourth day, a swift rowing-boat was seen coming up from the south. In it was Abronychus, an Athenian who had been left off the Malian coast to bear intelligence from the army to the flect. The news which he brought from Thermopylae was so disastrous that the admirals had not a moment to lose before they retreated.

When the multitudes of Xerxes came pouring over the passes of Othrys into the Malian plain, they halted on finding that the defile of Thermopylae was occupied. The king had now before him two alternatives: he might force the pass, or he might move inland, and march round by the upland roads which pass through Doris, so as to turn Thermopylae just as he had turned Tempe. To take the inland road meant to lose many days, and to break off communication with the fleet. He therefore determined to assult the Phecian wall, and trample down its presumptuous defenders.

The story of the fight in the case of Thermopylae is surrounded Xernes before by a bost of legends, probable possible and impossible, Thermopylae whose authenticity it is useless to discuss. Most of them illustrate the utter insensibility of the Spartans in the face of

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imminont death, and the bewilderneut which that inscreibility caused in the mind of a king accustomed to regard courage as the offencing of confidence in victory alone. When the Persian scouts, we are told, appeared for the first time in front of the pass, they did not flud the Specians cowering behind their wall, but carelessly wandering without it, combing their long hair, or indulging in gymnastic exercises. The king laughed at them as madmen for not taking to flight, and was only amused when Demaratus, the exiled Sportan king who had attacked himself to the Persian court, explained that their heedlessness was the sign of desperate resolution, and not of folly. After waiting awhite to allow the madmen time to come to their senses. Xurxes grew irritated, and son's forward a body of troops from Media and Elam, bidding them. "take these presumptuous men alive, and bring them before the face of the king."

Leonidas must have already realized, as the days went by without the promised succears from Pelaponnesus reaching blan, that he was sent on a hopeless tosk, for, although he might maintain the defile and even the flanking read ever Augusta, he could do nothing to keep the king from the mere western passes. But, like a true Spartau, he kept his orders before him, and took no thought of the consequences. He had by this time repaired the Phouinn wall to serve him as a final defence, but was still helding ground in front of it, at one of the parrowest points of the pass. He had divided his men into several bodies, of which each was to take the place of charger in turn, for a few secon of hoplites only could find space between the water and the cliff, and the rest had perforce to remain in reserve.

The Medes came on with great confidence, pushing forward into the defile till they formed a long, deep column, with a front no broader than that of the Greeks. Then the shook magnetists came, and ere long the Asiatics were husled back in disorder. In fighting band-to-hard on equal torms, it was seen new, as it had been at Marathon ten years before, that the lightly armed Orlental, with his dart and scinitar and wicker shield could do nothing against the hoplite cased in horse from head to foot, and armed with the long, thrusting spear. The Modes were fighting under the eye of their king, and would not give up the

contest; they came on again and again, to be beaten back with fearful slaughter. Then Xorxes, thinking that it was for want of courage that they failed, called them in, and sent forward instead his own body-guard, the ton thousand chosen Persians, called "The Immortals." But though they fought gallantly enough, the second column was dashed back with even greater lose than the first, Night then fell, but next morning the attack was renewed, for the king was beside himself with rage, and had determined to wear out the Greeks by mere force of numbers, if no other means would avail. But Leonidas, relieving each of his battallons as it grew tired by another from the reserve, kept his ground with little loss, while the road before him was almost choked with dead Aslatics, and the Persian officers were seen endeavouring to lash their dispirited men back to the charge with whips, when no lighter persunsion would induce them to tempt the dangers of the reeking pass. By the second evening it was evident that no effort from in front could possibly break through; the whole invasion was at a standstill, and although the actual loss signified little among the myrials of Xerxes' army, the moral effect of the check was growing fatal. If ten thousand Greeks could hold the king at bay, what was likely to happen when the hundred and fifty thousand mon whom a national levy might at any moment produce, came up to help their comrades? It was fortunate for Xerxes that the Peloponomian towns were too far off to allow the news of the first days of battle to work any immediate effect. Despondency still reigned at Sparta, while eager self-confidence was felt at Thermopylae.

named Ephialtes came before the downcast king, and offered, for a tursed large sum of gold, to guide the Persians over the tursed, heights of Anopsea by the winding path which came out at the rear of the pass. Strangely enough, no previous search seems to have been made for such a road, though its existence must have been known to every inhabitant of Trachis, where Xerxes had now been tarrying for six days. The traitor's proposals were readily received, and at midnight the sairap Hydarnes started, with the king's "Immortals," to attempt the passage. It

was in the stillness of the last hour of the night, just before the

It was on the night following the second conflict that a Malian

dawn, that Ephialiss brought the Persians to the point on the ridge where key the Phocian force which Leandes had set to guard ble flank. The Phocians kept a carcless watch; and when the rustling of thousands of feet among the dead leaves of the oak forest smote upon their ears as they woke, they were select with panic. Instead of holding the path, they was back, and formed up to defend themselves on the summit of Caltidromus. But Hydrams, paying no further attention to them, passed rapidly on, and next marning the Greeks in the pass are, to their utter dismuy, the head of the Persian column descending from the hills in their rore.

There was small time for debate, and as little need, since it was evident that, if the army was not to be lost, an instant retreet must begin. Then came the crowning moraent in the life of Leonidas, As a Sportan king at the head of the vanguard of the hosts of Greece, he fult that he must not desert the post-committed to his charge. His orders bade him hold Thermopylao, and spoke of nothing more: Thermopyles, then, he would hold. He sent away his Arcadian and Coringhian auxiliaries; they were not bound by the from bonds of Sportan discipline and Sportan honour, and might retreat without disprace from a hopoless field. The four hundred Thebans, however, he would not suffer to depart; he knew that they were truitors at heart, and had no reason to smare thorn. The Thespians, with a constancy as unexpected as it was splendld. stayed behind of their own free will. Adding to them his own three hyndred Spartnes and their Helots, Leonidas had something like four thousand men left for the final struggle.

The third day's fighting at Thermopylae was quite unlike that which had gone before. Instead of waiting to be attacked, and keeping strong reserves in hand, Leonidas determined Leonidas and to throw himself on the enemy in front, and do what the three-headarings he could, before Hydarnos cano up to serround free dain. Accordingly, when the Persians came fleeting up, as on the previous days, he can out into the wider parts of the pass, and out his way deep into the midst of them. Then the Greeks termed and burst back again as far as the Phoeiau wall, lesing heavily as their maks grow leaser in the onest, but thrusting the barbarians by hundreds into the sea, and rolling column against column till

more perished by being trampled down in the press than fell by the edge of the sword. Ere long Leonidas was slain, but the fight went on only the more fisrcely over his body, and two brothers and two uncles of Xerxes went down in the meléa. Prescutly Hydarnes and the "Immortale" came up from Alpenl. By this time the surviving Greeks were well-nigh wearfed out; their spears were broken, their awords blunted, their armour hacked from their limbs. But retiring on to a hillock beside the readway, they made one final stand, till they fell under the arrows and jarelius of a fee who dated not close. Only the Thotans escaped. Early in the conflict they had fallen back and surrendored to the nearest enemy; they were led to the Persian camp, and branded with the king's mark as his slaves; but when Xerxes learnt that they were only in arms by compulsion, and that their city was about to "Medize" on his approach, he at once set them free.

Thus ended the fight in the pass of Thermopplas. It had caused the death of some four thousand Greeks and of more than twenty Morni results thousand Persians. But its effects were not to be or the battle, measured by the mere numbers of the shin. Its real importance lay in the impression which it left on the mind of the Great King and his army. Xerxes had at last begun to have doubts of his own omnipotence, and his self-confidence had been the only spring of strength in his character. Deprived of it, he would become the weakest of despots. His soldiery had imbibed an exaggerated dread of their enemies. There was but ope Leonidas in Hellas, and Sparta was but a single state among a multitude; but to the Persian spearman every Greek was in future a reckless hero, careless of life, and only bent on slaughteran adversary who in open fight was individually superior to himself, and could only be overpowered by numbers. There were many brave men in Xerxee' host, who in later ougagements went into battle readily snough; but they never after fought with the confidence in their own superiority which had been the strength of the Persian down to Thermopylae, This was fortunate for Greece: for one Leonidas there were in the Greek ranks scores of weak, venal, selfish leaders like Eurybindes or Adeimantus, whose inefficiency was hidden from the enemy by the glory which surrounded the name of the hero of Thormopylae.

But for the moment the Greeks could not judge of the moral effect of the battle on the enemy, and, looked at from the military aspect, the war had begun with a disaster. A Spartan king, the soul of the war-party, had fallen; the vanguard of the confederate host had been cut to pleces; the strengest position in Greece had been forced by the enemy, who was now ready to pour down into the plain of the Caphissus, and to be joined by all the Medizing cities of Boectin. The fleet, too, was compelled to fall back at once from the Euboean Strait, and where its retreat might end it was impossible to foresee. In short, no one in Greece could tell at the time that the moral gain of Thermopylae had been so tremendous as quite to outweigh the military and political loss.

CHAPTER XX.

THE INVASION OF XERXES-SALAMDS AND PLATARA.

The inexcusable slackness and solfishness of the Peloponnesians, which had ruined Leonidas by depriving him of his expected The Greek nest reinforcements, reacted at once on the feet atat salamis. Artemisium. In order to avoid being cut off. Eurybiades had to weigh anchor on the night after the ill news arrived. He retired down the Euripus, leaving Themistocles and a detachment of the Athenian squadron to bring up the rear, and, after rounding Sunium, halted opposite Athens in the bay of Salamia. The Athenian admiral is said to have employed himself during the retreat in painting up, on the rocks near the wateringplaces of the Eubocan coast, appeals to the Ionians in the Persian fleet not to destroy the land of their ancestors. If this tale be true, he was probably aiming at making Xerxes suspicious of his Greek subjects, rather than at inducing them to come over; for he must have known well enough that the Ionians were not the men to desort a winning for a losing cause.

In consequence of the retreat of the Greek squadron, the Ruboens found that their bribes to Themistocles had availed them but for a few days. Their leading mon took refuge on the Enhousa slips in the confederate fleet, and followed its fortunes, but the towns themselves made their poses with Xexes.

On the mainland the loss to the cause of independence was even greater. When Thermopylae was clear, Xerxes began to Xerxes in push his army forward, using not only the pass he Boeotia. had forced, but the more circuitous inland road through Doris and the Upper Cephissus valley, which he had previously left unessayed. The Phocians, who refused to submit

to him, were compelled to take to the hills, and to see all their townships harried by the Persian, to whom their hereditary enemies the Thessalians soied as willing guides. The Lorrians of Opus, and the eligarchies who governed the majority of the Boostian towns, took the opposite course, and promptly made their submission to the king, who received them graciously enough, and contented himself with incorporating their contingents in his army. Platuca Thesplac and Haliartus alope refused to join in the general surrender, and had to face the consequences of their patriotism. The last-named town suffered complete destruction, but from the others, which lay further from the enemy, the inhabitants had time to meape. The Thespians, though they had suffered so severely at Thermonylae, were in nowise shaken in their devotion to the national cause, but took refuge at Corinth. The Platacaus retired to their old friends at Athens, whose fortunes now, as ten years before, they had determined to follow.

Now that the Great King was already in Bocotin, and his vanguard might at any moment reach the foot of the passes of Cithaeron, the Athenians had to face the whole danger of their position. Ot defending Attica by land there could be no question: if Thermanying could not be held, it would be madness to attempt to block the four comparatively easy roads which converge on Athens from the north. Three alternatives only were possible: to submit to Xerxes: to man the walls and stand a siege; or to ahandon the city and retire on the Peloponnese, as the Thespians had already done. Each opinion had its advocates—even the first and most dishonourable. But Themistoclus, in the moment of crisis, carried everything before him by his ready eloquence. He pointed out the hopelessnoss of surrender for the city, which was beyond all others the reculiar object of the hatred of the Great King, and so inconsed the people against Cyrellus, an orater who pleaded in favour of that menn and witless stop, that we hear that the traiter was stoned on the spot. He had ingculous arguments to urge against those who bade Athens stand at bay behind her ramparts, on the spot hallowed by the traditions of centuries. He pointed to the fleet, his own creation, as the true hope and safety of the people; in it was to be found the " wooden wall " of which the Delphie omele had speken as the sole refuge in the day of disaster. To abandon

without a struggle the temples of their national delities and the tombs of their ancestors, required a pitch of patriotic exaltation which it was hard for the Athenians to altain, when ultimate success was so problematic. Nevertheless Themistocles roused his countrymen to stake everything on the fleet, to deliberately Examples evacuate Attice and Athens, place the aged, the women, and children in safety, and then man every available vessel and stand for the mentery in the waters of the Attic Strait. There can be no doubt that his plan was the only f-asible one. The experience of Thermonylas had shown that the land army of Xernes would probably full at the Isthmus, where it would be mot, not by a scent ten thousand men, but by the national lawy of the Peloponnese. Now, if the position at the Isthmus could be turned by the Persians from the side of the sea, and troops landed in its rear, the previous disaster would only be repeated on a larger scale. But if the great king's fleet could be driven back, and kept from assisting his army, the whole expedition would be brought to a check; for the Corinthian Isthmus offered no facilities for a finale movement by land such as had settled the day at Thermopyine. The buttles of Artemisium had made it clear that the Persian fleet could be bareased and insulted by a squadron of far inferior cumbers, and at these engagements the Grooks had brought up little more than bulf of their available strongth. Themistooles, therefore, was convinced that in a vigorous menultion the sen-power of the enemy by the only hope of salvation; and it was fortunate for Athens, for Greece, and for the whole world, that his flery alongence won over his countrymon to accept his views.

It was not every Athenian who could be convinced by the orator. A small but elections party refused to find the "reacter wall," which was to save the city, anywhere but in the palisades of the Acceptals, and shut themselves up therein, relying on divise aid. But the wast unjority set to work to transport their families and their portable goods to a place of safety. For several days every available ship was pressed into service to forry the sailed multitude over the Saronic Gulf. Troczen, a town connected with Athens both by traditional its and close commercial intercourse, was the chosen point of refuge, and its hospitable citizens not only

received the fugitives with kindness, but even resisted them with a considerable allowance from the public revenue. Some of the Atheninus also retired to Angian, and a few want no further than Salamis, but the great bulk of them sought the more distant and secure haven in the Peloponnesus. It is said that the departing multitude were in no small degree comforted by the disappearance of the second snake of the Acropolis on the first day of embarkation -a portent which was taken to imply that Athena and her visible representative had quitted the city in company with her worshippers. Probably Themistocles could have explained the marvel had he so chosen. The just act of the Athenians before describing their home was to pass on act of indomnity for all exites, inviting them to return and help their bostbren in the day of adversity. Of the many who took advantage of this decree, and prepared to join the floot, by far the most important was Aristeldes, who, since life estracism four years ago, had been living in retirement in the Polopopnese. The moment that he respected in the Athenian ranks his old influence returned to blm, and he was not the man to use it aroles in the time of danger.

White the emberkation was proceeding at the quays of Pelranus and Philerum, the armics of the great king were herrying through the plains of Boostia on their southward much, and The Parsians before it was completed the passes of Cithaeron must attack Points. have pleasely fallon into their hands. While the main body pressed on for Athens, a considerable detacliment marched west to seize Delphi, whose vest temple-treasures were enough to tempt the invader, even if he had no conception of the shock which he could inflict on Greek national feeling by the destruction of the greatest fantatuary of the Heilenic world. But this expedition come to nought; its end is so shrouded with wild legends that it is hard to asserbain the facts. We hear of great falls of rock in the passes of Parnossus which slew many of the Asiatics, and of a punio fear which fell upon them when the holy place was almost in their greep, and sent them crowding back to groundless terror into the Becetian plain. The Delphians maintained that Apollo had interfered in person to save his temple, though the god had shown himself spathetic enough when his " loved Didymean dwolling " at Branchidge had been sacked by the same enemy, at the time of the

Ionian revolt. At any rate the tressures of Delphi remained unspoiled, and the fact of their presorvation went far to recore the repute of the oracle from the discredit cast upon it by the dismal Medizing prophecies which it had been venting during the previous year.

If the sanctuary of Apollo remained unscothed, the home of Pallas on the Affienian Acropalis had a very different fate. The Kerkes takes heads of the Persian columns converged on Athens,

and entered the city only to find it completely described, save for the few fanatics who were still holding out behind the palisades of the Acropolis. They made a longer defence than might have been expected, but finally a body of Persians, scrambling up the almost impracticable cliff below the temple of Aglaurus. carried the place by escalade, and slew the remnant of the garrison in the very temple of Athens. Xerxes was determined to make an example of the city which had so long and so successfully defied his father and himself. Contrary to the custom of the Persians, he not only burnt all private dwellings, but levelled to the ground the racral buildings on the Acropolis, as if determined to drive the gods of Athens as well as her citizens from their ancient stronghold. So thoroughly did he do his work, and so completely was everything overturned, that many of the statues which he then cast down remained buried in the fragments of the edifices which had contained them, only to be uncarthed by the explorers of our own day.


The destruction of Athens was carried out under the very eyes of her citisens, for the flames of the city were plainly visible from Salamis, where the Greek fleet was still lying. The vessels which fought at Artemisium had now been largely reinforced by fresh detachments from various localities; the Sicyonians had doubled their contingent, and the ships of the Curinthian colonies on the west coast of Greece had at last arrived. But except Athens no city had exerted itself to its utmost. Aegins, for example, kept more than half her fleet at home, to provide for her safety in the event of defect; and Corinth only put forty ships into the confederate squadron. Then it came to pass that Athens, in spite of considerable losses at Artemisium, still supplied almost half the total—180 tricumes out of the 378 which lay in the Salaminian Bay. The

Scartan Eurybiados still held nominal command of the whole, but his personal incompotence threw the settlement of every important question into the hands of stormy councils of war. The admirals of the various equadrons were hopelessly at variance Dimentes of Adelmantus the Corluthian and the majority of the the Greek Polopomesians were for retiring to the Isthmos, and

noting it close coupert with the land army, which had now gathered " there in strength, and was communicing to build a wall from sea to sa for the defence of the peninsula. Eurybindes, to bie vacillating way, inclined to fayour this course. But Themistocles was determined to attack the Persian ships the monant they appeared in Attic waters, and before they could commence my movement against the rent of the Grooks. The Accinetan and Magarian admirals polished to his opinion, for the position at Salamis protected their cities, which would be exposed to attack from the sea the moment the confederate fleet retreated to Corieth. The contention was brought to a crisis by the appearance of the Persian arounds, which rounded Sunjum and appeared in the harbour of Phaternes. After a fruitless discussion many of the Petoponnesians were actually propuring to weigh anchor, when Themistodes, bringing all the influence of his volument personality to bear on Eurybindes, procured a final meeting of the admirals at maleight. Here words grew hot and furious. Adeimantus bade Themistocles, "a man who had no longer a country," hold his peace and obey. The Athenian replied that the admiral who had a bundred and eighty pur-ships at his back could choose himself a country wherever he wished. and sweep that if the Polonomacsians retired to the Isthmus, the Athenian squadron should separate itself from those, take on heard the fugitives at Treezon, and sail for Italy, there to found a new Athens. This threat so disturbed Eurybindes that be threw all his influence into the scale, and ere daybreak the council of wor resolved to stand firm and offer battle in the strait.

The phonen battle-field was the space of land-locked water whose northern portion forms the bay of Eleusis. A deep curve in the Attin coust is faced for the greater part of its length by the corthern shore of the ragged and irregularly shared island of Salamis, which braves in the control a considerable expanse of sea, but sends out to east and west long promountaries which approach the mainland.

and contract the bay into a strait. In the eastern exit of this island sea lie the harbour and town of Salamis, where the Grecian fleet was moored. Further out, beyond the straft, and round an angle of the Atile coast, lay the Persian fleet in the harbour of Phalfarum. As long as this remained the relative position of the two armaments, the eastern passage was practically barred to the confederates, but they had full opportunity to retire on Megara and Corinth by the western exit.



In the vehenence of his desire to precipitate a collision, Themistocles now had recourse to one of these ingenious but untramistocles scrupplous maneauves which give the key to his communicates character. He sent by night a confidential Asiatic with Xurxee shave to the Persian camp; the man bore letters to the king which protested that the Athenian admiral was anxious to serve him, and would have him know that the Greek commanders were about to retire under cover of the darkness. If, therefore, he wished to crush his enemies, he must make haste to solve both entries of the bay of Salamis, or the confiderate fleet would escape westward. Themistocles thus provided for himself, whatever the course of events might be. If, as he hoped, the Persians should proceed to sattack, the battle for which he yearned would take place, and victory would probably follow; but if Xurxes either should refuse

to advance, or should attack and be successful, he would at any rate be personally well disposed to a man who had endeavoured to do seenothing in his behalf.

The events fell out exactly as the ingenious plotter desired. The Great King, in fear that his enemies might occurs, determined to render their flight impossible. Before dawn his yessels wore already filing into the Salarnipian Bay, and pushing on to the north and west so as to completely encircle the anchorage where the confederates by. He even ordered band topops to be trougported negate to the small island of Psythologo, which lies off the south-east exit of the bay, in order that they might seize any Greeks whose vessels might run ashore upon that island-no excess of pregention which was soon to appear Indigrous enough during The confederate admirals were thrown into a new fover of indecision by the advance of the Persian fleet, and spent the day to inconclusive Jubates, during which several of the Pulconnesians showed that their old design of abscording was not even now forgotton. But meanwhile the horse of the crescent into which the hostile squadron and formed itself were slowly contracting, till retreat had grown impossible. At nightfall the exiled Aristides made his appearance among the Athonians, to antiounce that he had only just found it possible to alle between the percest skips of the enemy and the shore, while his news were scon confirmed by descripts, who reported that a complete blockade of the harbour of Salangie had been established. A battle next day was inevitable.

The Persian king had still about a thousand vessels, in spite of all his losses by war and shipwreck. He had coalised his enemies in a position where defeat must mean destruction, and full integrither as doubt of the result. His crews were roused to the destruction and extitement by the fact that they were to fight under his own royal eys. For on the slope of Mount Aegialous, evertocking the bay, a splendid throne had been erected, and on it the king took his seat, surrounded by his princes and courriers, and well furnished with settles, who were to take down the transce and actions of all who distinguished themselves in the coming engagement. Not a soul lind ventured to raise a doubt as to the pulicy of fighting, save Actumists, the widowed Queen of Halicumassus,

who had headed her own squadron on the expedition, and more than once displayed prudence and foresight which should have been invaluable to the king. But Xerxes treated her advice, to attack the Isthmus by land before joining battle by sea, with quiet disregard, and no one else had the temerity to run counter to the royal will.

By the desertion of two vessels, a Lemnian and a Tonian, from the enemy, the Greek armament had been raised to 380 sail. Retreat was completely cut off, so that it was for every man a question of victory or destruction; and there was no opportunity for faint-hearted captains to edge away and make for the open sea, as the Samians had done with such fatal result fifteen years before, at the battle of Lade. The Athenians and Aeginetans. who formed the majority of the combatants, were ready enough for the fight; while the Poloponnesians, though they had wished to avoid an engagement, had no temptations to slackness now that one had become inevitable. The generals did their best to encourage their men by citing such prophecies and oracles as seemed to pertend a victory for Greece, and even fetched out and placed on shipboard the images of Ainx and his kinsmen, the tutclary heroes of Salamis, as if to make them their leaders in a fight which seemed to reproduce the old struggle with Asia in the mythic days of Troy. But no less important than the moral advantages of the Greeks was the character of the waters in which they were about to fight. The sea-room was so confined. and so hampered with reefs, promontories, and islands, that the king's admirals could not make full use of their overwhelming numbers, while their inferior scamanship and want of knowledge of the localities led to overcrowding, stranding, and other small mishaps long before the battle began,

Next merning each fleet discerned the other drawn up in battle array. On the side of the confederates the Atheniau squadron held the left wing, the Eubcenns and Agginetans the centre, the Coriothians and other Peloponnesian contingents the right, the place of honour; here, too, Eurybiades, the commander-in-oblef, with his sixteen ships from Laconia, took his station. Among the barbarians the Phoenicians were on the right, facing the Athenians, the Cilicians and Pamphyliaus in the centre and the Ionian saugarons on the left.

The day was rough, a south wind was blowing in the teeth of the terbecions, and the suct can high. Nevertheless, it was the king's fleet which made the first movement. Rowlog against wind and tide, and soffering much from overcowding, they slowly and laboriously advanced. For a moment the Greeks hung back, close to the land and their anchorage; then Ameioins of Pallone, an Athenian trierorch, shot out from the line and rammed a Sidepian vessel. Ship after ship fullowed him, and soon buttle had been infined all along the strait, and the water was covered by a confused medlay of gallays, circling round each other, and seeking opportunity to rain, or looked in close combat, where the press was thicker and no room for managavring remained. On neither side was much strategy displayed; the day was decided by the superior scammaship and determination of the confederates, not by the ability of their admirals. Before long it was evident that the barbarians were gaining no advantage, but their confidence in gross numbers kept them from panic, and there were shins unnumbered ready to press : forward into the fighting line to repince disabled conserts. Even the Icahuse, on whose desertion many of the Greeks had been relying. showed no reluctores to ongage, and took their full share of the action. For many hours the conflict showed no signs of slackening, and the king, as he sat on Aegisleus, with his scribes at his feet, guring on the vast paperama in the bay, had time enough to note down many a bold deed of friend and fee. But at last the current of the fight becan to set markedly toward the north and east; numbers of Persian ships dropped out of the line disabled, and rau ashore, or drifted down the coast; the rest fell more and more into confusion, huddling into helpicas masses, and fighting purely on the defensive. Finally their lesses began to tell on them. The king's bruther, Ariabienes, who held the supremu command, foll as he was attempting to board an Athenian vessel, and about nightfull the broken fleet reeled slowly back to the Attic coast and took refuge with the land army, which had moved down to the beach to assist it. Most of its reasonast vessels were cut off by the Athenians and Acginetags, who pressed their victory home, and chased the enemy till he was absolutely out of reach, To crown the day, Aristides embarked some Athenian heplites

from the town of Salamis, and putting them ashore on Psyttaleia out to pieces the Persian detachment which had landed there, and was now completely isolated by the falling back of the fleet.

So ended the battle of Salamia. Balancing the mere loss of ships, we find that the king's fleet bad been diminished by some

Resultant two hundred vessels, while the Greeks were only weakened by forty. The victory, therefore, though decisive enough, was far from being a crushing one, and the barbarians still outnumbered the Hellenes by more than two to one. But all spirit had been taken out of the vanquished. The Phoenicians accused the Ionians of having lost the battle by their slackness; while the Ionians fully made up their minds that they were on the losing side, and resolved to quit it as soon as possible. Xerxes was profoundly disgusted with his fleet, and began to deem that uncertain element the sea unworthy of his royal notice. At the same time he realized that, if he was no longer master of the Aegean, his homeward route by the long circuit back to the bridge on the Hellesport was in no small danger. When once his self-confidence was abated, regard for his own valuable person began to assume the most prominent place in his thoughts, and those of his courtiers who could read the signs of the times were quick to fail in with his new disposition.

On the Grook side the revulsion of feeling was no less great. There were few who, with Themistodes, had foreseen a victory from the first; the majority, even among the Athenians, had accented the battle as the last desperate chance in a hazardous game; many had not fought voluntarily at all, but merely because their retreat was cut off, and no other alternative remained. The success which they had won with such small loss completely changed their spirit, and for the future the Greeks by sea were inclined to recklessness rather than fear, and thought of nothing but taking the offensive. More than any others did the Athenians rise to this pitch of clation; they had staked everything on the buttle; they alone, by the numbers of their contingent, had made victory possible; their general had been the one consistent prophet of good fortune, and they rightly felt that the credit of the day was almost entirely their own. The council of admirals, indeed, awarded the prize of valour to an Agginetan, and presented Eurybiades with

a wreath of honour, but their partial decision decisived nobody; Athens and Themistocles were entitled to the glory of having sixed Greece.

For a few days after the battle Xerxes kept up a show of presoverance; his army commenced to construct a broad mole out from the mainland, as if he were determined to win Salamis by military if not by neval operations. But this was only a cover to his real design; he had made up his mind to return home. Mardonias, who had been the most prominent supporter of the expedition, and still hoped to bring it to a successful and, supplied him with a plausible excuse. Athens, he said, had been the city at which the great king's wrath had been directed, and now that Athens was a mass of smoking ruins, the object of the invesion had been fulfilled. The minor task of finishing the campaign unight be left to laferly hands. Lat the king, therefore, roturn to Suan, and leave some satran with an adequate force to complete the subjection of Hellas, Xerxes engurly accepted this view; he bade Mardenius chose what troops he wished, and appounced his intention of returning home with the remainder, Marked returns His departure is said to have been hastened by a secret message from Themistocles, who again despatched his confidential slave to the majnisud, to inform the king that he had with great difficulty induced the admirals to postgone easiing to the Hellespont to destroy the bridge of boats, and that it would undoubtedly be attacked ere long. As a matter of fact Themistooles himself had advised this step, but Eurybindes had found it too mah, and prevented any such design from being taken in hand.

Accordingly Mardonius chose the best troops of the array—all the Persians, including the king's body-guard, together with the Median Sacan and Bactrian contingents, and many smaller bodies from other nations. The test of the host set out with the king, to retrace the rong coad through Bacetia Thesasily and Maceilonia by which they had advanced. The entrap Artabazus, with sixty thousand picked men, brought up the rear, and after covering the march of the main body as for as the Hollespont, remained behind to oversaw the Macedonians and keep up communications between Mardonius and Asia. The Persians are said to have sufficed severa privations on their return journey; for the magazines which had

supplied them during their advance were no longer full, and the season had grown late and was now verging on winter. It was with ranks much thinned by dysentery and exposure to the bleak Thracian climate that Karres reached Abydos. There he found the bridge broken by the sterms of the equinox, and was compelled to cross on shipboard. His army was slowly ferried ever, and followed him back to Sardis in a sufficiently depressed and disconsolate frame of mind.

Meanwhile the Persian fleet had left the ports of Athens at the same time that Xerxes set out on his return. Sailing by night, The Persian the defeated armada ingleriously made off for the feet departs. Hellespont. It reached Abydes long before the land army, and protected the passage of the king, which was not molested by the Greeks. Then part of it, apparently the Phoenician squadrons, went home; while the western contingents wintered at the harbour of Cyme in Acolis. The Greek admirals, with a vague dread of the power of Persia still hanging about them, made no attempt to pursue the enemy. They contented themselves with sailing to the nearer Cyclades and compelling the islanders to throw off their lately sworn allegiance to Persia. The Andrians alone made resistance, and had their land raveged; the Parlans and some others got their submission more easily accepted by sending large bribes in secret to Themistocles, who readily made their peace for them with the other confederate admirals. After a solemn visit to the Isthmus, where the beety of Salamis was divided up, and large offerings made to the national gods-not even the Medialng Apollo of Delphi being omitted-the various squadrous dispersed to their native cities.

The winter of 480-479 n.c. was long protracted, and more than six months slapsed before warlike operations recommenced. Mardonius

Winter of drew back his army far to the north, cantening the 490-479 B.C. greater part of it in the towns of Thessaly. His Bosenian allies kept to their own territories north of the range of Cithaeron, and Attica was therefore left uneccupied. This emboldened the Athenians to return to their ruined city, and to bring over their families from Treesen. They were already beginning to restore their dikajdated dwellings, when they received a warning that their troubles were not yet ended. In the early

spring Alexander the Maccolonian appeared among them, bearing a message from Mardonian. The Persian, anxious to detach the Athenians from the league of Greece, proposed to them terms such as the great king had there before deigned to profiler to an ally. In return for withdrawing from their appealities, they were not only to retain complete independence, but to be allowed to annex as much of their neighbours' tarritory as they might choose, and to receive from Xerxes a sum large arough to enable them to restore all the relas of their temples and dwellings. Refusal was to be punished by a second occupation of the city, when the compagning season cante round. But it was not likely that, after Solamis, the Athenians would desert a course to which they had been faithful in the darkest hour. They sent away the Maccolonian prince with a definit really, and stoically awaited the chances of war.

Mandonius was as good as his word. When spring arrived his army came flexible southward from Thesesty, and then, swotlen by the contingents of Bosotia, swept over the crest Marnishus reof Cithucron and into the Thriasian plate. The turns to Attion, Atheniaus had been beging that their offices from Polopownesus would come out in full force from the Isthmus and help them to hold the passes of Citheeren against the Persian. But the Spartung had not yet given up their old scheme of making the wall in front of Corinth, now completed into a substantial fortification, their line of defence. Not a hopito appeared to defend Attien, and the Athenians were constrained once more to put their families on shipboard and escape to Troopen and Salamia. Exactly ten months after Xernes had first entered Athens, Mardenius appeared in front of its descript walls and occupied them without resistance. The Athenians were in high dudgeon at the isolation The Athensane in which they were left; they sent ambassoders to and apartona

Sparia to upheald their selfish confedentes, and to stants endeavour to drive them forward by hinting that they still had before them the proposels made by Alexander of Macedon, and might be driven to accept them if no help came. This threat secretly moved the ephons, but they determined to concert their perturbation from the Atheniaus, and put off the authorsanders some days before giving them on answer, alleging as no excuse the


that their great fastivel, the Hyacinthia, was at that increase

being celebrated. They then collected five thousand Spartans,—more than half the available force of the state;—placed Pausanias, the cousin of Leonidas, in command, and started them off by night to march northward. Thus, when the Athenian ambassadors received their audience, they learnt to their surprise that the Spartan army was already far advanced towards the Isthanus, and had its orders to go beyond it. Five thousand hoplites of the Periceci accompanied the ambassadors on their return journey, and soon it became apparent that the whole of the Pelopounces was en their them. All the contingents of the states that owned the hereenony of Sparta came flocking in to Corinth; then

The Greeks advance from the whole body, an army such as Greece had never Cortath. before put in the field, advanced to Megara and Rleusis. At the latter place they were joined by eight thousand Athenian hoplites, who crossed the strait from Salamis. But they did not find Mardonius in front of them and offering battle, as they had expected. On their approach the satrap, after directing a cavalry recommissance as far as the gates of Megara-the furthest point to the west which the I'ersian arms reached-had eracuated Athens. He carefully destroyed any remains of the temples and walls that had escaped the first occupation, and levelled the new buildings which had been commenced in the winter. Then he marched across the front of the advancing Greek army, cassed Cithaeron, and settled down in the valley of the Asopus. Here he offered battle in the plain of Southern Bosotia. His camp, surrounded by an earthen rampart which formed a square of ten forlongs, was pitched by the river, facing towards Plataea, the spot

The arrates at which the roads leading from Megara and the as Platesa. Peloponness into Docotia converge. The Greeks lay above on the hillside, for they did not dare to come down into the plain on account of the large bodies of horse which Mardonius could put into the field. As the two armies were posted, the Persian threatened equally the pass into the Megarid and that which led by the shore of the Corinthian Gulf towards the Isthmus. Similarly the Greeks were posted so that they could attack Mardonius at advantage in the hilly ground, if he moved forward on either of these lines of communication. For some time the two armies faced cach other, each expecting the other to make the

decisive move. Mardonius was determined not to attack the Greeks on billy ground, remorabering Thormoppine. Pausanias, though a brave and smbitious man, had no military judgment or power of initiative, and ferred that the movals of many of his troops was bad.



The Greek army had now swelled to more than a hundred thousand men, of whom nearly forty thousand were troops at the line, hoplites in full brazen panoply, such as no Asiatic toron of anything like equal numbers could nope to resist.³ Yet there

¹ Herodotus gires, in jr., 28, 20, the full muster-roll of the Greeks.

were still many contingents due; the Eleians and Mantineans alone, who were expected every day, were bringing up at least five or six thousand hoplites more. The strength of Mardonius we cannot so easily calculate; but, including his Greek allies, he must have had at least twice or three times the numbers of Pausanias.

After some days Mardonius sent bodies of cavalry up the gentler part of the slopes of the Greek position, to annoy the confederates Preliminary and tempt them to advance. There was hot skir-skirmiabes, mishing in the centre of the Greek army, but it terminated in the complete repulse of the Persians, who left Masiatius, commander of the cavelry of the whole army, dead on the field within the Greek lines.

This emboldened Pausanlas to come down more into the plain: the first dread of the Persian cavalry had passed away, now that it was discovered to be by no means invincible. Accordingly the Grocks marched westward, and drew up upon a line of hillocks which run out from Cithaeron some two miles and a half in front of Plataca, behind the fountain of Gargaphia. The Spartans beld the right wing, nearest to the mountains; the other Peloponnesians formed the centre; while the Athenians on the left wing lay furthest out in the plain. For ten days they lay in this position. with the Asupus between them and the enemy. They were, however, much approved by the Persian cavalry, who stopped up the fountain to front from which they drew their water, and sometimes rode round their fishks and intercented the convoys which brought up provisions from Megara. Pausapias was still unable to make up his mind to attack, and had the tameness of spirit to determine on drawing his army back nearer to Plataca, to a position where water was more abundant and the slopes less exposed to envelry raids. Accordingly the army commenced its retreat by night; but everything went wrong with the movement. The Poloponnesians of the centre started off in a hurry, and did not halt in the chosen position, but a mile too far to the rear. The Spartans delayed till nearly day; for one commander of a brigade obstinately refused to believe in a retreat, and had to be convinced by Pausanias himself before he would move. The Athenians waited for the Lacedaemonians to retire before they themselves went back. Hence it came to pass that when day broke the Persians saw that the Greek centre had disappeared, while the two wings were retreating across the rolling ground towards Platnea, without any connection between their movements.

Mardonius thought his opportunity had come, and sallied forth with horse and foot, taking no trouble to form a line of battle, but hurrying on to catch the enemy before they could take up a position. It looked as if the Greeks were lost, but despair gave Pausanias the necessary courage: he fronted up the portion of the army that was with him-ten thousand Spartan and Laconian hoplites, fifteen hundred Arcadians of Tegen, and a mass of some thirty-five thousand Helots and other light troops. Then, after sending off to tell the Athenians that he was going to fight, he dashed at the confused mass of pursuers that was streaming after him. Here the Persians were in front, while the rest of the army was hurrying up from the camp in great disorder, and was not yet on the field. The Persians set their large wicker shields on the ground before them, and began to ply their bons, but after they had let fly a few volleys the Greak line came crashing down upon them, rolled over the barrier of shields, and fell to work at close quarters with sword and lance. There was half an hour of hard fighting, for the picked troops of the army of Mardonius stood their ground like men. But their short swords and quilted tunion were not a fair match for the heavy nike and complete mail of the Spartans. They began to fall back towards the river, and rolled in upon the hordes that were advancing to join them. Mardonius was struck down by a stone; no officer came forward to take his place, and the whole vast body of Asiatics broke up in disorder. Artabazus, who led the rear, drew off his forty thousand men and retired in safety on the road which led to the north-west. He started off with all speed, and marched day and night, everywhere preceding the rumour of the disaster, so that he got safely away to Thessaly, and flually reached Asla. No doubt he was followed by many other scattered hodies. But the mass of the Asiatics fell back on their fortified camp beyond the Asopus, and thea turned to bay.

Meanwhile, for to the lofe, a separate hattle had been going on between the Athenians and the Boostian contingent of the Persian army. It raged until the Bosotlans saw that their main body was routed; then they give way and retreated on Thebes. The Athenians did not pursue them, but marched on the Persia camp, where they found the Sparkans valuely endeavouring to force an entrance. Presently the Greek centre also appeared, too late to take any part in the main battle. It had not soon an enemy, except one stay body of Theban here, which cought the Megarian contingent on the march, and slew six hundred men before it was driven off.

After some severe fighting at the palisades of the entremched camp, the Atherians and Togons burst their may in. The rest representation of the Orientals successed and the oriental success and the oriental success and the oriental success and the oriental without a struggle, till the corporal by massed in heaps in every corner of the entry. Nothing put an end to the shaughter but the wearings of the conquerors. The spoil which field into the hands of the Greeks was coronous; the entry equipage of the Persian officers comprised cups and dishes of allow and gold, tich staffs and hangings, and troops of slaws and concubines; even their folial woopons and armour were of very considerable value; houses, canols, and makes in countless numbers were also captured. If was a booty angle as no Greeks had over divided before.

Plateen was fought and wen to the most unsatentific way; not even at Inkerman was the generalship more wanting on both sides. But the victory was now the less decisive; while the victors coly lost thirteen bundred onen, the Persian army was annihilated; nothing was left of it save broken bands flying northweat towards the Hellespont. All that remained to be done was to punish the traitors in Greece. A few days after the battle the army marched on Thobes and laid slege to it; ore long the towards at the unreader. It was punished by the public execution of the leaders of its oligarally, and deprived of its presidency in the Bosetian League, which seems to have fallen for a time to Tanages. The other allies of Persia submitted without striking a blow.

On the very day on which the bettle of Platens had been fought,

The nowek flort, modher congregment of great importance had taken
of Acids. place on the other side of the Account. At the same

time that the Greek army marched for Decotis, a confederate

fact of one hundred and ten ships had been collected at Accion. under the Sparter King Leotychides and the Athenian Xanthippus. This squadron was destined to create a diversion in Asiatic waters. and to watch the remnant of the Persian fleet, of which three hundred vessels still lay off the coast of Ionia. Moreover, there was some hope that the Greeks of Asia, especially the islanders, would rise in revolt when they saw the confederate fleet at hand.

Accordingly the Greeks advanced as far as Delos; here they received emissaries from Samos promising active assistance, and beard that an outbreak had already taken place at Chics. This emboldened them to push out and search for the Persian fleet. They found it drawn ashore on the promentory of Mycale. not for from Miletus. A considerable land force, sent down from Sandis, lay encounted baside the fleet. With a promotness and doctaion which contrasts very strongly with the alounges, and timidity of Pausanias at Plateen, Lootychides and Xanthippus determined on an immediate attack. They landed on the mainland and marched straight on the Persian camp. The enemy came out to meet them, and a protracted struggle was fought on the shore, which unded in the retreat of the Asiatics towards their ontrenched camp. Here a second contest raped, but it was short. for the Athenians and Corinthians got in at the gates along with the flying foc. Then the Persians dispersed and took to the hills, loaving both their camp and their three hundred ships on the shore in the hands of the viotors. The loss of the Greeks was heavy, that of their enemies commons, and many of the fugitives were out off by the Milesians, who now reballed openly, and beset the passes through which the Persians Sed.

Such was the end of the Persian dominion in Ionia; for the moment that the battle was known all the islands threw off their allegiance to Xerres, and as many of the majuland towns as dared followed their example. The Great King made his way home to Susa, not only without having gained the new provinces he had covered, but having actually lost the greater part of one of his own astropics.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE GREEKS OF ITALY AND SICILY DOWN TO THE END OF THE TTRAKEY AT STRAUSE, 600-465 D.C.

Writes the recorded history of the states of Greece becomes fairly continuous in the seventh content, that of the colonies of Sicily and Magna Greecia remains very fragmentary till the end of the sixth. This is but natural; the earlier years of the existence of these cities must have been occupied with little more; than monotonous increase and expansion, and obscure wars with the tribes of the inland. It would not be until they last arrived at their full maturity, and found leisure for other things than more growth, that their annals were likely to become important.

Of the relations of the Greeks of Italy and Sicily with their baybarian neighbours there is little to tell before the fifth century, The Constrings and Messapiens of the one country, the Sicels and Signainus of the other, gave little trouble to the immigrants. But behind these feeble tribes there becomed in the distance two greatpowers with whom the Greeks were one day to be engaged in desponds struggles. The colonists of Cumae and Neapolis dwelt hard by the Etruscan; those of Selinus and Himera were the immediate neighbours of the Carthaginian merchants of Pauermus and Lilyfreum. But it would seem that neither of these nations. were provoked to war by the growth of the Greek states till the commonesment of the fifth contury. Nor was it till the end of that period that the warlike Sabellian tribes came wandering down. Central Italy, and commenced to cut short the dominions of the states of Magna Graccia; then only do the names of the Samulty or the Lucanian begin to be heard.

Among the Italiet Greeks the most important events of the sixth. century are connected with the curious story of the Pythagorean, brotherhoods. Pythagoras was a celebrated philo- The Pythogo-choice. His tenets were strange and fanciful-including such beliefs as the transmigration of souls, and the mystic meaning of arithmetical numbers; but he imported a moral carnestness and a religious fervour into his teaching which secured him many disciples. These followers were formed into secleties, and bound. themselves by eath to pasist each other as well in temporal matters as in the diffusion of the Pythagorem philosophy. No member was admitted without long probation, and the societies were divided into a hierarchy of grades, through which the aspirant had to pass before becoming fully initiated. It may, therefore, be said that the organization of these brotherhoods had a considerable resemblance to that of the Freemasons of our own day. But they were for from preserving the character of secteties for mutual benevolepge and philosophic life, and turged ore long to interfering in politics. They bred up such a feeling of clauship, and such contompt for the unphilosophic multitude, that the Pythagoreaus were ere long found acting as an organized party in the Italiot cities, Their strongest scat was at Croton, where the philosopher himself, had settled, and where many of the leading usen had become his disciples. Everywhere they are found on the side of ollenethy; the teaching of Pythogoras was too subtle to attract the ignorant masses, and leaf a sanction to the contempt which the upper classes apprished for the proletariate. When, as happened at Croton, the Pythagorean bretherhoods secured a hold on the magistracy and the conduct of public offnirs, they worked in favour of autocratic government by the initiated, and the exclusion of the democracy from power,

Croton, while under the rule of the Pythingersans, became involved in a war with her wealthy and lexurious neighbours of Sybaris. The struggle was fought out on a larger scale and carried to a more bitter and thus was usual in the contests of Greek stites. When each town bud called in its allies and armed its native Italian subjects, Sybaris is said to have put three hundred thousand, and Croton a hundred thousand men into the field. The natures are

maeters.

no doubt exaggerated, but they bear witness to the size and wealth of the cities of Magna Greecia. Mile the famous athlete, a distinguished follower of Pythagores, commanded the Croteclate easily and triumphed over the enemy, whose typout Telys—with thousands

Destruction of his followers—was slain in the lactic. The of Spheres, conquered city itself fell into the hands of the victors, is connect, who granted no terms, but expelled the whole of the inhabitants, and divided up their land among themselves. The exited Bybarites wandered far and wide, but the majority settled at Lails and Scidrus on the Tyrrhenian See, old cotonies of their native town. The whole Greek world was surprised and shocked at the fall of so great a city; oven the distant Milesians put on mourning when the speer reached them; for they had long been bound to Syburis by commercial ties, and their manufacturers were wnot to mean into astroneuts the wool of the rich Syberite Soil-

Their ruthless treatment of the conquered city was ultimately the cause of the ruin of the Pythagerevae of Greton. The oligarche divided upual the Sylarite territory among themselves, and refused to grant allotments to the projection. This gave rise to a scription much resembling some of the agrarian troubles at Rome. The populace took name under a certain Cylon, and made an attack

Democracy ou the haughty philosophors. A domocracy was escablebed successfully established, and the Pythagorean brother-in Beetr hoods were subjected to such a releatines persecution that ofter much blacelabed they were crushed. Similar but less violent movements troubled the other Italiot cities, and coulted in the destruction of Pythagoreanism as a political power. As a philosophy, however, it long remained vigorous in Italy; as late as 376 n.c. Architas, the great legislator of Tarentum, is said to have endeavoured to ambody Pythagorean principles in his system of government.

Like their mother-cities in Greece, the respective of the states of Italy and Sirily passed under the rule of a lymnt at some period

Phalacie of their existence. The most formers among the sariler tyrnet of despots was Planiaris of Acrogas (circ. 570 n.e.), a Acrogas magistrate who had seized the throne by means of the unmerous clients and public servants whom his office put at his

disposal. He was noted above all his follows in the West or the the East for his savage cruelty; even Periander is not credited with any deeds so attocious as that of rousting enemies alive within a beazon bull, which tradition assoribes to Phalaris. This rufflen was overthrown at the end of sixteep years by a popular cuthousk, but Aarages was not thereby freed from tyronts; the grandsons of Telemachus, the lender who slew Phalaris, are found ruling the city as despots till 475 n.c.

Anaxhais, of the Ifaliot town of Thegium, was another tyrant of great power and resolution. His chief exploit was to solut complete control over the Sicilian Steat by capturing remarkation or the town of Zanoch, which lay over against him on Measure. the other side of the mater (493 a.c.). He instigated the exiled Samians, who field from Asia after the Louis reveil, to seize the place by a transferous and pipatical descent. When they had done this he himself fell upon these, and avenged the Zanoleous by crushing their compenses. He then settled up the town with colonists of his own, who changed its name to Messene, in honour of the Messenian blood which can be the relate of the population of Ilhegium. Thus the great port on the southern shore of the strait became a Dorian testend of an Ionian town.

But the greatest of the despots of the West were the two sons. of Deinomenes, Gelo and Hiero, tyrants of Syracuse. originally officers in the service of Hippokentes, the Gete typus of rotor of Gole; but when their master was killed in battle, Gele, by the aid of the samy, became his successor. Five years after, the oligarchic party at Syracuse-expelled from their city by the nonulace-called in Gelo to help them. The tyrant restored them to their homes, but retained possession of Symensofor blunself (485 p.c.). He fixed his abode there, and hunded ever Gein to be governed by his brother Hiero. Gelo was the fuunder of the supremacy of Syracuse in Sicily: before his day it would segm that both Acragas and Gela were more important places. His method of colarging Byraguse was not celike that of the Assyrian kings of old; he took Cumarina, and forest all its inhabitants to come and dwell in his new capital. Soon after he fell on Megam. Hyblaca and other neighbouring places, and after willing the lower classes as slaves-" for he thought the projectivists a most trouble-

some companion to dwell with "1-transplanted the wealthier citizens to Syrucuso. These accessions of population may have mode that city larger and richer, but they paved the way for countless troubles in the Inture; for, as was undural, the old and the new inhabitants were always quarrelling. But perhaps Galo calculated that their divisions made him strong. He fortified Syranuse with new walls and adorned it with many public edifices. This andiapated away extended over the larger half of Sleily; only Mersene, Acragas, Himero, and Selfaus wore outside his power. Moreover, he maintained an immense mercenary army, the inevitable appendage of a tyronny. So large was it, that when the Greeks sent to ask and at the time of the furasion of Xerxes, Gelo was able to proffer them twenty thousand haplites and eight thousand horsemen and light-troops, if only they would necept him. as their commander-in-chief. It will be remambered that the confederates very wisely refused to put themselves in the hands of the unserupulous truunt.

The same spring which witnessed the invasion of Grocce by Xorxes proved a time of no small danger for Gelo. The Carthacertherician Sinians seem to have been moved into a fear for their invested of own passessions by the growth of the Syramean power. Moreover, there were Slellian exites who, with the true Greek recklespess in matters of civil strife, called in the burbarians to old them. It is said too that the Persian bing usged them on to the attack, in order that they might prevent any aid from being sent to Greece by the Ituliot or Sicellot towns. It is, et any rate, certain that the first great Carthaginian invasion of Sicily coincides in time with Thermopylae and Salamis. Hamiless, one of the two "suffetes," or supreme magistrates of Carthago, landed on the north coast of the Island with 4, yest mercenary samy of barbarhan troops, drawn from all the tribes of the Western Mediterrament; it is said to have amounted to skroo bundred thousand mon. He then laid alogo to Himera, the nearest Greek city, and was lying before it when Gelo attacked him. The tyrant had get together all his own forces, and was joined by those of Acragas, whose ruler There was his close friend. With about sixty thousand men in hand, he boldly full upon the Carthaginian camp. The day

¹ Revod, vii. 1 156.

was bloody and the victory long disputed, but at last Gole learnt, from an intercepted letter, that Hamilear was expecting a coinforcement of cavelry. Disguising a body of Himare, bis own becomes, he sent them round to the back of 480 h.C.

the Carthaghnian camp, and at the critical moment these supposed friends charged the rear of Hamilear's men and threw them into confusion. This settled the fight; the Carthaghnian suffete fell, his army was acuttered, and its less in sinth and prisoners was so great that it was practically annihilated. The viotory was some followed by a poace, and it was eventy years before nother army from Africa dayed to make a descent on the shares of Sicily.

While the Inurels which he had sarned by saving the Greeks of the West from the barbarian were still fresh, Gelo died of a dropsical complaint, and left his throne and his army Higgs and the to his brother Hiero (473 n.c.). That prince was not less powerful or less able than his producessor. The chief event of his rolgn was the defent which he inflicted on the barbarian power which stood to the Greeks of Italy in much the same relation that Carthago did to the Greeks of Skilly. The Etroscaps had long rescried the attempts of Helicale merchants. and sottlers to establish themselves in the northern half of the Tyerhenian Son. Half a contary before they had succeeded, ofter a desperate struggle, in preventing the exiled Phoesesus of Asia Minor from establishing themselves in Corsica (540 p.c.). Now they themselves took the offensive, and collecting a considerable fleet laid siege to Comao, the northernmost of the Italiet cities. The Cumacana sent for aid to Ujero, who came up in haste with a powerful squadron, and completely defented the Etriscans (47± a.c.). Chance has preserved, among the few relies of the fifth century which have come down to us, one of the original Etruscan helmets which the victor offered up to Apollo at Delphi, with its dedicatory inscription still ingible.

In Sivily Hiero extended the dominion which his brother had left him. He quarrilled with Thresphaeus, son of Thero of Acraga, and successful in expelling that tyrant propagation and numering his dominions. This conquest made of Arma. him master of all Sicily except the extreme west and northeast of the island. Hiero resolved to make himself a name by

establishing a new city, and sot to work much in the same way as his brother had done in propiling Syracuss. He composited the inhabitants of the Ionic city of Catana to remove to Lecenteria, and fixed on their desorted city as the place for his new foundation. On its site, which be renamed Astmanfer the mountain which overlooked it, he settled ten thousand caloniate, mostly chosen from the ranks of his mercennites. So pleased was he with this achievement, that when his chariot chanced to be victorious at the Olympic gauses, he ordered the haralds to grandaire his mane as "Hiero the Astmatena" rather than "the Syracusan,"

After a prosperous reign of ten years, Hiero died (406 n.c.). His death was the signal for the wildest internal commetions at Byrn-End of tytamny cuse. The throne was disputed between his brother at Syruouse. Throsybulus, and his nophew, the son of Galo. This quatrel gave the Symousus an opportunity of coming by their owe. After a stormy period, in which the old citizens and the more energies of Hiero estiled all their outstanding gradiers with the sword, the party of the tyrants had the worst of the game. Thrasybūlus was besieged in Ortygia, the island-citadel of Syracuso. and at last compelled to surrender it, and to retire under a capitulation to Italy. His departure, however, was far from making an end of the civil brotls. The rights of the original inhabitants of the city, of the Camerinasans and others whom Gele had forced to dwell there, of the strangers from all parts of Greece who had been invited over by the syrants, and of the numerous exiles who returned to reclaim their property, were so hopelessly at variance that no peaceful agreement could be made between them. Seditions were equally rife in the other towns of Sicily; when the strong hand of Hiero was removed, the faction which had supported and that which had opposed the tyronts promptly fell to blows. It was not till several years of desperate sadition and civil year had alapsed that the Sicelists arrived at a medies vicendi. It was the democratic faction which emquered; they colourated their triumph by giving back to each city its complete autonomy, and by restoring all the exiles who had been driven out by the same of Doinomones. The survivors of the merconaries of Hispo were allowed to settle down at Messens alone. Catain was reconquered by its old inhabitants, and resumed its former name. Camarina also rose

from the dust, and everywhere an andeavour was made to restore the old state of things which had existed before the ties of the trants. The next forty years formed the most flourishing period in the whole of the history of Shally. The troubles which the islanders and undergone seem to have aroused them to the same onorgy which the Persian wars had kindled in their brethren of Their progress in wealth and prosperity was Greece proper. astonishing; that side of outtare which displays itself in act was especially rapid in development; in the middle of the fifth century the Sicoliats were decidedly shead of their contemporates in the older Hellenic lands. It was not till the influence of Pheidias was fold in Greece that art of the mother-country attained to the level of that of its colonies. In political matters the Siceliots commined consistently attached to democracy, until a series of disasters in the and of the century drove them to take refuge once more under the strong hand of a despot. But for sixty years they flourished beneath the demogratic form of government which was best suited to obies that possessed such a mixed body of inhabitants.

The Greeks of Italy had nover fallen so wholly late the power of tyracts as had their Siceliot brethren. The few towns, such as Rhagium, which were despotically governed seem to, rice restons have freed themselves about the same time that the and that despots of Skilly were expelled. The chief event in defeat, 470 2.0, Italiot history which marked this period was the first check which the Greeks suffered at the hands of the peoples of the interior. 478 n.c., the next year after the defeat of the Etruscaps at Cumae, the Tarantines and Rhogines allied themselves to make an attack on the powerful tribe of the Ispygians, in hope of extending the area of Greek colonization. But they suffered a most disastrous repulse, and the greater part of their army was cut to pieces. "Newer in my day," wrote Herodotus, "was there such a terrible slaughter of Helienes; three thousand of the Rhegines alone fell, and the loss of the Tarentines was even greater." This defeat was but the first intimation of greater dissulers to come, when two generations later the Sabellian tribes were to set themselves to cut short the borders of the states of Magua Graccia. But for the present the Italiot cities shared allke in the rapid development and the democratic tondencies of their Signification beighbours.

CHAPTER XXII.

SYLETS IN ASIA MINOR AND DENOM, 479-406 Inc.—ORIGIN OF THE DONFEDERADY OF DRICE.

Arrism the battle of Mycale the Peloponnesian admirale considered that ecough had been done in disabiling the Persians from further navni operations in the Aegean. This was not, however, the opinion of Xanthippes and the Athenians; strengthening themselves with ships from the revolted limins cities, they sailed north, and began to attack the Persian garrisons along the Hellespent. They found the famous bridge completely destroyed by storms, but the towns in its neighbourhood ware still as firmly hold by the Persians that means of the inhabitants had not dured to rise. Seeks was the

here of sacco place which gave the Athenians most trouble; they before it all the antama, and did not take it until the familiang gardson alipped out by night into the Thracksa hills, there to be one to pieces by the natives. Only Artsyctes, the governor of the Greek custom, they put to death by urusifixion, to avonge a wanton pollution of the temple of Protesidain, of which he had been guilty. After this the Athenians sailed home, and their allies dispersed.

Such was the panie which the result of Plataca and Mycale had cast on the soul of Xerxes, that the Great Ring made no further endeavour to sustain the numerous outlying garrisons which still held for him the cities of the Thracisn const and other distant passessions. Neverthaless the Persian power had been so firely rected beyond the Heldespeat that it did not fall at once. Several years of war were necessary to reduce these strongholds. In 478 n.c. the Pelopounesians fitted out a small finet of twenty ships, which was joined by thirty more from Athons. They were placed

under Patsanias, regent of Sparta, the victorious communder at Platsea; while the Athenian squadron was hadded by Aristeldes and by Cimen, the young son of the great Miltindes. After salling into the Levant and asslating the Greek cities of Cyprus to revolt, Pausanias turned north and laid slegs to Byzantiam, the most important of the Persian fortrosses in Threes. It hold out as obstitutely as Sestee in the previous year; but later in the autumn the governor, a kinemen of Xernes, surrendered. The fleet was therefore able to winter in the town.

Pausacins was a man of more ambition than ability; the honours and wealth which had fallen to him on account of his share in the triumph of Plataca had completely turned his head.

Pausacina believed the whole credit of the battle to himself, and Dynamics of delicated in his own name, and not in that of the delicated in his own name, and not in that of the

confidentes, the tripod which was set up at Delphi as a memorial of the victory. While in Sparta he had openly showed his dislike for the frugal and irksome manner of life which was there imposed upon him, and whom care he was away from home his laxary, butgitiness, and reckless violence became unbearable. But, Ill regulated though his ambition might be, it was not at first suspected that it would spor him on to high treason against Greece. Such, however, was its effect; after taking Byzantian he scoretly released some of the prisoners, and charged them with letters to the Traisan ling, in which he offered to subdue Greece and to do homone for it as the vascal of Xerxes, if only he were supplied with sufficient means and granted the king's daughter as his wife. It was his aim, in short, to become tyrant of all Greece, and he was ready to purchase his opportunity by becoming the servant of the barbarian whose armies he had routed.

Xexxes was for from estimating the presumptances regent at his right value, and showed binaself delighted with the overfures. He placed his resources at the Spartini's disposal, and bade him "work on night said day to accomplish his purposa, without lotting bimself he hold back by lack of gold or ellver, or want of troops, for all should be at his commend." If Pausenlas could have hept coal, he might have become really dengarous to Greece, but when cose had the king's letters before him his conduct grew we outrogeous that his designs began to be suspected. Not only did he affect

royal state and surround himself with numbers of foreign merceparties, but his bearing towards the allies assumed such an arbitrary and dictatorial cast that no Oriental despot could have been more effensive. Free long reports of his behaviour reached Sparts, and provoked the epibors into issuing a worsant for his recall, and appointing a certain Dereis admiral in his stead.

Before Doreis could reach Byzantium, matters had come to a head; the floot and musticied against its commander, and placed Musicy against Steelf at the disposition of the Athenian leaders, Azisteldes and Circon. One morning, we are told, a Samian captain gave the signal for revolt, by rewing up to the regent's galley and running toto it in a deliberate and malicious manney. Pausanias was driven to fury, when his angry rebukes were mot by the roply that "he had better go home, and that if it had not been for the momory of Plutaca he would have been punished as he described." He could do nothing to revenge himself; the Pelopomesian ships in the fleet were few, and those of the Athenians and the revolted Greeks of Asia outaumbered thou threafold. The would-be tyrant found bluesels stripped of his power, and summoned home to take his trial for treason at Sparts. Mis successor's orders were quietly disregarded by the fleet, which acknowledged Aristoides alone as admiral,

The mad conduct of Fransanias had precipitated a change which was incritable; it was obvices that Sparts could not any longer period to the direction of the confidents fleet. Her contingent sit on amount to a tithe of its force, and was is no way distinguished for conduct or seamanship. Her admirals had nearly wrested the cause of Greece at Artendsium and Salamia. The Athentaus, as we shall seen see, owed her no gratified; the Greeke of Asia were Ionians who preferred to follow their kinsmen of Athene maker them a Dorlan from Sparts. Moreover, Aristeides and Cimon were personally the models of everything that Pausanias was not; the inflaxible honesty of purpose of the one, and the gallmstry and generosity of the other, wen every heart, and made the transformed of power as popular as it was necessary.

While the slego of Byzantium was in progress, a very dangerous crisis in the home politics of Greece had been tided over. When the winter which followed Plataca and Myoule had passed, the Athonians got the insolves to rebuild their twice-missed city. They included In the new circuit much ground which had formerly been outside the walls, and planned for its defence a far against actions, 479-479 B.O. racya formidable line of fortifications than had existed before. The energy which they displayed in this work roused an unworthy jealousy in the hearts of their neighbours. Several states, beaded by Aegina, sont private information to Sparts, to the effect that Athens was making herself dangerously strong, and urged the culture to andeavour to arrest the work. The Spartens were already growing alarmed at the power and resolution which Athens had displayed in the late war; their timid and conservative policy was sure to come into collision scoper or later with the designs of the active and restless naval state. Accordingly they listened with attention to the complaints of their allies, and determined to interfere. For very shame they could not venture absolutely to forbid the fertilication of Athens, but they sent an embassy to urge that the work was both unnecessary and inexpedient. In the event of another Persian invarion they asserted that the passession of a strongly walled city, just outside Pelopounesus, would give the enomy a dangerous base of operations, and they offered to receive the Athenians within the Isthmus and give them safe harbourage there, if ever they were again compelled to evacuate Attion. plea was fatile and obviously insincere, but the Athenians were for the moment in too begardous a position to return a bold refusal. Their wells were but half-built, and showed gaps and breaches

everywhere.

The orisis was one at which the public genius of Themistodes was able to display itself in all its power. By his odvice the Athenian assembly returned answer that an embassy Themistodes should at once be sent to Sparia to dispuse the matter, and the walls Themistodes was given two colleagues and entrusted.

with the offair; he himself went off at once, and notified his mission to the ephors, but his companions, by previous arrangement, were long in making their appearance. Until they scrived Themistodies professed houself unable to commence the negotiations. Meanwhile the whole population of Attion, men, women, and children, were working they and night to complete the wall. Abundant materials was at houd in the rules of the old city, and the fortifications rese

at an incredible rate ; ever after the baste of the builders could be disserned from the roughness of their construction; tembetones, temple-columns, and wrought blocks of all kinds were to be seen bellt up in the courses of the wall. By the time that the two belated ambassidors reached Sparts, Athens was already getting into a state of defence. Meanwhile rumours of this activity began to reach the ophors; but Themistocles succeeded in keeping them nuist, by asserting with the utmost confidence that nothing was being done at Athens. He even induced the Spartans to send commissioners to obtain confirmation with their own ayes as to the suspension of the work; when these enveys arrived in Athens they were treated with courtesy, but detained to serve as heatingss for the personal safety of Themistocles and his colleagues. At last appoint months had been wasted, and the walls were sufficiently strong to withstand a siege; Thomistocles then changed his tone, boldly avowed the stratagem, and proclaimed the fortifications of Athens as an accomplished fact. The Szurtans were hitterly voxed at the trick, but the time for action had now gone by, and they were compelled to accept the inevitable, and leave Athens to herself. This incident, combined with the mutiny against Pausanias, sufficed to complete the estrangement of the two powers which had conquered the Persian.

When the walls of the old city of Athens were finished, Themistoeles provailed on his countrymen to enlarge their system of

Petranes fortifications. Such was his influence with the sections. Ecolesia, that he obtained a vote which sanctioned the erection of another line of walls around Petranes and the neighbouring harbour of Munyelin. This work was even more laborious and expensive than that which had just been completed. The ramparts were built to a thickness of fourteen or fifteen fact, and not lined with rubble, as was usual in Grook fortifications, but composed of hown stometheologically, they were by far the strongest piece of nulltary architecture which Grooce had yet seen. In the splondld harbours which they protected, ships might ride by the hundred, while the ample open spaces which lay within them were large enough to serve as a refuge for a great part of the inhabitants of Atties. Ere long the population of Petraeus began to increase at a guach more rapid rate than that of the old city;

it had long been the chosen abode of the recreatile and scalaring choses, and now became the chief bount of the numerous Metics (or resident allens) who were drawn to Attica by the commercial advantages to be found there. Indeed, if it had not been for the sentimental patriotism which clung to the time-honoured rock of the Acropolis, Peineus rather than Athens might have become the capital of the land.

The transference to Athenian bands of the control over the confederate flost at Byzantium was destined to have the most momentum consequences. The stress of circumstances combined with the ability of the Athenian leaders to turn the unexpected situation of the moment into a permanent estdement. Asistic Greece was but builf liberated, and the Athenians and their Ionian himsen were set upon completing the week. Now that the Paloponnesians had withdrawn from the outerprise, there was no third party present to provest them from coming to an agreement. Accordingly it was but natural that Aristoldus, as representing Athens, should conclude conventions with the Ionian states for the regulation of the future conduct of the war. On those compacts, freely and voluntarily entered into by both parties, the future compte of Athena was to be built.

The chief clauses of the treaties which were new ratified provided that the several states should furnish ships or money for the further prosecution of the war with Persia, and should origin of the not withdraw from the alliance without the consent Confidence of of the whole body of ennfederates. The probity of Aristeides was so universally recognized, that he was allowed to assess the limbilities of the various cities at his own discretion. We read that he fixed the sum required for the prosecution of the wat at four hundred and sixty talonts per annum, partly payable in ships, partly in money. The amount appears considerable, but when it is remembered that, besides the Ionina and Acolina towns, all the islands of the Gyclades, the colonies of Chalcidice, and the liberated states along both shorts of the Reliespont were entelled as contributors, it comes to appear excessive. Subsequent experience showed that it could be largely increased without becoming unheamble. The westernmost of the confederates were the cities of Euboca, the most easterly the Byzantines; but the list of members

was ere long to be largely increased. It was agreed that the common treasury of the larges should be placed in the sacred island of Delos, and that delegates from every state should annually repair to the same spot to discuss the needs of the war. The execution of the downess of this synod was placed in the hands of the Athenians, who were also charged with the appointment of the officers, afterwards called Hallenotamine, by whom the foods of the league were to be collected. In their behalf tex-gatherers sailed round the Aegean every spring, and gathered in all contributions, from the few drachman at which Carla or Anaphe were assessed, to the narrorous takents over by Miletus or Abdera.

The Confederacy of Delos, as this league came to be styled, was in its origin purely military; the sole and which it proposed to tampasses itself was the expulsion of the Persian from the various against the Exerines.

Sections. 477-470 B.C. In this design it had no small success. Its first triumphs were wen over the garrisons which held the towns of the Thracing coast; but of the operations which dislodged them only one has left a mark in history. This was the siege of Elon, the fertress at the mouth of the Strymon, by the Athenians under Cimon. Boges, the Persian governor, made a resistance which surpassed in obstinacy any that the Greeks had yet known. When his provisions at last gave out, he gathered his family and his treasures. on a great funeral pyre and burnt himself alive, like the legendary. Sardanapolus. In the course of seven or eight years of war tho Athenions and their confederates succeeded in completely expolling the Persian from Europe, and in restricting his dominion in Western Asia Minor to the inland parts. The whole coast-line, except a small tract between the Tread and the northernment towns of Applis, was liberated; and its towns, without exception, enrolled thomselves in the Confederacy of Delca. As these new mombers came in, the payments of the original confederates were probably reduced, so that nothing more than the necessary four hundred and sixty talents might be relect. Athens had not yet contemplated turning hor predominance into an empire, and was still anxious to show that her activity was dislaterested.

While the Confederacy of Delos was galuing strength beyond the Access, the course of politics in European Greece was compara-

tively uneventful. At Sports Pausanius had been tried for treason after his return from Byzantium, but either because the treasure of of the caution with which he had conducted his Pensanies. traltorous correspondence, or because the ophers did not wish to nuch matters to extremity, he was sequitted. Movertheless he was a marked man, and was never again entrusted with a command, Yet though reduced to the condition of a private individual, he did not desist from his intrigues with Xerxes. He satted back to the East, and once more placed blusslf in secret connection with the sotrups of Asia Minor. The wealth which he had at his disposal and the eternal factions which divided the Greek attice still gave him some hopes of success. At Byzantium he gained such an nacendancy that the Athenians were obliged to interfere, and to expel him by force. He then established himself to the Tread, and continued his schomes with each vigour, that the Spartan government at last summoned him back to stand another trial. He had the assurance to accept the challenge, and when he appeared at home no accuser had the courage to appear against him. He therefore remained at large, though shunned and suspected by his followeltizms. This social cetracism drove him to plan a more violent rovenge; he commenced to intrigue with the Helpis, and set on foot a scheme for a general insurrection of the serie of Legonia and the massacre of the Derian eligarchy. The Heleta were always ready to revolt when a lorder presented himself, and Pansaniss found them ready to follow him. Although the ophors obtained some blate as to his designs, they could obtain no convincing evidence till obence placed it in their bands,

Pausanias had a confidential slave, who was acquainted with all his secrets; one day his master outcusted him with a letter directed to the satrap Arishaus. The slave had observed that, the rionts of full the messengers who were sent to Asia, none over Fausanian, enterned. This induced him to tamper with the letter, 400 h.C. he opened it, and found in a postercipt a request that the bearer might be put to death. This discovery naturally induced him to key the whole matter before the Spartan government. In order that they might have clear orbidine against the traiter, the ophores laid a trap for him. They directed the slave to take as not vary at Tamarama, and arranged a hiding-place for two of their number

within carebot of his refuge. Pausanias hastened to the spot to remonatrite with his messenger, and the concealed ophors were able to gather from his conversation ample proof of his guitt, When he returned to Sparts orders were issued for his arrest, and the officers set out to seize birn. Pousanine was passing by a temple of Athena whom he saw the ophore and their followers approaching blun; his guilty conscience gave bire sufficient warning, and he rushed into the temple and took sanctuary. Instead of tearing him from the alter, the ephers ordered the doors to be built up, and left the ex-regent to die of starvation. It is soid that his own mother was the first to approach and aid the magistrates in the work. Whou, after some days, Pausanias was drawing near his last gasp, the cphore had the temple opened, and trok the dying man outside, that the holy place might not be polluted by his death. Thus perished the conqueror of Platers, the viotim of his own insane pride and ambition (469 n.c.).

The fall of Pausanias brought about the disgues of a man of much greater gentus, one who had done ten times more service for needing of the Erecce than the value-glorious regent. For the last power of few years Thomletectes and been steadily declining in the matter of the popularity at Athens. His unscruppious tributs were better suited to troublous times than to the less eventful days which had now arrived, and his gross faults were more ensily discorned when no crisis was at hand to distract the attention of his fellow-citizens. The fact that his political schemes nover abowed the least respect for honesty or good faith might not entirely have alienated the people. But his open corruption could not be pullisted; it was well known to every one that he took belbes from all quarters on all possible occasions. A characteristic story reintes that while Themistocles was delecting in public with Aristeldes, he observed in a self-laudatory manner of that the object excellence of a statusman was to be able to foresee and frustrate the designs of public onomies," to which Aristeides rejoined " that another very excellent and necessary quality in a statesman was to have clean bands." The retort was considered crushing. It was indeed unfortunate for Themistocles that he was continually being contrasted with Arisboides, a mon who as much exceeded the average Greek standard of probity as he himself fell below it. Moreover, he had the had taste to be continually reminding the Athenians of the services he had done them—the worst way to keep the favour of the multitude, for repetition sickens the heavet.

It is also probable that the influence of Themistocles was weakened by the fact that his political antagonists no longer showed themselves such foss to democratic reforms inspecies of in the constitution as they had been before the Aristoslees. Persian war. The result of Salamis had convinced even the most conservative statesmen that the future career of Atlana was to be found on the sea, and that her true strength lay in the arms of her sailors. Nothing marks this change of opinion better than the fact that it was Aristoides, the old opponent of naval expansion, who founded the Confederacy of Belos. It was also Aristoides who, a short time after, removed the political disabilities which Clotethemes had allowed to remain imposed on the Thites, the class which included the "assistring multitude" who throught Pirsons. By a law which he proposed, the arubonship and other magnistracies were thrown open to these poor citizens.

About the year \$11 n.c., the strife of political parties become so keen that recourse was once more had to estradam, the expedient which had been fistal to Ariestides twelve years before.

But this time it was Themistocles who was its victim; Themistocles, the property that have been property benishment and took or \$47.2.0.

he was sont into honorary banishment, and took up his abode at Argos. While he was staying there, Pausanias, then doen in his treascaphio schemes, sounded him as to his willingness to join in the plot against the liberties of Greece. With more firmness then might have been expected of him, Themistocles refused to take part in the latrigue but he did not reveal the plans of Pausanias to any one. When the ephors seized the traitor's papers after his death, they found traces of this correapontlence with Themistocles, though there was nothing which actually proved the Athenian's implication in the plot. However, his countrymen showed an futuation of bringing the exiled statesman to trial, and sunt to fetch bim from Argos. Themistocles resolved to fly rather than to face his political apponents; he reached Corcyra, but such a hue-and-cry after him Procesiption of was raised throughout Groece, that he could find no Themistocias. safe refuge, and, after a series of hair-breadth escapes, which lasted for more than two years, was compelled to take refuge in Asia, on Persian ground (466 n.c.).

All chance of an honourable career in Athens was now gone from Themistoches. In shoer disguist he turned to his old ensuries, Themistoches and crured the protection of the Great King. Xerxes to Asia: his was just dead, show by a demestic conspiracy, and it death.

480 B.O.F was to his young son Artaxerxes that the exile made his petition. The name of Themistocks was so dreaded at Suza. that his offers of service produced all the effect he could have desired. It is even said that Artaxerxes was so affected with juy, that he was heard at night to cry threes in his dreams, "Themistocles the Athenian is mine." The king received his supplient with the greatest favour, listened with attention to his solutions for the subjugation of Greece, and sent him down to Asia Miner faralshed with ample resources. He was allotted considerable revenues for his support, and made typant of Maguesia, where he dwelt in great state. Here he was joined by his family, and his friends in Attion contrived to remit him the greater part of his fortune. Eighty talents had been seized by the state, yet this was only the smaller half of the wealth of a man who at the moment he entered public life had not three talents of his own. Themistocles raise at Magnesia for a fow years, and then died, without having fulfilled any of the promises which he had made to the Persian. It is probable that he nover had the heart to injure Athens, and resigned himself to ending his life in unile as the pensioner of the barbarian. If he had really latended to forward the intrigues of Artaxornes, there is little doubt that he might have done much against the liberties of Greeen: that he failed to his promise argues want of will rather than want of power. Perhaps his last years may have been made less unboarable to him by the sight of the rapid expansion of the mayel power of Athens, a power of which he had himself been the solo founder.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE DUMBING UP OF THE ATHERIAN EMPIRE, 471-458 D.O.

These years after Themistocles had suffered estratem and disappeared from the politics of Athens, his great rival was removed by desth. Aristoides had come to be considered so far above all mere party and faction, that his death was removed by every class alike—as much by the democrate, who remembered his services at Byzantium and his later continuitional reforms, as by the chi Atte party, which recollected the history of his service years. Although the legends which relate that he died in absolute poverty deserve little credit, it is certain that he was not an abol the richer for all the years he had spent in the service of the state. Athens never saw his like again; though she owned many able statemen in after years, and many two particles, she was a never so happy as to produce another man who combined in such a degree the spirit of honour and self-abnogation with the highest practical athlity.

The death of Aristeides left Cimon the most prominent figure in Atherian politics. The sea of Mittindes was a man of generous impulses and perfect honestr, but he could nover rise observed to the position of a party leader, or win the entire confidence of his follow-citizens. The aristocratic spirit was so deeply record in film, that he was constantly acting in a way which caused him to be sespected by the democratic party. Above all, his reverence and admiration for Sparts, and the efforts which he made to keep his country on good terms with her, were destined to work him harm. The Atherians could never believe that a man who loved Laccoian manners and admirate the Laccoian constitution was a safe political guide. Nevertheless, there were

many things in his favour: his first appearance in public life had been when he discharged, in the true spirit of filet piety, the fine which had been inflicted on his father Miltindea. Next he had ally seconded Aristeides at the time of the foundation of the Confederacy of Delea. Again he had greatly distinguished himself in the campaign against the Persian garrisons in Theore, the first occasion on which he had been placed to supreme command of an Athenian armament. Moreover, his life at home was devoted to winning the hearts of the probletariate. He threw his parks and gardens open to the public, and legit a free table for all the poorer members of his own deme. We are even assured that he used to walk abroad with a retinue of well-dressed slaves, and, if he met a citizen in threadbare clothes, would order zone one of them to change garments with him. But all this liberality won bire applicage rather than confidence from the classes that he courted.

Olmon's political schemes were entirely directed towards the East. He thought that Athems should extendily avoid all entangloments in the quarrels of European Green, and devote herself solely to the war with Pomia and the strengthening of the maritime confederacy. He wished to preserve a benevolent attitude towards Sparts, and even to assist her, it need should arise, to maintain her old position of predominance on land. In return he hoped to scence her goodwill, and to induce her to nequiesce in the maral supremacy of Athems. His blind admiration for the Lacedhennomians caused him to forget the narrowness and selfishness of their views, and to hope that they would join in a fair and equal alliance—a polley of which those dull egoists were quite incapable.

While Athens was under the political gaidance of Cimon, her maritime expeditions never caused. In 470 n.c. she fell upon the

Gaptone of Seyros and occupied it. The inhabitants, a people of "Pelasgie" vace, were much addicted to pimey, not had made themselves such a nuisance to traders that their expulsion was halled as a public benefit to Greece. The Island was compied by a body of Athenians as "Cleracles." They settled there, not us an independent community, but as an outlying body of citizens who did not abandon their civic rights at home. Athenian supersition was much gratified by the discovery in Seyros of a gigantic skeleton, which was

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pronounced to be that of the old Attic here Theseus, who had, necording to legend, died in sails on the island. The bones were hought to Athens with great rejoicings, and a temple named the

Thesaum was built over them.

A more important expedition was that which Cimon led, a few years later, to liberate the Greek cities of Lycia and Pamphylia. many of which were still in the hands of the Persians. He set sail from Cuidus with three hundred Athenian and Ionian galleys, and passed custward, expelling Persian garrisons from Phaselis and other places. At last he heard that a fleet was collecting to oppose him. The satrap in command had not yet been joined by his Phognician contingents, and in order to avoid a battle retired up the river Eurymedon, on whose shores a considerable land army yeas lying. Chimon was set upon fighting before this reinforcement arrived; be mushed up the river and brought the Battle of the anomy to action in a confined space where the mayrandon, superior seamanship of the Atheniana was of little avail. Novertheless he gained a declaive victory, and when the

defeated Passians can their galleys aground, and endeavoured to save them by the aid of their land army, he put his hoplites cabors and won a second battle on the beach. His good fortune and skilful strategy combined to give him yet another triumph; putting to see, he intercepted the eighty Phoenician gallays, which had set out to join the main armament, and destroyed most of them

off the coast of Cyprus.

This brilliant series of victories completely broke the naval power of Persia; two generations were to pass before a barbarian floot was again seen in Greek waters. Meanwhile Phaselis and the other Greek towns of the neighbourhood joined the Confederacy of Delos, and the liberation of the Asiatic Hellones was completed.

The nominal object of the league which the Athenians and the Ionians had formed at Dyzantium was now fulfilled. There was no longer any Greek state in servitude to the lurberian. It might, therefore, be ressonably pleaded that the reasons for the existence of the Confederacy of Delos no longer survived. The Persian had ceased to be dangerous, and any further attacks on him could meraly had to unrecessary expenditure of blood and money. Moreover, the continuence of the league left in the hands

of Athens a power of taxing her alties and imposing orders on thom which was decidedly in contradiction to the universal Greek desire for "autonomy." The states of Asia and the Aggest had placed power in her hands in the moment of danger, but had not intended it to be parmagent. When the crisis was over, they began to think of withdrawing from the league and managing their own affairs.

The first state which declared its secession from the confederacy of Delos was the wealthy island-city of Maxos in the Cyclades.

Probably her citizens remembered the regular which Beveited they had inflicted on the Powian in 501 0.0., and Maxos, 460 RO. thought that they were once prore quite able to take care of themselves. In the spine year that the buttle of the Eurymodon was fought, they aengument that they intended to withdraw from the league. In strict equity Athens ought to have allowed her recolcitrant ally to secode; but she had no intention of doing so. Her greatness and strength were so bound up with her position as head of the Confederacy of Deios, that her statesmen had no thought of allowing the lengue to dissolve. When Maxos produinced its accession it was immediately blockeded by on Athenian fleet. After a siege of some duration the islanders wore forced to sarrender; they were punished by the demolition of their walls, the forfeiture of their war-ships, and the imposition of a heavy fine.

It was now evident to the whole body of the allies of Athena that by joining the league they had provided themselves with a mistress rather than a leader. Moreover, the shokness

changed mistress rather than a leader. Moreover, the shakness changes of many members of the confederacy had been for some time working to diminish the naval strength of the whole body of allies as compared with that of Athans. It had grown customary for tities, especially small places which had no old traditions of naval greatuess, to compound for their contingent of ships, by paying a larger annual contribution in money. Athens had gladly accepted their offers, and the gallovs which should have been supplied by them were now replaced by Athenian vessels maintained by their composition-inchey. This enabled the Athenian government to keep affort a much larger number of ships than could have been supported from the mere revenues of Attica. There was, in all probability, no ulturior motive in the

minds of Cimon or his fellows when they supported this scheme. They were metely desirous of having a larger number of Athenian. vessels with them, because of their superlority in efficiency to those of the allies. But, at the same time, the system of composition worked entirely in the direction of giving Athena a complete mostery, and of turning her allies into mere payors of tribute. Two years after the reduction of Maxos another powerful island-

state broke out into reballion against the supremacy of Athens. The people of Thoses had from very early times possessed territory on the mainland of Thrace exposite to their island. By holding this coast-slip they engrossed the trade of the valley of the Strymon, and held the rich gold-mines of Mount Pangaeus. But the Athenians, after the capture of Bion, set themselves to develop that port as the commercial centre of Thruce. They even sont two considerable expeditions inland, with the object of solving the lower The Asbertans course of the Strymen. A spot called "The Nines in Themes, Ways" (Euria Mo.), where that great river first 489-480 R.O. begins to broaden out into its estuary, but can still be spanned by a bridge, was the chosen site for a fortress to seeme the bold of Athens on the land. But the native Thracian tribes bunded theraselyes together, and fell upon the invodors with such desperation that both the Athenian armies were defeated; the rout of the second and larger force in 466 a.c. was a heavy diseaser for Athens;" of the ten thousand men under League who had feerned the expedition, the larger half were cut to pieces on the hattle-field, It was probably the discouragement which this defeat caused at Athens that emboldened Theses to declare her accession from the confoleracy of Delos. She wished to save her Thracian trade, before Athens could make another attempt to divert it from her. The Thesians did not rely on their own resources alone; they culisted the Thracians and Macedonians of the mainland, and sent to Sparta to endeavour to induce the ephone to declare war on Athens, as a traitor-state who was endeavouring

to steel away the autonomy of her neighbours. The 405-400 a.c. Spartness were in a jealous and sullen mood, and sufficiently alarmed at the continued growth of Attio power to make them. think of granting aid to Thases. But, at the very moment that they were about to declare war, they were diverted from it by a disaster that no one could have foresten. The island-state was therefore left to its own resources; and these were so considerable that she held out against the force of the Athenian confiderable that she held out against the force of the Athenian confiderable when who whole years. But her obtimate foilure was inevitable when she met with no assistance from without. She was obliged at last to currender to Cirnon, whose ermy find long been lying before her walls. Like Maxos, she was pusished for her defection by the loss of her wat-fleet and her fortifications, and the imposition of a fine of canny talents. Still more galling must have been the final loss of her trade with Three, which now passed outliefy into Athenian lands.

Up to the moment of the slege of Theses, Athons had been for some fourteen or fifteen years entirely untroubled by the home affilies Palaponossian of Greece; this freedom she owed partly to the policy of Cimon, and partly to the condition of affirm in Pelopounesus. Sluce the fall of Pausannias, Sparta had been undergoing many troubles at home. Her old rival Argos had at last recovered from the blow which had been dealt her by Cleomones. in the provious generation. In 468 p.c. she began to bestir himself, and to reclaim her old dominion over her nearest neighbours. One of her expeditions ended in the final destruction of Myconau, the little Achalan state in the hills which had servived so many vicissifudes of furtume. It has appears in history as having sont n small contingent to Plateas, la marked contrast to the solfish indifference of Argos. Now at last it met its fats, and was left an empty ring of Cyclopean walls on its locally billelde (468 p.c.). This against of the Argives soon brought down on them the anger of Sports; and a war broke out, in which many of the Arcadian states. lent their sid to Argas. The Spartens fought two severe battlescon in front of Tegen against the allied Tegenns and Argives, the other at Dipnea with the full force of Arendip, except the Mautineans, who, out of hatred to Togen, clung to their old mesters. Ju both conflicts the Lacedaemonians were victorious, and Argos had once more to sink back into her neual sollen apathy, while the Arcadians returned to their allegiance. It was seen after the termination of this rent that the overtures of the Thasians were made at Sparts. The event which prevented them from receiving attention was the great earthquake of 464 B.c. Buch a torrific shock ban never

visited Polopomesus before; its wonst ferce was fell in the valley of the Eurobas. The earth was claft asunder into chasms; Exchange fearful landslips occurred on the slopes of Taygutus; 40 the C. and while in the town of Sparta hardly a house or temple Enter asian was left atanding, and the loss of life was scormons. This disaster emboldered the Helots to attempt a rising. They had been more suspected and oppressed than ever since the conspiracy of Pausanias, and were ready for any desperate treason. All Messenia rose as one man, and much of Lacomia followed its example. The Spartans, backed by their Parlocal, had great difficulty in making head against the robels, who feetified as their base of operations the old Messenian citadel and semetuary on Mount Ithūme.

The Spartans were still organged in a desperate struggle with their revolted subjects, when the siege of Theses came to an end, Cimon, who was now at the height of his reputation Cimon being and power, saw with distress the troubles of the city 469 B.d. he so much admired. He set himself to persuade the Athenians that they ought to forget old grudges, and save from destruction the state which had shared with them the glory of the Persian war. "Would they," he asked, "consent to see Hollas lamed of one log, and Athens drawing without her yokefellow?" His pleading was bitterly encosed by the anti-Spartan party at Athens, headed by two statesmen, Ephialtes and Perjoles, who had already come into notice as antagonists of Cimon. But the more generous and unwise policy prevailed, and four thousand haplites were sent to the aid of Sparta. This array was persped by misfortune; it was no unsuccessful in attacking Ithônie, that the Spartnes attributed its failure to Ill will rether than Ill fuck. They therefore began to treat their allies with marked discourtesy, and at last sent them home without a word of thanks. movely stating that their services could be of no further use. This radeness and ingratitude fully justified the enti-Sportan party at Athens for their opposition to the projects of Cimon, and gave them a power with the assembly which they had not previously enjoyed.

Cirnon was now no longer able to deal with the policy of the state as he chose, and the conduct of althirs began to pass into the hands of men whose foreign and domestic policy were alike opposed to all like views. Epidaltes and Perioles proceeded to form alliances abroad with all the states which were ill disposed toward Sparte, and at home to commune a revision of the constitute. They were determined to outry out to its furthest logical development the democratic tendency which Cleisthenes and introduced into the Athenian polity. Of Epidaltes, the sen of Sephandes, comparatively little is known. Although he of first appears as the recognised leader of the popular and anti-Sparten party at Athens, he was destined to be cut off so early in his career that we have little record of his character and doings. He seems to have been an elequent and fiery sponker.

and an extreme democrat. But Puricles was a man of very different importance. He was the son of Xanthippus, the accuser of Militades in 489 a.c., and the victor of Myoale and Sestos; while, on his mother's side, he came of the blood of the Alemaeonidae. Pericles was stoid, self-contained, and baughty -a strange chief for the popular party. But his reletionship to Clearhones, and the enuntry which existed between his bonso and that of Cimon, organism to especies the cause of democracy. Moreover, the foreign policy to which he was devoted was the one which had commended itself to the populace. He wished to conting the scheme of Thomistocles, and to extend the Athenian power to all directions, without any regard for the susceptibilities of Sports. The war with Persia he was ready to abandon, now that all danger from that side had passed away, while he designed to steengthen and onlarge the confederacy of Delos in every possible way, and to make use of its power to the west as well as the east of the Aegean. While Cimon had Greece in his mind, Perioles could only think of Athens, and the temper of the times was favourable to the narrower policy,

Pericles was a man of grave and noble presence; his friends in admiration and his ensuries in jest alike compared him to Zous. He lived a reserved, sectuded life, and was seldem to be some except on great public occasions. His elequence was all the more effective for not being beard every day; for he always withhold himself, and only appeared to speak on affairs of high monomal. But though the unn was better fitted to command respect than affection from his followers, his policy was one which was so well

solited to the spirit of the times, that the populace was quite enthusiastic in his favour.

The first aim which Parieles and Ephinites set before themselves was the acting down of the power of the Arcopagus. That body had since the Persian was become the strong-Attack on the hold of the Conservative and philo-Laconian party. Arcopagus. The reforms of Aristoides which threw office open to

the Thütes does not seem to have sensibly affected the character of the ancient council. Moreover, it was the one political exponention at Athens whose members held office for life, and were not reaponable for their votes to the people. This by itself sufficed to give the Arcopague a conservative tendency, like that which may be remarked in such bedies as our own House of Leeds.

Ephialtes took the lead in the attack on the Arespagas. He chose a moment when Cimon was away at see, bent on assisting a rebellion against the Great King which had broken out in Egypt. After a violent struggle, he succeeded in carrying a law which deprived the Arcopagus of its ancient consocial power, and reduced it to a mere court to try bestieldes.\(^1\) As a sign that the guardianship of the laws was thereby taken from the ancient corporation and placed in the hands of the people, he brought down from the Accopolia the tablets inscribed with the laws of Solon, and set them up before the Prytansium in the market-place. The prerogatives of the Areopagus were divided among peyonal newly created boards. The Souly enistee and Gunaienzomoi worn to take over its moral supervision of the private lives of the citizens, while the Nonophylaces undertook its other function of gunriling the constitution. These officers were given a sent of honour in the public assembly, and instructed to interfere with a vete, whenever a legislative proposal was made which transgressed one of the fundamental principles of the constitution,

When Cimon owne home from Egypt, he was wildly enraged at the advantage that had been taken of his absence, and actually endenvoured to repeal the degree of Ephialtes on a technical point

¹ We have already pointed out that the introduction of election by let to the archoesing, which is often put down as a result of this crisis, must have occurred much earlier.

of law. This brought matters to a crisis, and, in the confusion, corrected was had to the test of estrainm. It decided against Cimon, who therefore went into handshownt, as n.C. But this wrong against the greatest general of Athens

was, not long after, avenged by an over-zealous and unscreptious margaret friend. Ephialtes was slain by assessins in his own Buliates. house, and though no one could reques Cimen himself, it was create that this party were responsible for the deed. The immediate result of this murder was to leave Perioles in sole and undivided command of the democratic party.

The foreign policy of Pericles soon began to involve Athena in troubles at home. He concluded alliances with Anges and Thessally, both states at variance with Sparts, and thereby made collision with the Lacedaemonian confederacy inevitable. He gave still more direct offence to Corinth, one of the most powerful monhers of that confederacy, by concluding a close alliance with Megans. That state had been engaged in unsuccessful war with Corinth, and had through herself under the protection of Athena to save her existence. In Becolin, too, he stirred up comity, by giving an active support to the democratic party in that country, which was at this moment endeavouring to subvert the oligarchies which provailed in most of its cities. These provocations made was inevitable.

In 456 n.o. the storm burst; the Corinthinas formed an all'ance with the Aeginetans, whose jealousy of Athons was as great as war of athons it had been in the earlier years of the century, and with Occanie with their Dorian kinsmen at Epideurus. They ask Aegine.

They continue the help which Cimen had afforded to the rebel prince lingua in his revolt against Persia. The allies had also the secret goodwill of Sparts, but as that state had not yet succeeded in putting down its revolted Helpis, it could not spare 'op nid to its confidentes, and tid not even declare way on Athons

CHAPTER XXIV.

ATHERS AT THE RESORT OF SEE POWER, 458-445 B.C.

Ar the recensus of the outbreak of the first important naval war which she had to wage with a Greek enemy since the formation of her empire. Athens took two important steps. The first was destined to guard against the risk of misfor- League and its tunes by sea; it consisted in the impaforence from Dalos to Athens of the central treasury of the confederacy. The Somians pointed out the exposed situation of the sacred laland in the event of an attack from Aegino, and with the consent of the ullies the hearded wealth of the lengue, amounting to eighteen hundred talents, was moved to Athens. If they had been more wary the Samians would have refruined from proposing this motion, which helped Athens forward one more stage in the process of turning her "hegsenony" into an ampire. By the removal of the common funds of the league from the sanctuary of Delos, the original religious and patriotic purpose of the confederates was obscured; by their storage at Athens it began to appear that the allies were paying tribute to their powerful protestress. It was not long before the Athenians came to regard the treasury on their own, and to draw upon it for purely Attle needs, which had no connection with the welfare of the other confederates. Paricles and his party were not at a loss for arguments to justify this embezzlement of the fands of the league. They represented that Athens had fer some time had the entire supervision of the war in her hands, and that the other cities had practically alundoped their shere in the undertaking : Chies, Lesbes, and Samos were the only states which continued to ampply slilps to the confederate fleet; all the others and commuted their galleys for money. Athens

had continued the struggle with Persia in the most energetic way, and apent so much of her own money on it, that, if she trespessed on the surplus in the common chost of the league, she was but vapaying herself for her leases. Moreover, no one could dispute that she had carried out the purposes of the league with perfect success; she had liberated all the Hellenia achiects of the Great King, and was now giving him such trouble in Egypt that he would never be able to stir agninst Helles. If this could be done at less expense than was originally calculated, it was due to her, and she deserved the surplus as her reward.

The second impertant event of the year 458 a.c. was the commenoppent of the famous "Long Walls" of Athens. They had The "Long been suggested by a much smaller work of the same walls" but kind at Megara. After forming their alliance with 468-460 B.C. that city, the Athenians had connected the old town, which lay on a hill not quite a mile from the sea, with its seaport of Nisaca, by building two walls which secured a safe cassage between them. But the Megatian "Long Walls" were only seven atadia from and to end, while Athens was divided from Phalacum and Poizacus by thirty-five and forty stadia respectively. The gigantic salience of constructing walks for the whole four mikes which lie between the old city and the water's edge could only have been formed when a war with an onemy overwhelmingly powerful on land was in view. It must have been the dread of Spartan interference which lost to the building of these great works. When they were finished, Athens, Peirneus, and Pholorum formed the angles of a wast fortified triangle, while the space between them, a considerable expanse of open country, could be utilized as a place of refuge for the population of Attic and even for their flocks and berds. Some years afterwords a second wall (10 5th perfor refixes) was arested close to and parallel with the original wall running to Peiracua. This gave an additional security to the communication between the city and its ports; even if the Phaleric wall were forced, there weald still be free access from the upper city to Peirame.

The war with Counth and Asgina commenced by two severe neval engagements in the Serenic Gulf. The first, fought off the island of Georyphaleis near the coast of Argells, had no decisive result. But when the floots met for the second time opposite to the fown of Aegina Itself, the Athenians gained a crustaling victory. No less than seventy Contuiting Contact and Aeginean vessels fell into their hands. The astendahing part of this success was the fact that two hundred Athenian galleys were at that moment in Egypt, so that it was with only half her resources that Athens succeeded in besting the two navies which were reckeded the second and third in Gregon.

After their victory the Athenians landed and laid siege to Aegina with the full force of hoplites that was at that moment at home. The Covinthians determined to do all they could to save their ally, and resolved to create a diversion by attacking Magaza. They calculated that, as the whole force of Athens was either in Egypt or at Aegina, no army could be put into the field against them, unless the slege of Aegina was missel. But they had not reckened on the indentitable spirit of their coordies. Since all the men of military age were absent, Athens determined to call out those who had not yet reached it, or find long passed it. The victories Myrmoides missel on army exclusively compased of of Myrmoides, boys and old men, and marched to relieve Megara.

He took up a defensive position and regulard the attack which was made on him; although not very severally handled, the Corinthians retired home and Magnra was saved. But when the defeated soldiery learnt the nature of the force which had bester them, they found the taunts of their fellow-citizens nuboccable, and returned to take their revenge. Myronides again wout out to need them, probably voinduced by the troops of Magnra. This time the lattle was decisive; the Corinthians were rected, and their less was heavy, for a large body were surrounded in a walled enclosure and shot down to a man. As an assertion of the courage of her citizens, Athens regarded those battles as only infarior to Marschon. To communicate the achievements of this season monumental pillars were creeded in the Commerciae, recording that "in one and the same year the soldiers of Athens had fallen off Cyprus, in Egypt, Phoenicia, Argolia, Argolia, and Magnam." 1

² The fighting in Egypt, Augine, and Megare we have already mentioned. That in Argolis was on Athenium descent on the Halistis, which failed; that in Cyptus and Phoenicis was dependent on the great expedition to Egypt.

fragment of this inscription will survives, to recall the energy of the Athenians at the highest moment of their glory.

Meanwhile a second war had broken out in Central Greece, between two accient enomies, the Phopians and the Boestian

League. The ruling oligarchies in Bosotia were so anti-Athenian in their sentiments, that the Photinus were felt to be fighting the battle of Athens by keeping amployed an enemy who would otherwise have joined Corinth and Aegins. During this war the Phoclans fell upon and occupied the little district to their north, the home of the four Dorian communities who had remained behind in their original seats, when the rest of the nation invaded Pelopennesus (see p. 40). The conquered Dorians sende a piteous appeal to Sparts, the natural protector of all states of kindred blood. The Spartans were at this moment beginning to make some headway in their long struggle with the revolted Helots; and though Ithoms was not yet taken, felt that they were in honour bound to aid their computrious, Making a great offort, they raised an army of eleven thousand mon, partly Laconians, partly Peloponnesian allies, and sont them by way of Corinth into Bosotia. Here they were juiced by the Thebans and their friends, and murched into Phosis. After completely defenting the Phocines and driving them out of Duris, they sat forth homoword. But their way lay through the territory of Megana, and when they arrived on its borders they were refused a passage. The Athenians had seen with suspicion a Spartan army in Bosotia, and, regarding war as inevitable, had determined to face its dangers at once, and to prevent the returning army from joining the Corin-They had obtained a thousand heplites from Arges, and a considerable body of horse from Thessaly, and, joining these to the levies of Megara and Plotses and such force as Athens could spare, had posted thomsolves in front of the passes which led from Bocotla towards the Isthmus. It was said that the eligarchie party at Athena had been making overtures to the Sparture, but this treachery is improbable; Climon, though in exite, appeared in the Athenian army as soon as it had passed the burder, and carnestly begged that he might fight as a volunteer in the ranks of his own tribe. The Strategi refused him the favour, but ere he departed he adjured his friends to prove by their conduct in battle that their party contained no traitors. The armies met mear Tanagm, and a hard-fought sugagement ensued; for a long time the day was doubtful, but in the heat of the fight the Thessalian country descrited their allies.

and less the Athenians the victory. No less than a hundred of the friends of Cheen fell in the ferefront of the battle, proving by their reckless courage that the Conservative party was unjustly accused of tracson. The Spectrus were never skilful at improving the results of a success, and their commander, the regent Nicomedes, contented himself with ravaging the Begard, and then returned to Pelopomassus across the new magnarded pause of Goranda.

By her last streke of polley Athena had now added Sparta and

the Bocotian League to the list of her enemies. It was necessary to act quickly and promptly, or she would be crushed, Conqueent of when the full force of Borotia and Pelonomesus was Boardin, AND R.O. put into the field. The first stop taken was to mark the suspension of party-feeds at Athens; the party of Chaon badbehaved so well at Tanagya that their conduct had wen the confidence of their very opponents. Pericles himself proposed the decree which revoked the estracism of his great rival. Then, long before the compaigning season had arrived, Myronides, with the full force of Athens at his back, burst into Brentia. The igread was quite unexpected, for the winter was not yet done. No akl. from Corinth or Soneta was at hand, but the Thebans and their supporters from the other Bosotian cities met the invadors at Ocnophyta in the valley of the Asopus. After a hard struggle they were beaten, and the hand lay exposed to the conquerer. The successes of Myronides were rapid and startling; a discontented party axisted in every Bocotian town, which regarded the rule of their oligarchs with hatred. These partians of democracy joined the Athenians, and town after town threw open its gates. Even Thebas, the centre of the eligarchic party, fell into the hands of the lavaders. Myronidas then set up democratic constitutions in every city, and handed over the government to the partisons of Atheas; the great families, for the most part, retired Into exilo. It would

Nicomeden was regent in behalf of the young king Phintonness, son of Pausonins.

seem probable that the Bosotian League was dissolved, and a separate treaty concluded by Athens with each individual state; at any rate, the complete autonomy of all towns, small and great, was secured, and the peramount influence of Thebes in the district destroyed. When Bosotia fell into the hands of Athens, the Learinus of Opes also east off their oligoralty, and seet a hundred hostinges from their leading families to be kept at Athens. The Phociam, who had been at war with Thebes, were also glad to outer the Athensa milliance. Thus at a single blow Athens had become a great lead power, and secured dominion over all the districts as far as Mount Octa. Moreover, she was well hacked by a party in each state, who tegarded their predominance at home as bound up with her success.

Meanwhile the siega of Aeglac was arraying to a cleen; in spite of all their operations on the mainland, the Athenians had stead-

Patter fastly kept up the blockade, and, after nine months of waiting, the provisions of the garcison began to fail. Except one reinforcement of three lumdred hoplites, they had received no help from Polopounests, and their own resources were quite exhausted. The ancient rivals of Athens were obliged to sue for yearc, which they only obtained on condition of destroying their walls, giving up their war-galleys, and catering the Ourfolcracy of Delee as tribute-paying in mbors.

Spatta seems to have taken little trouble to support her aliles ontside Pelepomaneus, but within it her efforts were at lest drawing

Sports to a successful end. After ten years of revolt the entitions the Edotes, the Edotes

It would seem that not even the capture of Ithomé could give Sparta sufficient breathing-space to recover her strength and to strive for the hogemony of continental Greece. For the next three years she made no attempt to force the passes of the Megarid and

attack Athens. Nor could she even defend Peloponnesus; she had to see her own novel arregal at Gythlum burnt, and to hear of the raveging of the territories of her Dorian dependents of Sleyon and Epideirum. She could not even prevent Treson and the coast cities of Achaia from openly joining the Athenian alliance; it would seem, indeed, that Argos sions sufficed to keep her in check while Athens was extending her committee to right and left.

There is no knowing where the extension of the Athenian power would have stopped, if a fearful disaster had not intervened to weaken its growth. In 454 s.c. a large Athenian parose of the expedition, not less than two hundred gaileys, was Atheniam in ngain despatched to Egypt to aid King Inarus. But at that moment the salrap Megabyzus levaded that country with a stronger army than the Great King land proviously devoted to its conquest. The Athenian fleet sailed up the Nile as but as Memphila, and got so far from the sea that they were finally cut off from their retreat, and besinged with their Egyptian allies in the [s]e of Presentie. Magabyzas diverted one of the branches of the Nile which cardreles the island, and crossed over on foot; a desporate struggle ensued, and, after hurstog their ships, the Athenians were obliged to surrender. had laid down their arms the perfidious victor fell upon them. and massacred the whole body. Only a few scattered fugitives escaped across the desert to Cyrene, and brought the news to A thens.

By the end of 452 n.c. the belligerents in Greece had arrived at a standstill, and by the mediation of Cimen a truce for five years was brought about between Sparta and Athens, The Theorem treether with their respective allies. That m definit Teach These, there peace was concluded was due to the action of 461 B.O. Corinth, who would not consent to recognize the new position of Athens on her borders. The agreement, therefore, only amounted to a prolonged armistice, based upon the actual position of the various powers. This moment marks the highest tide in the fertunes of Athens. Her influence was predominant in Mogaris, Bosotia, Locris, Phoris, Acham, and Treeson, while Arges was her firm ally. Her couples on land covered as large an expanse on

that of Sparta, while at sea every city in the Augean and Propontis from Aegina to Byzantlum did her homage.1

Freed from their war with Sparts, the Athenians turned to revenge their defeat in Egypt. Citour was once more at home, and had regained no small portion of his old power, policy of He found it easy to persuade his follow-citizons that the massacre of Prosupitis called for yougeanes, and obtained a fleet of two hundred vessels and a free commission to attack what portion of the Persian empire he might choose. He determined to fall on the Phoenician cities of Cyprus, which still maintained their allegiance to Artaxerxes. Accordingly be laid siego to Citium: while lying before its walls he was stricken down by disease, and felt his end approaching. But on his very deathhed be was able to give the directions which resulted in two brilliant victories; the Phoenician flort which came to mise the blockade of Citium was defeated off the neighbouring port of Salamis, and shortly after a land army was routed on the shore. The expedition, thus deprived of its leader, returned to Athens, and made no further attack on Asia.

Cimon's untimely death-he was still in the full vigour of manhood-preserved him from seeing the commencement of a series of

disasters which were about to befull his country. The Revolt in Athenian land couples was to be lost as rapidly as it Becotin. 447 B.C. was won. It was an impossibility that such old enemien as the Bocotlana should ever be faithful alties to Athens; the democratic governments which had been set up in the various cities

of that land grew more and more unpopular. Not only wore they hated by patriotic Breetians as the tools of Athens, but they made themselves odious by their misgovernment. At last, in 447 e.c., an insurrection broke out against the democratic party in the towns of Northern Bosotia. All the oligarchic exiles hastened home to join the rebels, who made their stronghold at Orchomenus. The Athenians despatched Tolmides with not more than a thousand

hoplites to support the Bocotian democrats. But Hallla of Coercialo. as he marched along the shore of Lake Copa's between Haliartus and Caroneia, he was surprised by the oligarchic

The islands of Molos and There in the Sporades were the sole exception; they retained an obscure independence.

army, who fell on him and routed him by the force of superior numbers. Telmides himself fell on the field, but several hundreds of his soldiery were taken prisoners, and to sucure their lives the Athenians were forced to conclude a treaty with the victors, by which they engaged not to interfere any more in Bosotian affairs. They were therefore compelled to look on while their democratic partisans were expelled from the various cities, and the old constitution was reintroduced. Once more oligarphy was restored, and Thebes took up her old position as managing partner in the league. Lowis immediately followed the example of Breetin, and dischained her dependence on Athons.

Nor was this all; the cities of Euboca, who had long been origin and obedient members of the Delian confedency, now thought that a favourable opportunity for freeing themselves from

their tribute and their dependence on Athens had

come. Histiaca, Erotria, Styrn, Carystus, and the other towns of the island rose in concert. So pressing was the emergency considered, that Perioles bimself took the command of an army which hastourd across to reconquer the island; but searcely had he reached it when he was recalled by the equally disastrous news that Megara had revolted. That city had entered the Athenian alliance of her own free will, and had been myed by it from fulling under the power of Corinth. But with signal perfidy her inhabitants not only broke off their connection with Athens, but surprised and massacred a body of Athenian troops which lay within their walls. It was a small consolation that their port of Nisson. remained in the hands of Athons. Corinth, Epidaurus, and Sigran lent their encouragement to their revolted Dorian kinamen, Nor was this the end of the misfortunes of Athena; it was remembered that the five years' truce with Sports was on the eve menewed war

of expiring, and eminous preparations for war were with sparts. being made in Peloponuesus. Nor was the expectation

false; Athens' extremity was Sparta's opportunity, and when the

five years were over war was promptly declared

In the spring of 446 p.c. the young king Pleistonnan and life guardien Cleandrides led an overwhelming force from Pelopounesses lute the Megarld, and prepared to attack Attica. They had renoked Bloosis when they suddonly balted, and after a few days

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returned home. It was soon remoured abroad that bribery had been at work. Spartan generals were notoriously youal, and it is probable that the report was true, which related that Perioles had entered into search challons with the energy, and paid a wast sum to Cleandridas, perhaps to Pleisteanax also, on the condition that they should find excuses for causing the expedicion to fail. This at least is certain, that when the Pelopouneaum army returned, the Ephora appechenical and titled both the king and his guardian, cunvicted them, and sent both into bandshraest.

When this danger was passed, Pericles took fifty ships and five thousand hoplites, and hastened across to Eubose. The main

Fishese coconsisted, to guard against attack from Corluth or Pelopomesus.

Asia B.C. With the force that was entrusted to him, Perioles

carried out a most brilliant campaign; he retook city after city till the whole island was subdued, and finally strengthered the hold of Athens on the land across the Euripus by planting a accord Cleredly therein. The land for this settlement was taken from the axiled oligancies of Histiner.

But Euboea was the only one of her numerous lesses which Athens was destined to recover. The odds against her were so great that Pericles himself shanels from the idea of continuing the cuntest. He let it be known at Sparts that Athens was ready to treat for peace on the basis of abandoning her claim to may suppire by land. When negotiations were found to be feasible, an embassy.

The "Thirty headed by Callias was sent to negotiate with the

Paner Paner, "uphors. They conceded everything on land that 440 N.C. Sparta and her allies could ask, and a "Thirty Years' Peacs" was concluded between the belligerouts. Athems recognized the hegomony of Sparta in Peloponnesus, while Sparta undertook not to interfore with the confederacy of Delos. All Athenian oilianous with outlying states, such as Achain or Troexen, were abregated, and the garrisons which she maintained in Nisaca and certain other outlying fortresses withdrawn. Megara and Boottia were recognized as free and autonomous states, and corolled among the allies of Sparta. To sum up the conditions of the peace, we may say that Athens gave up everything on land, asking in return nothing but that her mayal surgemony should be left untombed

Not long after the conclusion of the "Tairty Years" Pence." Athens concluded saother important place of negutiation. Now that Cimon was dead there was no one accome her sintesmen who desired to prosecute the never-ending war with Persia. The compalens in Egypt had failed so signally and cost so many lives that no further land operations were likely to be undertaken, while by sea Persia had nothing more to lose. Accordingly Callins, the successful negotister at Sparts, was sent up to Susa to propess conditions of peace to King Artaxerzes. Athenian vanity in after years fabled that Galtina extorted such conditions as he chose from the Persian, even so far as to make blue promise to scud no war-vessels west of the Oyanean tocks at the mouth of the Bosphorus, and the Chelidonian Cane in Lycin. But, as a matter of fact, no formal treaty seems to have . been concluded, and Callias on his return was proscouted for wilful mismanagement of the negotiation. However, by a working agreemount with the satraps of Asia Minor, a medua pipendi was established. The Athenians and their confedentes abstrined from any further attacks on Petalin territory, while the extraps remained contented with the inland and made no attempt to regain the coast. Nevertholess the names of the just cities of Ionia and Carla still remained inscribed on the tribute-roll of the Great King, and the Persian power awalted its opportunity to repasort all its old र्व्यक्षित्रंस.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE YEARS OF PRACE, 445-481 D.C.—PERICUES AND THE APPENDANCE EMPIRE.

The "Fhirty Years' Peace" concluded between Athens and Sparta. In 446 n.c., though not destined to endure for half of its appointed time, gave Greece some fourteen years of comparative quiet. The war which it terminated had not brought about any fluid belance of power; it had morely settled that Sparta should retain a hegemony on land, and that Athens should confine her empire to the sen. Which was the stronger had not yet been decided, and till this mas known it was impossible that any permanent pance should be established. Nevertheless, the two great powers having made trial of each other's strength, and discovered that the fluid struggle for mastery would be long and exhausting, were in no hurry to recommence hostilities. It required the accumulated grievances of fourteen years to bring them again into collision.

At Athens these years coincided with the south of the power and influence of Pericles, who was practically first minister of the Constructions republic for the whole period, though he had several

offections times to undergo attacks on his policy and to anifer temperary collipses of his popularity. Now that Gimen was dead there was no one in the slate who could hope to vio in personal inducace with Periodes. The conservative party could only oppose to him Thucydides son of Melesias, a statement of far infector capacity and power. In the democratic party there was no one, since the raunder of Ephialess, who in any measure approached the importance of the great leader. He was, in fact, so pre-eminently the leading man in the state that his opening did not sample to call him its tyrant, and to inclineate that his appearance,

demension, and statory bore a marked resemblance to those of Possistature.

In his domestic policy Perioles set himself to work out to its full extent the movement which he had begun by his attack on the Arcogague. He set to work to thoroughly democratize all the institutions of the state, to do away with all the checks which limited the omnipotence of the Ecclegia in political and the Diensturies in indicial matters. While he himself was alive the consequences of this policy were not immediately apparent, for the people was so habitually ready to follow him, that its decrees seldom lacked the unity of purpose which marks the action of a single mind. As long as the Ecclesis let itself be guided by one leader the real effects of a purely democratic constitution did not make themselves felt. It was only after his doubt, when the assembly found itself urged in many different directions by a crowdof statesmen who agreed in nothing but their medicore ability, that the defects of "covernment by plebiscity" became visible. and measures that indicated energy or vaciliation, desire for war or desire for nexes, were passed in chaotic succession, according as the namion of the moment decreed.

Among the most characteristic of the features of the policy of Perioles were the laws which subsidized the poorer citizens for their trouble in attending to the affairs of the state, Payment of Instead of holding that only those who interested "Geneteries themselves in such matters should be encouraged to take part in public business, Perioles desired to attract every citizen to the Ecclesia and the law courts, and used the most direct means to secure their attendance by providing them with nav out of the public purse. At some date early in the fifth century the Hölinen, which Cleisthones bart instituted as the supreme court of justice for the state, and been divided into the smaller bodies known as Diensteries. It was probably becappe of the large increase of business which came before it, -as the archonship gradually lost credit and men occeed to be entisfied to take their lawsuits before the six junior arolinus for trial.-that this division took place. The work of the Dicasteries was still more increased when Pericles and Ephlalics stripped the Arcopagua of well-nigh all its judicial powers. But the largest rise in the number of sults needing a court to decide them, must have resulted from the gradual increase of the custom of sending cases pending between members of the Confederacy of Dules to be tried at Athens. It was but natural that legal disputes between two of her subject aliles should be settled by the head of the league; but not only there, but all cases in which an Athenian was either plaintiff or defendant, and finally, as it would appear, all important soits-even though they were between citizens of the same city-were called up to the supreme copts of justice. The yest number of trials on hand must have mayod a heavy tax on the time and pationes of those citizens who were drawn as jurymen, and found themselves set down for a year's work in the Dieusteries. But Perioles changed the facu of offices by paying the Dienet, and thereby made his position one to be sought rather than avoided. The sum given was three chols a day-an amount which seems small to us, but was enough to be of consequence to a poor Athenian; it was, for example, three-fourths as much as a hoplite received for his day of military service. From this time forward the Diensteries became the almost permanent abode of many citizens, particularly of these of the peoper classes who were post the age of military service, and therefore had no other duty which could everyide the Hability to not as jurymen. But it was not only the Dieasts of Athens who were furnished with pay; ere long the same principle was applied to the

Payment or Euclesia. Calllatratus of Parnope brought forward a Recimia. Inw which provided that every citizen who attended the public assembly should receive one obed for his trouble. We hear mothing of opposition on the part of Pericles, and he probably had no objection to a necessure which carried his own system a little further. The Athenian democrats beasted that by means of these subsides a fracyledge of law and politics was diffused through the whole hody of citizens, and a level of political intelligence reached with which no other state in Greece could vie. This was to a certain extent time; but there is a limit to the educating influence of politics or lawarits, and it may well be derited whether that country was likely to be well governed where every citizen aspired to be a professional stateman and judge, and was paid for his aspirations. The enemies of Pericles aumened up the results of his legislation by saying that it made the Athenians idle, lequacious;

and money-loving. It led men, they complained, to spend more time than was right in hanging about the Payx and the law-courts; it set every one practising public oratory or judicial pleading; it induced Athenians to think that they ought to be pull for carrying out the primary duties of oftisenship—likelihities which ought to be regarded as secred trusts rather than as work deserving remomention. Probably the opponents of Perioles had the greater states of creasen on their side; it is likely that the state suffered more from the encouragement of amateur statesmonship than it gained by the increased amount of political intalligence which prevailed in the multitude.

The system of subsidizing the poor did not stop short in the Ecclesia and the Dienstories; it was carried by Pericles himself into other spheres of life. He was the author of laws "Backoly." by which the state charged itself with numerous doles and unyments on the occasion of public festivals. It is said that these measures originated in his opposition to Clmon: the wealthy conservative statesman had been accustomed to throw onen his parks and gardens to the proletariate, and to keen free house for his followers. Pericles' private means did not permit him to practise belbery on such a magnificent scale, and he is said. to have conceived the idea of supplying from the public purse what was not forthcoming from his own. At any rate, he was the proposer of the law which instituted the "Dioboly," or free gift of two obols to each poor citizen, to enable him to pay the entrance-money at the theatre during the Dionyala. This was only the first of a number of grants of public money made at . festivals, in order that the poor might not only witness state pageants, but might oven buy themselves most and wine at the public expense whenever days of public rejoicing came round. It was, in short, an anticipation of the system whereby Rome in a later age was demoralized by the deles and games of her emperors. The worst feature of the "Diaboly" and its kindred institutions was that the money did not really come out of the treasury of the Attie state, but out of that of her allies, the confederates of the league of Delos, for without their accumulated tribute the distributions would have been impossible.

A not less efficacious method for draining the treasury was

discovered when Pericles set to week to strengthen and beautify The buildings Athens out of the common funds of the league. We of Perioles. have already spoken of the third Long Wall which he built between the upper city and the Peimous; but this was one of the least ambitious of his ventures in stone and morter, The most important of his achievements were the noble public buildings with which he adorned Athens. Some of these lay in the level parts of the city; such was the Oddum at the foot of the south-eastern chiff of the Aeropolis, whose roof-copied, according to legend, from the vast and gorgeous tent of Xerxes-sheltered musical performances. Others lay in the Pelrasus, such as the great Corn Hall and the Deigma, or exchange for merchants. Even outside Athens magnificent temples were commenced at Rhamnus, Eleusis, and Semium. But by far the most important group of buildings which Pericles took in hand were those situated. on the Acropolia. At its western cod, where alone the slope was

The necessible, the architect Mussicles was set to build Proposes. the Proposes, or entrance halls of the citadel. These works alone cost two themsend talonts. They consisted of a magnificant light of marble steps, seventy feet broad, leading up to a double colonnade, through which the visitor entered the Acceptis. This central colonnade was finited by two projecting wings carried along the edge of the cliff, and opening with smaller rows of columns on to the central staincas. The northers wing contained a colebrated chamber called the Pinacotheau, from its being covered with freezoes of the great patient Polygeotus.

After pessing through the Propylass, the visitor found himself seeing the colosest bronze statue of Athene Promaches, which

Promotion, are new, with outstretched spear and chiefd. This grant work of Phekilina was more than fifty feet in height, and was mised twenty feet more by its pedested, till it evertepped the temple cooks; the golden plume of Athene's believe was to be seen for out at see, and formed a well-known landmark to the sailors of the Gulf of Aeging.

Beyond the statue of Athene Promudess stood the greatest of the works which Pericles called into being—the funcus Parthenou, the largest and most beautiful, though not the most revered, of the

temples on the Accopolia. The neighbouring temple of Athene Pollas 1 contained the sacred wooden image of immemorial antiquity which was the Palladium of the Parthenon. city, the holy offer tree which had sprouted forth again after it had been felled by the axe of the Persian, and the living sacke which symbolised the presence of the goddess. But If the Parthenon. did not gather around it any of the old superstitious awe which the neighbouring building called forth, it symbolized to every Athenian the imperial greatness of his city. Not only was Its glorious decoration paid for out of the funds of the subject allies. but his walls themselves served as the trensury for the boarded tribute money which gave Athens bor strength, while the inscriptions which set forth the amount that each member of the Delian, League naid to the central nower were engraved without. architecture of the Parthenon was the work of letions, its sculptures and reliefs that of Pheidias. Not only did the great sculptor place in the "pedimonts," or castern and western gable-ends of the temple, cinborate groups representing the birth of Athens and the strife of Athene and Poseldon, but he filled the ninety-two "motopes," or square spaces which lay above the capitals of the columns and beneath the odge of the roof, with as many separate compositions, showing the battles of the success beroes with the American and the Centaurs, Moreover, within the outer columnde of the Parthenou he traced along the upper portion of the wall of the temple itself an endless procession of graceful figures, representing the coromonies of the Pausthennie festival-the setting forth of the priests and magistrates, the maidens and knights of Athens, to do honour to Athene on the day of her greatest festival. No less than four thousand square foot of surface were covered by the works of the soulptor's untiting hand. While the hinder part of the temple, called the Opisthedoures, served as a vast strongcoom for the treasures of the state, the front half formed the actual sanctuary. Here was placed the tacet gargeous of the works of Pheldias-a colossal figure of Athene, wrought not in marble or bronze, but in ivery and gold. Her robes alone contained farty talents' weight of gold (£9750), and her annour was studded with precious stones of great price. But the mere monetary worth

of this imposing figure was as nothing compared with its artistic value, as the masterpiece of the greatest sculptor of the ancient world; there was nothing in Greece which could compare with it, save the colossal Zeus at Olympia which Pheidias constructed a few years inter. If Pericles sinced against international morality in using the treasures of the Delian League for the adarmment of Athens, if must at any rate be confessed that he applied the embezzled inlents to no unworthy end.

The final developments of Perioles' constitutional changes did not come about fill the party which opposed them had been completely swept out of the field. We have already monitioned Theoreties, that after the death of Cimon the leadership of the 433 h.

conservative and Phile-Spartan party fell into the hands of his kinsman, Thucydides the son of Melesius. This statesman kept up a bitter opposition to all the proposals of Pericles ; he taught his followers to sit close together in the assembly, and compensate for thoir lack of numbers by their simultaneous shouts and well-drilled applause. But this custom of hording together also served to betray to their enemies their decided inferiogity in voting strength. The democrats nicknamed them "the Few," and were encouraged to persevere by the manifest majority which they pessessed. It was in value that Thucydides denounced all the measures of Pericles in terms of warm moral indignation, declaring that he had brought dishonour on Athens by inducing her to turn to her private use moneys that were contributed for the public benefit of Greece: and that all the world would consider it the act of a tyrant city to use the gold of the allies in subsidizing her proleturiate and adorning her streets with temples and monumenta: " when Athens wasted talents by the thousand from the Dellan treasury in gilding her statues and carving her shrines, she was but acting like a tight and valu woman decking herself with ill-gotton jowels." Perioles made his usual reply-that as long as Athens kent off Persian invasious she was outitled to spend what she chose out of the figure of the Delian Lengue, and suppressed the fact that all operations against Persia had been abandoned since he came into power. The continual blokering between the democrats and the followers of Thnovdides lasted till the year 448 n.c., when the paraintent but fruitless apposition of

Thucydides was brought to an end by a recourse to estracism. The stronger party voted his exile, and Perioles was left without any opponent of importance.



The foreign policy which was pursued by Athens under the direction of Perioles was directed to vigorous extension of her power in all directions, except indeed in those continental districts close at hand, where interference would have brought about an

immediate war with Sparts or Thebes.

The organization of the Dollan League had now been perfected.

It embraced all the coast-cities of Asia Minor from Artané, just

The extent of outside the Bosphorus in Bithynia, down to Callydna

The extent of outside the Bosphorus in Bithynia, down to Callydna

the Athenian in Lycia. Similarly in Europe an unlarken chain of Athenian tributaries stretched along the Thracian and Chalcidian aboves from Byzantium to Acnela. All the islands of the Asgent, except the insignificant Dorinn states of Melos and There, were also numbered among the confederates. Even ontside these limits there were many cities which had joined the lengue: Nymphacum in the distant Taurie Chersonese (Crimea), and Celouder's in Citicin, were members of the Athenian alliance no less than Eretria or Aegina. Among the two hundred and forty-nine cities whose names appear on the tribute lists which have been dug out from the ruins of Athens, only throo-Samos, Lesbos, and Chios-bad refused to compound their original contingents of shirs for a money payment, and still possessed a war-navy. The remaining two hundred and forty-six were divided for financial purposes into five groups, known as the Thracian, Insular, Hellespoutine, Ionian, and Carian tributo-districts. At fixed times tax-collecting galleys sailed round the Aeguan and Hellespont and withered in the contributions due from each city, which were finally naid over to the Heilenotamine and stored in the Aeropolis of Athens. The synodic meetings seem to have dropped antirely out of use: if any occurred they were more formal assemblies, at which no one except Athenian deputies appeared. The total annual sum which the tribute brought in during the ascendancy of Pericles was about six hundred talents; the only outgoings for league purposes were the moneys required to keep sixty Athenian galleys constantly cruising in the Asgean. Hence it was possible for no less than nine thousand seven hundred talents to accumulate in the Aeropolis, in spite of the large sums which were spent on Athenian state-doles, pageants, and public edifices.

The amount due from each city was carefully revised every five years, and that justice on the whole prevailed in the assessment appears from the fact that places like Acgina or Naxos, against which Athens might have been expected to feel a grudge, are not rated on a heavier scale than their more decide fellow-subjects. It was not the fact that they were ever-taxed, but the fact that they were taxed at all for Athenian objects, which made the tribute so inteful to the athes.

We have already spoken of the Chouchtes which were planted by Perioles in Euboen after the rebellion of the year 446 p.c. Similar garrisons of Athenian citizens were also placed by him in other localities, notably in the Thrucian Charseness, the old patrimony of Militiades. But such settlements were not the only means which he devised for extending the influence of Athena; actual colonies were also sent forth to well-chosen spots. Amisus and Sinope in Paphlagonia were strongthened by bands of emigmate desputched under Athenian guidance. The site of Enura Hoder on the Strymon, so fatal to the arms of Athens twenty-pine years before (see p. 251), was seized for a third time, and fortified, in 457 n.n. This time the Throcians proved unable to dislodge the settlers, and Hagnon became the ocklet of the new form of Amphipolis. The Athenian element among the population was in this case but small. but the nationality of the official founder served to constitute Amphipolis a nominal daughter-state of Athens. The same was the case in another colony of equal impor- ampaignile tance in the far West. For seventy years the site of and Thurst. the creat city of Sybaris on the Lapygian shore had been Iving desulate, and the surviving families of Sybarite origin and been dwelling scattered through Italy, Poricles now collected them. associated with them a certain number of Athenian emigrants and a neucla larger body of Ioulans and other Greeks, and planted a now Bybrais close to the ruins of the old city. Several very distinguished men folged in the colonization of Sykaris; among them were the historian Horodotus, the philosopher Protagoras, and the orntor Lysias. After a short time quarrels seem between the citizens. of pld Sybarite bland and the settlers from the East; the attentity of the furneer to form themselves into an eliquichy was put down. seid, to mask the changed character of the state, the victorious merty changed its name to Thurii (443 p.c.).

The administration of Pericles was not disturbed by more than une important campaign during the fourteen years which followed the peace of 445 no., This isolated struggle resulted from the revolt

of Sames-one of the last three states of the Delian League which had maintained their war-navies, and kept themselves from falling into the complete subjection which had befallen their peighbours. Semos had engaged in a dispute with Miletus about the boundaries of her territory on the mainland. The decision of the question was referred to the Athenians, who awarded the land to Miletna. But the oligarchy of Samos refused to give up their claim to the territory. and remained obdurate till a fleet of forty ships sailed across from Athens and entered their harbour. The commander was Pericles. who promptly put down the oligarchic government, established a democracy, and took off a hundred hostages, whom he deposited at the Athenian Cleruchy of Lemnos. This high-handed action provoked the national sentiment of the Samians; the remaining oligarchs called in the aid of the satrap Pissuthnes, overturned the new democratio constitution, and disavowed their membership of the Delian League. A few ships sailed hastily across to Lempos and liberated the hostages, and then open war on Athens was proclaimed. Undeterred by the memory of the fates of Naxos and Thases, the Samians thought that they could regain their complete autonomy, and called on the other members of the Delian confederacy to join them in revolt. Of the whole body of allies. however, only Byzantium was bold enough to deciare its secession and face the wrath of Athena,

The moment that the news of the Samian rising arrived at Athens an expedition was sent off to attack the rebels. A flect of sixty ships, among whose ten commanders Pericles held the chief place and the poet Sophooles was also numbered, crossed the Aegean, met the Samian fleet off the island of Tragia, and defeated it. Soon after Pericles was largely reinforced from Athons, Chies, and Lesbes, till he had a bundred and twenty-five vessels with him, and was able to blockade Sames by see and land. But a false rumour that the satrap Pissathnes had ordered up the Phoenician fleet, induced him to detach half his force to watch for its approach along the Lycina coast. The Samians seized this opportunity, came boldly out of their harbour with seventy ships, and engaged the blockading squadron, which they completely routed. For fourteen days they held the mastery of the see, and

were able to send out messengers to box for aid from all quarters. and especially from the Spartans. But soon Athenian reinforcements came flocking from all directions, and the blockede was renewed. The Samions held out with desperate energy; in soits of a number of new siege-engines which were constructed for Pericles by Artemon, the most celebrated ouglneer of the time, they maketalued their deferee with complete success. It was not till nine months were passed, and it had become completely cortain that no help from without was approaching them, that the islanders espitulated. They were treated in accordance with the precedents of Naxos and Thates; being compelled to raze their walls, give up their war-ships, and pay an indemnity of a thousand talents. Strangely enough, the Athenians did not reimpose a democratic government on them. but allowed the oligarchy to survive. Byzantinu surrendered the moment that the fate of Samos was known.

The appeal of the Samians to Sparta had acarly brought about a general war in European Greece. The options had summoned tegether a congress of their allies, and many states had deemed the opportunity inventable for an attack on Athens. But the Corinthians prevailed on the Spartan government to hold back, induced, it is said, by the fact that they thurselves were in difficulties with their subject allies, and dreaded the precedent of encouraging revolt. It was to be snother series of grievances, and not the wrongs of Sames, that was to cause the renewal of war in Greece.

CHAPTER XXVI.

The outdreak of the peroponesian war and its causes, $435-432~\mathrm{h.o.}$

As late as the year of the revolt of Sames the balance of opinion among the allies of Sparts was still in favour of preserving peace with Athens; but very shortly after the scales had begun to incline in the opposite direction. causes which led to this change of feeling were very various. In Sparta itself a new generation was now coming to the front, which had grown up since the truce of 445 n.c. These younger men did not remember the dangers and difficulties of the time that had followed the great earthquake of 464 m.c. and the revolt of the Helots. Moreover, a dozen years of unbroken peace had sufficed to restore the power of Sparta, and to consulidate once more her ancient begeineny in Peleponnesus. There was no longer any fear of seeing a renewal of those Atherian attempts to win territory within the Isthmus which the clier men could remember. In the depth of his heart well-nigh every Spartan felt a gradge against Athens, for having built up an empire which-even since the loss of her dominion on land -was sufficient to overshadow the comparatively loces and ill-defined begamony which his own city pussessed in Polopounesus. He was jealous that any Grecian state should be able to vie with Sparts, and anxious to fight out to a final decision the question whether that state or Sparta was really the stronger. It was remembered that the Sparton discipline and the Spartan constitution existed for the sole object of producing warlike efficiency, yet for more than a dozen yours no war had been waged. Nevertheless, some further impulse from without was required to Induce the slow-moving Lacednemonians

to plungs into war. They needed the pressure of circumstance to drive them to take the decisive sten.

Among the allies of Sparta there were several states which had standing grievances against Athens. The Thebaus could never forget the ten years of Athenian supremacy in Becetia, delegances of and longed for their revenge; moreover, they had Becotts and always before their eyes the town of Plataca, once a member of their own confederacy, but now an Athenian outpost pushed forward beyond Cithagran. The Magarlans had a more recent and a more tangible grievance. Athens had never forelyen them their revolt in 440 n.c., and the treacherous massage of their Athenian garrison. Though compelled to make pence with them, in common with the other allies of Sparts, in 445 p.c., she had taken the first opportunity to do them on all term. Utilizing as excuses some disputes about fugitive slaves and delectable lands on the frontier, she had nicked a quarrot with Megura. covering her designs with one of those superstitions pleas which were so well-known in Greek diplomacy, she had accused the Megarines of sacrilege, for tilling some frontler-hand dedicated to Demeter. Finally, as a punishment for this alleged estrilege, she had closed her ports and markets to Megarian morelunts, and compelled all her subject allies to do the same. These proceedings inflicted a deen wound on her Dorisa neighbour. Meesan had always been a naval state, with a considerable trade both to east and west. The problibition to visit the harbours of any of the members of the Delina confederacy destroyed half her commerce at a blow. The whole state languished and decayed in consequenco; again and again embassics were sent to bug the old of Sparts, and to beseech her to compel the Athenians to rescind the obnaxious decree. But for some time no result followed these petitions.

There was yet another state, not far from Megaro, whose condition was likely to provoke discentent at Spartn. Agglue, once the equal and the rival of Athens, and for many years a mamber of the Pelopopuesian alliance, had been compelled, in the days of Sparta's weakness, to become a more dependency of Athons and to inin the Delian confederacy. Though no formal embassy could be sent by her, there can be little doubt that her Dorina oligarchy

contrived to keep her unhappy condition before the eyes of the ephors, and to make private petition for release from the Athenian yoke. But in spite of all their grievances, it was neither Thebes, Megara, nor Aegina which was to play the chief part in driving Sparta into a new struggle with Athens. Corint, the state which in 439 a.c. had been the strongest partisan of peace, was destined to become, under the stress of circumstances, the chief advocate of war.

We have already had occasion to mention the fact that Corinth was far more successful than other Greek states in keeping her correct and colonias in a state of dependence. The chain of cities which she had founded along the western coast of Greece was, with one exception, retained under her power. Ambracia, Laucas, Anactorium, and the other colonies were united by a close alliance to their mother-city; they formed a commercial union whose currency was interchangeable, and a political confederacy whose resources were always used in common. Corinth was the managing partner in the alliance, and her colonies were content to follow her guidance. But to the porth of the other Corinthian cities lay one colony which had always taken a different line. Coreym had from her first foundation been hostile to her mother-city. After a severe struggle she had made herself independent in the seventh century; the tyrant Periander had once reduced her to obedience, but after his death she had again torn berself free from the Corinthian alliance. Lying as she did full in the course of the trade route from Corinth to Tarentum and Syracuse, she was frequently able to interfere with the commerce of her mother-country, and used her power to the full. It was not

On the Illyrian shore, some distance to the north, lay the fown of Epidamous, better known in later days as Dyrhachium. The Corcyraeans had founded the place, but, in accordance with the universal usage of Greece, had taken a Corinthian, the Heracleid Pholius, as the official celeis of the settlement. Epidamous was in 435 no. cagaged in one of those factor civil wars between the object, and the democracy to which every Greek state was liable. The populace finally expelled their opponents, who took rotige with the neighbouring Illyrian tribe of the Taulantii, and stirred them

unnatural, then, that Corinth and Coreyra were bitter enemies.

up to alfack the city. Being cooped up within their walls by the bacharians, and prevented from cultivating their ter- The troubtes ritory, the Epidamnian democrats were reduced to at Epidamens. great straits; accordingly they made application for help to the Corryracons, as their nearest neighbours and kinsmen. The Coreversing government, however, refused to interfere in the party quarrel, and would not grant assistance. It then occurred to the Epidemajans that they were connected with Corinth also, from the fact that their ockiet had been a Cortathian. Accordingly they sent an embassy to bog from the mother-city for the aid. which they had been unable to obtain from the daughter. The Carinthians were delighted to have the opportunity of delig Coroyra on ill turn, by obtaining her nearest neighbour as an ally, and extending their influence up the Higrian Gulf. If Epidamous were included to their commercial league, the harm that Copyre sould do them would be such diminished. Accordingly they received the Epidemaian ambassadors with offusion, and protessed them preacht assistance. Not only did they equip a small first, and place on bunch of it a garrison for Epkhannus, but they invited. congrants to come forward to reinforce the thinned population of the place, and guaranteed them the protection of Corinth. This expedition reached Epidamana, and greatly strengthened its power of resistance; but at the same time it called down on the town the wroth of Corcyrn. The Corcyrnesus were indignant that Corintle should trespose in waters which they considered to be their own, and resolved to put an end to the allinges of Corinth and Epidamans by force. Accordingly they sent a flest of ferty ships to blockade the town from the side of the sea, and entered late on alliance with the Epidsonian oligarchs and the Taulantii, who were besieging it on land. This notion on the part of Coreym was certain to lead to open

war. The Contribinus took up the challenge, equipped thirty slips of their own, called out contingents from their Leucadian and Ambraciot colomats, and obtained and also from Magara, whose citizens—debarred by
Athens from eastern trade—were eager to find new outlots to the
west. Late in the year 435 a.c. a combined fleet of saventy-twe
salleys, under the Compilation Aristaus, act sail to raise the blockade

of Epidamnus. They were met off the premontory of Actions by eighty Coreymean vessels, who completely defeated them, with the leas of fifteen abject. On the some day Epidamnus surrendered, the notive population consenting to receive back their exited oligarchy, while the Corimbian garrison were made prisoners of war.

This check caused the wildest wrath at Corinth, and extensive preparations were at once set on foot to repair the disaster. The Corinthians opent the whole of 434 n.o. in strengthening and equipping their fleet, and by the spring of the next year had ninety galleys ready for sec. They hade their subject allies follow their example, and raised thirty-eight ships from them. This armament, strongthened by a dozen Megarian and ten Eleisu vessels, composed a fiest which Coreyes could not hope to withstand, although she was necounted the second moval power of Greece, and owned not less than a hundred and twenty tritemes.

The Coreyranus had up to this moment held themselves aloof from Grecian politics; not even such a crisis as the lavasion of coreves asks Xerxos had been able to induce them to interest

aid from themselves in paything that went on to the east of Caps Males. But when they had drawn upon them-438 B.C. selves such a storm as was now impending, they were constrained. to look around for allies. All the naval states of Western Greece were leagued with Cariath; their Italiot neighbours across the sea had no war-fleets of importance. Nowhere could they discover any power except Athens which could afford them the help they needed. After many searchings of heart, and with great reluctance, the Corcymenus resolved to apply to be admitted into the alllauce of Athons, although they thereby sacrificed the complete independence which had hitherto been their pride. In the early spring of 493 s.c. they desputched envoye to solicit the conclusion of an offensive and defensive allinees. The mornent that the news of this move arrived at Corinth, the government of that city sent a counter-embrasy to persuade the Athenians to refuse the petition of their committee. Thus it came to pass that on the day on which the Coreveness numbers appeared before the Roolesia with their propositions, the Corinthians were also present to set forth the arguments against the conclusion of the alliance.

Thoughlides has preserved for us the substance of the speeches

made by the rival envoys on this occasion; though expressed in his own language, they fairly represent the arguments amployed during the debate, at which the historian himself was probably present. The Corevenenes appealed entirely to the self-interest of Athens; they acknowledged that they bad no moral chim for her assistance, but pointed out that they nessessed the second largest pany in Greece, and that, if they were allowed to fall under the power of Christh, that navy might at any time be turned against Athera. They declared that war between Athens and the Pelopounesian alliance, of which Corinth was such a prominent member, was esttalu to break out ere long, and asked whether it was better that the Corcyragan float should be found on that day on the side of Athens, or on that of her enemiss. As to the idea that the conclusion of on alliance with themselves would bring on an humodiate war with Currenth and Sports, they declared that the reverse would be the case; for the Athenian and Coreymore mavice, if united, would be so newerful that the Peloponnesians would not days to attack them

While the Coreymeans spoke of profit and expediency, the Corinthian envoys in their reply took a higher tone. They pointed out that Coreyra had always pursued a selfish and false policy, that she had been equally careless of the common interests of Greece and of the respect due to her mother-city, and that in the case of Euklanouns she had been actuated by mena jealousy. If any state might roske an append for the friendship of Athens, it was Corinth, who had not only done her good sorvices in past days,1 but had only a few years before restrained Sparta from declaring was at the moment of the revolt of Sames. On that occasion Corinch had vindicated the rights of every severalgo states to punish its own subject allies, and now she expected that Atheus weald do as much for her. If the treaty which the Corcyracans desired was now concluded, there would be full precedent for the Peloponnesian alliance helping the next member of the Delian Confederacy that revolted. As to the plea that war was inevitable. and that even if Coreyra did not furnish a casus belle some other must ere long arise, they declared that unless Athens provoked

¹ As, for example, during the investor of Attien by Cleonecoes (p. 166), and the Aegineten war (p. 186).

them they had no intention of attacking her, and that the majority of the members of the Pelaponnesian alliance were of the same mind.

After the ambassadors had spoken, Athenian oretors took up the debate, which was protracted far into the second day. It was Athena althet the speech of Pericles which decided the vote of the to Decerta. Reclasia: the great statesman had fully made up his mind that war must come sconer or lates, and threw his weight on to the side of the Curcyrassus. In accordance with his advice a defensive alliance was concluded with them, which bound Athena to lead them her help if they were attacked. As an entrest of the protection which was thereby granted, Lacedasmonius, the son of the great Cimen, was sent with a small squadron of ten ships to emiss in Coreyrasan waters.

There can be no doubt that Athens put hemself in the wrong by this action. The treaty with Coreyrs was virtually a declaration of war on Corinth, whose flost was just about to sail against that city. Of all the allies of Sparta, Corinth deserved the best treatment from Athens, and was the state which could be most costly conciliated, for the lines of Corinthian and Athenian commerce did not cross each other to may great extent. Even if war was really inevitable, it was not worth while to precipitate it by high-handed action which obviously broke the sparit of the Thirty Years' Trues. Nor was Coreyrs an ally whose past history gave much promise of future good faith; she had always played a purely selfish game, and as a matter of fact gave Athens very little assistance in the coming struggle. During the twenty-eight years of the war not a single Coreyrasan galley rounded Cape Males to help Athens in her struggle to maintain the empire of the Aegen.

Though fully aware of the meaning of the new treaty, Cerloth permitted in her intention of chestleing her undutiful daughter-city.

A few days after the ten Athenian ships under LoceBybota, desmonius had reached Coreym, the approach of the
Corinthian fleet was signalled. Now that all its
reinforcements bad come in, from Megara, Loucas, and elsewhere,
the armament mustered one hundred and fifty sail; the Coreyresons put out to meet it with one hundred and tru vessels,
With them sailed Locedsemonius and his ton ships; but the

Athenian commander had determined to take no active part in the coming fight unless compelled, for he was under orders not to attack the Corintbians, and only to resist if circumstances compalled blue. The fleets met off the coast of Epirus, at the island. of Sybota, and battle was joined along the whole line, except at the extreme left flank of the Coreyroean squadron, where the ten-Athonian ships kept managuring without coming to close quarters. After a hard fight, carried on with more courage than naval skill. the Coriothian right wing broke through the opposing line, and, although the Coreymenns had some advantage at other points, decided the fate of the battle. More than half of the Corevrsean floot wore sunk, taken, or disabled; and Lacelasmonius, who univtook an netive part in the fight when his silies were already beaten, could not do much to protect their retreat. After pausing to rearrange their disordered line of battle and to capture or slay the crows of the disabled Coroyraeau ships, the Corinthians came on for a second attack, that must have been fatal to the defeated fleet, which did not now muster more than fifty or sixty seaworthy ships. But after advancing to within a abort distance of the enemy, the victorious soundron was suddeply seen to back water, go about, and retreat down the Epirot coast. The cause of this manoguyre was the sudden appearance of a second Athenian squadron, which had been sent out to reinforce Lacedsomonius. It only mestered twenty ships, but the Corbublans took them for the mero vanguard of a large fleet, and cautiously drew back, When the new-corners had joined the Corevrsean deet, the Corinthian admiral sent out an officer in a small book to depounce the employed of the Athenian commander, and to ask him whether he was intending to break the pence existing between Cocneth and Athens. Lacedarmoning answered that he was not about to begin offensive hostilities, but intended to protect Coroyra. Thereupen the Corinthian, resolved not to precipitate a general war by hastyaction, cave orders for his arresment to steer homeward. Before starting he set up a trophy on the Epirot coast as a testimony to his victory in the battle; the Coroyrseans also, we Jearn to our surprise, philipped a success because their enemies had retired, and set up another trophy on the southernmost headland of their island. Except the capture of a thousand prisoners from the

months.

conquered fleet, the Corinthians had made no gate from their carefully prepared expedition.

The buttle of Sybota made war between Athens and the Peloponnesten alliance practically certain, but the movements of Sporta were so slow that events were able to develop them-Rewells of solves for some months before the actual rupture came. Potidoga. 432 B.C. The chief interest during this period lay in a series of events which took place in the north-western Aegean. Purdicess, King of Macedenia, the successor of that Alexander who took part in the invesion of Xerxes, had for some time been at variance with Athens. He endeavoured to harm her by inducing the tributary cities of Chalcidice to revolt. Among the most important of these places was Potidien, a Corintbian colony, which, in spite of its mambership in the Delian Confederacy, was still so closely condected with its muther-country as to receive its annual magistrates from hor. The Potidnesias were induced to lend a favourable car to the propagals of Perdiceas by the encouragement which they received from Corinth. To revenge the Corryroean treaty the Corinthians were ready to molest Athens in any may they could; and secretly propaged an expedition of two thousand mon, under their invourite general Aristons. When this force arrived at Potidacs the town openly revolted, as did many of the smaller places in its peighbourhood. However, an Athenian force which was then operating against Perdicess was at once divorted against the robol towns, In a battle fought in front of the walls of Potidica the Athenings' were victorious, though their general Callins was slain. They then laid siege to the town; but it had been smply provisioned in proparation for the royalt, and proved able to realst for many

Athens and Corinth were now virtually at war, though no open declaration of hostilities had yet been published. Hofore definitely sparts decides committing horself to the struggle, Corinth had deter-

mined to make certain of the assistance of Sparta, her ancient protector. The Spartane had long been contemplating the apparench of war, and were not unprepared for the appeal of their alics. Late in the year 482 nc. the ophers allowed the Corinthians to set forth their grievances before a meeting of the Apella. The Magnetans and other states who were at odds with Athens also

appeared to make their wrongs known. The general drift of all the speeches was the same: Athens had become haughty and blobhanded; she was an intolerably bad neighbour, whose one sim was to reduce and impoverish every state which was not numbered among her subject allies; the empire which she had built up was kent together in violation of the natural law which made autonomy the sacred right of every Hollenia community; if her restless activity were not checked, the liberty of Greece was in danger. Some Athenian ambasandors, who chanced to be in Sparta on another mission, spoke before the Apella in defence of the conduct of their country; but they could not deav the charge which was at the bottom of the accusations—the fact that Athens had turned her begamony over the states of the Aegean into an imperial dominion, where no pretence was made of granting her allies a share in the control of affairs. The Spartan king Arobidamus also spoke against an immediate declaration of war, on the ground that the Poloponnesian states were as yet ill-propared for a struggle with an enemy whose main power lay on the sea. But the large unjerity of the Spartana had long made up their minds: their opinion was curtly stated by the ephor Sthaneloldes, when he teld the assembly "they must not suffer the Athenians tobecome any greater, nor sit still when their ellies were being wronged, but march with the aid of the gods against these wrong. deers." So certain was Sthemeloides of the numerical superiority of his party, that he actually took the step, unhaved of before, of bidding the assembly divide, justeed of merely listening to its turnaltuous cries of assent or dissent.\ As he had foreseen, atensumous majority voted in favour of war.

A formal congress of all the allies of Sparta was then held, to ratify the decision of the Apella. It was well known that the greater part of the states were quite ready to follow the lead of their suscenia. Many places besides Covinth, Megant, and Thebes had their own private grudges against Atlans; Elis, Epideurus, and Ehitus, for example, had been interested in the success of the campaign against Coreyra, to whose expanses they had contributed. The Areadian tribes were always ready for a war which gave a promise of plumder, and yet was herer likely to extend to the

Sec pp. 66, 67, as to the voting in the Sparine assembly.

neighbourhood of their own inland mountains. Accordingly the congress of cilies proceeded to confirm the decision of the Spartan assembly; if any votes were given in favour of peace, they were so

unimportant that no record of them has been preserved.

Two diplomatic spisoles occurred before the actual outbreak of hestilities. The Spartans first sent a message designed to stake the credit of Porieles with the more superstitions of his fellow-pitizons. It hads the Athonians, in the old formula (see p. 105), "expel the accursed family of the Alemaconidea." To this no reply was made except by a contemptation for quogree, in which the Spartans were told to "explote the pollution they had brought to themselves by the straving of Pansantas in the temple of Athone, and by patting to death certain Helots who had taken refuge in the americary of Transarum."

The Pelopamesian alliance then presented a peremptory note to Athens which contained three points. It required that the

The Sparrow decrees against the Magarians should be repealed, that Aggies should be restored to her autonomy, and that the blockade of Potidace should be raised. The first demand was one which suight possibly bave been greated; but the two last struck at the whole principle of the Athenian naval dominion, hidding Athens permit secessions from the Confederacy of Delos, -a proceeding which her conduct in the cases of Naxus, Theses, and Sames showed that she would never suffer. Naturally the demands were refused. A few days after the Spartons sent in an ultimatum, conched in the form of a demand that Athens should "yestore their autonomy to the states of Greece," The Spartan ambassadors who came as bearers of the ultimatum expected a percomptory refusal of these demands, and must have been somewhat surprised when the Athenian peace-party proved strong enough to rules a lively debate in the Ecclesia, for the purpose of taking the three points into consideration.

During the seven or eight mouths which had slaped sizes the battle of Sybeta, the power of Pericles had been suffering a tem-

Temporary porncy eclipse. Now that were laid become certain, especialistis all the classes which were likely to suffer from it felt of Periodes. ill disposed towards the statemen whose advice had brought 12 on. The ill will shown against Periodes was no general

that his suemies thought that a favourable opportunity had agrired for molesting bira. Their attacks took the form of accusations against his friends and confidents. The philosopher Annuagers. was accused of impicty, and the sculptor Phoidias of embezzlement. merely because they were honoured with the friendship of Perioles. The furmer was obliged to leave Athens, the latter-though he successfully proved by the test of the egules that he had not made away with any of the gold which had been given him for the status of Athene Parthenes-was retained in prison on another charge. He had introduced portraits of Perioles and himself among the ancient heroes represented in the "metopes" of the Parthenon, and this was imputed to him as sacrilage. Before his second trial the unfortunate soulptor died in prison. The musician Damon, an intimate friend of Perioles stuce his wouth, was accessed of having apoken in favour of tyranuy as a form of government, and suffered catencism. A fourth attack was aimed at a personage still penger and dearer to Pericles. The creat statesmen had been unhappy in his married life, and after divorcing his wife had been living in a connection not hallowed by the tip of wedlock with a Milesian lady unused Aspasia. The equivocal position of the mistress of Perioles made her an easy mark for slander, and she was indicted for living an infamous life. When she appeared before the dimatery. Pericles for once broke through his habitual reserve, and appeared in court to plead the cause of Aspeals. His biographers relate that during his cration he was seen to shed terrs, for the first time on record during his public life: his evident opiction had its effect, and the trial resulted in a verdict of acquituel.

At the moment that the Sparten ambassaders appeared in Athens to by their ultimatum before the Beclesis, the discontent felt against Perfeles was still high, and it was this fact that led to the discussion of the three points. But rejects the after many speeches had been made, Perfeles was able ultimated and more to assert his mostery over the sasambly. He showed clearly enough that it was not the Magarian decrees or the siegs of Potidisen that were the real causes of the heatlifty of the Peleponnan. The true reason for the harted which Sparts felt towards Athens was her jealousy at the formation of the Athenian empire, which so much overshadowed her own loos pro-eminence in Peleponne in the most of the Athenian empire,

ponnesus. The Corinthians and other maritime allies of Sparta were envious of the commercial prosperity of Athens. Neither Sparta nor her allies would ever be antisfied as long as the Confederacy of Delas continued to exist; if the three polute now brought formard were conceded, it would only cause the appearance of another and more stringent set of demands. The force of these arguments was soon folt; it was recognized that for the last year was had been inevitable, and the Spartan ambasendors were sent back with the refusal that they had expected.

A few days later the actual outbreak of hostilities occurred,

apparently in the mouth of March, 431 s.c.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE EARLY THANS OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR DOWN TO THE DEATH OF PERIOLES, 431-429 B.C.

Beroux passing on to describe the opening of the Peloponnesian war, it will not be out of place to recapitulate the resources of the

two confederacies which were pitted against each other.

The Spartans had enlisted in their cause the full force of their Peloponnesian allies; that is, they were supported by Elis, Corinth, Sicyon, all the Arcadian states, Epidaurus, Hermione, The Pelopon-Troczen, and Phlius: all the peninsula, in fact-neglan conexcept Argos and Achaia, which remained neutralwas ranked on their side. Outside the Isthmus they could count on the zealous assistance of Megara and the Boostian League, while the Phocians, the Lecrians, and the Corinthian colonies along the Acarnanian coast were also numbered among their allies. Every one of these powers could put a considerable body of hoplites into the field, and the Boontians and Localans could supply cavalry also. If the whole army of the alliance could have been mustered for a great battle, it would have amounted to more than a hundred thousand foot, with perhaps two thousand horse. But great battles on shore were very rare during the Pelaponnesian war, and no such force was ever engaged at one time during the whole twenty-eight years of its course. By sea the Spartan alliance was comparatively weak; except Corinth there was no first-class maritime power included in it. But Sieven and Megara were each possessed of some scores of galleys, and Elis, Epidanrus, and even Sports and the Bosotian League were not entirely without war-vessels. It was not, however, in numbers alone that the allies of Sparta felt themselves weak at sea; the morals and the training of their suamen

were equally deficient. Their officers were unnecustomed to the menagement of a large fleet; their crews, except the Corinthians, had no recent experience of naval war. Moveover, the Athenian nary bad developed in the last forty years a new system of tactics and manouves, while their memies were still employing the same methods which had served at Salamis. The old school of seamen. had been accustomed to lay their vessels alongside of the enemy. and then to allow the hoplites and light troops on board to fight the matter out. The Athenians had altogether abandoned these tactics; they had cut down the number of marines whom a vessel carried, and trusted almost entirely to ramming. Their system the weakeness was to secure by rapid and skilful manageving a

involvable moment to drive their sullay's beak into the energy's side, or to crash into and disable his long projecting line of cars. The Pelopounesian had no conception of any other way of conquering his enougy than by grappling with him, while the Athenian loved a running fight, avoided close grips, and trusted to a rapid and unexpected charge. With these taptics the old-frabioued seamen of Corinth or Megara were at first utterly unable to cone. They know their inferiority, and refused to engage unless that found themselves in largely superior force.

Next to its neknowledged inferiority at sea, the greatest weakness of the Spartan confedency lay in its financial poverty. Sparta herealf preseased no monetary resources, and among her allies Corinth and Thebes alone had any accumulated wealth. The rest were " ready enough with their persons, but not at all ready with their nurses." So obvious was the figureal difficulty of maintaining the war, that, even before hostillties had become prepasals were made that the lengue should horrow money from the templeteensures of Olympia and Delphi-a course which those who made it would have been the first to denounce as sacrilege, had it been brought forward on any other occasion. Thus it came to pass that Sports could summed a very large army into the field for five or six weeks, but could not keep permanently on foot more than a few thousand men, for sheer want of money to pay theen. She and her allies were invincible for a single battle or a frontier raid, but compaintively helpless in carrying on a prolonged campaign,

[|] Thun, L 140:

The position of Athens was very different. On land she had few allies; her trusty neighbours at Platana, her dependents the Messenians of Naupactus, and the Acarnanians, who The resources joined her because of their perpetual feuds with their of Athena. Corinthian neighbours of Leucas and Ambracia, were the only friends on whom she could thoroughly roly. Coreyra, of course, was culisted on her side, but proved of little assistance. Some of the Thossalian cities also had concluded alliances with her, but their forces never took the field in her favour, and they practically remained neutral in the war. Her own military resources were very considerable, amounting to twelve hundred horsemen and thirteen thousand hoplites fit to take the field, beside sixteen thousand more—men past the prime of life or resident allons—who were available only for surrison duty at home.

The Athenian fleet ready for son amounted to not less than three hundred galleys in the highest state of efficiency, and the well-stored arosand of Peiraeus was able to equip a yet larger number. This two Aslatic islands which still maintained a war navy—Lesbes and Chica—could reinforce their suzerain with a considerable squadron. With this exception the Cenfederacy of Delos contributed no naval or military assistance. The states which composed it had long ceased to maintain a fleet, while it would seem that Athens accounted their hoplites as too wanting in splitje or loyalty to make it worth her while to call them out in large numbers. At any rate, Ionian troops were scarcely ever brought across the Acgent to reinforce the Athenian army for a campaign in Europe.

The finances of Athens were in the most flourishing condition. She was enjoying an average annual revenue of about a thousand talents, of which six hundred consisted of the tribute of the confederacy of Delos, while the rest was obtained from various forms of domestic taxation. Moreover, she passessed a large accumulation of hoarded wealth. Of the surplus of the tribute-money six thousand talents were lying in the Acropolis ready for instant use. This great treasure had a few years before amounted to as much as nine thousand seven hundred talents, but the lavish expenditure of Pericles for the adornment of Athons, togother with the cost of the siege of Potidaca, had decreased it by more than a third.

In considering the relative strength of Sparts and Athens, there was another aloment, not less important than their railitary and financial resources, to be taken into account. This the allieg on was the feeling and disposition of their respective allies. Here Sparts, had the advantage; the greater part of the members of her alliance had an active dislike and fear of Atlana, and looked upon the war against her as a crusade in favour of that "autonomy" which every Gook valued so highly. Among the subjects of Athens no such feeling against Sparts existed. The members of the Confederacy of Deles had long cossed to look upon their connection with Athens as an advantage. It was only the few of sharing the fute of Theses or Sames that knot them quiet; if that four could be removed, they were for the most next ready to speeds. The vintery of Athens over Smarta could bring them no advantage, while the continuance of the war might very possibly cause a diminution of trade and an increase of terration. Of active hatred for specific acts of misgovernment on the part of Athres there was little; but, on the other hand, the yearning after autonomy was always present, to make them long for the break-up of the empire of their suxernin. The ullies of Athens, therefore, were at the best passive supportors, and might canily be turned jute rebels if the hardships of way bore heavily upon them, or if a fair chance of recovering those freedom was presented to them. The chief guarantee for fidelity was merely the fact that they were cut off from Sparts, by an expanse of ses,

The first blood shed in the struggle was split in Bosotia. Before the final declaration of war had taken place, while men were still The surprise awaiting it, the Thebrus unde a treacherous attempt of Flateau, to saize Plateau. That town, like crory Greek state, 481E.0. owned a discontented faction widdle its walls. The reajority being attached to Athens, the minority were partisans of the Bosotian League. They antered into correspondence with the Thebra Government, and undertook to betray their city by opening one of its gates on the evening of a festival. On a night of wind and rain in March, three hundred Thebra hoplites stole beneath the walls of Plateau, while the whole force of the city followed them

and that while the Athenian flest was undisputedly sugreme they

could not hope to obtain aid for a rebeilion.

some miles behind The traitors admitted the advanced guard. who marched into the market-place and drew themselves up there. sounding their trumpets and bidding their herald proclaim that all true Boestians should take arms and join them. But the ollearchic narty in Plataea was not numerous, and the Thebans, instead of seizing the prominent men of the city, remained quietly waiting for their reinforcements to come up. Unluckily the abowers of the night had caused the river Asonus to rise, and the main Thehan army was detained beyond it, vainly seeking for a ford. The Platacans, who had awoke at midnight to find their city betrayed, were at first in despair; but after a time they perceived that their enemies were but a haudful, and plucked up courage. They mustered in the side lanes, clapped to the gates, and berricaded the issues from the market-place. In the dusk of the dawn a desperate street-fight took place, when the Thebaus received that they were entrapped, and strove to cut their way out. A few escaped by a postern gate, many were slaip, but the majority were driven into a large granary, whence there was no exit, and forced to lay down their arms. Some hours afterwards when all their countrymen were taken or slain, the Thelan army appeared before the walls.

Finding that they were too late, the Theban generals at once laid hands on all the inhabitants of the country-side, and held them as securities for the lives of their captured friends. The Plateans then sent out a horald to upbraid their neighbours for their treacherous attack, and threatened to put their prisoners to death if the hostages were not given up and the Plateans iterritory evacuated. Accordingly the Thebans released the persons they had seized, and returned home across the border. The Plateans drove off their cattle into Attien, brought all their movable property into the city, and then, with a cruel and deliberate breach of faith, also their prisoners, to the number of nearly two hundred. Thus with treachery, porjury, and deliberate massacre, in which it is difficult to blame one party more than the other, commenced the Peloponnesian war.

When the first news of the attack on Platzes reached Athens, the strategi had sent off at once to beg their allies to keep their prisoners safe, as a means of bringing pressure to bear on Thebes. The news of the massacre caused much discontent, but nothing could be done to repair the crime. War was now actually begun; accordingly the frontier forts were put in a state of defence, the flocks and herds of Atties placed in safety across the water, in Salamis or Euleen, and the inhabitants received warning that they would soon have to take refuge within the walls of the city. From Platoca the women and children were removed, and only a small marrison of four hundred citizens and eighty Athenians remained behind to man its ramparts.

The impending storm soon broke over Atties. A few weeks after the attempt on Plataes, the whole armed loves of Peloponnesus Investor of impatered at the Isthmus, and set out on its march

Attim, June, northward. Every state had sent two-thirds of its hoplites, and the whole amounted to some seventy or eighty thousand mm. Archidamus, king of Sparts, though originally an opponent of the war, had been placed in command. After being joined by the contingents of Bocctia, he halted on the Attle frontier, and sent forward on ambassador named Molesippus to offer the Athenians one final chance of submission before war was let loose upon them. But on the motion of Pericles, the Ecclesia refused the envoy a hearing, and sent blue back under guard. to the frontier. When he was dismissed by his escort, the Spartan took leave of them with the solaren words, "This day will be the beginning of great evils for Greace," and returned to the camp of Archidamus.

The Sporten king and calculated that the approach of an irresistible army would humble the spirit of the Athenians, and that when they saw that the raveging of Attion was about to begin, they would offer terms of peace. He was so far right that there was a large party which looked with dismay on the prospect of an invasion; and the ruin to their country-side which must fellow. But the landed interest at Athens was much less powerful than the commercial, and Perfeles had successful in persuading the merchants capitalists and shipmasters of Athens that the war would bring them no great loss. He had from the first forcesen that, in the case of invasion, the open country of Attica must be evacuated, and abandened to the energy. He had familiarized his followers with the idea, and when the invasion took place, the terror on which Archidamus reckoned had long been discounted. Some days before

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the Sparian army arrived, the Athenian proprietors had retired within the walls of the city, taking with them their families, their slaves, and all their bousehold goods. There was nothing left but

empty farmeteads for the enemy to destroy.

After making an ineffectual attempt to storm the frontier fort of Oence, Archidamus descended from the spurs of Cithacron into the plain of Eleusis, and began to burn and harry the land in the most systematic manner. It was now ravaged. early June, and crops and fruits were well advanced towards maturity. The Pelopounesians spread over the face of the country, beat down the corn, felled the orchards and olive groves, and burnt the deserted farms and villas. Working steadily south, they crossed Mount Accialens, entered the plain of Athens, and encamped hard by Acharme, the richest and most repulous of the Attic demes. When the smoke of the burning town was blown towards the walls of Athens, and the bands of plunderers were seen scattered like locusts over the plain, there was great excitement in the city. Forgetful of their inferior numbers, the Athenians longed to leave the abolter of the city and to fall on the invaders. The hoplites of Acharpae, who numbered no less than three thousand, took the lead in demanding a sortle. Groups of armed men mustered at the gates, and it required all the personal influence of Perioles to prevent the excited multitude from rushing out to court a certain defeat. It was the firm resolve of the great statesman to avoid all fighting in the open field, but he found a vent for the feelings of his fellow-citizens by planning two naval expeditions. One consisting of thirty triremes sailed up the Euripus, expeditions. and made predatory descents on the coasts of Bocotia and Locals. The other, mustering not less than a hundred ships, and carrying a thousand hoplitos for land service, coasted round Pelopounesus, and did all the harm possible to the seaboard of Laconia, Messenia. and Elis. Then it was joined by fifty Corcyroan galleys, and passed up the coast of Acarnania, harrying the Corinthian colonies in that quarter. The presence of this powerful fleet in Western waters drew over to the Athenian alliance the four cities of Cophallenis, which had hitherto remained neutral.

After remaining forty days in Attica, Archidamus drew off his army from the wasted land, and returned to Peloponnesus. The

moment that he was gone, Perioles sallied out from Athens with thirteen thousand men, marched into the Meearld, and paid off on the villages and farms of the Megarians all the ravages that Attice had been suffering during the last six weeks. This destructive visit was regularly repeated every autumn during the first cloven years of the war: sometimes the Athenians even surplemented it by an additional raid in the spring.

The events of the first year of the war made plain to every one what had bitherto been suspected by few-the fact that under Character of existing conditions the struggle must be prelonged indefinitely, for neither party had shown the power to strike an effective blow seniust its enemy. If the Athenians refused to meet the Pelopounusian army in the open field, and acquiesced in the abandonment of their home territory, there was no means of bringing pressure on thom. The Spartans could not dream of besieging the vast circuit of the city and its maritime suburbs; the walls were too strong for the siege artillery of those days; and the sea was always open for the supply of new resources. On the other hand, the Athenians had almost as little power to coerce the Peleuennesians : no amount of myarings of the Magazid or hasty descents on the coast of Laconia would appreciably offset the policy of an inland state like Sparta. Acute misery might be inflicted on the mercantile classes in Corinth or the farmers of the Elclan scaboard, but their sufferings would not disturb the stelld Lacedaemonian. Unless one side or the other found some more effective way of harming its enemy, the war might go on for over. Pericles and long forescen that Sparta's ability to harm Athone was confined to the power of wasting Attion, and and made up his mind that after some years of ineffectual effort the enemy would be reduced to sue for pence. But he calculated that the struggle would belong, and as a measure of precaution induced the Ecclesia to vote that a thousand talents out of the treasures in the Parthenen should be put aside as a reserve fund, only to be need in the event of an attack on Athone by sea. With a similar object, a hundred triremes fully manned were always to be kept in home waters. The Spartage had not been so prescient as Perioles, and the utter fallure of their first attack in bringing pressure to bear on Athens caused much discontent. It was obvious that some new method

of coercing the enemy must be found, unless the war was to last . for ever.

Among the other events of the first year of the war was the expulsion from their native island of the Agginetans. Aggina had been an unwilling member of the Confederacy of Delos since her conquest in 456 s.c., but her chief men were the Asgine-

known to be in correspondence with Sparta, and Pericles dreaded the possible results of having a city ripe for revolt at the very gates of Athens. As long as Aegina was held by disaffected allies, it remained "the evesore of Polrague," and the Athenians now took the cruel and high-handed step of deporting its whole population. As Aegina had not justified this arbitrary action by any open revolt, much indignation was felt throughout Greece at seeing an ancient and famous city destroyed, merely to case the suspicions of a jealous suzemin. The Spartens granted to the expelled inhabitants the land of Thyreatis on their northern border, close to the frontiers of Argolis.

At the end of the campaigning season of 431 u.c., the Atheniana held a solemn funeral celebration in honour of those citizens who .. had fallen in the numerous, if unimportant, skirmishes of the year. The oration in honour of the departed was spoken by Pericles: it was accounted the highest flight of his elequence, and contained. besides its estensible purport, a lofty panegyric on the social and political life of Athena.

When the spring of 430 a.c. arrived, the Peloponnesian confederates prepared to repeat their incursion into Attica. The second venr of the war might have been as uneventful as the second invafirst, if a great national calamity had not intervened ston of Attion, to make it memorable. The army of Archidamus had hardly crossed the frontier, and the hosts of fagitive country-folk had only just taken refuge within the walls of Athens, when the plague broke out in the city. There ensued a fearful outbreak of pestilence, comparable in the fierceness of its ravages, though not in their extent, to the Black Death of 1349 or the London Plague of 1665, and far more dreadful than any of the visitations of cholera which our own century has known. The infection is said to have originated in Egypt, and to have been brought westward by merchants from inner Asia, where pestilence is almost always racing. It might, however, have passed Athens by, if everything there had not been prepared to make a disastrone outbreak awy, The city was crowded with refugees living in the most wretched and unsanitary condition. They had quartered themselves as best they could in the towers of the fortifications; the space between the Lone Walls was provided with them; every open square was crammed, and even such temples as were not kept locked up, They dwalt in booths and touts, even (we are told) in tubs, without my possible provision for elempliness or comfort, and depending on a seanty and polluted water-supply. In the heat of a stiffing June, the filth and overcrowding had propared the way for the restlence. The moment that the lafection was fatroduced it spread like wildfire. Thucydides has given a detailed account of the symptoms of this plague, which show it to have been a kind of cruptive typhoid fever. After seven or nine days of suffering, the victime, covered with pustules and maked with continual

The plague womiting and unquenchable thirst, early into their graves. Recoveries, though not infrequent (Thuevof Achene. dides himself survived an attack), were few in comparison to the deaths. Honce the carliest symptoms of the discuse brought on a state of reckless despair which led to much unnecessary loss of life. The physicians had nearly all fallon victims, and when all human skill was found unavoiling, a selfish pento set in. Many refused to vay the least attention to the sufferings of their nearest relatives, and left them to perjah untended. Moreover, under the metal and physical strain of the epidemio, the restraints of social order broke down, and men abandoned themselves to all manuer of excess and debauchery. Oring and riot ran wild through the streets, while unburied corpses lay in every corner and crossway. The comotories were glantly sights; funeral trains might be seen fighting with each other for the possession of a pyre, and when a burning had begun the attendants fled, leaving the bedy half-charged to pollute the neighbouring air.

At least a quarter of the population of Athens perished in this herrible calculity, nor were its ravages cooling to the city alone. The plague degged the steps of two considerable expeditions which, Poriolos sent out to relieve the overcrowded city. A force of four thousand man, despatched on slipboard to ravage the coasts of

Treeson and Epidaurus, suffered heavily. The army lying before Pottdaea—which was still helding out, though now in the twenty-fifth menth of its siege—caught the infection from reinforcements which arrived from Athens, and fifteen hundred hoplites died in the camp. It was not till the approach of winter that the deathrate began to diminish.

By an unreasoning but not unnatural impulse, many of the Athenians looked on Pericles, the author of the war, as responsible for the calemities of his country. In expression of Tanonularity the feeling of the mob, the demagogue Cleon actually of Pericles : brought a charge of peculation against the great minister, and, to mark their anger, the dicastery found him guilty of the preposterons charge. A vote of the Ecclesia even ordered the despatch of envoys to Sparta, to sue for peace. This was, of course, refused by the enemy, and the Athenians gradually came round again to their old policy, and again elected Pericles as strategus. The plague had left the rest of Greece almost untouched; nowhere were the conditions so favourable for its apread as at Athens, sud the mortality in the few places in which it appeared was therefore small-The Pelopoppesians were able to harry Attier in June and July without catching the infection, and carried their incursious into every nook and corner of the land that had been left unvisited in the previous year.

In the autumn of 430 n.c., after the Athenian fleets had gone home, a considerable Felopomesian squadron collected at Cerinti, and ventured out into the Ionian Sea; but, though muster—The flats of log a hundred ships, it did no more than execute a Aristons. hasty descent on Zacyminas, and then returned into the gulf. A more efficient method of larming Athens than such a timid excursion was devised in the same year by the Polopomesians; they determined to endeavour to make an alliance with the Great King, and to obtain from him Petsian gold to supplement their own should resources. Aristons the Cerinthian and five others set out, to make the long land-journey to Asia which the prependerance of Athens at sea rendered necessary. On their way the envoys passed through Three, where reigned Sitalkes, a firm ally of Athens. Apprised of their arrival in his dominions, the harberian king laid hands on them, and made them over to the Athenian envoy at his

court. They were forwarded to Athens, and there put to death without a trial. This cold-blooded execution of non-combetants exaspected the Pelopophesians to the highest pitch of fury, all the more because Aristous was can of the most distinguished officers of their whole confederacy. The justification which the Athenians gave of their conduct, was that the crows of several merchant vessels, which had been taken by Pulapounesian privateors, and enfified messecre: it was suspected that their real reason was personal batrod for Aristous, arising from the trouble he had given them at Potdasa.

A few mouths after the dark of Aristens, the town which he had induced to revolt fell into the hands of its enemies. Potidaes

had now been under siege for about thirty months. and all its magazines but been exhausted. The walls were still intact, but there was hardly a crumb of food left in the city; we are told that some of the inhabitants. had even been reduced to facil on the bodies of the dend. Seeing that there was no hope of help from Pulopounegas, the Potidnega leaders at last proposed a surreader. The Athenian generals Xonophon and Hestindorus, wishing to spare their army the hardshins of another winter in the trenches, granted easy terms, on condition that the surrender should take place at once. Accordlogly the Petidaeses, their families, and their Corinthian auxiliaries were permitted to depart whither they chose, though no individual was to take with blee more than a single change of raimout and a fixed sum of money. The Atheniau assembly was much discontouted with this capitalation; they been a heavy gradge against the Poliducums, as one of the causes of the war, and had been looking forward to wreaking their vengeanes on thora when the longexpected surrender took place. A few weeks more of blockade. as was very justly observed, would have compelled Potidaen to surrender at discretion, and placed all her inhabitants at the mercy of the bestegers, to be slain or sold as slaves. More than two thousand talents had been spont on the sleps, and many lives had been lost in the trenches; we cannot, therefore, wonder that Xonophon and his colleagues were severely consured by the home government. The fall of Potidaen was the last military event of 480 n.c., and must have occurred in the October or November of that year,

The third year of the war opened with an event destined to exercise the greatest influence on the policy of Athens. In the early sommer of 529 p.c., two years and six months after the outbreak of the war. Periolos died. The great statesman was struck down by the plague. which had reappeared with the hot weather. Although he recovered from the attack, he was left too weak to rally, and sank into his grave from sheer weakness a few weeks after. Since the previous year he had not been the same man. The plague had carried off his two sons, his sister, and most of his intimate friends. After the death of his younger son, Paralus, he shut himself up in his bouse, and was with difficulty induced to come abroad, or to take an interest in public business. The instructude of the records. which had resulted in his trial and condemnation on the charge of Cleon, must have added to his weariness of life. But down to the last he maintained his ascendency over the Reclesia. Just before he died the Athenians gave him a signal proof of their renewed confidence. The death of his sons having left him without an heir, the revulsion of feeling which succeeded to their momentary anger, took the form of a decree of the Ecclesia, which logitimatized a natural son whom Aspasia had borne to him. This youth, who bore the same name as his father, was reserved for a stirring career and an unharny and.

Perioles viewed his approaching and with philosophic eaim. As he hy dying, his surviving friends spoke by his bedside of the great achievements of his life. They thought him far gone beyond the power of hearing and spoech; but he presently raised binself and said, "I marvel that you so dwell upon and praise these acts of mine. Fortune had her share in them, and many other generals have done more. But you take no notice of that which is my real pride, that no Athenian ever were mourning through me."

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CHAPTER XXVIII.

FROM THE DEATH OF PERIOLES TO THE FALL OF PLATABA, 489-427 B.C.

Tip death of Pericles deprived the Athenian democracy of the one guiding spirit whom it was accustomed to obey, and left it exposed to the verying impulses of half a dozen stateamen of second-rate ability. As long as Perioles lived, the war had been conducted towards a definite end on one simple and rigid plan, Sparta was to be wearfed out, not struck down; therefore all action on land was to be avoided, all distant and hazardous enterprises eschewed: the ferces of Athens were to be kept in hand, and devoted sulply to preserving her supremacy at sea, and proventing any accumunication between her enomy and her discontented subjectallies across the Aegean. After a time—probably a very considerable time, but still one whose coming was inevitable-the Peleponnesian confederacy would desprin at its funbility to harm Athens, would tire of accing its commercial may kept under pernetual blockade and its const-land exposed to the constant descouts of an enemy who oluded any counter-blow. Sparta's allies, if not Sparta herself, would then sue for peace, and Athens would be left with her craping unimpaired, beyond all controllication the strongest state in Greece.

The policy of Pericles, if it could have been consistently carried out, would probably have proved efficacious; but it was a policy particularly hard to enforce in a democratic state. We may, indeed, say that no estatesiman save the one who had for so long exerted the influence of his master-mind on the Ecclesia could possibly have put it in practice. It involved the constant exercise of temetry and soff-restraint, the two virtues in which a democratic

assembly is notoriously wanting. It eften exacted the neglect of tempting opportunities for action on land, or promising expeditions to distant regions; it gave few opportunities for distinction to the ambitious military men in whom the state abounded; it brought the most cruel suffering on the sgricultural classes of Attica, who were compelled to give up their farms year by year to be ravaged by the invador. Hence it was certain that, when the guiding hand of Pericles was removed, the Ecclesia would be driven by anger, fear, or ambition into abandoning the narrow line of policy which he had marked out for it. We shall soon be able to trace the results of his removal, by noting the increasing scope and variety of the efforts of Athens during the few succeeding years.

The Peloponnesian army, which marched up from the Isthmus about the time of the death of Pericles (June, 429?), did not repeat the ravages of the two preceding years. King Archi- Archidamne damus this time left Attica untouched-perhaps the before Plataes. renewed outbreak of the plague in Athens frightened him-and turned northward to strike at a smaller proy. Plataca had for the last two years been deserted by its inhabitants, and contained only a small garrison of some five hundred men. To oblige his Bocotian allies. Archidamus had determined to dislodge this outpost of Athenian power. When his army sat down before their walls, the Platacans protested that half a century before Pausonias the Spartan, after his great victory over the Porsians, had pronounced the soil of Plaines hallowed ground, and guaranteed its perceival antonomy. They therefore begged Archidamus to remember this sperred obligation, and to withdraw his forces. The king replied by an offer to leave them unmolested, if they would become allies of Sparta, or even if they would renounce their alliance with Athens and stand neutral in the war. To this the Platseans answered that as their families and their goods had been removed to Athens, and were in the custody of their allies, they were not free agents; but that, if they were permitted, they would send an envoy to beg from the Athenian Ecclesia leave to become neutrals. Archidamus then made a very liberal offer; he promised to allow the Platacaus to depart, after handing over the town and district to the custody of Sparts, together with a list of all the buildings, orchards, plantations, and so forth contained therein. They should be held in trust during the continuance of the war, kept in good order, and restored to the Platasana on the conclusion of a general peace. He was even ready to guarantee an allowance to the oxided citizens from the proceeds of the cultivation of their land.

This proposal tempted the Plateenes sorely, but they again required permission to communicate with Athens. Archidenes granted leave, and messengers went forth from the city, only to return with the answer that "Athens never described for allies, and would not now neglect the Plateenes, but succour them with all her might. Wherefore the allience must stord, and the attack of the Spartans be withnessed." Accordingly the proposals of Archideness were rejected, and the siege beans.

After running a continuous line of palisades around the little town, the Spartans commenced to throw up a mound against one

portion of the wall, intending to raise it until it filled up the ditch and rose level with the battlements, so as to furnish a path into the city. To foil this design, the Platacans kept mising the height of the wall as the around grew, and, when this proved an inadequate defence, pierced through the lower course of their camparts and can a tunned into the interior of the mound. Through this tunnel they removed the earth in such quantities that the recent kept orambling and sinking in. The Sportage, however, foiled this method of defence by hearing on the mound, not loose mould, but crates and hurdles tightly wedged up with clay. Fluding themselves in huminent danger, the Pinterans next built a crescent-shaped wall in rear of the threatened point, with materials taken from the deserted houses of the city. When, therefore, the mound had accomplished its nursoes, the Seartness found themselves in front of a second line of wall, connected at its ends with the original fortifications. By the time that this was done, the season was so far advanced that Archidamus gave up all, hope of capturing Platner in the current year. He resolved to turn the siege into a blockade, and to dismiss the greater part of his army homewards. Accordingly he surrounded the alty with carufully planned lines of circumvaliation, consisting of two substantial walls of unbaked brick, with towers at regular intervals: they faced, the one inward and the other outured, in case now

attempts might be made by the Athenians to raise the blockade. In front of each of the faces lay a ditch, while the space between the two walls provided dwelling-space for the troops. Leaving a force, consisting half of Becctians and half of Peloponnesians, to maintain these lines, Archidamus marched back to Corinth with the bulk of his army.

During the summer, while the army of Archidamus remained in Boestla, the Athenians had kept within their walls. But it is surprising to find that, when the main body of the enemy had exparted, they made no attempt to relieve Plataea, in spite of the solemn assumnces of assistance which they had given to its inhabitants at the time of the negotiations with Archidamus. But in the whole of 420 n.c. the Athenians made no expeditions near home; the military interest of the year is centred entirely in operations in the distant land of Acarpania.

At the same time that Archidamus laid siege to Plataca, a small Pelopoppesian expedition under a Spartan officer named Chemus, had crossed the mouth of the Gulf of Corintit, and Operations in joined the land forces of the Leucadlans and Ambra- Acaroania. closs. They were bent on conquering the Acarnanians and the Measenians of Naupactus, the only continental allies whom Athens possessed in Western Greece. A long feud had existed between the Corinthian colonists on the shore, and the Acarnanian and Amphilochian highlanders of the inland; the former were continually encroaching on the territory of the latter, and had of late brought matters to a head by seizing Argos, the capital of the Amphilochian tribe. It was owing to this local quarrel, and not to any love for Athens, that the Acarnanians are found carolled in the Athenian alliance. When Chemus had been joined by the troops of Leucas and the other Corinthian towns, and had further strongthened himself by summoning to his standard a number of the predatory barbarian tribes of Epirus, he advanced on Stratus, the chief city of Acarnania. At the same time a squadron of Peloponnesian ships collected at Corinth, and set sail down the gulf towards Naupactus. The only Athenias force in these waters consisted of twenty gulleys under an able officer named Phormio. who was cruising off the straits of Rhlum, to protect Nauractus and blockade the Corinthian Gulf.

Both by land and by sea the operations of the Peloponnesians miscarried miscarbly. Chemus collected a very considerable army, but as he sent his men forward to attack Stratus by three asparate reads, he exposed them to defeat in detail. His courte, compased this Egirot auxiliaries, was routed by the Stratians, and the Greek troops on either flack were then compelled to retire without having struck a blow. By sea the defeat of the Peloponnesians was even more diagraceful; the Covinthian admirals Machana and Isocrates were so scared, when they same across the squadron of Phormic at the mouth of the gulf, that, although they mustered forty-seven ships to his twenty, they took up the defensive. Hudding together in a circle, they shrunk from his attack, and allowed thomselves to

Phormic's be hustled and werried into the Achaian harbour of see-fights Patrag, losing several ships in their flight. Presently velnforcements arrived; the Pelopennesian floot was raised to no less than seventy-seven vessels, and three Sparten officers were sens on board, to compel the Corinthian admirals, who had behaved so badly, to do their best in future. The whole squadron then set out to hunt down Phormio. They found him with his twenty ships consting along the Actollan above towards Naumagus, and at once set out in pursuit. The long chase sejumnted the larger fleet into scuttered knots, and gave the fighting a disconnected and irregular observer. While the rear ships of Phonoic's soundron were compelled to run on shore a few railes outside Naupactus, the cloven leading vessels reached the harbour in safety. Finding that he was now only pursued by about a some of the enemy-the rost having stayed behind to take pessession of the stranded Athenian vessels-Phormio came buildly out of port again, His eleven yessels took six, and sunk one of their puragers; and then, pushing on westward, autually succeeded in rempturing most of the nine ships which had been lost in the morning. This ongagement, though it had no great results, was considered the most daring feat performed by the Athenian pavy during the whole war,

Phormio was soon after relatured from Athens, and the Poloponnesians sailed back to Cavinth. While they lay there, Bresidas, one of the Spartae officers serving on heart the squadren, carried out a sudden and despotato feat of arms which gave carnest of his future achievements. Ever slace the beginning of the war the Megarian navy had been lylug in port, without daring to venture out into the Saronic Gulf. It amounted to forty vensels, of which many were old and leaky, but all could be used for a short cruise, Choosing the best of their crews, the Peloponnesian commanders marched them overland to Megara, each man carrying his car and mat, and manned the galleys at nightfall. Then percent on saddenly putting out to sen, they captured three Galaxia.

Athenian galleys which were blockading the port of Nissca, and afterwards landed on Salamis. That island had been considered a secure refuge by the Atheniaus, and was full of cattle and property that had been removed for safety out of Attica. All this the Peloponnesians swept of, and so promptly did they sat that they re-embarked unharmed with their prisoners and spoil. The Atheniaus, who had throughed down in rage and uproar to man the galleys that lay at Peirneus, were too late to catch a single one of the rangeages.

With the exception of a fierce but fruitless inread made by the Thracian allies of Athens into Maccelonia, no other operations took place in 429 n.c. The winter passed uneventfully, and the war seemed as far as ever from showing any signs of producing a definite result. But although the Spartan invasion of 428 s.c. had no more effect than those of the preceding years, yet in the late summer there occurred an event so fraught with evil omens for Athens, as to threaten the whole fabric of her empire. For the first time since the commencement of hostilities, an important subject state made an endeayour to free itself by the aid of the Spartan fleet. Lesbos was one of the two Aegean islands which still remained from tribute, and possessed a considerable war-navy. Among its five towns' Mitylene was the chief, and far exceeded the others in wealth and resources. It was governed by an oligarchy, who had long been yearning to revolt, and had made careful preparation by accumulating warlike stores and enlisting foreign mercenaries. Before their arrangements were quite complete, their neighbours of Tenedos and Methymna sent secret information to Athens of the intended rebellion. The Athenians

at first hardly credited the news, and thought it a serious matter to have to add such a powerful state to the list of their enemies.

^{· 1} Mitylene, Methymna, Antissa, Bressa, Pyrcha.

They sent ambassadors to pacify the Mitylouseaus, but without any result. The whole island except Methymna, where a democracy ruled, rose in arms, and determined to send for aid to Sparta. The Atheniaus at once despitched against Mitylene a squadron of forty ships ander Cleippides, which had just been equipped for a cruise in Peloponesian waters. This force had an engagement with the Lestian fleet, and drove it back into the barbour of Mitylene. To gain time for assistance from across the Asgent to arrive, the Lestiaus new pretended to be enxious to surronder, and engaged Cleippides in a long and fruitless negotiation, while they were repenting their demands at Sparta. But at last the Athenian grow suspicious, established a close blockade of Mitylene by son, and landed a sparit force of legities to held a fortified camp on shore.

The autumn had now arrived, and the Lesbian envoys who had been sent to Sparts were conducted to Olympia, where the representatives of the various Pelopopuesian states were just assembling to assist at the colebration of the games. Here they laid their erlevances before the confederates, dwelling not so much on ledividual instances of oppression on the part of Athens, as on the fact that her emaize made impossible that autonomy which was the right of every state, and complaining that though they had only ontered the Delian Longue to aid in freeing the Access from the Persians, they were now employed against their will in every mivate quarrel which Athens waged with another Greek city. Believing the revolt of the Lesbians to be the saruest of a general rising of all the vassads of Athens, the Peloponomians determined to make a vigorous effort in their favour. The land contingants of the various states were summoned to the Isthmus-though the harvest was now rips, and the allies were loath to leave their resping-while it was also determined to hand over the Corinthian lathmus the fleet which bad fought against Phormic, and then to desputch it to relieve Micylene.

It would seem that much of this temporary burst of nelivity among the Polopounesians was due to the idea that Athene, in consequence of the plague and the four years of costly and indecisive way, was now brought very low in resources. They were soon undecisived; the Athenians were futious at the idea that their vasuals were now about to be stirred up to revolt, and strained

every nerve to defend themselves. While the blockade of Mitylene was kent up, and a hundred galleys cruised in the Aeguan to intercept any succours sent to Lesbos, another squadron of a hundred ships sailed round Peloponnesus and harried the coastland with a systematic forcelty that surpassed any of their previous doings. To complete the crows of the two hundred and fifty ships now affoat and in active service proved so great a drain on the military force of Athens, that not only the Thotes but citizens of the higher classes were drafted on shipboard. Nevertheless the effect which they designed by this display of power was fully produced. To defend their own harvests the confederates who had met at the Isthmus went homewards, while the dismay at the strength of the Athenian flect was so great that the plan of sending paval ald to Leebos was put off for the present. Only a Lacedaemonian officer named Salacthus was secretly sent across to Mitylene, when winter had already arrived : he was but a poor reinforcement when the Leslians had been expecting a whole fleet to come to their aid.

All through the winter of 428-7 n.o. the blockade of Mitylene was kept up, though its maintenance proved a great drain on the resources of Athens. On the land side a considerable surge of hoplites under Paches strengthened the troops already on the apot, and made it possible to wall the city in with lines of circumvallation. To provide funds for the slege, the Athenians, having now exhausted the greater part of the hearded treasure of the Delian League, raised two hundred talents from among themselves by a property-tax, and also sent round galleys to collect extra contributions from their allies.

When the spring of \$27 n.c. arrived, the Spartans determined to make a serious attempt to send aid to Lesbos; but the fear of imperilling all their naval resources in a single expedition kept them from despatching a fleet of sufficient size. Only forty-two galleys, under an admiral named Alcidas, were sent forth from Corintia. This squadron managed to cross the Asgean without meeting the Athenians, by steering a cautious and circuitous course among the islands. But so much time was lost on the way, that on arriving off Embatum in Ionia, Alcidas found that Mitylene had surrendowed just seven days before.

The circumstances of the fall of Mitylene were peculiar. Pro-

visions had been growing scarce, and Salasthus, whom the Lesbians Fall of had placed in command, resolved to break the Athe-Mitrione. nion lines of investment by a sertie of the full force of the city. For this purpose be distributed full armour to all the lower classes of the city, who had proviously served only as light troops. But the proletariate of Mitylone had no interest in the war, which had been entirely the work of the clientchy. They only thought of ending the semi-staryation from which they had been suffering of late. When they were provided with arms they refused to murals, mustered in the market-place, and demanded with threats that all the previsions in the town should be placed in their hands, swearing to throw the gates open to the Athonians if any delay was made. The sedition grew so hat that the magistrates, in fear for their lives, resolved to make terms with the beniegers before the rioters anticipated them. Accordingly they merely stipulated with Paches that no one should be put to death until the Athenian Ecclesia should have come to a decision as to the fate of the city, and that when the center was being debated they might be allowed to send envoys to speak in their defence. These terms amounted to a surrender at discretion, and were readily granted by the Athenian general. Placing the leading men of the oligarchical party in bonds at Tonodos, he let the rest of the people remain undisturbed, only throwing a strong garrison into the town. A few days after the capitulation Alcidas and his floot perived in Asiatio waters. Learning the fall of Mitylone, he made off southward, and, after intercepting many merchant vessels off the Iopian coast and brutally slaying their crows, returned to Corinth without having struck a single blow for the cause of Sports. Pachas soon reduced Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha, the three Lesbian towns which had joined in the revolt of Mitylene, and was then able to sail home, taking with him the Lucenian genual Salacthus, who had been caught in hiding at Mitylene, together with the other leaders of the revolt.

When the prisoners arrived at Athens Salacthus was at once put to death without a trial. But the fate of the Lesbians was the Debate in the subject of an important and characteristic debate in Bookeast the Ecclesia. Led by the demagague Claon, the Athenians at first passed the monstrous resolution that the whole of the Mitylenacans, not merely the prisoners at Athens, but every adult male in the city, should be put to death, and their wives and families sold as slaves. It is some explanation but no excuss for this horrible decree that Lesboe had been an especially favoured ally, and that its revolt had for a moment put Athens in deadly fear of a general rising of Ionia and Aeolis.

Cleon the leather-soller, the author of this infamous decree, was one of the statesmen of a coarse and inferior stamp, whose rise had been rendered possible by the democratic changes which Pericles had introduced into the state. We need not brand him with ignominy, as did Aristophanes, for being low-born and ill-educated, or following a distasteful trade; but his character is sufficiently blackened by the acknowledged facts of his history. He had first made himself known as an uncompromising democrat, and a captious critic of every one who held an office; even Perioles himself had suffered from his boisterous assaults. Close was one of those men who, being gifted with very moderate abilities, endeavour to thrust themselves to the frent by the profession of a narrow and unscrupulous patriotism. He openly treated international morality as non-existent, and proclaimed that his country's interest overrode all considerations of right and wrong. Cleon's ability was limited to a power of gauging very accurately the varying moods of the Ecclesia. He rose to notoriety by making himself the mouthpiece of the public opinion of the moment, and by always coming forward to lead the assault on any statesman or general who made himself obnexious to popular prejudice. The chief victims of his invective were the remains of the old Conservative party, whom he unceasingly accused of sympathizing with Sparta and designedly mismanaging the war. It is unfortunate for his reputation that his portrait has been drawn for us by two authors whom he had personally injured : he had driven the historian Thucydides into exile, and endeavoured to deprive the comic dramatist Aristophanes of his citizenship. But even when we discount the wholesale charges of cowardice, corruption, crucity, and shamelessness brought against him by those authors, it is obvious that he was a bane to his country. The statesman who preaches to the populace that they are infallible and omniscient, and at the same time encourages them to cast aside principle and guide themselves by self-interest alone, is the most permiclous product of democracy. Clean's action at the Mitylemean debate is a fair sample of the whole of his public life.

On the eve of the first day of debate the motion of Gleen had been passed, and a galley sent off to Probes at Mitylene, bidding him slay all the Lesbians; but on the next morning, when men thought ever the matter in cold blood, there are such a revulsion of feeling among the citizens of the better sort, that the pryanels were laduced to reassemble the Ecolesis, and bring forward the question of the fate of Mitylene for a second decision.

The second question of the fate of Dilylene for a second decision. Mitstenson (Heon stuck to his bloodithasty resolution; he openly delegate, said that the Athenian empire rested on four alone, and that the only may to keep the rest of the allies in a wholesome state of fear was to visit the Mitylensonse with the hardness punishment that could be devised. If the assembly voted one thing one day and another the next, it would become the hughing-stock of Gresco; while its imbesile good-nature would encourage other states to revolt, in the expectation that, even if they were subdued, they would not fare very III.

Diodotus, the orator who came forward to answer Cleon, did next dars to appeal to the justice of the assembly, but rather strove to demonstrate that expediency required Atlana to refrain from wholesale massacre. "Let the leaders be put to trial," he said, what the rest left alone. If you conderne the common people of Mityleus, who took no part in the revolt, and as seen as they got reseasion of arms attacked the rebels, you are not merely slaying your benefictors, but committing a political blunder. At present the roling classes in every nilied state are ready to revolt, while the reoleteriate is, on the whole, well disposed fowards Athens. But If you execute all the Mitylepassus without distinction, the populace in every city will feel that their cause is the same as that of the nobles, and revolts for the future will be desperate and unanimous." Such arguments won over the Reelesin to the side of mercy. decree of Olean was resoluded by a small majority, and a second galley sent off to stay Packes from the massage which he had been directed to commence. But the first ship had now a start of a day and a night, and it was absolutely accessary to make all possible speed, or the reprieve would come too late. The friends and represeniatives of the Mitylenaeaus promised the crow great rewards if they would only arrive in time; and, atimulated by their promises, the vessel made an extraordinarily rapid passage. The commen took their food at the bench, and rested in relays, so that the ship's progress never slackened. By extraordinary exertions the bearers of the reprieve contrived to reach Lesbes only a few hours after Paches had received the first despatch, and before he had time to put it into execution.

Thus the majority of the Mitylenaeans were saved; but all their leaders and prominent men, not less than a thousand in number, were put to death; the mercy of the Athenian Ecclesia would have been called recklass bloodthirstiness in most other ages. The land of the Lesbians was divided into three thousand lots, of which a tenth was consecrated to the gods, while the rest ware gameled out to Athenian eleruchs, who became the landlords of the old owners, and permitted them to cultivate their own estates at a rept of two mines per sunum.

Nothing can illustrate more strongly the emational and inconsistent character of the Athenians than the fate of Paches, the conquerer of Mitylene. On his return home he was proscouted before the dieastery for having done violence to two Mitylenaesan halles, whose husbands he had put to death. The anger excited by this atrocity found such outspoten expression, that the crimbal fell on his sword before the eyes of his judges, in order to anticipate his certain condomnation to death. Yet the mob, which howled down Paches, had contemplated an outrage on a scale a thousandfold greater than that which their victim had committed.

In the winter and spring of 427 n.c., while the slegs and fall of Mitylene were in progress, another blockade had been drawing to an end, in a land nearer Athens. Plates had now been besieged ever since the summer of 429 n.c., and as the Athenians had belied their promises, and made no natempt to relieve the place, the garrison were drawing near the end of their stores. Starvation was growing so threatening by the end of the winter of 428-7 n.c., that a large part of the garrison determined to make a desperate attempt to break out. Eupompidas the Platesen commander The scribe persuaded about fifty Athenians and a hundred and from Plates seventy of his own countrymen to follow him, though the prespect

of having to creas two ditches and force two separate lines of wall might have appalled the most venturesome of men. They chose a morpless pight, when rain was falling, and stole out of the city carving scalleg-Indders. They crossed the inner ditch unobserved, and had mounted the first wall before they were discovered by the sentingly. Then the alerm was given, and the basispers began to come up in disorder from their various posts. The darkness, however, sept many astray, while those of the Platneaus who had not initial in the attenute reads a sortie from the apposite side of the town to distract the enemy.' Thus it happened that the adventurers were already descending from the second wall before the begiezers becan to appear in force. While the majority were crossing the outer ditch, which was deep and full of floating ice. the rest stood at bay and kept back the approaching Bosotians. So silently and rapidly was the matter finished that the Platsenns not away in safety almost to a man; for two hundred and twelve out of two hundred and twenty stipped through. After excaping from the outer wall they avoided the direct rend to Athens, by which they know they would be pursued, and after making a detour In the plain reached a road far to the cast, by which they escaped unmalested.

This gallant and successful sortio left Platases very seartily manned, but enabled the reduced garrison to hold out much longer on their limited stock of previsions. The sloge was pre-tracted not less than six months, till the summer of 427 n.c. was at its height. Then obsolute starvation so weakened the Platasans that the besingers might have taken the place by storm, but they refinized from doing so on occount of orders from Sparts, which

rintees this was that the Ephors intended to make a distinction, if over peace with Athens became measurer, between places which had been explained by force and those which rande a voluntary surrander. At last the besieged were brought so low that they surrendered at discretion, on the controls condition "that the Lacedsemoutans should be allowed to punish the guilty," Five judges were sent down from Sports, and the survivors of the garrison, two hundred Platseaus and twenty-live Atheniaus, were arrangeded before them. The trial power a preposterous face; the

prisoners were asked one after the other "whether during the war they had done any service to the Lacednemousnes or their allies." On making the only possible reply, they were condemned without exception to suffer death. It was to no effect that The Industriant close leaders pleaded in their behalf the many services ***excepted which Plates and done to the cause of Greece during past times, and especially in the Persian war. The Thebans, who had never forgiven the massacre of their three hundred citizens at the outbreak of the war, unswered with a flood of bitter invective, and put such pressure on their Spartan allies that the sentence was at once carried out. Thus fell Plates after two full years of siege, in the fifth summer of the war.

The Thebana appropriated the territory of the conquered town, demolished its houses, and left nothing standing on the spot save the temple of Hors, and a sort of wast lan or caravanemal for strongers, which they built with the stonework of the ruined decilings.

CHAPTER XXIX.

BEHACTORIA AND DELIUM, 427-424 R.C.

THE Same summer which saw the fall of Platner and Mitylone · beheld the first grave instance of divergence from the policy of Pericles of which the Athenians had yet been guilty. Although they were conscious of the imminent danger in the Aegean which they had just escaped, they now proceeded to indulge in a rush and vanturesome expedition for from home. In Sleily a war was at this moment racing between Syrneuse-with whom were allied Gela, Selfmus, and Acrogas, together with the Italies town of Local -and a confederacy of the three Jonian cities of Nexos, Catana, and Leontini, joined with Camarina and the Hallots of Rhagiam. We are assured that the interference of Atheas in this distant strife was due to a desire to establish a feeting in Sicily, and to a nine for rulning the corn trade with the West, which formed the most profitable branch of the commerce of Corinth. Twenty Athenian ships under Lachus sailed round by Coroyen to Rhegium, where they joined the fleet of the Ionian cities, and next spring engaged in a desolitory naval campaign which brought notifier party any min.

The later months of 427 n.c. were also notable for a flerce sedition in Corcyrs, where a party which favoured peace with Corinth made a desperate rising, and strove to put down the democracy, which was responsible for the alliance with Athens and the continuance of the war. The Spartans determined to strongthen their friends by sending to their aid the fleet which had falled to relieve Mitylene. But Alcidas once more arrived too late; the Corcyraem alignment were put down, and the victorious democratic faction took a bloody and reckless coverage on their defeated

opponents. Several hundreds, including many who were innecent of treason, were put to death without any regular Itial or condemonstration.

The next year of the war, 426 p.o., was perhaps the least eventful

which had passed since the outbreak of hostilities. A second outbreak of the plague occurred at Athens, but it wrought no very ereat destruction of life in comparison with the awful visitation of 430 n.c. The most important event of the year was on expedition -ns reckless though not so remote as that which had been sout to Sicily-which marked once more the tendency of the Athenians to engage in distant adventures. Demostheres, the Demostheres seneral who was now in command of the equadron in Astrola. in the Corinthian Gulf which had once belonged to Phormic, determined to make an attack on the numerous and warlike tribes of Actolia, who had up to this moment preserved their nontrality. The Messenians of Naupacius had persuaded bim that their Actalian neighbours were so uncivilized and so untrained to regular war, that they would yield to a bold attack, and consent to join the Athenian alliance. Accordingly Demosthers took with him, besides his own hoplites, forces from Naumotus and Zacynthus, and started up into the Actolian bills. He exptured a village or two, but presently the whole country side turned out is name, and the lightly equipped mountaineers so yexed and gailed the invadors that Demosthenes was obliged to fall back. When once he began to retire he was so closely pressed that his whole army broke up, and fled in disorder to Nauguetus with the less of nearly half its numbers.

It was of some solace to Athenian pride, but of little use to Athenian pelicy, that a few months later Demostheres succeeded in retrieving his military reputation by a brilliant victory in Acaranania. The demostherest of Poloponnesian troops, which had been sent to that country in 429 n.c., had been once more joined by the heplites of the Corinthian colonies on the count, and was again attacking the Acarananians. Demostheres, massing the whole disposable forces of bis allies, threw himself between the main body of the enemy and their reserves. On one day he defeated the Peloponnesians and slow their leader, Enrylochus; on the next he felt upon the Ambracian rejuforcements which were advancing to

sid the defeated force, and almost exterminated them. The blow to Ambracia was so sreat that in the opinion of Ratific of Thunydides it was the heaviest which fell on any city Circas. 426 B.C. in the whole war, and the proportion of the military strength of the place which was destroyed was almost incredibly large. But the victory led to an unexpected result; the Acarnaplans, knowing themselves to be free from any further danger from their neighbours of the sea-coast, made a separate peace with them. The Afhenisa alliance had served their purpose in preserving them. from conquest by the Cortathian colonists, and they had no longer any been interest in the war. Thus Demosthenes, though he had crippled an energy of Athens by his victory, had also taken of the edge of the devotion of a zonious and useful ally.

The year 425 s.c. was destined to be more fruitful in decisive events than any which had preceded it store the opening of the war. These events, however, sprang not from the deliberts plans of either side, but from a mere chance. Early in the year the Athendans, still following their visionary scheme for establishing a footheid in Sicily, had determined to send out reinforcements to Laches. A flost of furty ships, under an efficir remod Eurymedon, was despatched to join him. Demosthenes, too, saided with this squadren: he had returned to Athens since his victories in Acarmania, and was now going back to his post. After Eurymedon and Demosthenes had rounded Tagastum, a storm compelled them to Demosthenes had rounded Tagastum, a storm compelled them to

them wind-bound for several days. The sailors ventured ashore, and, to secure themselves from sudden attacks of the Poloponnosions, throw up a light entrendment on the rocky headland which forms the northern point of the Pylian bay. The stay of the float was protracted for beyond the expectations of the admirals, and it presently occurred to Demosthenes that the extemporized fort might be strengthened and made a permanent base for incursions against the western shore of the Poloponnese. It was prothed on an extraordinarily innacessible spat, commanded a good harbourage, and lay in that Messecoina district whose Holots had rises so often against the Spartan, Accordingly Demosthenes persuaded his men to entreach the

Probably not the same as the Pyles of Nester mentioned on p. 84.


hendland as best they could, piling stone on atoms into a strong though rough wall wherever it was possible to ascend the slope on the land side, till the fort was made tonable against any ordinary assault. On the sen side the cliffs allowed of approach only on one narrow slip of beach, where lay the landing-piace at which the Athenians had gone ashore. When the work of fortification had been completed, Eurymedea proceeded on his way to Sloily with thirty-five ships, leaving Demosthenes with five to hold the fort.

The news of the occupation of Pylos soon reached Sparta, and the attempth of the Attenian force which had hunded was so eneggetated by report, that the ephers sent in hot hasts to recall the Polopomesian array, which had marched a few wooks before to carry out the usual summer raid into Attien. Accordingly, King Agis with his host quitted their ravaging, and set out becomerad. At the same moment the fleet, which had been so unfortunately tardy at Mitylane and Coreyra, was summed up to complete the blockade of Pylos on the sea-front. Demosthenes had just time to send off two vessels to report the approach of the energy, before he was completely invested and besse on all aides.

The promontery of Pylos forms the northern horn of the tay of the same name; facing it at a distance of a hundred yards, and fronting the whole expense of the bay, lies the island of Sphaeteria, a narrow rock some two miles in length, prergrown with underwood and thickets. As this island was the natural point which an Atheoism force, dealting to relieve Pylos, would choose as its base of operations, the Spartans determined to occupy, it. Accordingly they sent over to it four hundred and twenty hoplities, together with the usual complement of light-armed Helms in attendance on their masters—a force sufficient to make any landing difficult. The two narrow inlets to the north and south of the island they intended to her with a close line of vessels moured across the outrance, but this design was not completed.

Meanwhile the garrison at Pyles was exposed to several desperate attacks. Knowing that an Athenian fleet would probably appear on long to all Demosthenes, the Sparken com-ras specime manders made a vigorous attempt to take the fort attack Pyles. by storm before it could be succoured. The lead and sea fronts

were simultaneously assaulted; on the former side the position was so strong that a small party of the besieged was able to keep the Pelopeonesians at buy. But a desperate struggle took place on the narrow ally of beach where alone landing was possible. These Demosthenes and his hoplites stood in secreted rows, while trieme after tricking the push itself up to the landing-place and to throw its fighting-men schore. Only two or three vessels



could approach at a time, and the front on which fighting could take place was so parrow that superiority of numbers was of no avail. After a prolonged encounter the Poloponnesians backed water; the difficulty of the place had been too much for thom; they had best many men, and their commander, Brusides, had fallen back on his deck desperately wounded, at the moment that he was emderocaring to loop achore. The assanit, indeed, had so signally falled that the Athenians set up a trophy to commomorate

it, binding therese the shield of Brasidas, which had fallen into the sea at the moment that its owner was struck down.

Before the Spartans had time to construct slege-engines or commonce a regular blockade of Pylon, an Athenian fleet appeared in the offing. Eurymedon had met the vessels which apparent Demosthenes had sent off to juck him, and had turned blockeded. back to relieve his colleague, after strengthening himself with the squadron which was stationed off the Actronomian coast. The Peloponnesian admirals, instead of endeavouring to block the two entrances of the bay of Pylos, allowed the Athenian fleet to file into the harbour, and engaged it in the space of water between Sphenteria and the mainland. The ferty-three vessels under the Scartan commander were defeated with case by the fifty galleys of Enrymedon. Five were taken, and the rest driven to run ashore and seek the protection of their friends of the land army. The importance of this victory lay in the fact that the Spartan haplites on Sphaeteria were now completely out off from help, and imprisoned on their island. They included some of the roost important citizens of the state, and were a very appreciable part of the small body of nure-blooded Lacadagmoniaus. Shut up on a desolate island, with provisions for a few days only in hand, they were obviously destined to fall into the power of the Athenians, unless something could be done to deliver them.

When the news from Pylos reached Sparts, the ophors at once set out for the camp, and viewed the altention with their own types. So little confidence did their visit bring them, that they at once proposal to Demosthenes and Eurymedon to conclude an amistice, and offered to send an embracy to Athena to treat for peace. The danger of four hundred of their own citizens had brought them at once to a state of despendency and humiliation, which is amount of suffering inflicted on their allies would have produced. The Athenian commanders consented to grant a truce, and to allow the blockeded hopities to be supplied with a ham ration of food, day by day, as long as the armistice continued. But they exacted in return that the Pelopounesian vessels, which were lying on shore by the camp, should be placed in their hands, as a security for the full observance of the terms of the truce. To this the ephrem consented, and at once despatched ambassadors to Athena to treat for peace.

This was the one opportunity which was presented to the Athenians, during the war, of retiring from the centest with glory

The Spartons appeared that they were and profit. & bortive asgetiations ready to revert to the status que of 481 n.c., and to ratify a permanent peace; they pointed out that the war had hitherto been inconclusive, and that, if their overtures were now refused, the next turn of fortune might make the Athunians lament their lost chance. The proposal was one which Perioles would undoubtedly have accepted; it left Athens with her empire and the commerce unimpaired, and record that, even when all the land-powers of Greece handed themselves together, they had been unable to shake her dominion. But the firm bond and cool head of Pericles no longer swayed the Athenian assembly, and the windy demagagues who now ruled it were set gpon pressing the advantage of Athans to the ottermost, without any regard for caution or moderation. Now, as at the time of the Mitylemenn debate, Cleon made himself the monthpiece of the ultra-patrictic party; he declared that Athens must not throw away her chance of making a hard burgain with Sparts, and proposed that, in return for peace, the Pelopomesians should surrender to Athens the districts which had formed part of the Athenian land-empire twenty years before. He demanded that Troozen, Achala, and the ports of the Megarid-Nissen and Pegae-all of which had been given up in 445 m.c., should be made over to their former suzerain. The Luconian ambassadors replied that the terms were lundmissible, but professed themselves ready to make advantageous proposals. If the Athenians would depute nonmissioners to treat with them, and not insist on the negotiations being carried on in the heated atmosphere of the Ecclesia. Cleon at once burst out with invectives. He justisted that the envoye were trifling with the people, and could have no honest intentions if they would not declare their whole mission in public. The feeling of the assembly was so obviously on his aids that the Spartage withdrow in descrip, and returned to report to the ephore the complete failure of their embassy.

The rupture of negotiations at Athens was the signal for the resumption of hostilities at Pylos. The Spartans on the island, who had for twenty days been subsisting on the rations with which they were supplied in accordance with the terms of the trace, were again thrown on their own stender resources. No help for them seemed possible, more especially since Eurymedua, alleging some slight infraction of the trace by the bostile commenders, utiturly refused to restore the Pelopomessian war-galleys which had been contrasted to him. His plea seemed to have been quite unitenable, but, having the vessels in his hands, he was master of the situation. While the Athenian flest bleckaked Sphanderia, two tritumes being continually kept moving up and down its coast in opposite directions, the marines strongthened the fort at Pylos. A very large Pelopomesian army now lay helper that work, but proved entirely unable to master it.

A few days would have sufficed to starve out the garriero of Sphacteria, and it not been for the extraordinary mensions which the Spartnes took to keep it supplied with food. Proceeded On every dark or stormy night small vessels put blockeds of out from various ports of Elis or Laconia and run. Sphacteria.

cut form various ports of Elis or Latents and rat the blackade; such high rewards were promised by the ophors for every suck of flour or skin of who that could be thrown ashors, that the merchants and seamen were ready to run any risk, and though many boats were taken, others continually succeeded in reaching the island. We are also assured that strong swimmers would frequently cross the bay at night from the realisand, dragging behind them akins filled with lineard or honey, and other feed that would pack closs. These expedients kept the mon or the Island supplied with a ration sufficient to maintain them, and the blockeds was therefore protracted for beyond the expectation of the Athenians, who had looked for the immediate surrender of the garrison. After two months had gone by the autumn was drawing on, and it began to appear as if the storms of the equinox would ere long drive the Athenians from their bleak and dangerous harbourage under the promontory of Pylos.

The discontent felt at Athens over the miscarrings of the blockade was now growing neute, and the people began to regret their recusal of the terms of peace which Sparta had offered. This induced them to turn their anger against Clem, who had caused these terms to be rejected. The demogages, wishing to direct their disponions, replied that the real fault by with the generals

at Pylos, who had showed a great lack of courage and enterprise, and might have reduced the island long age if they had possessed ordinary vigilance and energy. "I could have taken Sphacteria myself," he added, "if I had been in commend." This count remark was at once taken up by the enemies of Clean. "If it is so easy, why not go and try it?" was should from the growd. Then mean rest to Nicion, son of Niciontus, one of the strategi, a rich

citizen who detested Cleon's political methods, stepped on to the Bême, and formally proposed that the tanner should be sent to Pylos. This decree was only proposed at first as a plece of party sarcasm : the conception of Gleon at the head of a fleet was too ridiculous in the eyes of his emponents to be taken seriously. An absurd scene then ensued, as the demagague kept dectioing the unexpected honour, and his enemies continued to press it on himwith effusion. But to many of the multitude the notion of Cleen in command did not appear so preposterous as it did to Nicias: and those who had been accustomed to follow the tanner's political lead, oried out in cornect that he was quite able to undertake the husiness. The proposal which had been brought forward in just was ore lone. seriously taken into consideration. Nicins was quable to withdraw his motion, and Cleon found himself constrained to stand by his first uncuarded words. Thus it came to pass that in the end the demagague plucked up his courage, declared that he did not share that ponts fear of Spartan horozon which other men accomed to feel, and staked his coreer on a promise to capture or destroy the garrison of Sphaoteria within twenty days. He asked for no Atheuien treops to help him, and undertook to finish the game with four hundred archers, some hoplites from Imbres and Lemnus who were then in the city, and a body of Thracian light infantry. Control over these forces was granted him, and he sailed at once for Pylos. "The most secsible men at Athons," says Thucydides, "thought that they had now gained one of two good things. Either (as was most likely) Cleon would fail and be politically extinguished for over; or else he would succeed, and a heavy blow be inflicted on Sparta."

Clean's undertaking was not so rash and ridiculous as men thought. He was quite right in believing that Spartons were after all not invulnerable and invincible herees, but men who could beeverwhelmed by stress of numbers like any other troops. The detachment on Sphacteria was composed of some few bundred men, and if attacked with sufficient vigour by four or five times its own force must finally succumb. It is said that Demosthenes had already been thinking of an attack on the island, and had only been prevented by the caution of his colleague.

Just before Oleon arrived at Sphacteria, an accidental fire land destroyed most of the woods with which the island was overgrown. and denrived the Sportnes of the greater part of their gapaciers. Their numbers could be more clearly seen and their manouvres more closely followed than had hitherto been possible. Clean at ones took general charge of the operations, heading over the execution of the details to Demosthenes. They resolved to overwhelm the Sportage by gross force of numbers. Eight bundred hoptites were handed by night, near the southern extremity of the island, and covered the discularention of the rost of the force. They cut off an outpost of thirty man which was posted in that direction, and were firmly established on shore before Epitudes, the Spartan commander, approached them with his main hody of three lundred and ofty mon. By this time eight hundred bownen. the space number of Peltrata, a body of Messenian light troops. and a large draft from the crews of the seventy ships at Pylos, had been thrown on the shore. When Epitades advanced against the hoplites, a cloud of slingers and bowmen closed in on his flanks and rear, and so beset him with a cloud of missiles, that his small body of men were gradually brought to a standstill. They were now charging over ground covered by the smouldering ashes of the burnt wood, and the dust and reck well-nigh cheked and blinded them. As the Athenians would not close, but kept shooting them down from a distance, their position became unbearable. At last, after Epitadas had been sloin, his successor in command mave the signed for retreat, and the surviving Sparians out their way through the light troops, and throw thousalves into a rained fort of prehistorio days, which lay at the north and of the island. Here they maintained themselves for a short time; but presently some Messenians, finding a way up a erng which everhong the fort, appeared on a spot which completely commounded: the Sportan position, and commenced to pick off the enemy fromthe rear. The Spartans were now obviously doomed men, and Cleon and Demosthenes, holding back their troops for a minute, sent out a herald to bid them surrendor. To the surprise of those who believed that a Spartan never would lay down his arms, the majority of the surrivors lowered their shields and waved their lands to show that they accepted the proposal. Their officers asked leave to communicate with the army on the mainhand, and after doing so, and receiving the despairing advice to "take such measures as they could, so long as they were not dishonourable," completed a formal capitalation. Two hundred and ninety-two hoplites still survived out of the four hundred and twenty on the island; how many of their Helets were left is not known. No less than one hundred and twenty of the prisoners were members of the first families of Sparta.

Thus had Clean fulfilled his promise to the Athenian Ecclesia. We are told that his success was, "of all the events of the war, the one which caused most surprise in Gresca." If this was so, it illustrates the exaggerated impression of Spartan valour which prevailed at the time, rather than the rashness or good luck of Clean. He landed on the island with more thousands at his back than Epitadias had hundreds, and yet his victory was considered remarkable.

After their fleet returned with the prisoners on board, the Athenians thought that the whole game was in their hands. Cleen, inflated by his exploits, was more exacting than ever; and when a new Spartan embusy arrived to propose once more a general peace, and the restoration of their prisoners, the terms offered them were even harder than before, so that nothing could be done.

The success at Sphineteria soon tempted the Athenians into action on land more daring than any they had hitherto persected formed. Before the year was out they handed several actions at

sedition at thousand haplites near the Covinthian Isthmua, de-Goreyra, 428 B.C. feated the Covinthians in a pitched battle at Solygeia, and retired numelested to their ships. Then coasting southward, they again landed in the territory of Epidaurus, and seized and fortified the peninsula of Methone. About the same time the bloody scenes which had occurred at Coreyra two years before were repeated under circumstances of even greater atrocity than those of 427 a.c. The democrets, nided by an Albenian force, having suppressed a second armed insurrection of the eligerchic party, allowed their defeated enemies to capitulate on premise of their lives. Then they deliberately persuaded a few of the oligarche to break their purele, and, on presence that this invalidated the whole agreement, opnoed the prisons and butchered such of the three or four hundred prisoners as did not seek a specifier death by suicide. The Atbenian general Eurymeden made no attempt to save the unfertunates, though he had been a party to the capitulation, and had pledged his word that they should be given a fair trial at Atbens.

The year 424 n.a opened with the brightest prospects for the Athonians, and for its first few months the tide of their successes continued to advance. The strategus Nicias, early in the year, eaptured the large but rugged island of Cylliëta, which lies off Cape Malea, facing towards the Laconian Gulf. It was at once carefuld as a member of the Delian League, and its harbours served as the starting-point for many mids on the opposite coast, till the truth of the old saying, "Well for Sparta if Cythère were suck in the sen," was realized more locally than ever. During the same expedition the Athenians harried the Thyrettis, and almost exterminated the unfortunate Aeginetans, whom the Spartaus had settled in that district (see p. 301).

This expedition under Niclas was only one of many which wasted the const-land of Pelopomeans. It was the darkest moment of the war for the Spartnes; Athens would great them presides each term are reasonable terms of pence, and her obstinacy drove senior them to desperate measures to defond themselves. To prevent the general revolt of the Helats, which they expected, they set the Crypteia (see p. 74), or accret police, working with even more than their usual cruotty; it is said that as mony as two thousand victims were scoretly despeaded by its means. In their carlety to strike a blow which should be felt at Athens, whatever might be the cost, the cphors determined to essay a new and insandous scheme for suppling the foundations of the Confederacy of Delos. Athens, possessed one group of subject allies who dwelt on the mainland of Europe, and could be approached without that sea-verage which had become the terror of

every Peloponnesian. But these cities, the towns of Chalcidics and the Thracian shope, were senarated from Phoein, the moarest state of the Spartan alliance, by a vast stretch of land, comprising Thesenly, where most of the towns preserved a friendly neutrality towards Athens, and the berbarisa kingdom of Macedenia. It had never before occurred either to the Athenian or the Spartan mind that the towns of the Thracian tribute-district might be assalled from the juland. But now the task was to be essayed. Brasidae, the most enterprising officer that Sparte possessed, was commissigned to lovy a force which should march northward, and endeawere to rekindle the embers of war which still smouldered to the north of the Aegean. A few towns, which had revolted along with Putidace, were still maintaining on obscure warfare against Athens. and would serve, if once they could be reached, as a base of emerations. Seven handred Helets, who had been promised their freedom if they volunteered for foreign service, formed the nucleus of Brasidae's army. So hazardone was the expedition considered, that no state was asked to supply a contingent for it, and individual recruits were collected in seanty numbers by the promise of high pay. Brasidas was at Corinth with about seventeen bundred need in hand when he was drawn northward, before he was ready, by the action of the Athenians.

Still intent on their new policy of vigorous action on land, the Athenians and resolved to attempt the surprise of Magara.

Beardonnat Some partisans of democracy within its walls and conmorans sented, in the true Greek spirit of fection, to betray
their city to the enemy. One night they threw open a posters in
the "Long Wells" which connected Megars with its port Misses,
and the Atheniaus, rushing in, secured the long walls, and next
day but one captured Nisnes. They would probably have taken
Megars itself, for the factions in the place had shoot fallen to
blows, if Brusidae had not hurried up from the Isthmus with his
own force and the levies of Coristh and Sicyon. He offered the
Athenians battle in front of Megars, but they would not accept
it, and, contenting themselves with the capture of Misses, went
off homewords. Somewhat later in the summer Brusidae, having
finished his preparations, started off through Bosotia and Phocis,
to attempt the lazardous march which had been planned for him.

The expedition to Memra was only a ferstaste of the energy which Athens had determined to put forth this year. She had determined to repeat the tactics of the heroic days of 450 n.c. and to endeavour to disable and overrun Bocotia by a blow struck after the ordinary campaigning season had closed, and when no aid from Peloromesus could be readily obtained. The plan of campaign was comprehensive and complicated. Demosthenes was to land at Siphae, on the Corinthian Gulf, with all the forces he could collect from the western allies of Athens. On the some day the general Hippocrates, with the entire home-levy of Attien, was to enter north-eastern Bosotia, and strike at Thungra. Simultaneously the tewn of Chaeronea was to be seized by a large body of exiled Bosotians of the democratic faction, who had undertaken to aid Athens. But the plan was far too intricate. All expeditions where forces starting from distant bases attempt to co-operate, are especially liable to the mischances of war. Thus it came to pass that the attempt to seize Chaeronea was betrayed by an informer, while in the rest of the scheme either Demosthenes was over-early or Hippocrates over-late. The former landed at Siphae with his allies from Naunactus and the western islands, and drew out against himself the whole force of Bocotia; for Hippocrates was yet for away, and had not crossed the border. Being too week to fight, Demosthenes re-omburked; but two days later Hippocrates, marching by Oropus and the abors of the Eubocan Strait, appeared in the territory of Tanagra. He seized the temple and precinct of Apolio at Delium, close by the senside, and omplayed four days in fortifying it, and in waiting for news of the diversions which ought to have synchronized with his invasion. On the fifth, nothing baving occurred, he determined to return home, but had not got two miles from Dellum when the Bosoting army appeared on his flank. After watching Demosthenes depart, it had turned north-eastward, and was in full time to attack Hippocrates. The forces were not very unequal in numbers. The Bocotians had brought up eight thousand hoplites, a thousand cavalry, and ten thousand light-armed troops; the Athenians had about the same number of hoplites, but were considerably weaker in horse, though they had a vastly greater multitude of light-troops. The majority of the eleven Docotarchs (or

generals of the Borotian League) and been against fighting, but Pagendas, one of the two Theban members of their body, had overruled the majority and forced on the combat. The army of Hippecrates had just time to form up, fronting westward and with its hack to the sea, when the enemy came suddenly over the brow of a hill and charged. Raylnes prevented the light-troops on the flanks from energing, but the main bodies of each army closed and fought desperately for some time. Pagendas had drawn up his own Thehan contingent in a dense column twenty-five deep; the cest of the Boentians fought in the usual line-formation. Honce it came to pass that while the bettle went hardly for the Boestians on their left, where the Thespina's were completely reuted, on their right the Theban column crushed through the Athenian line, and volled it downhill in disorder. An opportune envaley charge checked the victorious Athenian right wing, and then the whole army of Hippocrates wavered and broke. A few fled northward to Delium; the rest took to the hills, and saved themselves on the spars of Parnes. Nearly a thousand Athenians, including Hippocrates bimself, had fallen in the conflict, while the Bosotians had lost about half that number. A fortaight after the battle the fortified root at Delium fell, the pallsading with which the Athenians had surrounded it having been set on the by the military engines. which the Bosotians turned against it.

This battle quite cured the Athenians of the taste for expeditions on land, which had been growing on them since the encurof Sphaeteria. It also marked the limit of their good forbane. Nover ugain did they win a considerable success, or find themselves in a position to make peace upon the forms which they had so rashly rejected at the moment of their triumph in 425 s.c.

CHAPTER XXX.

BRASIDAS IN THRACE—THE PRACE OF RICIAS, 424-421 B.C.

EVEN before the hattle of Delium had been fought, the end of the good fortune of Athens had been marked by other events. The wild and useless expedition to Sicily had come to a sudden termination. The Sicilian towns had grown thred of their purposaless strife, and concluded a general pacification; when this had taken place nothing remained for the Athenian aquadron but to return home. Sophocles and Eurymedon, its commanders, were prosecuted, unjustly enough, on their return, for having failed to prolong the war; they were condemned, the one to go into exile, and the other to may a heavy fine. About the same time troubles appeared to be brewing in Asia Minor; the exiled Lesbian oligarchs got together in some force, and seized the towns of Sigëum and Antandrus in the Tread; while at the same time a faction of the Samlans, who had established themselves at Annes, vexed the neighbouring Ionian towns.

But these symptoms of rebellion in the eastern districts of the Athenian empire were of small consequence compared with the troubles which were now rising in the north. We have already spoken of the departure from Corinth of Brasidas and his seventeen hundred Peloponnesian adventurers. Pushing on for some time through friendly territory, they met their first difficulties on the Thessalian frontier. Here the envoys of the Thessalian towns which favoured Athens forbade the army to precede. But Brasidas caplede them with frigued negotiations, and then slipped past them and crossed the great plain in three marches to forced marches. He was in the Perrhaebican hills, Thrace, and far on his way towards Macedonia, before his stratagem was

detected. In Macedonia he fell in with King Perdiceas, an old cuemy of Athens, who granted him a free passage into Chalcidice. Strengthening himself with the troops of the revolted towns in that direction, Brasidas at once commenced a campsign against the allies of Athens. He mot with little notive resistance; Acathens and Stagtrus fell into his bands before the winter arrived, and swen after the cold weather had set in the Spartan kept the field. His next attack was directed against Amphipolis, the new and flourishing Athenian colony on the Strymon, which commanded the only read that led castwards from Chalcidice towards the cities of the Thracian coest. If once Amphipolis and its all-important bridge were in his bands, no limit could be set to the castward extension of the revolt. Coming unexpectedly down to the Strymon, Brusidas

Broadeas soixed the bridge by a daring comp do mass during a suppressed amphipole. Suppressed as the companion of the Amphipoles and herds of the community. Moved with fear for their property and their friends, a party in the town proposed a surrender; the Athenian governor was mathe to command chedience, and the gates were thrown open. The historian Thoughdes, who was in command of a small Athenian squadron which lay at Theses, arrived too late to save the piece. So rapidly had events gone on, that though only one day's sail from the town, he failed to come up in time, and only succeeded in preserving for Athene Eien, the port at the mouth of the Strymon. For his tardiness, which was probably more the result of ill-tuck than of negligence, Throeydides was presecuted and exiled by a decree proposed by them.

Brasides had not yet completed the full measure of his successes. Before the winter was done he had gained possession of nearly all the towes which lie on the coast of Mount Athes, and also of Tortone on the control headland of the Chaloidic penhaula. These surrenders struck terror into the bearts of the Athentans, not merely on account of the actual impertance of the lesses—though these were heavy enough—but as showing the utter disloyalty which pervaded the whole body of their subject allica. When Brasidas presented himself before the walls of a town, there was always an oligarchic party which was scalous to admit him, while

the democratic faction, which should naturally have been friendly to Athens, showed at most a passive disinclination to revolt, and would not strike a blow for its suscenin. Hardly a siegle town preserved its allegiance when attacked, unless there happened to be an Athenian garrison within its walls. The personality of Brasidas aided to no small extent in securing his successors; he was no less distinguished for tact than for courage, and won golden opinions by his generosity, moderation, and good faith. The power of his name began to grow mighty in Chalcidlee, and it soon became evident that unless he were promptly crushed, or disarmed by the conclusion of a general peace, Athens would less every one of her tributaries to the north of the Aegean.

The battle of Delium had stripped Athens of her self-confidence; the loss of Amphipolis and Torone had made her contemplate with equanimity the prospect of a peace. Accordingly Abertive when, early in the next spring (423 n.c.), Sparts schemes for again made overtures for a pacification, the Athenian schemes for again made overtures for a pacification, the Athenian schemes for again made overtures for a pacification, the Athenian scheme for tunity for the conclusion of a final and definitive peace, the two powers agreed to a truce for twelve menths. For the first time for eight years the Athenians were able to put their neglected fields under the plough, with a reasonable prospect of resping what they had sown. Nor was the boen less to the maritime states of Peloponnesus, who could now resume the coasting trade which had been forbilden to them for so long.

complication occurred to postpone the negotiations. By the terms of the truce each party was to retain in its hands the places belonging to the enemy which it had captured; "Beson, Thebes, for instance, still held Plataca, and Athens Cythera and Pyles. But at the very moment of the ratification of the truce, the important town of Sciöne, in Chalcidice, opened its gates to Brasidas; the Athenians insisted that the place ought to be restored to them, while Brasidas maintained that, as the truce was unknown in Thrace when the place revolved, it did not come under the terms of the agreement. While this matter was in dispute, the still more important city of Menda, the third in size of the Chalcidian communities, followed the example of Sciöne.

Matters seemed in a fair way towards peace, when an unexpected

Those events so excited the Athenian Reclesia, that it voted, on the motion of Cleon, that an expedition should be sent against Science, and that, when the town was taken, its active population should be exterminated.

Thus it came to pass that although the trace was observed in Greece, and all around the southern Aegean, war still continued in the north. Niesas salled with a considerable armament to Thrace, and recaptured Mende; but he failed at Scione, and his troops were still lying before its walls when the year's truce expired, early in 423 n.c. Hostilities then recommenced along the whole line of contact between Atheus and her exceedes; but at home little of importance occurred, save that the fortress of Panictum, which commanded one of the passes of Cithaeron, fell by treachery into the heads of the Bosotians.

In Chalcidice, however, the war came to its bend. Burly in the year Clean appeared before Science, at the head of a considerable army. It is second venture in generalship was due to much the same causes as his first; now, as in 425 n.c., he had not brimself at the head of the party of action, and was consequently made responsible for the conduct of the war. Probably the demogracy had become to believe in his good luck, and hoped that, by some furturate chance, he would put down Bruskles as easily as he had checked to conquered Sphacteris. Clean's first operations were

Thunds Assertion and Isabepaus, and then healed at Euca, and and down opposite Amphipells, where Brasidas had concentrated the main part of his forces. There he waited, while reinforcements of lightness, and very wisely refused to give battle till he was reak in that arm, and very wisely refused to give battle till he was raised to an equality with the enemy. But the Athenian bepliftes grumbled at their commander's insertion, and the tanner, who lived by following every breath of public opinion, did not days to disregard their nurmandags. Accordingly he started off with his whole force

better to reconnecte the position of Brasilias, and to offer
Amphibolis, bim buttle. Brasilias drow his army into the town,
and kept perfectly quiet, allowing the Atheniums to
meach past his front without any moleculous. Clean rushly concluded that the enemy would not fight, and neglected every military

precaution; he himself went on ahead to explore the country-side to the north, while he left his army halted within a few score yards of the walls of Amphipolis, but not drawn up in battle array. Presently news was sent on to the demagogue that the streets near the gates of the town were crowded with armed men, and that an attack was impending. He at once hurried back to foin his men, and ordered the army to retire and take ground to its left-a command which caused the Athenians to delle cuce more before the gates of the town. This was what Brasidas had been expecting. "I see," he cried, "that these troops will not stand: I know it from the wavering of their spears;" and when the Athenian centre was opposite him, he launched a column out of each gate, and charged the enemy's line of march. Cleon's men were caught while executing a hurried movement of retrest, with their shieldless side exposed to the enemy. Many of them broke at the first onset : the left wing, which headed the line of march, fied back to Fion without suffering much loss; but the right wing and the centre, who were driven off their line of retreat by Brasidas's chargo, were very severely handled. Cloon turned to fly, like the majority of his followers, and was speared as he ran by a Thracian poltost. Only the Athenian right wing made any attempt at resistance, and that body was soon overwhelmed by numbers, and scattered by a vigorous cavalry charge. The rout was very bloody. Six hundred Athenians had fallen, and not a dozen of their opponents; but among the few whose loss the victors had to mourn was their general. Brasidas had received a spear-thrust in the side, and only lived long enough to hear that his victory was complete. The Amphipolitans buried him with the most splendid funeral rites, set up a temple to his memory, and vowed to honour him as their Ocklet, instead of Hagnon, the original Athenian founder of the city.

The deaths of Cleon and Bensidas removed the chief obstacles to a general peace. When the Spartan was gone, the revolt in Chalcidice ceased to spread, for it was his personal influence which had from the first been its mainstay.

At home in Sparts also Brasidas had always been at 23.2.6.

the bend of the party of action, and his death groutly weekened its influence. On the other hand, when Cleon was removed, the

strongest advocats of war in the Athenian Ecclosia disappeared, and the partisans of peace could bring forward their proposals. without any fear of being overwhelmed by his blustering eloquence. The negotiations which had been interrupted by the events in Thrace were some resumed, and brought to a successful issue. The Spartan king Binistoanax, who had lately been restored after more than twenty years of exile (see p. 266), and the Athenian general Micins, were mainly instrumental in the maification, to which the latter has given his name. The treaty provided for a fifty years! peace, and enjoined a mutual restoration of prisoners and of places captured, during the war, but this arrangement was not perfectly carried out; for the Thebans refused to give up Plataca, on the ground that it had not been taken by force, but had surroudered on expitulation. On a similar plea, therefore, Athens refused to give up the Corinthian colonies of Sollium and Acasterium, and the Megorian port of Nissen. In her auxioty to scenre the evacuation of the Athenian strongholds around Peloponnesus, and the release of the prisoners of Sphaoteria, Sparia sacrificed the interests of the Chalciding cities whom she had tompted to revolt; she promised to secrender Amphipolis in return for Pyles and Cythera, and to break off her alliance with the other Thraceword cities. In their behalf she only stipulated that Athens should not corres them by force, though she might, if she could, induce them to re-enter the Delian League of their own free will.\(\) Scione, which was still being invested by an Athenian army, was left to take its chance; and when it fell, a few months' later, suffered the penalty which had been degreed for it eighteen months before by the law of Cleon; ris men were slain and its women sold as slaves. As a matter of fact, Amphipolis was never given up to the Athenians, for Cheridas, who had succeeded Brasidas in command, declared that he was not strong coough to surrender it contrary to the will of its inhabitants, and contented himself with returning home with his Pelopennesian troops. In consequence of this infraction of the treaty, the Athenians refused to evacuate Pylos or Cythern. Thus. it came to pass that although the prisoners on both sides were

¹ The Chalcidino towns thus granted a qualified freedom were Olymbias, Acouthos, Singirus, Anglius, Sone, Singue, and a few more. Amphipotis, being nover recovered by Athens, shared their lot.

restored, the other clauses of the peace of Nicias were not fully carried out, and the main result of the pacification was to leave each party in possession of just so much as it was holding at the moment of the suspension of hostilities. Several of the most important allies of Sparta considered that they had been betrayed by their leader, and refused to ratify the treaty. The Thebana, therefore, contented themselves with concluding a temporary armistics with Athens, which was renewable every ten days, and might at any moment be denounced at that short notice. The Megarians and Corinthlans made no formal truce at all, but merely abstained from hostilities.

Thus the first stage of the Pelopouncian war came to an end, just ten years after the first invasion of Atties by Archidamus in 431 a.c. Its results had been almost purely negative; a vast quantity of blood and treasure had been wasted on each side, but to no great purpose. The Athenian naval power was unimpaired, and the Confederacy of Delas, though shaken by the successful revolt of Amphipolis and the Thraceward towns, was still left subsisting. On the other hand, the attempts of Athenia to accompilish anything on land had entirely failed, and the defensive policy of Pericles had been so far justified. Well would it have been for Athens if her citizens had taken the lesson to heart, and contented themselves with having escaped so easily from the greatest war they had ever known.

CHAPTER XXXI.

тив указа от тик такси, 421-416 п.с.

The period during which the truce of Niclas was more or less observed amounted to nearly seven years, but they are hardly to be reduced as a time of peace. "It is true," says Thucyddies, "that the Athenians and Lucedaemonians abstained for six years and ten months from murching against each other's territory, but with that exception they did each other as much damage as they could. They actually came into contact at Martinea and Epidacrus, and all the time hostilities were proceeding in Throse just as before; so that if any one objects to consider it a time of was, he will not be estimating it rightly." 1

But though there was no actual interval of peace after the treaty of 421 n.c., yet the main setion of the great drama stood still, and the events of the years 421-416 n.c. formed a stronge and incoherent teterhold between the two acts of the Pelopornosian war. The parties in the struggle are grouped differently, a new set of motives influence the actors, and the original causes and objects of

the war ere lost sight of.

One of the chief reasons which had made Sparta anxious to conclude putos with Athons was the fact that a thirty years' trace

Rupture with Argos, which had been concluded in 481 a.c., between was now drawing to an end, and that it was strongly Argos, 401 3-6 suspected that the Argives were disposed to try the jortime of war. The ephora had been anxious to end one coeffict before they were involved in another. Their suspicious were not misplaced. Argos had eccumulated new strongth in her thirty years of rest, and thought that Sparta was so weakened and

brought down by ten years of warfare that she might be faced with ease. Moreover, the Argive government had been sounding all the Pelononnesian states which were supposed to have a grudge against Sparta, and thought that they could find several powerful The Corinthians, who were grievously offended at the sacrifice of their colonies of Sollium and Anactorium to Athene: the Mantineaus, who were engaged in one of their perennial fends with their neighbours of Teges; and the Eleans, who were conducting a bitter litigation with Sparts concerning the border-town of Lepreum, were all believed to be ready to join in a rising to do away with the Lacednemonian hegemony in the Pelopounesus, Amphinolis and the states of Chalcidios were thought to cherish similar feelings, owing to the way in which they were abandoned to the mercy of Athens by the peace of Nicias.

Ambassadors were soon ressing from state to state, with the final result that Argos, Ells, Mantines, and the Chalcidians entered into an offensive and defensive alliance, which soon brought them into hostile contact with Sparta. Corinth drew back, and would not commit herself to war with her old suzonin, while the majority of the smaller states of Poloponnesus showed no desire to break with their Laconian allies.

Hostilities commenced, late in the summer of 421 s.c., by a raid of King Pleisteanax into Arcadia, when he took several places belonging to Mantinea. But nothing of importance had been accomplished when the coming of winter brought about a susneusion of operations.

By the outbreak of this war Athens was compelled to make her choice between two policies. It was doubtful whether she would do more wisely by standing saids from the struggle, Policy of and concentrating her energies on the recovery of the revolted cities of Chalcidios, or by taking advantage of Sparta's difficulties and renewing bestilities. In justification of the latter course, it could be argued that the Lacedsemonians had failed to observe the stimulations of the treaty, having neither restored Amphipolis, nor compelled their Bosotian and Corinthian allies to ratify the terms of peace. On the other side, it was urged by Nicias and the philo-Spartan party that, before ongaging in another war, Athens should reconquer what she had lost, and that the state

was above all things in need of a period of rost, to bring her rulned country-side once more into cultivation. When the summer of 420 n.a. arrived, ambassadors both from Argos and from Sparta appeared at Athens to plead respectively the causes of war and of peace. Miclas and his party would probably have prevailed, and the Argive ambassy would have been dismissed, had it not been for the machinations of a young statesman who now stood forward for the first time on the political stage.

Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, was at this moment a very young man. "In any other state then Athens," says Thucydides, "he would have been considered a mere boy, and for-

hidden to meddle in politics," But at Athens he had already made himsolf a name, and was a well-known figure on He came of an ancient and wealthy stock, which traced its origin back to the old Salaminian kings, and was placed by his position among the first families of Athens. His lundsome person and ready wit made him the idel of the gilded youth of the city, and his reckless love of adventure and mischief was ourtinually bringing him into notice. Any frunkon escapade, any malicious practical joke, any inconious piece of fooling that was perpetrated in Athens, was instantly credited to his account. He was continually indulging to frenks that put him in danger of the law courts; but offences that would have brought fine and imarisonment on any other citizen were visited lightly on the spoilt child of the people. His profligacy and insolance miscal up many enemies, but with the masses he was immensely popular. His utter went of decorum only smused them. When he snoke before the Reclasin with a net quail tucked under his arm, it was considered an excellent jest; when in the law court be casually snatched up and destroyed the judiciment brought against one of his friends, he was laughed at and not prosecuted. But in his more serious moments Alcibindes frequently turned to politics, which he treated as an incentous and amusing game, well suited for the display of his abilities. As a politician he might have been described as a second Themistocles, had not his inherent frivolity and fickleness placed him for below the great statesman of the times of the Persian was; but he had all the readiness, ingenuity. and persuasive power of his prototype. Like Themistocles he

was a strong democrat. It is true that on his first entry into political life he had come forward as an oliganch and a friend of Sparta, and had put his good offices at the disposal of the prisoners of Sphacteria; but the respectable Nicias and his philo-Spartan friends were appalled at the prospect of having to co-operate with a colleague of such approved disreputability; they rejected his advances, and advised the Spartans to have nothing to do with him. Alcibiades immediately performed a political somersault, and promptly appeared as an ardent democrat. It became his ambition to take up the fallen mantle of Cleon, and to be known as the people's friend and the monthpiece of public opinion. Ho had not only greater natural abilities than Cleon, but a double portion of his unscrupulousness. He scon became a considerable power in politics, and would have risen to the highest place if his levity and reckless vanity had not been too well known.

In 420 s.c. Alcibiades was set on causing the Spartan embassy to Athens to fail, and on bringing about an alliance with Argos. His plan was characterized by shameless duplicity. Alcibiados' He secretly visited the Lacednemonian envoys, and assured them that if they acknowledged that they possessed full powers to agree to any terms of alliance which Athens might propose, they would find themselves forced to grant more than they could wish. But if they would say that they were merely authorized to report the Athenian proposals to the ephors, he would throw his personal influence on to their side, and obtain for them the restoration of Pyles, and anything else that they might desire. The unwary ambassadors believed his protestations; and, although they had announced only a few days before that they possessed full powers to trust, declared at the next meeting of the Reclesia that no such authority had been granted to them. Then Alcibiades arose, and to the dismay of the simple Spartans proceeded to denounce them to the people as reckless deceivers, who said one thing one day and another the next, and whose overtures should be received with contempt. The people shouted applause, and the embassy was wrecked. A few days later a decree was passed whereby Athens concluded an offensive and defensive alliance for a hundred years with Argos, Elia, and Mantinea. All that Nicias, who opposed the motion with such

energy as he possessed, could obtain, was that war with Sparta was not solually declared, nor the truce formally denounced. But to make alliance with Argos was not very remote from cutering into hastilities with Laccinemen.

The next two years were occupied by a despitory and sporadic war in Pelepennesus, in which both sides displayed an astonishing want of generalship and decision. The new confidency possessed many advantages. Mantines almost blocked the way from Spurta to Corinth and the other towns which remained faithful to their old sussemin; Elis and Argos threatened it on each flank; yet, whomover the Spartane made a serious attempt to force their way northward, they invariably succeeded. The allies could never agree for a common plan of campaign; the Eleans wished to attack Learent and to carry the war into Measurie, while the Argives were intent on subduing their neighbours of Epidaurus and Phlius, and the Mantineans only thought of extending their power in Central Arcadia. But this want of common purpose among the Agran Argon allies led to no crowning disaster, for the Spartan King Agis, who directed the movements of their 418 B.C. enomics, was guite unexpant to his position. After many indecisive moves, he at last, in the summer of 418 n.c., severeded in beinging matters to a head. While he himself, with the forces of Laconia and his Arcadian allies, slipped past Mantinca and appeared at the mouth of the southernmost of the three passes which lead down into the Acrive plain, a second column from Corinth and Phlius debouched by the central pass, and a large body from the north, mainly consisting of Becetians and Megarians, advanced down the main road which leads by Nemes. The Argives were completely outconcealled and outcumbered, though they had received considerable contingents from Klis and Mantinea. Their army was, however, beat on fighting, and would doubtless have suffered a complete disester if two of their leaders had not opened negotiations for a peace with Agis. Instead of using the advantages of his position, the Spartan king consented to treat, on the assumance that Argos was roady to lay down her arms, and submit her disputes with Sparta to arbitration. He therefore dismissed his army. and permitted the Argives to secape. A few days later there arrived at Argos a considerable Athenian force under Alcibiodes;

and on very slight persuasion the Argive democracy was induced to disavow the agreement with Agis, on the pretext that it had been concluded without the consent of their allies, and to recommence hostilities. Thus the Spartans lost all the fruits of their compaign through the simplicity of their king.

While the Peloponnesians were engaged in these operations, Athens had been halting between the two policies that were open to her. She had not thrown herself heart and soul into the Argive alliance, nor had she taken decisive expeditions. measures to reconquer the rebellious cities of Chalcidies. At nome she had offended Sparta, without materially harming her; for although the peace of Nicias was still so far observed that her fleets refrained from ravaging Laconia, yet small forces were continually sent to aid the Argives, and to support Athenian interests in other parts of Peloponnesus. In these operations Alcibiades made his first essays in military command, and gained some credit for establishing the Athenian party in possession of the Achmian town of Patrae. Meanwhile a desultory warfare was still going on in Chalcidice; but since the attention of Athens was mainly directed towards the south, no adequate force was directed against Amphipolis or Olynthus. In consequence nothing more was recovered after the capture of Scione, and several small towns joined the rebels. At last the Athenians acknowledged their weakness in this quarter, by concluding a truce, renewable every ten days, with their revolted subjects.

The Spartan ephors had been greatly angered by the failure of Agis at Arges; they had actually proposed to demolish his home and fine him ten thousand drachmae, but this punishment was not carried out; it was merely enacted that when again in command he should be bound to refer all important matters to a council of war—an infringement of the royal precagative such as had not before been known in Sparta. In spite, however, of his unpopularity, he was still retained in command, owing to the general distruct full for his colleague Pleistoanux. Burning to avenge the perjury of the Argives, Agis resolved to give them battle whenever he found them. Although he had not been joined by any of his allies except the Tegeans and Herneans, he brought the cuemy to action not far from Mantines. The Argives and Montineans in

full force, together with their subject allies and a body of thirteen hundred Athenians, were opposed to him; the Ricans were absent, engaged in operations against Lepronus

The battle of Mantinea was a fair stand-up fight between two armies of almost equal force, in which the troops mot front to front

without any attempt to win tretienl advantages, and marrie of settled the day in hand-to-hand fighting. Each side Mantinea. was found to have slightly outfisaked its enemy on 419 B.C. the right,1 The Tegeans on the Sparian right stretched beyond the Athenians, who held the left wing in the Argive army; similarly the Mantineens had outflanked the division of Laconian Periocci, who formed the Spartan left. In each case the body that was outflanked suffered a disaster, but the fair of the Laconians was the worst, for Agis had contrived to cause a gap between his centre and his left wing, by ordering the latter to take ground to the left at the moment of charging. Into the interval thus opened a regiment of a thousand picked Arrive troops made their way; they turned the defeat of the Sparton left wing into a rout, and pushed on suto the camp of Agis, where they out the baggage-grand to nieces. Meanwhile the native Spartan troops in the centre had smeshed to stoms the line opposed to them, where the main body of the Argives, and the Argive Perlocal from Ornesa and Cleonae, were posted. Agis then assisted the Tegesna to complete the rout of the Athenians, and finally turned on the victorious right wing of the enemy, where he out up the Mantineans severely, and forced the Argive thousand off the field.

Though tactically beaten, through the mismanagement of Agis, the Spartens fairly won the field by hard fighting. Their encient valuer was found to be undersinished, and the unmerited disrepute into which they had fallen since the surrender at Sphaeteria was at once forgotten. In the fight eleven hundred haplites of the allied army had fallen, among whom were numbered Luckes and Micostrutus, the two Athenian generals. Of the army of Agis three

¹ There was always a tendency in Grack armies to advance taking ground slightly to the right, so as to outflook the enomy, at the extreme right wing. The hast haplite on the right wing patient forward to the right, in order to avoid exposing his maintabled side to the orient; his neighbours corried on the movement till it went all down the line.

hundred had been slain, all of them Spartans or Laconians, for the Tegeaus hardly lost a man,

The defeat of Mantinea drove Argos into peace with Sparta; soon afterwards the democratic government, discredited by the disasters it had brought upon the city, was overthrown Exemplations by a sudden eligarchic rising, in which the regiment an Argos of the thousand, which had distinguished itself at Mantinea, took the chief part. But the Argive eligarchy proved unbearably insolent and brutal; its leaders perpetrated murders and outrages which led in a few months to a counter-revolution. The victorious democratic party soon found itself committed to a renowed war with Sparta, and was compelled to call in once more the aid of Athens. The Athenians and Argives now attempted to put Argos in safety by constructing long walls from the city to the sea. But soon a Spartan army appeared in Argolis, and they were compelled to abandon the attempt, which would have involved

The new war proved as indecisive as that which had preceded it. Argos was completely overmatched, but the Spartaus made no ndequate use of their superiority, and contented themselves with supporting their allies of Philus and Epidaurus, and keeping the Argive armice at home. The Athenians despatched no large forces to Peloponnesus, and still avoided direct attacks on Laconia, though the exiled Messenians, whom they had established at Pylos, were not so forbearing.

the building of a double wall not less than five miles in length.

The chief event of 416 n.c. was the attack which the Athenians made on Möles. That island, unlike the ruet of the Cyclades, had never been a member of the Confederacy of Deles, and, Fain of Meles, had preserved an obscure independence in happy 416 B.O. ignorance of essessments and tribute lists. With no other justification except that an autonomous island was an anomaly, the Athenians threw a strong force ashere and summoned the Melians to submission. When the Islanders refused to surrender their independence, their city was blockaded by sea and land. After a vigorous defence the place fell; in brutal assertion of the right of the stronger, the Athenians slaw off the whole male population, and sold the women as slaves. This action was perhaps the most atrocious political crime committed in the whole war; Melos was

a neutral state, had given Athens no offence, and had been attacked without any declaration of bostlittes. Its destruction was the crowning achievement of Athenian lust for empire, and every right-minded man in Greece saw the vengonnes of Herven for the massacre of Moles in the unbroken series of disasters which thencofeyword attended the Achenian sins.

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE EXPEDITION OF THE ATHERIANS TO SIGHLY, 415-413 D.G.

ir might have been expected that while the Chalcidian cities were till unsubdued, and while Sparta was gradually freeing herself from her home troubles, Athens would have refrained from any further indulgence in those distant and hazardons expeditions which had proved so profitless bitherto. But this was not to be: insulred by its accustomed hopefulness, and led on by the volatile Alcibiades, the Ecclesia now proceeded to undertake an adventure which far surpassed in reckloseness anything that it had previously sanctioned. Peace at home was precarious, for the Bocotlans might at ten days' notice renew hostilities, and Corinth and Memma were also free from any permanent engagement. The Spartans were known to have been bitterly provoked by the Athenian alliance with Argos and by the appearance of Athenian troops in the Peloponness, and had fair grounds for repudiating at any moment the treaty of 421 a.c. The fields of Attica were only just resuming their ancient aspect of cultivation. The depleted trensury of the Delian League was far from showing the superabundant masses of bullion which it had contained before the beginning of the war. Yet, in spite of these obvious facts, Athons proceeded to stake her whole empire on a single reckless cast, and to imperil the reality of power in the Aegean while grasping at a shedow of conquest in the waters of the West.

It was now eight years since the first Athenian expedition to Sicily had been brought to an ignominious end by the conclusion of pence between the belligerent states in the island Troubtes in (see p. 335). Since that time new troubles had Sicily. arisen. In Western Sicily a war had broken out between the Dorlan

state of Selfmus and the barbarlan city of Segesta. In Eastern Sicily Syracuse had taken advantage of civil state among her leating neighbours of Leonthia, and destroyed their city; but the exiled Leonthias were keeping up a desultory warfare against their appressor from such strongholds as they could retain. Both the Segestans and the Leonthies had been allies of Athens, and it was natural that in their hour of distress they should bethick them of the great imperial city, who had before shown that her arm was long enough to reach out and deliver blows in the distant West. The Segestans About the middle of the year 416 n.a., a Segestan soud to Athens, embassy appeared at Athens to ask for assistance,

and to promise layish supplies of monoy and vigorous military ald to any force that should be sent to help them. Boolesia voted that enveys should be sent to Sicily to investigate the state of affairs; this was done, and in the spring of 415 p.c. their report was laid before the assembly. They brought sixty talents of silver, as an earnest of the resources which Segasta would put at the disposal of Athens, and save a glowing account of the wealth and strongth of the city. It is said that while In Sicily they had been victimized by an elaborate scheme of deception practised by their bosts, who pessed off on them all the allver-glit vessels in their temples as solid gold, and made a sumptuous display of private riches, by sending round to every house at which the envoys were entertained all the plate which could be becrowed in the city. Blinded by this astentations show of wealth, the ambassadors hold out magnificent prospects to the Ecclosia; the Segestans who accompanied their renewed their appeal, and some of the exited Leoutines came forward to back their potition.

The Conservative party at Athens put forward all their power to oppose the grant of sid to the Sagestan envoys. Ricins, now as Debaste to the Mayes acting us their spokesman, denounced the idea and the B.C. of interfering in Skillian affairs as propostores. But, full on by Akcibiades, the assembly voted that sixty ships should be sent to Skilly, in order "to easist the Sagestans, to join in re-establishing Leontirs, and to carry out such other monances in Skilly as should be best for the Athenians." The last clause of the decree was no side pleas of various, but covered a

cestgn—fully worked out in the mind of Alcibiades, though only partially apprehended by his followers—of reducing the whole of the Sicillan states to dependence on Athons. The idea had entered the teeming brain of Alcibiades that Sicily was so honeycombed by intestine feude that state might be systematically turned against state till all were subdued. He thought that the expedition of 427 no. had failed merely for want of strength and guidance, and that a large armanent, used with sufficient unsern-pulcusness and decision, would easily achieve his end. He got himself nominated as one of the three commanders of the expedition; the other two were Lamachus, a skilful but poor and uninfluential soldier of forbune, and Nicias. The name of the latter must have been insurfed by the vote of the opponents of Alcibiades, who would not have dogged himself with such an uncongenial colleague.

Appointed against his will to conduct a war which he had denounced, Nicias cast about for means to prevent the expedition from setting out. The bent of his mind inclined-as his conduct to 424 R.C. with reference to Cleon and Sphneteria had showntowards diplomacy rather than atraightforwardness. Accordingly he refrained from any further oren opposition to the Sicilian scheme, and only strove to disgust the people with it, by enlarging on its difficulties, and magnifying the land and sea forces which would be necessary to carry it out. But, to his horror and diagust, the Ecclusia, now as in 424 s.c., took him at his word. If sixty galleys seemed too small a squadron to him, he should be given a hundred; if the force of hoplice voted in the first bill was insufficient, he should be allowed to fix the number for himself. Alcibiades completed the victory of his side by a flery speech, in which he appealed to the national pride in the prestige of Athens, and promised his countrymen an easy victory over the mixed multitudes of the faction-ridden cities of Sicily. Accordingly the decree was passed that the armament should be prepared, and that its size and scope should be settled by the three generals who had been elected to command it.

Alcibiades' vanity and ambilion led him to ask for control over as large a force as the people would grant him, while Nicins though he did not believe in the possibility of success—had come to the conclusion that a powerful armament would fail less disasThe expedition trously than a weak one. Accordingly the generals agreed in demanding the most ample resources.
Besides the hundred Athenian vessels voted to them, they raised thirty-four more from the subject-allies; two thousand two hundred Athenian hoplites formed the core of the land force; to them were added about two thousand allies, with five hundred Argives and two hundred and fifty Mantineaus, whom Alchiades succeeded in enlisting in the Peloponnese. Of alingers and bownen from Rhodes, Crete, and classwhere, they lived thirteen hundred. Athens had once or twice sent out larger expeditions for some short campaign near home, but such a force had never been despatched on a distant adventure fully equipped for many months of service.

Public opinion in the city was so thoroughly convinced of the fensibility of the conquest of Sicily and of the unlimited possibilities of private money-getting that would follow, that every one was eager to have a hand in the business. The trierarchs spared no expense on the fitting out of their vessels; the hoplites who were drawn for the expedition considered themselves favoured by fortune; numerous merchants made ready to accompany the fleet in their own ships, in order to get the first choice of the new lines of trade that were to be opened. Alcibiades, whose windy promises buoyed every one up, had promised that the fall of Selinus and Syracuse should be a mere prolude to the subjection of all Sicily, the conquest of Carthage, and the absorption of the whole commerce of the Western Mcditorranean. Must men were ignorant of the size and power of the Siceliot cities, and even those who knew were carried away by the enthusiasm of the hour. In pare heedlessness and lightness of heart the Athenbans committed themselves irrevocably to the adventure that was to be their rula.

The expedition was not, however, destined to set forth under favourable auspices. Just as the dockyards and arsunals of Athens are the former were completing the last equipments of the fleet, and the Herman the generals were on the eve of putting their men on shipboard, a mysterious outrage threw all Athens into perturbation. There were scattered throughout the city, before the doors of private houses, as well as at every street corner and in every place of public resort, quantities of Herman, or busts of the god

Hormes, consisting of pillars about five or six feet high, with their upper portions haven into the semblance of that delty's head and shoulders. They were as common and as superstitiously reverenced as the shrines of the Madonna at the street corners of a modern continental town. In a single night unknown hands played havon with all these images, chipping and hacking newsy every vectige of human shape from them. It is said that only one bust in the whole city escaped mutilation.

Next morning there was a universal cry of wrath at the senseless and profane outrage. It was not merely the superstition of the Athenians that was roused; the vast number of the figures that had been harmed proved that scores of persons must have been concerned in the affair, and the city was frightened to find that a large band of scoret conspirators was lurking in its midst. The first cry of the public volce was that Alcibiades was the only person in Athens capable of such a wild and impious freak. But public opinion was almost certainly wrong; there was much method in the madness of Alcibiades. Rockless as he was, he must have been most desirous at this moment that his expedition should start with every favourable once. It is far more likely that the enemies of Alcibiades did the deed, knowing that it would be laid at his door, and perhaps hoping that it might step the expedition.

Large rewards were at once offered for information as to the outringe, and a special commission was appointed to conduct the inquiry; but the secret was well kept, and no evidence alcitiates in was forthcoming. A quantity of information, how-dassec. ever, cropped up concerning other recent pieces of sacrilege, the most prominent of which was a profune parody of the Eleusinian mysteries, in which Alcibiades had taken the leading part. At the next meeting of the Ecclesia, a citizen named Pythonicus rose to charge Alcibiades with this crime, to argo that he must also have mutilated the Hermac, and to demand his instant prosecution. The young general denied the accusation, and asked for a prompt trial; but it was refused him, for his own side thought the proposal preparateous, and his enomies preferred to bring charges against him in his absence, when he could not refute them.

Accordingly Alcibiades set sail with the other generals, at the

head of the expedition. Their departure was a magnificent and Departure of impressive some, for the whole city thronged down to Peiraeus to bid God-speed to the great armathe fiech ment, which was to win Athens a new empire in 416 B.C. the West. The heralds preclaimed silence, and public prayer was made for the success of the expedition; seamen and officers joined in pouring libations to the dolties of the sea, and as they chanted the hymn of departure, the great multitude on shore joined in. Then all the fleet simultaneously weighed anchor, and the swifter galleys raced with each other as far as Aegina, before falling in to the column of route. The acene was long remembered. It was the last day of unalluyed hope and exultation that a whole generation of Athenians was to know. The fleet rounded Malea and steered an uneventful course as far as Corcyra, where it picked up a large convoy of store ships and murchantmen, which had been sent on before to that place of rendezvous. Then, after despatching three vessels to Sicily to warn the Segustaus and Leoutines of their approaching arrival, the generals crossed the Ionian Sca at its narrowest, and pushed along the Calabrian coast toward Tarontum.

The Siceliots and long refused to credit the designs which Athens was entertaining. They believed that at the most a small squadron,

like those which Laches and Eurymedon had brought Feeling in across in 427-424 s.c., was likely to visit their waters, and made little or no preparations to resist it. Knowing that the strong anti-Syrscusan alliance, which had existed twelve years before, had now ceased to be, they thought that an Athenian army would get no foothold in the island, and would soon be constrained It was not till the fleet of invasion reached Corevra that they recognized that a real danger was impending over them. and learnt the true size and scope of the expedition. The Syracusans, on whom the brunt of the attack was likely to fall, then at last began to make preparations for war, sending out garrisons to the forts which kent down their Sicel subjects, and despatching envoys to all the cities in the islami for the purpose of forming a Pan-Sicelist alliance to preserve their common autonomy. But if the Athenian generals had acted with reasonable premptitude, they would have found Syracuse still far from ready for an immediate struggle.

Nichas and his collangues were now coasting down the shores of Italy; they found the Italiot states determined to preserve a jealous neutrality. Towns like Thurii and Metapontum, which were bound to Athens by old ties of alliance, only granted the armanest water and an anchorage; Tarentum and Locri denied them even those small boons. It was not till they reached Rhegium that they could find a state which would allow them to purchase provisions in a market outside its walls. While they lay in the Rhegium territory they received a discouraging report from the vessels which had been sent on to Segesta. Instead of proving to be wealthy and powerful, the Segestans were found to be unable to contribute more than thirty talents to the support of the allies they had summoned.

This depressing intelligence affected the generals in different Nicias held that, as a cold welcome awaited them in Sicily, they should content themselves with striking Plans of the a blow at Sellius, and then return home, and justify generala. themselves to the Ecclosia by plending the misleading nature of their instructions. Lamachus proposed to sail straight to Syracuse before the enemy had realized the nearness of their approach, and to endeavour to capture or orippie the city by a sodden attack, Alcibiades held the first scheme pushlanimous and the second rash, and proposed to open negotiations with the various towns which had a grudge against Syrucuse, to incite the Sicels to rebel, and meanwhile to enduarour to get possession of some city in the western part of the island as a place of arms and a base of operations against Syracuse. This fatal " middle course " was adopted. Nicias' proposal would have brought the armament safely, if ingloriously, home; that of Lamachus would have offered some chance of a victory, and brought matters quickly to a head. But Alcibiades' plan, by the long delays which it necessitated, ruined the purpose of the expedition.

In pursuance of the plan of Alcibindes, the Athenians spent the remaining months of the summer in coasting round Sicily in sourch of allies, and allowed overy one to learn their numbers, their objects, and their plans. They were unable to win any town to themselves, except Naxos and Calana; the latter was compelled perforce to join them, for while negotiations were going on, a party of Athenians slipped in at an unguarded postern door in the wall,

and left the Catananacans no choice but alliance or destruction. Camarina and Measone, allies of Athens in 427 k.c., would have nothing to do with their old friends. Some slight fornys into the territories of Synouse and Gela failed completely. The only military achievement of the Atlenians was to capture the small Stoel town of Hycoura, whose inhabitants they sold as slaves—a proceeding which brought them some gain, but taught every state in the Island what it had to expect in the event of an Athenian success.

While this dilatory exmpaign was in progress, the Salaminia, one of the two Athenian state-galleys, arrived in Sicily with orders

Algebrates for Alcibiades to consider himself under arrest, and to return at once to take his trial for the matter of the mutilation of the Hermae. Since the departure of the fleet the Athenian government had been making desperate efforts to unravel that mystery; their offers of rowards and indomnity to any informers who should present themselves produced a crop of venal and untrustworthy witnesses. Scores of persons were thrown into prison on such testimony, and the unending series of arrests led to something like a nanic in the city. The whole business may be not inaptly compared to the stir in England which followed the 80-called " Popish Plot" of 1679. The Titus Oates of Athens was the orator Andocides. Finding himself arrested and in danger, ho proceeded to make a pretended confession, on condition that his own life should be spared. He named himself and many other parsons as guilty of the sacrilege. His story was confused and improbable, but the authorities were ready to take any evidence that presented itself. Hastily accepting the whole tale as true, the Athenians brought to trial and executed every one within their reach whom Andocides denounced. The next thing was to investigate the profanation of the Eleusinian mysteries in which Alcibiades had been declared to be implicated. His political onemies, the demagnguas Peisander and Charloies, cried loudly for his punishment, and he was accordingly summaned to return and appear for trial. He started homeward from Cutana, with several of his friends who were also accused, but on arriving at Thuril very wisely gave his conductors the slip, went into hiding, and is next heard of as crossing the sea and appearing at Sparta to do what harm he

could to his ungrateful country. He had, of course, been condemned to death in his absence, his flight being taken as convincing evidence of guilt.

When Alabhudes was removed, we might have expected that one of the schemes which Michas and Lamachus had recommended would have been put into action. But this was not to be; all that the generals did was to land near Syracuse, defent the Syracusen army in the plain south of the dity, and then to sail back again to Cultana and go into winter quarters. The descent was purfectly



objectless, unless it was to serve as the immediate prelude to the siege. All that it did was to reveal to the Syracusans the nearness of the danger, and to induce them to take more vigorous measures for defence than they had hitherto thought necessary.

Syracuse, as it then stood, consisted of two portions. The narrow-neaked poninsula of Ortygiu, the oldest part of the place, projecting into the sea on its long spit of land, reastes of formed the inner and lower city. The larger and Syracuse newer quarter, the "Outer City." in a mound the heads of the two hurbours. The two quarters seem each to have lad its separate

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wall, the one cutting off the reginsula from the mainland, and forming an inner line of defence (8 on the map); the other, whose exact line is uncertain, forming an outer circle (perhaps as A A in man). To the north law the bare limestone plateau of Epipolae, a long spur of upland which runs down from the mountains of the interior, and overlooks the two harbours and the city around them. During the winter of 415-414 m.c. it occurred to the Syracusans that, if once the enemy seized Epipolae, they would be able to blockade the city with little difficulty, owing to the parrowness of the front of the defences. Accordingly, during the four months' respite which the inaction of the Athenians gave them, the Syracumus worked hard to construct a new wall. Starting from the sea on the north, they built a line of fortifications right across Epipolae from north to south, including all the western part of the plateau. and forming a strong line of defence, with a much longer front than that of the previous city-wall (o c in map),

Nor did the Syracusans neglect other means of strengthening themselves. They renewed their alliances with the other citles of Sicily, and sent for aid across the Ionian Sea to Sparts and Corinth. At Corinth, their mother city, they met with a favourable

Alerbiades at reception, and were at once promised assistance. At Sparta the ephors hesitated for some time, but were 414 B.C. at length convinced by the arguments of Alcibiades, who had joined the Syracusan embassy, and did all in his power to further its objects. He explained to the sphers the full scope of the Athenian designs on Sicily, and pointed out how they could be meet easily frustrated. He recommended that a Spartan officer should be sent to Syracuse with some troops at his back to encourage the Siceliots. Moreover, he advised the open renewal of war with Athens, now that so large a part of her resources was diverted to the West. But above all he hald stress on the advantage of sefzing and fortifying the commanding position of Deceloa on the brow of Mount Parnes, and of retaining it as a permanent post for the molestation of Athens, to play in Attica the part that Pylos had played in Laconia. Much of this advice the ephora were ready to take. They did not declare immediate war on Albens, but they resolved to send a force under Gylippus, an officer of distinction, to assist the Syracusans; Athenian auxiliarica

had been found in the Argive line of battle at Mantines, and Arbens could not complain if Laconians and Carlothinus were seen fighting in the Syraquam ranks. Four ships were endored to be prepared for Gylippus at once, to sail from Corinth; others were to follow.

When spring came round, Niciss and Lamachus received from Athens a reinforcement of envalry, in which sem they but hithertobeen deficient. They also raised some horse from the Demantes. Segestane, Catanaceans, and Sicels, till they had alto-monorates. cother six hundred and fifty. Thus strengthoused, they landed at Leon, a village a few miles purth of Syracuse, and advanced towards the town. Before them lay a line of heights, the northern slope of the plateau of Epipolus. The cliff could only be ascended at cortain points, and the Symonesus had placed there a guard of six hundred men. But this three was caught unprepared, for every one had been expecting the Athenians to disemback south, not north, of the city. Accordingly, the invading army had reached the brow of Epipolae before they were attacked, and succeeded in driving off the defenders and establishing thomselves on the plateau, facing the new Syracusan wall. The fleet come to anchor at Thansus, a little to the north of Leon.

Nicias and Laranchus had resolved to wall in Syraouse with lines of circumvallation, in the orthodox fashion of Greek siegecraft. The ground over which their lines would have to run was settled by the contour of the new wall which the Symonsaus had built in the winter; opposite it, at a distance just beyond bowshot, the Athenian lines were to be constructed. The porthern half of their extent would cut across the high plateau of Epipolae; the southern half would lie on the singe where Epipole sank down towards the Great Harbour, and on the marshy plain by the senshore. Nicins began by constructing a fort called Labdelum at the highest point on Epipolae, and then a large chroniar entroughment (E in map) somewhat further south. The letter was to be the central point of the line of circumvallation, lying at an equal distance from the open sen on the north and the Great Harbour on the south. Instead of coming out and offering battle, the Symcusen generals had determined to endeavour to frustrate the attempt to build them in, by throwing out counter-walls from the city, across the ground

where the Athenian lines were to be drawn. They accordingly built, towards the southern brow of the plateau of Epipolas, a stockade running east and west (it on the map), south of the central fort which Niclas had crocted. The Athenian works could not be continued unless this entrenchment were captured and destroyed; accordingly a vigorous and successful attempt was made to storm it, when the Syracusaus at midday were intent on their rest or their meal. The counter-wall was destroyed, and the Athenian line of circumvaliation completed southward from the circular fort as far as the foot of Epipolae.

The Syracusans, still persevering with the same plan of resistance, now built a second counter-wall on the low marshy ground Athenian near the Great Harbour (s on the plan). This

macrossea also the Athenians assembled, but they did not on that occasion surprise the enemy, who came out in full force into the open, and fought a general action in defence of the counterwall. Again, however, the Athenians were victorious; the Syracusaus were scattered and routed, and their entrenchment carried by storm. But in the midst of the battle Lamachus was slain, so that the sele command of the Athenian army now develved upon This was an immense misfortune for Athens; the fallen general was a man of energy and decision and a practised soldier. while the survivor was more of a politician than a military man, and though fit enough for fair-weather campaigning, was mone to doubt and freeschitlon at critical moments. Moreover, he hated the task which had been put upon him, and believed in his own heart that it was impossible. To add to his troubles, he was suffering from a painful internal disease, which frequently confined him to his tont.

Having driven the Syracusans within their walls, the Athenian army was now in a position to complete the lines of circumvallation. Nicias had brought round the fleet from Thapsus to the Great Harbour, had landed all his stores and drawn his ships ashors on its beach. He therefore thought is most important to complete the southern portion of the lines, so as to cover the fleet; the northern section, towards the open sea, he left unfinished till he should have fully built the rest. Thus is some to pass that while the circumvallation from the brow of Epipolae to the Great Harbour

was elaborately complete, with a double line of wall, that which ren from the central circular fort to the mothlern sea was full of gaps, and in places hardly even commenced. This was to prove of fatal importance during the next few weeks.

The Athenians had now reached the height of their good fortune, though this only amounted to having abut up the Syracusans in their city; the real siege had yet to begin. Nevertheless the moral effect of their success was considerable; a faction in Syracuse had already commenced to talk of asking for terms of peace, and reinforcements were beginning to join the invaders from several states hitherto neutral, even from distant Etruria.

Just at this moment a new factor intervened in the struggle. Gylippus had started from Corlath with bis four ships when the spring came round, and had now arrived in Skelly. Oylippus in He landed at Himera, hardly hoping to save Syracuse. for rumour had reported that the city was now entirely circumvallated. Finding that this was not yet the case, he resolved to throw himself into it. He added to the seven hundred men whom he had brought with him several thousand more from Himera, Schous, and Gela, and marched rapidly towards Symouse. Coming upon the unfinished portion of the Athenian lines, on the northern side of Epipolae, he passed through one of the gaps and threw blmself into the town. The whole Syracusan army Gytingus enters came out to join him, and then offered the Athenians battle. Nicias would not accept the challenge, finding himself outnumbered now that Gylippus' army had arrived. He lay with his troops under arms near the circular fort on the south side of Epipolae, and made no movement when Gyllppus laid hands on the unfinished wall to the north, pulled it down, and began to build with its materials a counter-wall running out from the Syracusan lines of defence toward the highest ground on Enlockae. He allowed his fort at Labdalum to be surprised and captured, and thus entirely lost communed of the northern slope of the plateau. Presently the Syracusan counter-wall reached the layel of the Athenian lines, just north of the circular fort; if it could be continued any further, Nicias could not hope to recover his lost ascendancy, and would himself be besieged rather than besieging. It required two sharp engagements to settle the question; but in the

second Gylippus was wholly victorious, and the counter-wall was carried past the critical point. During the succeeding month the Syracusans prolonged it more and more to the west, till it finally reached Euryslus, the narrow and lofty western summit of Epipolae; at the more exposed points on its front it was strengthened with four forts (m m in map).

The misfortunes of Nicias were only just beginning. A few days later twelve Peloponnesian triremes ran the blockade, and entered the small harbour in safety. They announced that more ships were to follow, a promise which encouraged the Syracusans to think of lannahing their own fleet; they possessed some forty or fifty vessels, which had not yet ventured out of port, for fear of the overwhelming forces of the Athenians. The stir which was soon visible in the Syracusan arsenal disturbed Nicias, for his sown squadron was now in very bad condition. The galleys had been lying on the beach for some months far from any dock, and were growing leaky. The crews were out of condition, and many of the slaves and mercenaries who filled the lower benches had begun to desert since the fortune of the armament seemed at an end.

Niclas now began to take defensive measures, in case Gylippus should be embeddened to take the offensive. He occupied the Niclas sairs peninsula of Plenmyrium, which runs out into the

Mains again partial and provided of the present of the stores, and a considerable portion of the fleet. Three forts were erected in commanding positions to protect the new depot. If the unfortunate general had possessed sufficient moral strength to carry out his own plans, he would now have put his troops on shiplocard and salled home, abandoning the whole enterprise. But Nicias was a man of irresolute anture, and terribly afraid of responsibility. He dreaded the reception which would have awaited him in Athens, and instead of departing, as his own impulse urged, contented himself with sending despatches home to describe his evil plight, and to ask for further orders. "Unless 'Athens," he wrote, "was realy to send to his assistance a very large expedition in the shortest possible time, or to allow him to return, he foresaw a disaster." Autumn was now at hand, and the time required for sending to Athens and receiving an answer

was so great, that it was obvious that the spring would have arrived before any orders sent from home could be carried out.

The despatches of Nicias reached Athens at a most unfavourable moment, for it had just become evident that the renewal of the war with Sparta was at hand. Exasperated by the sending of Pelopounesian troops to Syracuse, the Athenians had, in the summer of 414 p.c., openly 414 B.C. broken the truce with Sports by sending a fleet of forty shins to harry the coast of Laconia. Prasino, Epidaurus Limera, and other places had been sacked and burnt; the ephore had sworn vengeance, and it was known that the great inroads into Attica. which had crased since 421 n.c., were to recommence next spring. It might have been expected that when the old strife with Scarta was about to to renewed, the Ecclesia would have commanded the instant return of the army in Stolly for service nearer home. But, blinded by their usual over-confidence and hopefulness, the Atheulans resolved to persevere lu the attack on Symouss. They refused to recall Nicias or to bring home the army, and sent out word that he should have reinforcements sufficient to bring the siege to a successful end. Demosthenes, the most distinguished general that Athens possessed, was to head the new expedition. which was almost to rival the first in its strength and resources. Eurymodon was sent forward at midwinter with ten shins to warn Nicias of the auproaching aid-

Meanwhile at Syrncuse the winter of 414-13 a.c. was passing by. No decisive event had happened, but the Athenian army was visibly growing weaker, while Gylippas had raised several thousand men, from the Siceliot cities allied with Syracuse, to strengthen his already superior force. He had also persuaded the Syracusans to launch every war-vessel that could possibly be made seaworthy, and not less than eighty gulleys were now lying ready for service in the two harbours. When the spring arrived, he assumed the offensive; marching inland, he worked right round to the rear of the Athenian camp, and established himself, unler cover of the night, close to their depôt at Plemmyrium. When the dawn came, his ships left the barbour and offered the Athenian battle; a violent conflict took place at the mouth of the Great Harbour, which ended in the defeat

of the Syracusans. But while Nicias was intent on the seafight, Gylippus had fallen upon the forts at Plemmyrium, stormed all three, and got possession of the vast stores which had been heaped together on that peninsula. So far, too, were the Syracusans from feeling discouraged by the result of the naval engagement, that a few days later they sent out a squadron of twelve ships to crulse in the open sea. These vessels fell in with some Athenian ships, which were conveying treasure to Nicias, and destroyed several of them.

Meanwhile King Agis, with a large Peloponnesian army, nad invaded Attica in April, and ravaged the whole country. He had taken the advice of Alcibiades, and established a permanent Spartan garrison at Decelifa. Nevertheless the Athenians had not slackened in their determination to send help to Nicias, and while the Spartan army was still in the land, had sent forth Demosthenes and his expedition. He had seventy-five triremes, five thousand hoplites, of whom twelve hundred were Athenians, and a large force of light-troops. On his way he obtained considerable reinforcements from Acarnania and also from Italy; for, owing to demestic revolutions, the states of Metapentum and Thurii had just changed their policy and concluded an alliance with Athens. About the same time that Demosthenes sailed forth, the Spartans despatched several small squadrons, with about two thousand troops on board, under orders to cross the open son to Sicily and run the Athenian blockade.

When the news of the approach of Demosthenes reached Syracuse, Gylippus and his Syracusan colleagues resolved to make a determined attempt to crush Nicins, before he could receive his reinforcements. The Syracusan army, divided late two corps, attacked the Athenian camp both from the city and from the island; at the same time their fiect offered buttle with eighty ships in the Great Harbour. The forces of Nicins were now so weakened that he could only man seventy-five ships, though forty or fifty more lay empty on the beach. The attempt on the Athenian camp failed, but by sea, after two days' hard fighting, the Syracusans had the mastery, and compelled the enemy to seek refuge on shore under the protection of his land army, leaving seven or eight galleys behind him. The victory of the Siceliots

was ascribed to the manner in which they had equipped their fleet; they had cut down and strengthened the bows of each ship, and made their beaks short and strong instead of long and sharp. When a Symcusan and an Athenian vessol came into direct collision, stem to stem, it resulted that the weaker beak of the latter made little impression on the solid bows of the other, while the shorter but stronger beak usually broke through the slighter frame of the Athenian ship. Those direct collisions were bound to occur very frequently in the confined space of the Great Harbour, which gave the Athenians little room for the skirmishing tactics in which they excelled.

Within a few days of the sea-fight Demosthenes arrived with his great armament, and once more threw the bulance of nower on to the side of the Athenians. Being a man of vigour Demostheness and decision, he overruled the dilatory Nicias, and at Syrasuse, commenced offensive operations the moment that his men were on shore. He first brought military engines to bear on the Syracusan counter-wall, which shut the Athenians off from the plateau of Rulpolas, and then tried to storm the works. His attack was repulsed, but his resources were not at an end. Marching inland under cover of the night, he ascended the hillside bayund Euryalus, the westernmost palat of Enipolae, where the Syracusan counterwall ended. This circuitons route brought him to the rear of the enemy's position, where his attack was whally unexpected. He captured a fort, drove back the forces left to guard the wall, and pushed on for some time, carrying all before him. But presently his troops fell into disorder, the enemy ralifed, and a desperate and confused conflict was carried on in the darkness. It terminated in the rout of the Athenians, who suffered terribly as they fled along the steep cliffs, and lost as many men by the precipioes as by the sword of the enemy. The defeat cost so many Defeator lives, and demoralized the army to such an extent, Demouthmen that Demosthenes at once decided that nothing remained presible but instant retreat. Niciae, however, withstood him, and insisted that the nesition was not yet bopcless, and that Syracuse would ere long ask for terms from sheer inability to bear any longer the intelerable pressure of the war. But soon the reinforcements from Peleponnesus joined Gylippus, and at the same time a fever, bred

in the marsh beside the Athenian camp, began to thin the invador's ranks. Even Nicias now consented to abandon the siege, and gave orders for embarkation. But, on the night before the day of departure, a total cellipse of the moon occurred. The soothsayers, who were called in to interpret the orner, proclaimed that the army must remain quiet for thrice nine days. Nicias, who was intensely superstitious, insisted on following their advice, and the embarkation was postponed for the period named.

This was the last stroke needed to complete the ruin of the Athenians. The obvious preparations for departure in the in-Great sea fight vader's comp had raised the spirits of the Syracusans in the harbour. to the highest pitch of exultation, and they commenced a series of attacks which made the position of Nicias and Demosthenes more and more difficult. Their fleet, though little more than half as strong in mere numbers as that of the Athenians, was increantly active. Its vigour and daring grew so great, that at last seventy-six Syracusan vessels routed a soundron of eightysix which Rurymedon led out against them, slew that officer, and took eighteen of his ships. The next action of Gylinpus showed that he had got beyond the idea of merely driving the Athenians away, and had begun to think of annihilating them. He rapidly threw agrass the narrow mouth of the Great Harbour, between Ortygia and the northernmost point of Plemmyrium, a barrier composed of merchantmen moored stem to stern, so as to complotely shut in the Athenian fleet.

This drove even Niclas to desperate and immediate netice. Rvery seaworthy ship that the invaders could muster was drawn down to the sea; large drafts both of hoplites and of light-armed troops were sent on board, and a supreme effort was made to crush the Syracusans by gross force of numbers. A hundred and ten galleys, with Demonsthroes at their head, sailed forth to burst the barrier at the mouth of the harbour, while Nicias kept guard in the camp on shore. The Syracusans, though they could only send out eightly resuels, did not decline the combat. The two flects grappled toguther in the confined space of the harbour, and lay locked in close conflict for hours. The whole of Syracusa crowded to the walls of Ortygla to view the fight, while the Athenian land army mounted the ramparts of their camp to

watch the dicision of their inte. The stake at issue was so heavy that the victory was disputed with far greater obstingey than had been soon in any previous engagement. The Athenians had rolly staring them in the face, if they could not burst the harrier and force their way to sea; the Syragusans were borne up by the selfconfidence which their previous successes had generated, and determined not to lose the fruits of their long struggle. There was little manocuvring possible, and the fight resembled a land battle on the sea, for the vessels drifted into knots, and lay wedged together, while the haplites fought hand to hand in their astempts to board. At last the resolution of the Athenians began to fall them; in spite of their superlor numbers they had made no headway, and had not even apprenched the boom. With a simultaneous immules every vessel that could get loose backed water, turned, and made for the shore. The land army, with one loud group of despair, ran down from the earn to the beach, to aid in drazeing the ships into safety. Bixty came safely to land, fifty were left in the power of the enemy, or lay at the bettom of the harbonr. The Syrncusans had suffered almost as severely in proportion to their numbers, for nearly thirty of their vessels were suck or utterly disabled.

Demosthenes made one final appeal to the defeated armament. He printed out that the Athenian vessels which survived still outnumbered the enemy, that the victors were completely exhausted, and that the only real chance for escape lay in bursting the barder. But when he ordered the seamen once more to embark, they sulbuly refused to return to the battle; nothing more could be done at sea.

The only remaining course for the Athenians was to burn their fleet, evacuate their camp, start includ, and attempt to reach Catana by a march of forly miles through the hills The Athenians and defiles of the Syracusan territory. Clear-headed arrival by men foresaw that the attempt must end in ruin, for the army was demoralized, the reads were bad, and a victorious enemy in everwhelming numbers was ready to start in pursuit. But to give the retreat any cleance of success it must be commenced at once, before the Syracusans had time to beset the pusses through which the army must thread its way. Misled, however, by false

reports of the intentions of the enemy, Niclas refused to start the night after the tattle, and even the next day was occupied in sorting over the stores, packing up treasure and provisions, and settling the details of the march. On the third morning the whole army started forth in a great hollow square, with the baggage in the centre. Nicias led the van, Demosthenes the rear. Vast quantities of stores were abandoned, and the apathy and carelessness displayed was so great that the larger part of the fleet was left unburnt for the enemy to tow away at lefaure. Not only were the correct of these who had fallen still lying unburied on the shore, but several thousand wounded were left behind, in spite of the pitiful appeals for ald which they addressed to their departing countrymen. The whole mass of combatants and non-combatants hurried away without any thought than that of saving their own persons. "They were quite disheartened and demoralized," writes Thucydides, " and resembled nothing but a whole city starved out and endeavouring to escape; and no small city too, for counting the whole multitude, there were not less than forty thousand on the march."

Meanwhile the two days of delay had permitted the Syracusums to seize all the difficult passes, throw up works against the fords, Dispeters of and break down the bridges on every read which the the retreat. Athenians could take. Mereover, they had planted parties of cavalry wherever the ground was open and level, so that no one could straggle from the ranks of the retreating force. the first day the army forced the passage of the river Anapus and advanced five miles, not without suffering severe losses. On the second day they reached the foot of a pass called the Aemean Chir, and found it strongly held by the enemy. The third and fourth days were spent in attempts to force this defile, which proved entirely unavailing; while the head of the army was fighting in the pass, the rear was being galled by unceasing cavalry charges, and shot down from a distance by the light-armed troops of the Syracusans. Finding the Acracan Cliff impregnable, the Athenians now fronted to the rear, and started off in a new direction; as they could not reach Gatana, they would endeavour to make their way to the friendly Sicels of the interior. The march new lay southward; before it could begin, Niclas had to cut his way through

the Syracusan corps which bad been banging on his roar, a feat which he accomplished only with heavy loss. The food of the retreating army was now well-nigh exhausted, and there was un spirit for fighting left in them; the whole force was ready to disband, and many thousands had already deserted and taken to the hills, in the hope of finding their way to Catana. When night came, the generals ordered tires to be lighted to deceive the enemy, and led off their remaining troops with such speed as they could. Nicias, with the smaller half of the army, got clear nway and gained some miles on his pursuers; but Demosthenes, who had lost his way in the darkness, was struggling along for to the rear. In the morning the Syracusans found the enemy vanished, and started off in hot haste to pursue him. They came up with Demosthenes' corps as it was making its way through a unrrow defile. The Atheniaus made little resistance; many were cut down, the main body took refuge in a walled enclosure which they held for a few hours. Then, finding themselves entirely surrounded, they haid down their arms on condition that their lives should be spared. Six thousand mon were taken here, a much larger number had fallen or been captured before nomostheness the final surrender. Demosthenes threw himself espenred. upon his sword when the surrender took place; but the wound was not mortal, and he was borne back, still living, to Syracuse,

Meanwhile Nicias, relieved for a day from the pressure of the enemy on his rear, had forced the passage of the river Cacyparis, and made considerable progress southward. But on the next day the Syracusan horse reappeared to molest his march, and brought him pows of the capture of Demostheres. Gylippus now bale the Athenian surrender; but Nicias, making a final offert, pushed on as far as the river Asinarus, though his men were now so famished and weary that it was hard to get them to move. By the time that the river was reached, the Syracusans had gone round and occupied the further bank. Hundreds of the Athenians perished in the stream, as they strove to cross; as many were tradical down in the narrow ford by their comrades as fell by the darts of the Siceliots. Soon the resistance censed; Nicias gave bimself up to Gylippus, and such of his followers as warenders.

troops of Demosthenes in captivity. A few scores at most escaped to the bills and reached Catana.

"Thus ended," says Thuoydides, "the greatest adventure that the Greeks entered into during this war, and in my opinion the greatest in which Greeks were ever concerned; the one most splendld for the conquerors and most disastrous for the conquered; for they suffered no common defeat, but were absolutely annihilated, —land army, fleet, and all—and of many thousands only a handful ever returned home."

The Syranusans used their victory in no gentle spirit. In spits of the remenstrances of Gylippus, they put to death the two un-

Pate of the fortunate generals who had fallen into their hands! generals. All Grooce lamented Niclas, "the most respectable man of his age," whose private virtues, moderation, and love of peace should have earned him a better fate. But in troublous times incompetence locurs a greater punishment than crime. It cannot be desired that the half-hearted and dilatory proceedings of Niclas were the chief cause of the great disaster in which he pertished. It is doubtful whether the supineous with which he conducted his operations at first, or the obstinacy which he displayed in refusing to bring the expedition home whon fortune had turned against him, was the more fatal to the expedition. At any rate, this respectable man dragged down to death his able colleague Demosthenes, lost his country the largest and finest armament it had ever sent out, and ultimately brought about the downfall of its imperial power.

The prisoners who had fallen into the hands of the Syrneusans were hardly better treated than their generals. They were shut Misery of the up for safe custody in the quarries which abouthed on prisoners. the hillsides of Epipolae, with no protection from the sun or the rale, and a very insufficient ration of bread and water, only half the ordinary dole of a slave, to keep body and soul together. Were out by their late exertions, and exposed to absolute famine, they began to die off like files as the unbealthy weather

¹ Thucydides says that they were actually executed; other authorities, that they slew themselves to avoid the ignominy of a public execution, having been forewarned of their fate by Gylippus, or by the Symouson general Hermocrates.

of the autumn set in. The Syracusans let the corpose lie unburied among the surviving prisoners, till the stench bred an infectious fewer that threatened to spread into the city. After seventy days, all but the native Athenians and those of their allies who were Siceliots were sold by suction as slaves. The remainder were exposed to the miserles of the quarries for eight mouths, till the greater portion of them perished. Those who still survived seem then to have been sold into slavery like their companions. We read that pity for their fate, and admiration for the calm courage with which they supported their misfortunes, finally led to the release of the greater number of them. But hardly one in ten of those who had sailed furth in such exuberant hopefulness to subdue Sicily ever saw his home again.

CHAPTER XXXIIL

THE DECLINE OF THE POWER OF ATHERS, DOWN TO THE PAIL OF THE FOUR HUNDRED, 413-411 R.C.

THE final disaster of the Athenians in Sicily had befallen them about the milile of the month of September: sung weeks later confused rumours of it began to sproad through Grocce, reaching Snarta and Corinth long before they arrived at Athens. We are assured by Plutarch that the news first came to those who were most concerned in it in the most casual way. A seafaring stranger landed at Peiraeus, and entered a barber's shop, where he began sucaking of the deaths of Nicias and Demostlenes as events already known to every one. The burber no souner heard the story than be ran up to Athens, to give information to the magistrates. But when he was brought forward, interrogated as to the particulars of the disaster and told to produce his informant, the poor man was at a loss. There was no one to corroborate his tale, and as the news seemed perfectly incredible to those who had seen the two magnificent armaments sail forth against Syracuse, he was treated as a forger of false news and sentenced to be exposed on the wheel. He had been suffering the torture some time, when several soldiers, who had escaped from Sicily before the final surrender, appeared to bear out his tale. But even when well-known and respectable citizens, who had seen the fatal end of the expedition, came straggling back to Athens with full particulars of the disaster, the people refused to credit them. It seemed impossible that so large and strong a fleet and army could perish so utterly.

Nevertheless the situation had to be faced. It was of no use to meanastion mob the crators who had promoted the expedition, or of Athana to denounce the sootlesayers and diviners who had prophesied its success. What had to be done was to take stock of

the remaining resources of the city, and to see if the naval and commercial empire of Athens could yet be preserved. The survey did not promise well; nearly two hundred ships out of a navy that had never numbered more than three hundred had been ouguifed in the disaster. There only remained to Athens a squadron of twenty-seven vessels at Naumetus, and some thirty or forty more ready for service in home waters. Three thousand seven hundred boulites had been lost out of a force that, since the great plague, did not muster more than ten or eleven thousand men fit for foreign service. Moreover, the finances of the state had been drained to the very bottom by the expense of sending forth the second expedition so soon after the first. Of all the funds that had been stored in the Acronelis, there only remained the thousand talents that Pericles had set uside, to be used only if Athens were to be attacked by a hostile flest. The soil of Attica had just been ravaged by an army of overpowering strength, and the fort at Deceles showed that the Sparisus were about to adopt a new and annuying method of warfare. Already many bundreds of slaves had deserted to that post, which offered them a close and easy refuge from their masters.

Nor was this all. At any moment a Peloponnesian squadron might insult the scantly guarded coast of Attica, and ere long the confederate firet, which had conquered at Syracuse, The Athenians might be expected to appear in overwhelming force determine on in the waters of the Aegean. Athens might well have despaired, and sent to ask from her enemies what terms they would be pleased to grant her. It is surprising to learn that she showed no signs of doing so; on the contrary, crippled and beggned though she was, she nerved herself for a second struggle, not less lungthy and far more desperate than that which had raged between 431 B.o. and 422 B.o. The deadly fear of the moment, says Thucydides, drove the democracy into a mood of discipline and self-restraint to which it had long been a stranger. A committee of public safety was elected and entrusted with absolute power for the crisis; every source of expenditure in the city that could be dispensed with was cut down; the thousand talents which Pericles had laid by were voted as supply for building a new fleet; contributions of money and ship-timber were requisitioned from the

allies, and garrisons were sent to Euboon and certain other strategical rounts.

All this preparation would have been useless if the Spartans had taken tune by the forelook, and attacked Athers by see and land the moment that the result of the lighting at Byracuse was known. But Sparta was ever dilatory; her rulers resolved to make a great effect, but book their time to prepare it. Instead of instantly blockading Primous with every vessel they could master, they desided to spend the winter in constructing a fleet of overwholming strength, and to defer operations till the spring. It seems not to have occurred to them that while they were building new triernes their enemies also would have time to do the same. Naturally, when the news arrived that the dockyards of Corinth and Gytheum and Aulis were busy, the Athenians commenced to lay down now leads in overy slip that Pairsaus could provide; by the indistinguished at 12 no. they calculated on having a hundred vessels ready for sea.

The winter of 413-412 n.c. was spent in these proparations on each side, and Athens obtained the respite that she so much medical. But meanwhile the members of the Con-

The Assession fallerney of Deles were realising the position; in wallnigh every state there was a powerful oligarchic faction yearning for independence, which had long been waiting for an opportunity to revolt from Athens. The democratic party in each city, on the other hand, preserved but a passive and unonthusiastic loyalty towards its suzerain, and was quite unprepared to make any eacrifice in her behalf. The veverses of Athens gave to the one faction a motive for instant reballion, and hid before the other a chilibray prospect of additional taxes and contributions if they adhered to their ancient mistress. Accountinely most of the leading states of Louis sent secret emissaries to Sparts or Thebes, offering to cast off the Athenian yoke the moment that a Pelopounusian flost should appear in Asiatic waters. The Chians sont emissaries to Sparta and opened negotiations with the enhors through the medium of Afribiados, who was the close friend of Endlos, the most prominent member of the Ephocalty. The Lesbians and Euleceans made a similar application to King Asia, who was occupied in Northern Greece and had planted his head-quarters at Decelva. Pharmabazus, the Persian satrap of the lands on the Hollespoot, sent, in behalf of himself and of several Greek cities in his neighbourhood, to beg for the despatch of a flect to the Propontis. Tissaphernes, the satrap of Lydia, made a similar request, and supported the demand of the Chians. Each of these barbarians had come to the conclusion that the break-up of the Athenian empire would give him an opportunity of recovering some of the lost coast-land of his satrapy. They vied with each other in promising assistance, both in men and money, if once a Peloponnesian foot should cross the Aegean.

The Spartans resolved to said first to Chios, the most powerful of the disaffected states, and afterwards to aid Leebes and the cities of the Hellespont. But instead of concentrating their feet, they sent out small squadrums piecement, but an each could be got ready for sea. The first which saided consisted of twenty Corlathian ships, but this was intercepted and blockaded off the Argive coast by the Athonian home-fleet. However, the Spartan admiral Chalcideus slipped out

from Gytheum with five vessels, taking with him Alcibiades as a volunteer, and safely reached Cirios. That great city at once revolted, and placed a fleet of thirty ships at the disposition of the Spartan. Claromenae, Erythrae, and Toos soon followed the example of Cirios; it was to no effect that the Athenians hurried off every galley that could possibly be got to sea. The mischief

was done before the first of them could reach Iunia.

A desultory naval campaign now began off the Asiatic coast; it was full of unforeseen turns of fortune, for each side was alternately receiving reluforcements from home, and obtaining a presarious superiority over the enemy. The bulance of success, however, lay with the Spartans. Although they failed at Mitylene, which revelted but was recaptured, they was great successes in other quarters. Miletus, still a great town, though no longer the metropolis of Ionia, joined them with enthusiasm; Insus, which resisted them, was taken by storm. At the approach of autumn their superiority was made more marked by the arrival of a considerable fleet from Syracuse. The Siceliots had determined to repay Athems for her unprovoked aggression in 415 n.c., and sent their favourite general Hermocrates with twenty-two ships to aid in revolutionizing Ionia.

It says more for the facility than for the Hellenic patriotism of the Spartan admirals that they entered into very humiliating terms. The Spartans of alliance with the Persian sateups of the neighborhood burkood. An agreement drawn up between Chalcitaspheres, deus and Tiesupheres actually stipulated that, in nature for supplies of namey, Sparta should help the Persian to take back "all that the Great King's foreinthers had held in Asla;" a phrase which, if present to its legical meaning, would have surrendered Milebus, Clazomonae, and the other mainland turns into the power of King Darius. Astycolius, who succeeded Chalcideus, thought the wording of the treaty objectionable, and substituted for the original clause another, which merely declared that "the Lacednesmonians and their allies should not proceed to

attack any city which belonged to King Davius or his accestors." This change relieved the Spartans of the obligation to assist the Great King in recovering the Great towns which had once been his, but bound them to stand by and permit the restoration of the Poreian parker, if the satzaps were strong enough to effect it. Though less disgratoful in form, the second treaty was a despicable in spirit as the first.

The first year of war after the Syracusan diseator had failed to rain Athens; it had seen the revolt of sound of her most important allies, but she still kept up the fight, favoured by the dilateriness and want of fixed purpose which the Spartan government and the Spartan commanders had alike displayed. The respite had allowed her to build and hunch a formidable fleet, and she was now in a position to struggle on, putting off by her despects offerts the final day of disaster, which was bound to arrive at no very distant date. For when come the great Ionian towas had committed themselves to revolt, there was no hope that the

Athenian coupire could be kept together.

For the easing period of the war the operations of the Athenians were carried on from the base of Sames. In that island the democratic faction had just risen, and massacred some hundreds of oligarchs. This action bound them by the sie of fear to their successin, for they knew that the victory of Sparis would be followed by the re-establishment of a Philo-Laconian oligarchy, which would take sample revenge for the late shaughter. Sames

of subsidies.

was messer to Athens than any other of the great Ionian ports, and lay in an advantageous position, enabling its possessors to intercept communications between the two chief areas of revolt—the northern which centred at Chios, and the southern which lay around Milotus.

In the early spring of 411 n.c., a further disaster befoil the Athenians by the revolt of the three cities of the great island of Rhodes. The Athenians from Samos salied to recover the island, but, when faced by the combined force of the Pelopoenesian and Chian fleets, declined the battle, on account of their decided inferiority in numbers. After this, however, the successes of the Spartans came to a standatill; their numerary resources had been exhausted by the expense of keeping a great armain at sea for a whole year, and their chief paymaster, the sature Tissophernes, was beginning to shacken in his granting

. The Persian is said to have been turned from his zeal for the Spartan cause by the advice of Alcibiades. That volatile personage had sailed for Asia with the full futention of doing all Authorizes at in his power to surend the revolt; but renegades are always distrusted by those they serve, and Alcibiades had, in addition, made himself personally hateful to some of the leading men in Sparta. His crowning offence is said to have been that he seduced the wife of King Agia. He soon found that he was regarded with suspicion by his colleagues, and after an unsucconsful engagement in front of Miletus, which had been entered into by his advice, was constrained to quit the Spartan count in fear for his life. He betook himself to the court of Tissaphernes, with whom he soon contrived to ingratiate himself, by the perfect knowledge both of Spartan and Athenian plans which he displayed, and by the ingenuity with which he pushed the satrap's interesta. He pointed out to the Persian that if he lavished his resources on the Pelopannesian fleet, and allowed the Athenians to be crushed. he would find that he had only replaced the Athenian empire by a Spartan empire. Athens was a naval power only desirous of holding the sea-coast; but the Lacednemonians, who had always nimed at empire on land, would be dangerous neighbours, likely to covet the conquest of the inner districts of Asia Minor. The wisest course would be to let the two Greek powers wear down each other's resources, and reconville to tay hands quictly on every Ionian town that could be secured, and hold it nominally against the Athenians, but really for the Great King.

Tissaphernes saw the force of this advice, and promptly out down by half the supplies of money he had been furnishing to the Sportons. He also kept them inactive, by promising the old of a Phomisian fleet which never arrived; and when the commanders complained to him, put thom off with personal bribes, but did not do anything for their argument. Findlug Tissaphernes so ready to take his advice. Alcibiades began to think out a new method of turning his influence with the salrup to good account. A short experience of the narrow meanness of Buartan life and the soulless come of an Oriental court had set him longing for the free and liberal atmosphere of Athens. He began to dream of securing his return from exile, by proplifiating Athenian public opinion by some extraordinary service. Had it been only the matter of the Mysteries that stood charged to his score, the people might easily have pardoned him; but some striking feat was needed to atono for his flight to Sparta and his too-effective advice that Decelar should be fortified. It occurred to Alcibiades that if he could draw Tissaphernes over to the Athonian alliance, and induce the Persian to open his purse for the needs of the well-nigh bunkrupt city, his paydon might possibly be granted.

Accordingly he began to sound his private friends in the Athenian armamout at Sames, to see how they liked the idea. He found atomized with their was a strong party in the cump who were omegical with longing to get tid of the democratic government at

the Athersa longing to gut the or the deductive government in the observation of thems; it was the democracy which had been responsible for the Sicilian expedition, and the wealthier and hunder chasses were now suffering for its sine by the rain of their estates. Accordingly he found it easy to appead a report among the malcontents that if the present constitution were overturned in Athena, and an oligarchie government tostalled in its place, he could undertake to bring over Tissaphernes to the Athenian alliance; without a change the Persian could not be won, for he had a rooted distruct of democratics. The intrigue prospered over better than Albibindus had ventured to hope; many officers of note in

the force at Samos furthered it with zeal, and a deputation of them, headed by the general Peisander, suited across to Athens to enlist recruits in its favour. The only man who opposed the scheme was Phrynichus, another of the generals, and he set himself against it, not because he disliked an oligarchy, but merely because he had a personal grudge against Alcibiades. The main mass of the army was imperfectly informed about the intrigue; and though it suspected and disliked the proposals of the compirators, it was content to let matters take their course, if thereby the aid of Persia could be secured.

Poisander and the oligarchs from Samos made no secret of their plans at Athens; they boldly laid the proposals of Alcibiades before the Ecclesia; they pointed out that if affairs Patempter went on as they had been doing of late, the ruin at Athana. of Athens must be close at hand, while the Porsian alliance would save the state. The price to be paid, the merifice of the cherished democratic constitution, was heavy; but was not any sacrifice preferable to destruction? One after another the spemies of Alcibiades rose to recall the misdeeds of the renegade statesman; demagognes denounced his lawless insolence, and priests expatiated upon his merilegious outrages, and warned the people not to draw down the wrath of Heaven by recalling him, But of every speaker Peisander asked the same unauswerable question.-Was it not true that the Spartane were superior at sea. that the allies were revolting, that the treasury of the state was empty; If so, could they suggest any lotter way of staying off the impending rain? After a long and tumultuous debate, the people, convinced against their will, voted that Pelsander and ten commissioners with blu should sail to Asia, and open negotiations with Alcibindes and Tissaphernes, on such terms as they could RECITO.

Before starting, Peisander set working all the eligarchic influences which could be utilized in Athens for the overthrow of the constitution. He stirred up the numerous political clubs, which existed for purposes of influencing elections and trials, and exhorted them to units and at without fear or scruple when a favourable moment arrived. The rhotoridan Antiphon, a skilful wire-puller who took no

catenable part in policies but was deep in all the accrets of the party, was entrusted with the management of the completely. Other loaders were soon forthcoming, among them many men who had never been suspected of any disloyably to the democratic constitution, and overything was proposed for a vigorous comp d'état.

But whom Pelsander and his colleagues had returned to Asia and arrived at the court of Tissaphornes, a new complication areae. Alcibindes found that he had much less influence with the same then he had supposed, and could not proved on him to take any steps towards concluding an alliance with Athens; all that the Persian would do was to stint his surplies to the Peloponnesians. and keen their fleet idle. When placed in the dilumma, and forced to emfess that he was either unwilling or unable to carry out his promises. Alcibiades took refuee in evasions. He protonded that Tisaspherum was still willing to conclude a treaty, but proposed as proliminary conditions that the Athenians should sucrender to him all their subject-cities on the mainland of Asia. When his exambitant demand was reluctantly granted, he began to ask for the Asiatio islands also, and made himself so impracticable that the ambassadors in great wrath broke off the negotiations and returned to Sames.

White these intrigues were in progress the war dragged itself slowly on, without any important action. As the Spartan fleet by paneuwhite at Rhodes, the Athenians from Senaes succeeded in establishing a blockade round Chies, and even landed troops on that island, but did not make any great progress towards its reduction. Elsewhere the war stood still.

The failure of Peisander's negotiations with Aleibiades placed the alignedic party in a very difficult position. They had made

relation all arrangements for a revolution, and gone so far more at that it was difficult to stop. At home the clubs had been hard at work; proposals had been moreted to cutrust the conduct of the war to some less unwhibly body than the Beelesia, to cut down all payments to decests and coolers and to eare the scanty revenue of the state to maintain the soldiers and sames in active service. These proposals provoked apposition from the democratic party; but when Androples.

the leading demagogue of the day, and several of his supporters

were promptly slain by assaussins, the people were covered, and open resistance to the oligarchic agitation almost entirely ocased. Conscious that a great plot was on foot, but ignorant of its extent and objects, the mass of the citizens waited passively to see what was going to happen.

Emboldened by the impunity which they were enjoying, the oligarchs resolved to carry out their plans, even though Alcibiades had played them false. Many of these felt all the more confident from not having the over-subtile exile on their side; and several men of importance, including the ox-general Phrynichus, joined the party when once they knew that Alcibiades was not to have any control over its actions. It was resolved that a simultaneous attempt should be made to win over to the oligarchy the fleet at Sumes and the city of Athens.

At Sames the plot failed; when the eligarchs, allied with the aristocratic party among the Samians, rose in arms under the General Charmines, they found themselves too weak

for their task. After slaying a few of their opponents,
—among them the exited Athenian demagogne

Abortive itsing at Samos.

they were put down by force of numbers. The Samisu democracy and the majority of the Athenians from the fleet combined against them, and crushed them without any serious fighting. The moment that the rising was suppressed, the victors sent to Athens the state-galley called the Paralus with a full report of their proceedings.

When the Paralus arrived at Athens, that city was found to have fallen into the bands of the oligarchs. The revolution at Athens had been conducted with more dexterity and less violence than that at Sames. Peisander, Antiphon, and Phryntehns had determined to avoid open fighting if possible. When they knew that the Ecclesia had been frightened and paralyzed by the sudden murder of Andrecles and other democratic leaders, they brought forward a motion that ten commissioners should be appointed to lay before the people a scheme of constitutional reform. This proposal was carried; a few days after, the commissioners, who had been carefully chosen from among the oligarchs, summoned the Ecclesia to meet, not on the Payx, but at the temple of Poscious

at Coloous, a suburb a mile beyond the northern gate of the city.

The democracy, suspecting some soure—perhaps an attack from the garrison of Decelon—would not trust themselves outside the

The year walls of Athens, and a packed and stanty meeting at the seewer constitution of Cleisthanas. On the proposal of Peisander, a bill was carried to elect five men as presidents, who again should chose a hundred, and each of these hundred three men more, and that the whole body, four hundred strong, should assume the government of the state in place of the orchona and the remate. They were to be responsible to a body of five theorem fall citizens, chosen by themselves; the rest of the Athenians were practically disfunchised. As the Four Hundred never culled the any mostraling powers, and free to govern at their own good will.

When the assembly had dispersed, without a single voice being raised against the bill, the Four Hundred marched on the Prytaneum, followed by a body of haplices who had been secretly get tegether for their assistance. They found the senate in assion, and summoned it to dispuse; the senaters were no less terror-stricken than the people, and obeyed the communed; as they went out each was given the public allowance of money due to him for the remainder of his term of office. We do not hear that a single man darch to resent the insult. Having cleared out their predecessors, the Four Hundred did selemn sacrifice, and assumed all the functions of government.

Their first step was to send to King Agis at Decelea, to inform him that a Philo-Sparine eligadaly was installed in power, and analous to trebt for terms of peace. Agis, however, instead of frenting, made a rapid march on Athens, thinking to find it in open sedifion, and easily to be captured by a vigorous compedemain. His plan, however, was failed; the gates were closed and the walls manued, so that, after lossing a few mean in a saily, he was faile to return in haste to Deceles. When the Four Hundred again mode overtures to him, he received them with greater respect, and forwarded their enveys to the ephors at Lacalasmon.

The Paralus arrived at the Peirneus, with the news of the sup-

pression of the oligarchic rising in Sames, shortly after the Four Hundred had taken over the conduct of affairs. Furring lest the democracy should be encouraged to at Samon declare for revolt when the events at Samos became known, the democracy. new rulers imprisoned some of the crew of the Paralus, and sent the rest off at once to cruisa round Buboea. But Chaerens, the cantain of the vessel, escaped and returned at once to Samos, where he laid the news of the revolution before the army. A great burst of democratic feeling swept through the ranks of the soldiery when the tale of Peisander's intrigues was heard; they decosed all the generals and trierarchs who were suspected of oligarchic leanings, and placed at their head two officers named Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, whose loyalty was undoubted. At a solemn assembly the whole army awore " to hold to the democracy, to live in concord, to zealously prosecute the war with Sparta, and to be fuce to the Pour Hundred, and have no intercourse with them." All the Samians of the democratic party took the same cath, being as much interested as the Athenians themselves in the suppression of oligarchic plots. Thrusybalus and his colleagues reasoned that as the whole maval force of Athens was in their hands, they would be able to rescue the mother-city from her oneressors. If the Four Hundred held out against them, they could easily make Samos, and not Athens, the sent for the time being of the Athenian empire; for the allied states would pay their allegiance and hand over their tribute to the party which controlled the flost of Athens, not to that which ant helpless and isolated within her walls. In short, the army claimed to represent the Athenian state, and resolved to make no account of the usurping Four Hundred.

Thrasybelus and Thrasyllus now proposed the recall of Alcibindes from exile, intending to culist his influence with Tisaphernes on the side of the democracy. Their proposal was reseal or welcomed by the army, and, after four years of Alcibiadea banishment, Alcibiadea speared once more in the assembly of his countrymen. He came full of protestations of his goodwill, and of his ability to bring over his friend the satrap to the Athenian cause; his promises goined such credit that he was at once elected as a colleague to Thrasylilus and Thrasylins, and granted full powers to treat with Tissaphernes. Accordingly he sailed of

to find the satrap, who lay at this moment far southward in the

Pamphylian city of Aspendus.

Tissaphernes and found the Pelaponnesian admirals wrought up to a dangerous pitch of wrath by the inactivity to which be had reduced their fleet, and by this constant interviews with Absiblades; accordingly he had at last determined to bring up the Phenician fleet to their sid. There were more than a hundred Phenician vessels lying at Aspendus when Alcibindes strived at the place. Nevertheless, the Athenian contrived to persunde the satisp to send the ships every, though he had only just brought them on to the scene of action. The fleet returned home, and the Seartans were more than ever energed with their faidhless ally. The most important result of this diplomatic success, however, was to restore Alcibiades to the full confidence of the array at Samos, who believed that he had given conclusive proof of his absolute control over the mind of Tissaphernes—a central which he was in radio very far from hossessing.

Meanwhile, everything at Athens was conspiring to role the cause of the Four Hundred. Their authority received a desperate

Civil steifs, shock when the news of the events at Samos became known. Dissensions, too, broke out among their own body. The more violent party under Phrypichus and Anthone proposed to strengthen their position by throwing themselves into the hands of the Spartage, and by calling Polynomosian troops within the walls; for this purpose they began to construct a fort at the mole of Estionen in the Poincers, built so as to facilitate the outry of the enemy. Their desperate treason was opposed by a more moderate faction, headed by Theramenes, a supple statesman who was always to be found on the safe side. Luckily for Athena, the Spartane were still suspicious of the good faith of the Muni-Hundred, and were so tardy in taking advantage of the civil strife in the city, that they once more lost their apportunity. The first blow to the oligarchy enma from the assassination of Phryaichus; as he loft the Sonate House he was stabled by a young soldier, who escaped, though the deed was wrought at midday in the midst of the market-place. A few days later a body of leoplites broke into open mutiny, spixed and demolished the suspected fort at Betlenes, and placed Theremones at their head.

This crisis induced the Four Hundred to take some tentative measures to render their power mere nonular and constitutional, by calling the assembly of the Five Thousand into sen-neutat existence. But this section came too late; open war seemed about to break out in the city; the cligarehs held the Senate House, while the molecutents lay round the temple of the Dioscuri to the south of the Acropolis. Suddenly, however, the face of affairs was changed by the alarming news that a flect of forty-two Peloponnesian ships was threatening Peimeus. Abandoning their dissensions, both parties ran down to the harbour and commenced to launch overy war-vessel that could be found. The Spartan admiral Agesandridas had come prepared to take advantage of the treachery of Phrynichus; but Phrynichus was dead, and his fort at Editiones destroyed. Accordingly the Spartan left Peiraeus behind, rounded Sunium, and made for Eubous, whose malcontents had long been praying for aid to enable them to revolt. Thirty-eix Athenian ships, manned in hot haste and very imperfectly fitted out, chosed Agesandridas up the Eubocan strait. and brought him to action off Eretrin. The fight resulted in the complete rout of the Ill-found and Ill-handled Athenian fleet; only fourteen vessels succeeded in oscaping from the disaster. The moment that the result of the battle was known, every city in Euboca revolted to the Spartans, with the single exception of Histinen, which was held (see p. 266) by Athenian cleruchs, To hied the island to the mainland and obviate the possibility of reconquest, the Euboeans and their continental neighbours of Becotia combined to throw a bridge over the narrowest point of the Enripus, just opposite Chalcis.

The loss of Eubees was a terrible blow to Athens; since Attice had become unasfe, it had been customary to keep in that spacious island all the flocks and herds which supplied the city, and to utilize it as a storehouse conveniently placed at the deors of Athens. The news of its revolt almost made the Athenians despair; even the disaster at Syracuse had caused less dismay, for that had taken place for away, while the battle of Eretria had been fought in the home-waters of the navy of Athens, and almost under the eves of her citizens.

The immediate result of the revolt of Eubera was the final over-

throw of the Four Unmired, for every one cast the responsibility for the disputer on the shoulders of these whose factions violence had thrown the city off her guard. the Four

An assembly once more met on the Phys. the ancient gathering-place of the democracy, and formully deposed the usurping government. The body of the Five Thousand was suffered nominally to exist; but as it was enacted that every citizen possessing a suit of armour should be included in the number. a modified democracy was in reality restored. The same assombly passed a decree authorizing the return of Alaibiades from exile.

and approving of all the actions of the army at Sames.

When their deposition was decreed, the Four Hundred dispersed. and fled. Peisander and most of his colleagues made their way to Decelon; one of them, the general Aristarchus, signalized his defection by inducing the blocksded garrison of Ocnic, a strong fort on the northern border, to surrender to the Bosotians, on a false report of a general maildeation. A few of the more notable monabors of the Four Hundred were caught, brought to trial, and executed. Of these the most proplems was the chetorician Antiphon, whose speech in defence of his notions was considered the most stiering herst of elequence ever heard in an Athenian law-court. Nevertheless he was condomned, and expirited his treason by a well-deserved death. Thus fell the Pour Hundred, after a stormy and inclorious rule extending over no more than fiver months.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE FALL OF ATHEMS, 411-406 D.C. END OF THE PRIOFOS-NESSAN WAR.

It might have been expected that the civil strife caused by the usurpation of the Four Hundred would have brought about the ruin of Athena. But once more the slackness and want of enterprise of the Spartan commanders came to the rescue of their enteries. In the western Aggean Agrandridas, who had swept the Athenian home-fleet off the water, accomplished nothing more than the revolt of Euboca. Though completely commanding the sea, he made no attempt to blockade Athens—a feat which he could have accomplished with case, for their were now only twenty ships ready for service at Peiraoua. After lingering some time by the Buripus, he set sail castward, to reinforce the Peloponnesian fleet in Asla. "Truly," as Thucydides observes, "the Spartans were a very convenient people to be at war with;" they generally did what their enemy most desired.

Meanwhile the Athenians at Samos had been planning an expedition to expel the Pour Hundred from the mother-city, a design from which they were turned by Alcibiades, who persuaded thom to persevere in the defence of Jonia, and to let matters at bonus right themselves. This advice was accepted, and the Poloponensian fleet was not left to work its will unresisted, as would have been the case if the expedition to Athens had been carried out. By giving this counsel Alcibiades did a real service to his country for the first time in his whole political career.

As the autumn draw near, the Peloponnesian admiral Mindarus gave up all hopes of help from Tissaphernes, and resolved to shift the scene of action northward. He knew that the Hellespontinu cities were ripe for revolt, and hoped for hearty aid from Pharusbazus, the Persian astrap of Northern Asia Minor, who had proved bimself a zealous and trustworthy ally of Sparts. The Spartons had already been provided with a base of operations on the Hellospont, for two small expeditions had been sent thither a few mouths before, and had brought about the rebellion of Abydes and Byzantium. Accordingly Mindarus, steering a westward course out into the Account so as to escape the notice of the Athenian fleet at Samson, started with seventy-three ships from the Hellespont. He intended to reach the straits, seize oil the cities on their shores, and block the way for the corn-ships from the Euxine, that brought to Athens the supplies of food on which her inhabitants were reminly supported. A storm delayed the Spartan, and when he reached the Hellespont the Athenians from Sames were close on his heels. The generals Throsybulus and Throsyllus had put to see with every thip they could muster, and by calling in detechments from all sides had got tagether a floot nearly as strong as that of Mindarus. They brought him to setton in the narrow waters between Sestes and Abydes, at the promontory of Cynesseme, hard by the tomb and chauel of the legendary Troinn oncess Hessiba. After a hord fight Mindarus was benten, and his fleet compelled to run school under the walls of Abydes, having twenty-one vessels in the bands of Thosyllus. But though checked the Spartan was and crushed; he was encouraged by the revolt of several cities on the Propontia, and he hoped to renew the struggle by the aid of Apsyndridas' ficet from Eubora, now hastily summened to his aid. and of some reinforcements from Rhodes which were on their way to him. The equation from Euboes was caught in a storm off Mount Ather, and almost outirely destroyed; but the force from the south reached the Hellespont, though passued by

Hallegont. Alcibindos, who had collected a small floet at Cos and Hallegont. Alcibindos, who had collected a small floet at Cos and suite. Sames. Seeing his reinforcements at hand, Mindams put out from Allydos to join them. A habito onsued, which remained undecided till Alcibiades was seen coming up to the distance. Then the Polynomeslans turned tail and once more sought refuge by running ashore; there they were jutued by a Persian force under Pharmbexus, who did his best to save the stranded ships. But the Athenians persisted, and towed off in triumph thirty galleys, a full third of the fleut of Mindams.

Believing that the Spartan was now thoroughly disabled, Thrasyllus and Alcibiades dispersed their fleet and went into winter quarters. Alcibiades took the opportunity to pay a visit to his old friend Tissaphernes; but the satrap had lately received a rebulse from Suss on account of his double-dealing pulicy, and was in no mood to welcome the Athenian. Instead of meeting his whitom councillor with effusion, he east him into chains and sent him to Sardis. But a mouth later Alcibiades found means to escape from the citalel, rode off in safety to the coast, and rajoined the fleet.

When the spring of 410 n.c. came round, Mindarus put to sea with a fleet again recruited up to sixty sail. But the Athenians had already begun to concentrate for his destruction.

As he lay opposite Cysicas, the Athenian fleet of Cysicas,

eighty-six vessels stole up, in a day of storm and rain, which allowed them to come upon him unawares. While the Athenian centre under Alciblades keut Mindarus employed. the wings under Thrasybulus and Theramenus alleged round the Sparten to cut him off from the shore. Seeing this manouvro Mindarus turned, and forced his way through to the land, where the army of Pharnabazus was coming to his succour. But the Athenians presend hard on him and cut off many vessels; and when he ran the remnant ashere, Alcibiades disembarked and engaged him in a land fight. After a desperate struggle the Peluponnesians and Porstans were completely routed; Mindarus fell, and overy single ship in his fleet was taken or sunk, except the few Syracusan vessels, and these were burnt by their own crews to prevent their capture. The victory seemed decisive of the fate of Asia Minor. In its incidents and its completoness alike it recalled to Athenian minds Clmon's triumph at the Eurymedon fifty-six years before. All the misdeeds of Alcihiades were furgiven and forgotten, now that he had won for Athens the most complete victory which had graced her arms in the whole War.

For the first time since the news of the Syracusan disaster had reached them, the Athenians were able to breath freely, and to look beyond the needs of the moment. The enemy's main armament had been destroyed; the Hollesport was reopened; and its sened

to require only due expenditure of time to reduce, one after another, the revolted cities of Asia. If anything could have been wanting to restore the confidence of Athons, it was supplied by a despatch from Hippounties, the Spartan who had been second-in-command to Mindarus, which was intercepted on its way to the ophers. "Our fortune and honour are gone," ran the lacould document; "Mindarus is slain; the men are starving; we know not what to do." The meb of shipless seamen under Hippocrates were thrown on the charity of Phernabazus, whose subsidies alone stood between them, and disbandment or destruction.

It is not surprising to learn that, on the receipt of the news of the battle of Cyzinus, the Lacedtermains thought for a moment Prottle news of Peace. Endius, the Spartan Frank of Alcibialte, negatiations, came to Athens to sound the mind of the Ecclesis, and to by before it proposals for a general crossation

The terms offered were, as was but natoral, of hostilities. founded on the actual state of offairs. Rhodes, Chies, Miletus, the Eubocana, and the other revolted allies of Athens, were to retain their independence; but Sperla was rendy to evacuate Decelen, and to promise to leave undisturbed these mombers of the Onofederacy of Delos who still along to Athens. Endine must have felt sure that the Athenians would be gind to get rid of the war at any price. They had been tiving for three years on the brink of destruction, and when an honourable peace, involving no further surrender of territory or prestige, was effered them, might have been expected to accept it. But the hopefulness and light-hearted confidence of the Reutesia was once more too strong. Led up by the demographe Gleophon, the people voted that they would listen to no turns which, 6-ft their revolted ulties independent, and Endlos was accordingly dismissed. This was a fatal mistake: the resources of Athens bad run so low that she should have embraced any opportunity of posco; her success was but mannertary, and the next turn of the wheel of fortune was destined to render an honourable conclusion of the war impossible.

But for the moment all located well for Adhens. Pharasbases, indeed, strained his resources to the atmost in the end avour to maintain the great body of Pelopomesian seamon who had been thrown upon his hands, and set to work at once to provide them.

with ships. But they were far from any friendly amenal—there was none nearer than Chlos—shipwrights were few, and the timber for the vessels had actually to be felled on Mount Ida before any further measures could be taken. For more than a year the Athenians were completely free from any trouble at sen, and had full leisure for re-establishing their ancient naval dominion.

Nothing, however, could have marked more strongly the utter exhaustion of Athens, and the hopolessness of the struggle in which she was engaged, than the small profit she was able to draw from the victory of Cyzicus. For two years the enemy never dared to risk a naval engagement; the officers whom the ephors despatched to Asia were men of little mark or ability; the revolted allies were cowed and disheartened. On the other hand, Alcibiades and Thrasyllus were both men of energy and decision, and their troops were flushed with a splendid victory. Yet all that was accomplished in the years 410-8 n.c. was the successment reconquest of these cities on the Hellescout and Alcibiadea, Propontis which had revolted at various times 400-88.0. during the stay of Mindurus in those parts. Perinthus and Selymbria were subdued in the autumn of 410 B.c.; the great island of Thasos returned to its allegiance in the following winter; in 409 s.c. Alcibiates ravaged the whole const-land of the satrapy of Pharnabazus, and laid siego to Chulcedon, the city which commands the Asiatic shore of the Bospherus. Mennwhile Thrasyllus turned south and attacked the revolted cities of Ionia; but Colophon was the only place which he succeeded in recapturing, and in front of Ephesus he received a severe repulse from the Ephesians, joined with the Persian treeps of Tissaphernes, who was once more inclining to the Spartan alliance. In the outumn of 409 m.c. Thrasyllus sailed up the Hellespont and rejoined Alcibindes; their united force took Chalcoden in the spring of the following year, and six months later recovered Byzantium, after a long slege which lasted till the inhabitants, now at starvation point, throw open the gates in defiance of their Sparton governor. Thus the Bosphorus, Hellespont, and Propontis were at last completely freed from the enemy, and the corn-ships of Athens came through once more from the Euxine without having to dread any disturbance on their voyage. After the fall of Byzantium, Pharmabarue, who had been bearing the whole financial strain of the war for more than two years, felt blunself so reduced that he offered to retire from the Sportan alliance and to make peace with Athena. This was the most promising symptom which the war had shown of late, but it was destined to have no ultimate effect.

Further than this the successes of Alcibiadea did not go. When the Hellespont was at last clear, he made no attempt against the Ionian cities, feeling apparently that the reduction à lothfadue of Chine or Miletus was honoless. peturan so salling south, he turned homowards, and led his fleat back to the Peirasus. It was with some heeltation that he ventured to approach his native city; even though he had been elected general in his absence, and, though he was conscious of having two years of good service bobind him, he still dyeaded the weath of the democracy, and remombered the curses which had been heaped upon him, and the sentences which were still hanging over his head. His reception, however, was all that he could have ventured to hope. His friends and relations througed down to the barbour to welcome birm, and seconted birm in triumph to the city. The Senate and the Reclesia gave him a polemu hearing, in which he vindicated himself from the old charge of sacrilegy, and swood that he was innocent of all that had been laid to his account. His sentence was thereupon revolved, and all lide civic rights restored. Not only was life term of office as general renoved, but he was entrusted with sole and absolute conteol over a considerable armament—que handred ships and illicen hundred herelites-and nutherized to use it as he thought best-He first employed it to excert the procession which annually went from Athens to Elevals for the celebration of the Elevainian mysteries. Ever since the Spartans had seized Deceles, the saged cortige had been compelled to proceed to Eleusis by sea; but under the protection of Alcihindes' troops the procession once more marched with its ancient pump along the line of the Speed Way.

After melting a fruittess attempt to recover the island of Andres, which had revolted to Sparta in spite of her late inisfertures, Alcibiades returned to Asia, where he found that an important change in the spirit of affairs had lately set to, and that the star of Athens was once more on the wans. Two causes co-operated

for this end. The first was the despatch from Sparta of a really able general to take charge of the war in Ionia. Leannder to Lysauder, the sen of Aristoclitus, was the most remarkable man that Scarts had produced for a century. His family was impoverished; his father was one of those citizens who had forfeited from poverty part of their civic rights, and his youth had been passed in obscurity. But by sheer energy and force of character he had made his way to the front, and had at last been appointed to the office of nanarchus, or high admiral. Lysander was not inferior in courage or ability to Brasidas, the only other Sportan of genius who appeared during But his character was quite different from that of the hero of Amphipolis. His ambition was wholly personal; he had no sympathy for Ilelicaic liberties, or care for the interests of his allies. If he served Sparts well, it was only because the growth of her power favoured his own aggrandizement. His means were as unsurupulous as his ends were selfish, and treachery and cruelty were no less prominent in his actions than acutanosa and decision.

Lysander would have been under any circumstances a dangerous foe to Athens, but at the moment at which he appeared in Innia another factor was introduced into the politics of Asia Minor, which made him doubly formidable, revernor of The court of Susa, resenting the endless double- Asia Minor. dealing of Tissapheroca, had at last superseded that sairap, and sent down in his stead Cyrus, the second son of the reigning king, Darius II. The young prince was not only entrusted with the satrany of Lydia, but given a general control over all the neighbouring governors. Cyrus, from his first arrival, showed himself ruled by one desire-the wish to pay off on Athens all the trouble she had caused to his appeators since the days of Marathon and Salamis. He at once put a ston to Pharnabagus' negotiations with Athens, and summoned the Sparian commanderin-chief to Sardis. When Lysander arrived, Cyrus declared to him that he had five hundred talents ready to assist in equipping a new fleet, and that, if these were not enough, he would provide more out of his own private means, "even though he were driven to coin into daries the golden throne on which he sat." It was at first settled that he should subsklize the P-lopomassian fleet to the extect of paying three choice a day to each comman; but suon after, at the request of Lysander, to whom he had taken a great personal liking, he raised the sum to four obols, an allowance greater than the Athenians were then able to pay their men.

Small reinforcements had gradually been crossing the Aegenn during the last two years—the most considerable of there a squadrum of twenty-five Syraguana ressels—so that

Bettle of Lysander was eru long at the head of bluely galleys, Matham. which he collected at Enhesus. Alcibindes, with the hundred vessels which the Athenians land given him, took his post at Notions, to prevent the Sparten from putting to sea. Presently, however, Alcibindes was called away to Phocaes, and railed off, having his fleet in chargo of Antiochus, a satellite and beca-companion of his own, when he placed over the hends of all the officers of the fleet, though he had only been serving as master on board the flag-ship, and had never had any experience in command. Alcibiates bade his follower avoid fighting; but the moment that he was gone Anticohne sailed, in mere brayade, into the harbour of Ephesus, and rowed mak the Suntan fleet, challenging Lysander to come feeth and meet A few vessels put out at anon to chase the presumptions intruder; then, eachig the enemy on the move, some Athenian ships from Nutium came to the resons of their commander. Gradually the whole of both fleets were drawn into an engagement, in which Lysander won an easy victory over the fitmanaged Athenian squadron. Antiochus was sinin, and fifteen of his calleys sunk or taken; the rest retired to Samos. Here they were rejoined by Alcthindes, who had been spending his time in a high-hunded and ill-judged attempt to levy extra contributions from the cities of Acolla. Lysandor refusod a second battle, and resumed his old position at Epheson, so that nothing had really been lost by the recklessness of Anticchus. Nevertheless there was such a strong feeling against Alcibindes mused at Athens, on account of his criminal negligenes in entrusting his boon-companion with the cummand of the fleet, and of his nawise exactions in Apolis, that his enemies succeeded in getting him doposed by a vote of the Ecclesia, which once more placed the conduct of the

war in the hands of the ten strategi. Alcibiates sailed off to the Thracian Chersonese, where he was the owner of a large domain and a castle, and spent the remaining years of the war in retirement.

Among the generals who superseded Alcibiades, the most prominent men were Thrayllus, long noted as a democratic leader; Pericles, the son and namesake of the great statesman (see p. 805); and an officer named Concu, who now for the first time appears in high command. It was Conon, however, who took charge of the first at Sames, which had lately been under the orders of Alcibiades.

About the same time that the change in the Athenian commanders took place, the Spartan fleet also received a new admiral. Lysander's year of office had run out, and the ophors, califorations adhering to the rule that no one should be made nguarchus twice, replaced their able servant by an officer named Callicutidas. The system of constant change was erli, but in this particular case led to no great harm, as Callicratidas was an energetic and efficient commander. But Lysander, piqued at his deposition, made his successor's task as hard as he could contrive, by prejudleing the mind of Cyrus against him, and by restoring to the Persian's treasury all that remained unspent of the money which had been lent him for the pay and equipment of the Peloponuesian fleet. Thus Callicratidas found on his arrival the military chest empty, and the scamen clamouring for their pay. When he went up to Sardis to ask Cyrus for a subsidy, he was kept so long waiting, without even obtaining an audience, that he had to depart, "cursing the necessities of the Greeks, which compelled them to fawn on barbarians for money, and declaring that if he ever got home he would do his best to reconcile Athens and Sparta." 1 However, by rersuading the Chians and Milesians to grant him a small contribution, Callierations was able to pay his men some of their arroars, and to get his fleet to sea. The Athenians were at the moment very scattered; some lay at Samos, while the main body, under Conon, were engaged in harrying the coasts of the revolted cities of Acolis. Callicratidas, after gatherlug in all the scattered divisions of the

¹ Xenophon, Hellen, i. 6, § 6.

Sparian fleet, bad no less then a hundred and seventy gallovs with him -the largest force that had yet been seen during the war. He sailed north and lauded on Leshos, where he took the town of Methymna by steem. There his mederation was shown by his refusal to sell the Methymnacans and their Athenian garrison into slavery, as his allies urged him. Next day Conon, with soventy Athenian ships, came in sight; underrating the Spartan fleet, he ma right into the jaws of danger, and only turned to fly when it was too late, after his retrent on Sames and been out off. He was compelled to take shelter in the barbour of Mitylens, after a running fight, in which he lost nearly half his shine. and only saved the remainder by harding them ashore under the ramparts of the town. Callieratidas immediately blockaded the place by sea and land, and excuted on taking it with no great difficulty, for the Athenian scames were certain to exhaust in a few weeks the food of a town which had not been prepared to stand и віосе.

Conon succeeded in sending out a swift vessel, which ran the blockade, and arrived in Athens with the tidings of his danger.

But it seemed unlikely that he could be saved, for there was no Athenian fleet in existence fit to cope with the great armament of Chillierations. A few dozen shires were lying at Bames, but there was no other considerable equadron at see. However, the Athenians, with their usual plack and perseverance, resolved to make an attempt to resone their general. The arread of the Petropus happened at the moment to be full of vessels undergoing country or far advanced in construction; it was resolved to send out everything that was in any way seaworthy, and to give buttle to Calligratidas. The Ecclesia voted that every man of full age, slave or freeman, should go on bound; even the knights, for the first time on regund, were sent to sea. In less than thirty days there were a bundred and ten vessels reanned, though the crews were raw and the equipment inadequate. Eight of the ten strategi took the command, and the fleet mashed across the Aegena to Sames, where it picked up nearly fifty gallers more, most of them, belonging to Sames and the other loyal states of Ionia. On braring that the Athenians had reached Asia, Calligratidas resolved to attempt to maintain the blockade of Mitvlene, and at the same time to meet the enemy in battle. Leaving his second-in-command, EtconTons. with fifty ships, to keep Conon in check, he took nost with one hundred and twenty off the southernmost cape of Lesbon. The same night the Athenian fleet came in view, salling northward along the mainland. Next day the battle took place Battle of off the Arginusae, a cluster of small islands which Arginusas. lie south from Lesbos. The Athenian generals were forced, by the inexperience of their crews, to adopt the tactics which had once been peculiar to their enemies-they drew up their fleet in a dense line without intervals, and endeavoured to come to close quarters at once and to prevent the enemy from managuring. Callieratidas, on the other hand, came on with his ships in open order, resolved to turn the flanks of the Athenians or to break their line. When the superior numbers of the enemy became visible, the unaster of his galley besought him to turn back: but Callicratidas, imoyed un by confidence in his own bravery and in the skill of his seamen, merely raplied that "flight was disenceful, and that if he fell Sparts would be none the worse for his death."

The fleets were soon locked in close combat, and after a write the numerical superiority of the Athenians began to tell. Callicratidas was thrown into the sea by the shock of a bestile galley, as he stood by his prow preparing to beard, and was seen at more. No less than seventy l'eloponosian ships were destroyed or taken; the fight had been at close quarters, and when the day went against them they were unable to get noun; only fifty escaped to Chies. No more than fifteen Athenian vessels had been such, but a dozon more lay waterlogged, and requiring prompt assistance.

There would seem to have been great confusion in the Athenian fleet after the battle was won. The generals resolved to push on at once to Mitylene, and to eatch Etconicus and his squadron hefore he could escape to sea. But after they had started a gale sprang up, and induced them to put back and haul their fleet ashere for the night. One consequence of this indecision was that Etconicus was able to slip off unharmed to Chies. Another was that the dozen Athenian ships which had been disabled in the

battle went down with all their crows, without having received any succoun.

It might have been expected that the Athenians would have forgotten all the shortcomings of their generals in the moment of Imperatory victory. Their limitily equipped vessels had won the day, relieved Mitplene, and saved Conon. The conquerors of Arginusae expected nothing but praise and glery. But the point which was seized by public opinion at Athens was that, by gross neglect on the most of some one or other, a dozon ships, manned by hundreds of citizens, had been suffered to purish upuided after the battle. The demogracues Archedemus and Timecrates brought this accusation against the generals with such effect that they were immediately deposed from office. Bix of them, among whom were Throavilus and Perioles, returned to Athens to justify themselves before the people. But when they appeared, a general clamour was raised against them, and Theramenes-the converted olienreh who had planed such a prominent part in the deposition of the Four Hundredproposed that they should be brought to trial for their criminal negligence in falling to rescue their follow-citizens. To this the generals centical that the storm and been too much for them, but that, as a matter of fact, they had commissioned Theramenes bimselves and several other trigranchs to see to the wrecks. Theremenes and the other persons named utterly douled having received any such orders, and it seems likely that this part of the generals' defence was an after-thought; In their first desnatches they Inidthe bisine on the storm alone. But the storm cannot have been very violent, since it did not prevent Eteophous and his Spartan. ships from putting to sea; and it was probably the disorder and confusion into which the raw and ill-equipped floot had fallon after a day's hard fighting that roully caused the loss of the disabled gallers.

After the debate as to the responsibility of the generals had pro-

¹ For an occurrence is modern history symboths similar to the creats of Angineses, compare the storm on the night after Trainigar, which sent as many stage to the bottom. But the English Government did not constantial Collingwood for neglecting to obey Noisen's dying words, and moor his feet.

ceeded to great length, the Ecclesia was adjourned. The next morning happened to be the festival of the Apaturia, a day dedicated to solemn family gutherings. The number of persons who appeared In black at these meetings, as having lost relatives in the fate battle, was so great that the whole city was shocked and excited, and the feeling against the generals rose to boiling point. When the Ecclesia reassembled, a senator named Callixenus brought forward a denree which was not only unjust but entirely unconstltutional. It proposed that, "as both the accusers and the generals had been heard at length, the people should at once proceed to vote, and that if the generals were convicted the penalty should be death." This decree not only proposed to out short the defence of the generals, but violated one of the fundamental laws of the Athenian constitution.1 which provided that accused persons should be indicted and scutenord one by one, and not condemned or acquitted by a verdict dealing with several persons simultaneously. The decree of Callixanus met with much opposition; several eltizens protested against its illegality, and threatened to prosecute its author for his onen disregard of the constitution. But the mob was so violent, and the threats used against the opponents of the bill so terrifying, that they finally gave way. Some of the Prytaneis refused to put the question to the vote, and were only coursed by a menace which Cullizenus made, that if they persovered they should be included in the generals' sentence. Even then the philosopher Socrates, who happened to be serving as one of the Prytaneis, refused to assent to the proposal. But his protect was disregarded; the question was put, and the un- Execution of fortunate generals condemned to instant execution, the generals. Thus perished, by a most unjust and cruel perversion of justice. Perioles the son of Perioles, Thrusylius the victor of Cyzicus, and four more officers, Leon, Diomedon, Emsinades, and Aristocrates. No long time after the people repeated of their madness, and ordered the impreschment of Callizonus and several of his supportors. However, the anthor of the infamous decree escaped without a trial, owing to the disnators which fell upon Athens at the time; but we learn with satisfaction that he remained an object of public execration, and finally died of hunger in the street.

¹ Known from its author's name as the Prophism of Canonus.

It would probably have been better for Athens had her fleet successible at Arginuses; she would then have follen into the hands of Callicratidus, a chivelrous and generous fee. Her victury was only destined to preserve her for a year, and to throw her into the power of an enemy of a very different character. After the death of Callierntidus the Spattan government resolved to replace Lysunder to command; but in order to preserve the tradition that no one should be nanorabus twice, he was given, as a nominal superior, an officer named Aracus (405 s.c.)

Lysander joined to the wreaks of the float of Californians all the wessels he could called from the Asiatic allies of Sparts. He also

Imander obtained large supplies of money from Cyrus, who and Oyeus. throw open his treasury the moment that his friend was restored to command. So far did the Persian prince's entinesisson for the Sparton cause lead blin, that when he was summened up for a time to Media, to visit his sick father, he made over the administration of the revenues of his samply to Lysauder, and hade him take all that he needed. With the funds obtained from this source many scores of new ships were built at Antandrus. Still the Spartan fleet was not yet equal to numbers to that which Conon, and the other officers who had replaced the victims of Callixenus, could put into lies of lattle. Accordingly the Sporton did not at once risk an engageneout, but resolved to carry out the plan which Mindarus had attempted in 410 n.c., and to block the Hellespont against the Athenian com-ships. He slipped northward, and falling on the rich town of Lumpstons, on the Asiatio side of the strait, took it by storm, and made it the base of his operations. The Athenians soon got the news. Concu and his collegees called in every calley they could muster, and appeared off Lampaneus with a flost of no less than a hundred and eighty vessels. For four days they offered Lysander battle, but the Sparing kept his ships upder the shelter of the walls of Laupaneus, and refused to put out to meet them. Accordingly the Athenian gaparqla established themselves just apposite to him, on the shore of the Thragian Cheregouse, and waited for blue to make some further move.

The Athenian vessels were moored off a barren and uninhabited beach, at a spot called Acquepotami; the nearest town to it was Seesos, two miles away, from which all the supplies for the fleet had to be procured. When Lysander kept quiet day after day, the Athenian commanders grew careless, and suffered their men to disembark in the afternoon and to disperse to Sestes and other neighbouring places, in search of provisions. Alcibiades, whose casele lay a few miles away, marked this dangerous negligence, and came down to warn the generals, and to recommend them to remove to Sestes, a position almost as convenient for observing Lysander as was Augospotami. But the generals Tydeus and Menauder replied that they commanded the fleet and not he, and that his presence was not wanted. Accordingly he departed.

The very next day Lysander, waiting till the afternoon was far spent, and the Athenian seamen scattered all over the Chersonese, suddenly put out from Lampancus and rowed at full spool across the strait. When his approach was Ascospotant, observed, the Athenians began to rush on board; but long before they were ready Lysander was upon them. Some vossels had two banks of cars manned, some one, some were still incored, when the Peloponnesian fleet rap in amongst them. There was practically no fighting; Conon, with the few Athenian ships that were ready for sea, fled southward. The rest were taken with hardly any resistance, though the greater part of the crews cucaned ashore. A hundred and seventy vessels full into Lysauder's hands, with more than four thousand prisoners, including three or four of the Athenian admirals. Lysander had the whole body of prisoners massacred on the day after the battle, alleging in excuse the cruelty with which some captured Corinthian seamen had been treated a little while before.

Conon, fearing, with good reason, the wrath of his countrymen, fled with eight vessels to Boagoras, King of Salamis in Cyprus, with whom he took service. But he sent home the Paralus, one of the state-gulleys, which had excepted in his company, to bear the tidings to Athens.

The fatal news arrived at the Peiracus as evening fell. "The noise of walling," wrote Xenophon, who was probably in Athens at the time, "spread all up the Long Walls into the city, as one lessed on the tidings to another; that night no one slept, for not only were they lamenting for their dead, but they were thinking of what they themselves had done to the Molinus and the Sciensause and the Aeginetine, and many others of the Greeks, and reflecting that they must now suffer the same fate."

The situation of Athens was perfectly desperate. Her sole fleut was desiroyed, her arsenals were stripped bure, her core-supply was cut off. Lyannier did not delay a memont after the battle, but sailed at once to Byzantium and Chalcodon, which surreindered at the first normons. After armuging for the closing of the Bosphorus against Athenian vessels, he went against Mitylens in person, while he sent Etconicus to Timose and the other towns which adhered to Athens in the direction of Thrace. Nowhere was any resistance made. Ifach city, when the Bjartons appeared, threw open its gates and gave up its Athenian garrison as present, threw open its gates and gave up its Athenian garrison as presented, the weeks after Aegospotarai, Samas was the only place which still held out for Athens. The Samian democracy, having mescared so many of their Philo-Sportan follow-citizens (see p. 875), were prevented from currendering by dread of the revengulabilither them would follow.

When Asin Minor was cleared of Athenian gartisons, Lysonder salled with two hundred ships into the gulf of Aegina, and established the blockeds of Peloteus. Simultaneously King Agis came down from Docalds with the full lety of Peloponnesus, and encamped over against Athens on the lend-side, pitching his tent in the Aesdensois, a celebrated gynnasium outside the walls.

Even at this supreme moment the courage of the Athenians did not fail them. Hoping against hope, they blooked up the mouths of their harbours, manned their walls, summond overy available measured their harbours, man proclaimed an amnesty for all political and civil criminals who would join in the defence of the city. When the someter Archestratus advised an immediate surrouder at discrution to the Spartans as the only available course, he was promptly thrown into prison. But Athene was without mercey, slips, alles, or corn, and the end could not long be delayed. After some mouths of blookade, when many had already died of starvation, they sent ambarsations to the ophors, affering to become affice of Sparta and to resonnes all chains to their old naval empire, but

⁵ It was this ammenty which sured Callisonus from condemnation (see p. 401).

requiring that they should be left with the Long Walls and the fortification of Pulmens intact. The ephors refused to see the envoys, and told them not to come again till they had grown wiser. A little later the Ecclesia commissioned Theramenes to go on a private mission to Lysander, and to ascertain from him what terms the ephors were likely to grant. Theramenes, who was once more intriguing for an oligarchic revolution in the city, remained no less than three months with Lysander, waiting till the famine had grown intolerable. Then he returned, and renerted tint he could get no definite information, but that the ophers would receive an embassy, if it was invested with full powers to agree to any terms. Accordingly the Ecclesia despatched Theramenes and nine other envoys to Sparts. On their arrival the full congress of the Pelepunnesian alliance was assembled, to debate on the lot of Athens. The representatives of Corinth and Thebes urged that no mercy should be shown to the tyrunt city, now that she was brought low; they would have treated her as she had treated Melos and Scious, and made an end of her altegether. But the Spartan government, with unexpected moderation, announced that it would not consent to the utter annihilation of a city which, in spite of all its crimes, had done good service for Greece in ancient days: Athens should be rendered harmless

for ever, but not destroyed. Accordingly the terms submits, which were laid before the Athenian ambassadors were that Athens should demolish the Long Walls and the fortification of

Pairsous, become a subject-ally of Sparta, awear to furnish her with a contingent of troops whenever called upon, recall her oligarchic exiles, and consent that her navy should be restricted to twelve vessels.

Hard as these conditions were, they were at any rate better than the utter destruction which many of the Atheniaus had been dreading. The war-party had been meltiog away as the famine grew more and more dreadful, and its last leader, the demagague Ckopken, had been killed in a riot. When Theramenes reappeared in the city, and announced that Sparta had consented to grant terms of peace, a shout of joy went up from the famishing multitude, and few cared to ask for the details of the trenty. Next day the Ecclesia ratified the agreement, and the gates were thrown open to the enemy.

Lysander landed with great pomp at Peiracus, and took possession both of the upper and the lower city. He destroyed the arsenal, took away the few war-galleys which lay in the harbour, and burnt those which were upon the stocks. Then the work of demolishing the fortifications was taken in hand; in presence of the Peloponnesian army and navy the Long Walls were breached, while triumphant music and choric dences testified to the scultation of the conquerors. A shout went up from the victorious ranks that Greece was freed of her syrant, and that every city could at last be sure of her autonomy.

Thus ended the Poleponnesian war, on the sixteenth day of the mouth Munychlon, 464 n.a., twenty-eight years after the attempt of the Thetans on Plataes which had marked its commencement.

CHAPTER XXXV.

SPARTA SUPREME IN GREECE, 404-306 R.C.

From the day of Salamis to the day of Acgospotami Greek history peasesses a dramatic unity which it does not display in any other age. A great problem was worked out in those seventy-six yearswhether the Greeks were capable, under favourable circumstances, of subordinating civic and tribal jealousies to the general interests of the Hellenic race, and of combining into a great federal state. All the events of the period group themselves around the growth. culmination, and destruction of the Athenian empire. No city had ever such an opportunity of forwarding the unity of Greece as had Athens in the middle of the fifth century. Her supremacy was established, not by force, but by the free and willing accession of hundreds of states. The Ionians and Islanders, in gratitude for their liberation from the Persian yoke, placed themselves entirely a her disposal. Half the cities of Greece were drawn within the circle of her influence, and ere long there were signs that the rest might follow. In 457 a.c. the union of the whole Helienic race on both sides of the Aegeen into a confederacy centring round Athena seemed quite possible.

We have seen that this prospect was never to be realized; the states which had once regarded Albens as their saviour and protector, are found, after a while, joining eagerly with her ancient enemies, and straining every nervo in the endeavour to cut themselves loose from their alliance. They had their wish; Athens succentible under a series of unpersiloted disasters, and sank from an imperial city to a second-rate provincial town.

Was the failure of the great experiment in the direction of the unity of Greece due to the crimes and blunders of Athens, or to the inherent impossibility of the task she had undertaken? On the one hand, there can be no doubt that Athens did not persevere

in her original resolve to dual justly and fairly with the cities which had put themselves into her hands. Although her rule was not oppressive or severe, it was essentially selfish; she administered the states of the Confederacy of Delos for her own private bonefit, involved them in wars with which they had no concern, and spent their money lavishiy on purely Athenian objects. In short, she made benefit a tyrant city, though her tyransy was after the model of Poisistratus and not of Pariander. Sometimes she even indulged in acts of cruelty and oppression of the most flagrant character, as in her dealings with Aegina, Scione, and Melos.

But, in spite of all the faults and crimes of Athena, it is probable that the breaking up of the Confederacy of Duke must be atcribed to another cause. The really fatal obstacle in the way of Greeian unity was the character of the Greeks. The passion for local autonomy was so deeply rooted in their breasts, that it dominated every other feeling. Neither glory nor gain could compensate them for that curtailment of their municipal liberties which a federal uning made necessary. Even if every state of the Delian Confederation had been allowed a fair share in the management of public affairs, we may be certain that discontent and secession would have fullowed. Much more was this bound to be the case when "represcatation did not accompany taxation," and when Athens made no pretence of allowing her allies to participate in the administration of the Langue. The Spartans had caught the spirit of the times when they bade Athens, at the communeement of the Pelopopnesian war, " to restore their liberty to the states of Greece," and proclaimed that the struggle was a crusade to behalf of local autonomy. This watchword rallied to the Spartan cause every discontented member of the Delian Lengue, and to it we may fairly say that Spartan's final triumph was due, for without the ald which she received from the revolted allies she could never have guided the war to the conclusion at which it actually arrived.

It remained to be seen how Sparta, after posing for so long as the enemy of tyranny and the protector of local liberties, would deal

Lysander with Gresce in the day of her triumph. A bitter dissuprema in appointment awaited the states which had been so
simple as to believe that the Lacodac monians had laid
seide their ancient selfishness. Lysander soon showed them that

they had only changed a light taskmaster for a stern one, and that the empire of Athens was to be replaced by the empire of Sparta. Some of his first measures, indeed, were intended to conciliate the public opinion of Greece; he restored the few surviving Aeginetans and Melians to the homes from which they had been expelled by Athens, and gave back Naupactus to the Locrians, driving out its Messenian inhabitants, who now took refuge in Libya. But such acts were few and far between; the greater part of Lysander's doings were of a very different character.

While the war was still raging in Asia, and the offerts of Athons were still to be feared, it had been most natural that Spartan garrisons should be placed in the cities of Iunia and The Harmosts the Hellospont, and Spartan governors put at the head of their military forces. These governors, or Harmosts, as they were called, were to be found everywhere at the end of the war. Their authority was backed by the support of committees chosen from among the most Phile-Spartan citizens of each state-bodies which were known as Decarchies, from their usually consisting of ten members. When the war was ended, it was generally expected that the Decarchies would be dissolved, and the Harmosts and their troops recalled. But Lysander had no such intention; he had taken great pains to organize the system, had selected Harmosts from among his own personal followers, and carefully apparintended the choice of the Decarchies. When Athens had long fallen, and the months were passing by, the Greeks of Asia found their cities still occupied by foreign troops, and their constitutional magistrates impeded in their functions by the irresponsible committees of ten. Gradually it began to dawn upon them that the system was intended to be permanent, and that, instead of the occasional visits of the Athenian tax-gatherer, they were to experionce the continual presence of the Spartan Harmost. Decarchies and the Lacrdaemonian governors played into each other's hands ; the former ruled the state as a strict oligarchy, and if any democratic feeling manifested itself, promptly put it down by the swords of the garrison; the Harmost, in return for his

Appearo's, organizer, had been a name originally applied to the commissioners whom Sparis kept resident among the towns of the Periocei in Luccoin.

assistance, was allowed to peculate and plunder to his heart's content—a gratification which most Spartans keenly appreciated. Such a form of government soon became unbastable to the cibles of Asia, most of whom had long been accustomed to a democratic constitution, while all contained a strong democratic element in their population. It was not long before they discovered that Sparta's little finger was thicker than Athens' loins, and learnt to curse the day in which they changed their masters.

But the oppression of the Harmost and the Decarchy was not the worst that the cities of the Asiatic mainland had to fear. Persian on-

creachments was bound by stringent treaties to give her ally a free in Asia. hand (see p. 378). Accordingly, Cyrus and Pharan-bazus proceeded ere long to encroach upon the Hellenic cities of the coast, while Lysander stood asklo or tacitly approved their doings. Foreign moreonary troops had been admitted into many places while the war was in progress, and when it was over held the town in behalf of the satrap. Even great cities like Epheuus and Miletus found themselves in danger; the Milesians had to rise in arms and fight a batilo in their own streets before they could get quit of the Persian garrison. Many of the smaller towns antually fell back into slavery to the barbarian, after seventy years of liberty under the Athenian rule. Sparta would do nothing to preserve her allies, except where she had a Harmost on the spot, and was herself in mucical noseession.

Masnwhile Lyander, whose nauarchy had been renewed, was administering the towns of the Aegean as if he had been an absolute monarch. His antellites and finterers did their best to turn his head with their fulsome applanse. After he had captured Samos (the town held out a few months longer than Athena) he was actually saluted with divine honours; alters were erected and hymns addressed to him. He ruled despotically, without making any reference to the home government, and by means of the Harmosts made his influence felt in every town; it was the nearest approach to a personal monarchy that Greece had seen for centuries. Lysander was, in fact, repeating the career of Pausanius on the same stage where his producessor had moved seventy years before. His fate was destined to be the same as that of the victor of

Plataea; after two years of dominion he provoked the ephors to desperation by his disregard for their orders. They summoned him home, laid before him countless congest dispraced by of insubordination and misgovernment, and bade him ebeephora. Lysander made no reply, but quitted the city, and betook himself for a time to Libya. When he returned shortly after, no further attempt was made to molest him; having become a private citizen again, he was no longer considered dangerous. But Lysander was skilled in intrigue; finding himself unmolested, he set to work to form a party in the state with a view to the reformation of the constitution and the removal of the ephornity; he grounded his main hope on the assistance of Agesilaus, brother of the reigning king Agis, who was his intimate personal friend and admirer.

The removal of Lysander made no difference in the character of the Spartan rule; the ephors proved as unscrupulous as the great natural had been, while the Harmosts were, if anything, a triffe more oppressive now that they were no longer working under the eye of a master.

Huw the cities of Greece fared while Sparta was supreme may be fairly judged from the single example of the fate of Athens, It will be remembered that when she threw open her gates to Lysander, one of the conditions which she had to accept was the return of her exiles. They were a large body, the remains of the partisans of the Pour Hundred, who had fied to the Spartan camp when their conspiracy failed, and had dwelt with the enemy ever since. It was soon known that the old democracy was not to be allowed to survive, and that the Spartage were determined to put the state into the hands of men whom they could trust. No one was surprised when an eligarch named Dracontidas ross in the Recleda, and proposed that a committee of thirty citizens should be chosen to revise the constitution. When opposition was offered, Lymander himself appeared in the assembly, reminded them that they were in his power, and bade them take counsel for their nersonal safety, and not cavil upon points of constitutional law. This threat allenced all opposition, and the list established at of thirty names which Dracontidas brought forward was carried without demur. It included the names of many of the returned exiles, and was, of course, composed entirely of oligarchs. The most prominent members were Critius, an exile and an old member of the Four Hundred, and Theramenes, who had once more swerved back to oligarchy when he saw that the tide was now running in its favour—a conversion which carned him the nickname of the "Turneant," 1

The thirty commissioners, who soon earned for themselves the name of the "Thirty Tyrants," were designed by May at Athens the part which the Decarchies carried out in the states of Asia. Though nominally appointed only to revise the constitution, they took possession of every function of government, and showed no intention whatever of laying down their power. They abolished the Dicasteries and the Areangus, and placed all jurisdiction in the hands of the Boulé, which they had first purged of every member who was not a declared oliganch. Having thus prepared the judicial machinery for making away with any one who should dare to oppose them, they proceeded to strengthen their position by asking Lysander to grant them a Sparten garrison. Accordingly seven hundred Peloponnesians entered the town under a Harmost named Callibbus, and took possession of the citadel.

The next step of the Thirty was to commence a systematic paraecution of prominent citizens who were noted for their democratic tendencies. Several officers who had served with distinction during the late were very condemned to death on futile pretexts. Others—the most prominent of whom was Thrusybulus, the general of the democracy at Bamos (see p. 335)—were driven into exile. The man, huwever, of whom the Thirty stood in the greatest for was Alcibindes, who might at any time return to Athens and head a democratic rising. He was out of their own reach, but they besought Lysander to see to him; the Spartan passed on the request to the satrap Pharmabaxus, who caused Alcibindes to be assessibated as he was travelling through Phrygin on his way to visit the court of Suca.

The first prescriptions which the Thirty took in hand was purely political, but ere long they began to extend the sphere of their operations. Men who had taken no prominent part in politics,

I Kolopees, from the name of the buskin, which would fit the right or the left foot equally well.

but were personally objectionable to members of the Thirty, were soon included in the list of viotims. Then followed Marule of the many whose only crime was that they were wealthy, and that their lands or their treasure were coveted

by some prominent oligarch; smong these the most noted name was that of Niceratus, son of the general Nicias, who was reputed the richest man in Athens. After these atrocities many of the Thirty felt that they had gone far enough, and proposed to halt in their career of crime. Theramenes, who perceived that, in spite of the Spartan garrison, the Athenian people would be driven to a rising in sheer despair, was especially urgent on the side of moderation, and his colleagues soon began to suspect that he was on the eve of one of his periodical conversions.

Critiss, however, backed by the more desperate members of the gang, was determined to persevere. The only precaution which they took was to disarm the conclude before proceeding to further extremities. Having first drawn up a list of three thousand citizens whom they thought that they could trust, they proclaimed that this body slone should enjoy full civic rights. Then they held a review of the whole armed force of the city, summoning the three thousand to meet in the market-place, while the rest of the citizens were scattered in small bodies at different posts. One after another these bedies were confronted by the Laconian honlites of Collibius, and bidden to lay down their arms. They obeyed, and were sent away disarmed to their homes, while their weapons were stored in the Acronolis. Thus the three thousand were the only armed force left in the state.

Having thus stripped the people of their arms, Critias and his faction launched but in the wildest excesses, and Athens experienced a perfect reign of terror. Day by day citizens were arrested, tried on the most frivolous charges, and condemned to death. No man of property could call his life his own, for the appetite of the Thirty for confiscation and plunder seemed insatiable. It was not only citizens that suffered; the wealth of the meties, or resident aliens, marked them out as fair game, and ere long they were being imprisoned and slain by the score. The legislation of the Thirty was as despotle as their administration; by one law they even forbade every one, except members of the Three Thousand, to dwell in Athens, and directed all other classes to disperse to the country denies.

Every one except Critias and his immediate followers felt that the state of affairs was too monstrous to last. Theramenes grew more and more energetic in his protests against the policy of the majority, till they came to consider him as utterly unbearable. Critias then resolved to rid himself of his over-equeamish colleague; he armed a considerable body of his friends and dependents, and brought them to the doors of the council-chamber while the senate was in session. Then he suddonly rose and impeached Theramenes, denouncing him as the betrayer of every party with which he had ever been concerned, and accusing him of plotting the overthrow of the Thirty. Thesemenes, though taken by surprise, defended himself with a burst of ready cloquence, in which be pointed out the inevitable ruin which must follow the policy which Critias and his friends were pursuing. When he appeared

Execution of to be carrying the senate with him, Critias ordered Theramenes, his armed men to enter the house, crying out that he would not allow the senate to be deceived by specious words, and that his friends were some to see that justice was done on a traiter. "And as," he added, "It is the rule that no one in the list of the Three Thousand shall be put to death without a regular vote passed by you, I hereby strike out the name of Theramenes from the list, and am thus able to condemn him to death myscht."

Theramenes sprang to the altar which stood in the midst of the council-chamber, and clung to it, adjuring the senators by every ploa, human and divine, to see that he was not made away with in this atrocious style. But the ministers of death tore him from the sancturry, dragged him straight to prison, and compelled him to drink the fatal hemlock. He died with a courage that surprisod his comies—a bitter taunt at Crities on his lips. His fate served to show the Athenians that not even the most studious triuming and time-serving would enable a man to be sure of his life while the Thirty were in power.

Even before Theramenes was dead, the storm was brewing which Threspoulus was to sweep Critics and his satellites from the helm and the exites of affairs. So many citizens had by this time fled abroad, that Thebes, Mogara, and the other cities near Athens were crowded with refugees. At Thebes they were so numerous that after a time Thrasybulus, who had settled in that town, was able to gather a hundred men resolute enough to make a desperate attempt to free Athens. Some Bosetiau friends supplied him with arms and provisions for this little band; and he then crossed the Attic frontier and selzed the deserted fort of Phylo. The Thirty at first paid little attention to the adventures, but presently sent an expedition to storm the castle. Its first assault failed, and a heavy fall of snow drove it back to Atlens. When a second force was sent out, Thrasybulus, whose band had now swelled to zeven hundred men, fell upon it in the night and put it to the rout.

Encouraged by this success, the exiles marched boldly on, and threw themselves into Peiragus. The walls of the harbour-city had been destroyed by Lysander, but its streets offered great facilities for defence. Thrasybulus ranged his men on the slope of the hill of Mnuychia, and waited to be attacked; hundreds of citizons had now joined him, but they were destitute of armour, and were forced to make themselves wicker shields, and to turn to account any miscellaneous weapons that came to hand. Presently the forces of the Thirty were seen coming down from Athens: Critiss himself led on the Three Thousand. while Callibius supported him with the seven hundred Pelaponnestans of the garrison. They alvanced in a solid column along the street which leads up to the hill of Munychia, and met the exiles on the slope. But their superior numbers were of no avail in the narrow way, while the missiles which were showered upon them from over the heads of Thrasybulus' men told fatally on their growded rauks. After a few minutes of hand-to-hand fighting the oligarchs gave way, and rolled backwards toward Athens, leaving Critias and seventy more dead on the billstde.

This dissistrous failure led to fierce dissensions among the defeated party. The surviving members of the Thirty and the Anarchy at other partisans of Critias, finding themselves in the Athena minority, had to fly to Eleusis, which they had already made rendy as a fortress in time of need by slaying all the Eleusinians—no less than three hundred in number—who were known to be partisans of democracy. Here they made ready to defend themselves, and sent urgent appeals for aid to Sparta. The more moderate parti-

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sans of oligarchy, though they had chased away the Thirty, were unwilling to come to terms with Throsybulus; they chose themselves tan new leaders, and prepared to resist the attack of the democrate from Poimers. Some desultory fighting took place outside the walls of Athens, but it was soon ended by the news that a Spartan army and fleet were approaching. It remained to be seen what course the Spartan government would adopt, and of this there was considerable doubt. Lyannder's party were for aiding the Thirty to reconquer Athens, and Lysauder bimself harded to the spot to support his profégés. But the relations between the nauarch and the cohors was at that moment drawing towards their final runture, and, luckily for Athens, any measure that Lysander favoured was sure to be bitterly opposed. Accordingly the ephore sent out King Pausanias to take over the command of the array in Attion knowing that he was a declared enemy of Lysender's policy. Pausanias was a man of cenerous sentiments and anatoved taoleration; he had the old Spartan batred for tyranny, and was determined to do nothing for the detestable gang at Eleusia. Instead of fulling upon the democrats at Peiracus and crushing them, he undertook to reconcile them to the party which held

Pansaniaa the city of Athens. Even when he became involved in a skirmish with the truops of Throsybulus, and saw several Spartan officers slain, he was not to be diverted from his pacific doeign. With some trouble he induced both sides to accept his good offices, and, after settling the terms of reconciliation. took his army bone. By the new agreement the top who headed the olimnels in the city were deposed, and superseded by regularly efected strategi; all the exiles were restored to their property and givic rights, and an amnesty was proclaimed for all except the Thirty and their most collous instruments. To mark the end of the time of troubles, a solemn thank-giving was held, and new archons chosen. The name of Pythodorus, who had held the next of enonymous archon under the Thirty, was sclemnly expansed from the official lists of the state, and the period during which he presided was describated "the year of anarchy," Thus sixteen mouths after Lysander and captured Athens the old constitution was restored to the much-tried city (September, 403 a.c.).

The Thirty came to an ill end. Abandoned by Sparta, they still

held out at Eleusis for some months; but at last they were reduced to ask for terms. When their leaders eams into the Athenian camp to endeavour to enter into a negotiation, they were suidenly fallen upon and slain by the infuriated soldiery. The rest escaped abroad and died in actio.

Athens was now once more a democracy, but she still remained a humble vassel of Sparta, bound to follow her lead in all matters of foreign policy, and to send her-contingents of mon and ships whenever called upon. Years were to slopes before the city that had once ruled the Aegeau was able to exercise any influence on the affairs of Greece.

The estitement of the internal quarrels of the Athonians was by no menns the only task that fell to the lat of Sparta in the years immediately following the Polopomestan war. In sparta 402 n.c. size full upon Bits, partly the revenge of the conqueen Bits old injury caused by the disloyal behaviour of the Elema in the Mantinean war (see p. 243), partly on account of new causes of quarrel. In two campagns the troops of Bits were bester out of the field, her territory meaged from end to end, and all her subject districts taken from her and restored to independence.

But events of far greater importance were occurring to Asia Minor, In 404 a.c. King Darius II, of Persia died, and was succeeded by his eldest son Artaxerxes IL Gyrus, his younger son, The expedition the friend and ally of Lysander, had long been scheming to obtain the grown, through the juffnence of his mother, the queen Purpostle, who had done her best to induce her husband to pass over his first born, and leave the thrope to her favourity. When his plans were foiled by the death of Darius, the ambitious young prince determined to obtain by force what he could not win by intrigue. He made large levies of native troops in his sattapies, but rested his main hopes on collecting a strong body of Greek mercenaries. Cyrus was a man of brilliant talents, and had learnt, by continual intercourse with his Scartan friends, the best ways of dealing with Helieues. His personality was so attractive and his service so profitable, that he had no difficulty in getting together as many then as he needed. Over thirteen thousand hoplites, under Clearakus, once Spartan Harmost of Byzantinon, were at last gathered beneath his bannor.

Knowing the dread with which the Greaks regarded the wast distances at the Porsian empire, Cyrus did not tell his moreonaries the real object of his march, but persuaded them that he was about to attack the produtory tribes of Southern Asia Minor. Insensibly he led them eastward till they found themselves close to the Euphrates, and so far committed to the expedition that it was lard to ture back. A heavy increase of pay soon persuaded them to pass on into Mesopotamia and commence their march on Suas. King Artaxerxes and his army did not make their march cannot still Cyrus was within a few days' journey of Babylon. But

hard by Cunaza the Persian host came suddenly in danasa, sight, streiching for miles over the plain, and out-to-take. numbering by tenfold the anny of Cyrus. A battle immediately followed, in which the Greeks on the right wing of the reled army rotted all that was apposed to them. But Cyrus himself was slain, as he pushed forward with a handful of horsemen in a foolbardy attempt to pierce Artaxerxes' body-guard and

end the struggle by the death of his brother,

The native troops of the robel prince at once dispersed, and the Gracks found themselves stranded in the midst of Mesopotamin, Retease of the hundreds of miles from the sen, without a cause for Ten Thomsand, which to fight or a guide to show them the way beme. 401-400 No. When they attempted to negotiate for an anmolested represt, the entrain Tissaphernes lured Clearchus and their other lenders to a conference and massacred there. All that they could do was to glose their ranks, clest new officers—among them Xenophon, the historian of the expedition—and attempt to force their passage northward into the Armenian mountains, where the power of Persia could hardly reach them. In spite of the continual attacks of the horsomen of Tissuphernes, the Greeks contrived to make their way along the Tigris and past the ruins of Minevell, till they were able to leave the ploins and their harassing enemy behind. But when they plunged into the mountains of Armenia their task was no ensier; almost without exception the tribes of the hill country turned out in arms against them, Passes were blocked and villages burned at their approach, and they had to fight for every inch of their way. When the winter fell, and they found themsolves compelled to wade through miles of snow-drift in the

country of the flerce Carduchians, their courage had almost failed them. But they hatdeard their hearts, pushed steadily northward, and wore at last rewarded by the sight of the Eurine stretching at their feet. A few days more brought them to Trapenes, and put them once more in touch with the Hellente world, after twelve months of weadering. But even now their troubles were not ended; every Greek city looked with suspicion on a hand of the amplying mercountries still ten thousend strong, and the army was refused help, sout on bootless errands, and finally stouded in Thrace in a desperate and starving condition. Just as it was about to dispose, war bruke out however Fersin and Sparts, and the remand of the much-tried army of Gyus was taken into the pay of the Lacednesmodan general Tolbron (399 n.c.).

A graphic account of the extraordinary wanderings of the Ten-Thousand has come down to us, from the pen of Xenophon the Athenian, one of the conerals chosen after Conaxa to replace the victims of the treachery of Tissanbernes. We can judge from it the vivid impression which the adventures of the companions of Cyrus made on the Greek mind. They had proved that it was possible to perstrate, without meeting with opposition, into the heart of the deminious of the Great King, and that a Greek appryof adequate size, under skilful generalship, might be trusted to go anywhere and do anything in Asia. It was not long before the lesson was turned to use, for war with the Possian had just been declared by the Spartan government. Before Cyrus had storted on his expedition he had made application for assistance to his old. friends at Spurts; his request was granted, and-although it was destined to bring him no assistance-n Spartan fleet was sent to the const of Cibleia. This action had not brought on any actual callision with Persin, but it had provoked Artaxerxes, and made war inovitable. After Cunaxa had been fought, the king despatched Tissuphernes to Asia Minor, investing him with all the power which had formerly bose in the hands of Cyrns. Immediately on his arrival the satran set to work to subdue the Greek towns of the Ionian and Acolian coast, to which he claimed a right under the terms of his treaty with Astyochus in 412 a.c. Knowing that they were bound to come into collision sooner or later with the king, the Spartans resolved to declare war before the cities full.

Accordingly, when Tissopheroes Inid siege to Cyme in the early war between spring of 390 ma, the ephots sent to its old a small searth and armycomposed of one thousand Lucoulan Period; three Period.

regulationed from Atheus. This rob, the officer placed in commond, was directed to emilet in his army the contingents of all the states of Lorde; but he found them ill disposed to help him, on account of the way in which they had been treated since the fall of Atheus. The only important reinforcement which he was able to mise was enriposed of the remains of the Ten Thousand. Even, with their ald he accomplished no more than the deliverance of some of the Greek towns of Acolis.

But when the feeble Thibron was succeeded by Bercyllidas, an officer of energy and morth, the tide of war took a decided turn in favour of Spacta, and place after place in the Troad and Acolts felt before the new general. In the next spring he shifted his operations southward, having reduced Pharmakazus, the antrup of the Heliospont, to such straits that he was glad to conclude a trace. Bercyllidas had now to do with Thisaphornes and the Porsian forces in Lydia and Carla; he found this enemy also more inclined to negotiate them to fight. When biblien to "heave the Greek cities free," Thisaphornes clid not refuse, but only made conditions about the simultaneous withdrawal of the Spartan army and of his own from the coast-land. No permanent understanding, however, bud been reached, when affairs suddenly took a new turn.

A new reem had at this moment commenced in Sparts. King Agis, the commander of so many expeditions during the Pelopon-Accession of nesian war, had lately died; he left a sun, Leotychides, Ascentes, to whom the crown would naturally have passed.

But ugly remoun pressiled about the parentage of this prince; it was asserted by many that he was no true son of Agis, but the offspring of Alcibhades, who was known to have seduced the ling's young wife during his stay at Sparts (see p. 270). Accomingly Agaslaus, the brother of Agis, put forward a claim to the throne. He was warmly supported by Lysander, who had long be-n

² The knights of Athers had strongly supported the Thirty, and the government position there on this occusion by accepting the white threehundred from among the prominent oligenties.

his guide and companion, and believed that he buil found in him a fitting justrument for bringing about the reference of the Scortan state-system. Agesilans had reached the age of forty, but had never yet hold any command or office of importance. He was of small stature and torignificant appearance; moreover, he was lame of one foot. Though he had won considerable popularity from his courteous and kindly disposition, no one looked upon him as a mon of mark : it was universally believed that he was a more tool of Lyaunder. The contest for the throne was, therefore, a new trial of strength. between the ephers and the victor of Acgospotamia. It was decided before the Apella, less by inquiry into ovidence than by ampeals to problectes and oracles. When the supporters of Leptychides produced a venerable saying which watted Sparta against "a lame reign," and referred it to Agosikus, personal defigurity, Lysunder skilfully turned the argument against these by declaring that the words really meant the reign of a king of doubtful pedigree. Finally the vote went in favour of Agesilaus, who ascended the throne late in the year 899 B c.

Lyappder and in reality provided himself with a master and not with a servant, for the new king contealed becouth his insignificant exterior more energy and intelligence than any Spartin ruler since the unfortunate Cleomenes. Agenilous had resolved to assert the old power of the royal house, and had availed himself of the support of Lysander only for his own purposes. However, he and his equacillar were outirely at one in those views on foreign policy; both were comer to mak on the war against Persia, having a fixed belief that the expulsion of the Great King from the whole of Asia Minor would be a feasible task. Accordingly they used their influence in the state to secure the appointment of Agestlans as the successor of Depurities, and in 297 n.c. carried their point. The king was authorized to take with him thirty Spartaus as a council of war, with Lysander at their head, and to mise two thousand Largerian perioed and six thousand troops of the allies for service across the seas.

When the centingents for this expedition were called in, the first grave symptoms of discontent against the Spartan begamony: that had yet been noted made themselves visible. Theles, Gorioth, and Athens all refused to supply the force that was demanded from them. The Athenians alleged poverty and weakness; the Corintbians uninvourable omens from their national gods; but the Thekans pushe no excuses, and simply sout a blank refusal. Nor was this all; Agesilans was anxious to commence his undertaking-the Assessments first important invasion of Asia by a Hellenie army out for Asia that had eccurred for ages-with a solemn and impressive ceremony. Before departing he went to Aulis on the Burious, the port from which Agamemon had set forth to the siege of Troy, and offered sacrifice to the gods of the land in imitation of his mythical predecessor. The ceromony was hardly completed, the fires were still burning, and the victims not wholly consumed, when a party of Theban borse rode up, cast down the alture, extinguished the flames, and hade the king to the cudest way to depart from their territory. Acceltans was constrained to go on beard at once, and sailed away to meet his troop-ships, which were lyleg off the southern cape of Euboca. From that day he nourished a flerce and not inexcusable baired of the whole Theban race,

When Agesilaus lauded in Asia he was at once met by enveys from Tissaphernes, who made great protestations of their master's desira to satisfy the Spartan government. The satrap had taken flight at the acrival of such large reinfercements for the army of Deroyllidas, and was anxious to divert the impusting attack. For a short time Agesilaus listened to his proposals, and consented to conclude a truce, but end long he discovered the hollowness of the negutiation into which he had been certropped, and set to work in good enmest to subthee the Lydian and Mysian inland which hy behind the Grook cities of the coast. Before actual operations began, the king was competled to engage in a trial of strength with Lyander. When the victor of Agespatiansi arrived in Louis he had at cose been surrounded by cowds of his old dependents, who ignored the king and paid court to his councillor alone. Agesilaus soon showed rescentment by deliberately refusing all

Become petitions preferred in behalf of Lymander's friends, and disputes of by rejecting any advice that came to him from that broader. Bre long a stormy scene emoret; Lymander cannoted that him with Ingraticula, and was bission in roturn to romember that the friend who presumes too cauch on past services becomes unbearable. Finding Agesilaus quite beyond his control.

Lysander was driven, when he came to a calmer mood, to solicit employment in some region where his humiliation might not be too avident. The king consented, and gave him command of the Spartan forces on the Hellespont, where he did good service against Phannabasus, until he was called home at the end of the year.

Now that he was freed from the tutchage of Lysander, Agesijaus

proceeded to conduct the war on his own system. He made Ephesus his head-quarters and base of operations, and from it struck alternately north and south, carrying his incursions up to the gates of Sardia, and ponetrating for into Mysia and Corta. He drove Pharmhagus out of Duscylium, the capital of his satrage, and compelled him to migrate inland with all his family and treasures. A rapid pursuit and a fortunate ongagement enabled him to selze the Persian's camp and all the wealth it contained—a sum which sufficied to malutain his army for several months: The troops of Tissaphernes also suffered such constant roverses successes of at the hands of Agestlaus, that King Artaxernes was Crin to bolieve that his representative was designedly 000-000 B.O. misseanoging the war. Accordingly he had the old satrap beheaded, and appointed in his stead an officer named Tithranates. But the now governor fared no better than his prodecessor: Agestinus refused to listen to proposals for an accommodation, and pushed bis locuratons further and further tuland. Moreover, he stirred up the notive tribes, especially the Paphlegonium, against their supersin, and raised numerous auxiliary troops from among them. Even discontented Persions of reak began to pass over to his camp, and to array their retainers among the Spartan auxiliaries. The whole of Western Asia Minor seemed to be slipping out of the hands of the Great King. The Greeks of Jocia, when they saw how the war was going, were induced to view the Spartan domination with kinder eyes; they began to make convributions of money with some arrayarch to enthusiasm, and even colleted in considerable numbers in the ranks of Agesilans. A large and efficient body of cavalry was formed from among them, by inviting their chief monto serve in that nim; some came themselves, but the majority oldensate soom dama leavent who proved made bing born and coleinal to discipling than the Ionina oligarche would have been. But the oblef uso to which Agreilaus intended to turn the Asiatio Greeks was to make them provide him with a fleet. By a special grant from Sparta he was given the authority of nauaroh as well as that of general. Then be requisitioned one bundred and twenty ships from the Ioulan and Carlan cides, and placed his brother-in-law Polamader as their head. This force was intended to fall upon the south const of Asia Minor; while the Spartan army, now at least twenty thousand strong, and in high spirits and efficiency, numerical opstward to conquer the central districts of the popiosopia.

To all appearance the Persian power in Asia Minor was now doomed. But Agesilaus was not destined to forestall Alexander the Great. There was one resource still remaining to the Great King; he might stir up war in Europe to distract the attention of the Spartaus from Asia. This line was now adopted. Tithrauster sent across the Aegean a Bhodian named Timocrates, giving him fafty talents of silver, and bidding him use it to rouse the lending near in the states that were known to be discontented with the Spartan dominion. The mission was happily timed, and its uncoess offentually stopped the operations of Agesilaus, and gave the Persian power a new lease of life for fifty years.

CHAPTER XXXVL

ATTEMPTS TO OVERTHOOW THE SPAUTAN BUPREMARY 805-387 h.c.

This emissary of Tithmustes found the task of stirring up a diversion in Europe an easy one. The states which had used Sparta as their instrument for the overthrow of Athons had long boun chaffing against the new ruler whom they had given themselves. More especially was feeling running high in the larger cities, which had policies and ambitions of their own, but were compelled to subordinate them to the interests of the Lacelaemenians. Adhering in one point at least to the programme which they but published at the outbreak of the Polippunesian war, the cubers had set themselves to encourage local autonomy, by isolating state from state among their allies, and by supporting componed independence, so long as it was consistent with a general deforence to the commands of Sparta. It resulted that the smaller states throughout Greace looked to Sparts for protection from their larger seighbours, while the inteer found the Sparton supremuey a complete bar to any further extension of their power and influence. In Becetia, for example, there were always two parties; Thebes was continually striving to turn the bose length of cities into a centralized confederation dependent on herself, but Orchomenus, Thespine, and the other towns which clung to their local independence, could always check her by colling in the aid of Sparts. Roughly speaking, the larger states of Greece were anxious to rid theoretives of their new auxorpin, and obtain a free scope for their ambition, while the smaller were ready to support Sparts, oppressive though also might be, in order to guarantee themselves from the worse evils of servitude to their tormediate neighbours.

The Thebans had shown their discontent some years before by the insult which they had inflicted on Agssilaus (see p. 422), and Thebeapres were new the leaders in open revolt against Sparts.

**Res Sparts Their most popular statesman, Ismenias, influenced by 205 R.C. patriotism and ambition even more than by the Persian. gold of Timogrates, determined to put himself in communication with the malconteuts in other states, and to bring about a collision. Having assured himself of the co-operation of Argos-who, now as always, was hungering after the lands of her neighbours of Epidagras and Phlius-and of Corinth, he took the decisive step. The Locrians of Opus, old dependents of Thebes, were encouraged to raid upon the lands of the Phocians, a tribe whose loyalty to Sparts was undoubted. The Injured Phocius appealed to their suzeroin, while Thebes at once sont her army lute the field to assist the Locrians. Sparta then declared war, without knowled that she was thereby opmonisted to a struggle not merely with Thebes, but with Corintly and Argos, whose governments had not

White King Panasaina, with the contingents of the Pelaparaneaus, was directed to cross the Isthmus and hundle Bosotia from the seeth, Lysander was once more drawn from his retirement and placed in command of a second army. With a small Laconian outlingunt he crossed the Corinthian Gulf and threw binaself into Phecis, where he gathered together the mountain tribes, the Malians, Phoeina, and Ostasaus, for a mid into the plain of the Cephissus. The Orekomenians, toe, broke away from the Bosotian Leagus, joined the Spartan, and declared was on their Theban neighbours.

ver declared themselves.

Before a blow had been struck the Thebans succeeded in enlisting another ally in their cause. Athens had been for the last eight Athens alone years endeavouring to live down her civil broils and 403 Ro. to full back into her old manner of life. But the crimes of the Thirty were not easy to forget, and a bitterness purvaised political life which exceeded anything that had provailed in the days before the Prinquancesian war. Presentions which, whatever their form, were really inspired by political grudges were always tife. The best known among them is that which led to the con-

demnation and death of the philosopher Secretes. Though per-

sonally bismoless, he had been the tutor and associate of Critins, Theramenes, Pythodörus, and others of the worst of the oligarchs. Moreover, his philosophic luquiries into every sphere of mornity and politics shocked conservative citizens, and his restress love of disputation had made him many personal coemies. When preservated by the democratic leader Anytes for "corrupting the youth and practising impicty," he vimilicated his manner of life, but would make no further defence; he was condemned by the dissectory, and draukt the fatal homitotic (309 s.a.).

Many of the best citizens of Athens thought that a foreign war was the best way of rousing their fellows from civil bickgrings, and Thrasybūlus, the here of E.a. 403, was scaleds to repay Thebra for the assistance she had given the exiled democracy in that year, Accordingly, though her many was non-existent and her Long Walls were still in rules, Athens was induced to join the Thebra.

alliance and declare war once more on lies old enemy.

The campaign of 295 n.c. began with an inread by Lysander into Bocotia. Expecting to be joined on a flood day by King Pausonius, he led his Phoclans and Malians down into the plain, Lycander alota and attacked Haliartus. But while he lay at its gates of Wallartus. the townsmen made a sortis, a great Theban army carne up in his rear, and in the solden fray he himself was slain and his forces dispursed. Prosecutos, who appeared next day, found the budy of the great general lying unburied by the wall, am. was constrained to ask for a truce to perform the last offices for the dead, and to consent to evacuate Bosetia if that been was granted blm. For his lateness in arriving, and his tameness in consenting to turn back without fighting, the king was impeached the moment he reached Sports. He find from trial, and was condemned in his absence, just as his father Pleistoanax had been fifty-one years before (see p. 266). His son Agesipulis, a youth of seventeen or eighteen, succeeded to the kingly power. In Lymander Sparta lost her ablest general, and the only man

who could have rescued her from internal decay. But his personal ambition had always been such a disturbing fastor conspiracy of in Lacedromonian politics that the ephore full more cluaders relief than regret at his full. Saved from the fear of his genius, they could go on in their old narrow ways, and work out

to the end the doom which its cost-iron constitution was propering for Sparta. The state was already in great danger; it was only a low years before that a general rising of the inferior citizens and Holots agniost the government had been frustrated by the sleying of Cinadon, who had organized the plot. But, trownrach by conspiracy within and revolt without, the ophers went on in the old paths, and kept Spartan policy in its usual groove of selfishness and indifference to the rights of others.

When the result of the battle of Haliartus was known, Argos and Corinth published their declaration of war, to which not long after the Aparaguians, the Eulocana, and many of the Thessellan. cities found. The Spartane found themselves forced to light for their hagemony in Peloponnesus, as well as for their empire la Greece. Realizing the gravity of the crists, they sent to Asia to summon book Agesilans and his army, for every available man would be wanted at home. When the spring of 394 n.c. came round, the forces of Laconia and of these alies who remained faithful were sent, under the regent Aristodemus, to march on Corinth and block the way of invadors from the north, array, however, arrived too late; twelve thousand Bonetius and Athenians and already crossed the Isthmus, and had been toined by the levies of Corinth and Argos. The allied host, twenty thousand haplites with a strong force of envelop and light-armed. lay on the Carlothian border, and was about to move southward. They had been planning a sudden raid into Lacoula, pursuant to the advice of the Counthian Timolaus, who hade them "not to strike at the wasps when they are flying around, but to run in and set fire to their nest." But while they were settling the details

Bettie of Cornets. Slayon, and was offering there hettle. Aristodemus use and alled up the levies of Aranda, Elis, Achaia, and the small attes of the Argive pennsula; he had nearly as many liopiltes as the allies, and was determined to fight. The armes came into collision by the break Nemes, four alles westward from Corints. The incidents of the fight were not unlike those of the last battle which Sparts had fought in Polopomesus. Now, as formerly at Mantinen, the Lacedermoulans themselves broke and trampled down the enemy opposed to them, while their allies

fared badly and were driven off the field. Once more the Lacedsomenians kept their ranks and retrieved the day, while the victorious wing of their opponents scattered itself in reskless pursuit. Thus it came to pass that though of the Spartane only eight full, their allies had lest cloven hundred men, while the enemy, shughtered up to the very gates of Corinth, left nearly three thousand dead on the field.

Meanwhile Agesilans had received the orders of the ephors to roturn bussu, and had reductionally given over his great scheme for the invasion of Asia. Leaving his brother-in-law Prisauder in charge of the fleet, and an officer named Euxonus with four thousand men to maintain the wor against Tithraustes, he assembled his army on the Helicspont, driven out of Asia, as he bitterly complained, not by force of name, but by the ten thousend golden bowmen which the satrop had sent across to Thobes and Argos. Crossing the straits, he fed his men homewards by the long const-road through Thrace and Masselonia. The force he took with him was strong, confident, and well disciplized; the veteran merconsties who had served under Cyrus, and the Peloponnesinus who had followed Agesilans to Asia, were equally enshuginatio for their leader. Foreing his way through hostile Thesealy, in apite of the hordes of cavalry which hang around him, Agesilans reached the friendly land of Phocis, about a month after the battle of Corinth had been fought. The Phopiaus and the discontented Buotines of Orchomenus juined him, and he then advanced along the valley of the Cophissus. At Coronea, where the Bosstian plain nerrows down between the hills of Helleen and the marshes of Copais, he found the enemy burning lds further progress. In spite of their late defeat, the Thebans were bont on fighting; they had sent in heate for their Argive and Athonian allies, and mustered in strongth beneath the walls of Corones.

Here was fought the most desperate action that Greece had seen slace Thermopylae. The Thuban treops, who charged—as of Delium—in a dense column on the right of the allied army, broke the ranks of their separatist countrymen sparse.

of Orthomenus; but on all other points of the line Seas.c. Agesilans won the day. The king then three biraself between

¹ The Persian gold Daric born the figure of the Great King holding a bow.

the victorious Thebans and their line of retreat; but the enemy merely closed their ranks, and pushed forward into the midst of the Scartan host, determined to force their way through. Their column wedged itself into the hostile line, but could not break it. The fight stood still; the front ranks on either side went down to a man, and the press grew so close that the combatants had to drop their spears and fight on with their daggers. Agesthus himself was thrown down and well-nigh trumpled to death before his budy-guard could draw him out from among the dead. At last, after a struggle of a length unprecedented in Greek battles, the survivors of the Theban column forced their way through the Spartan line, and reached the slones of Helloon. Agesilans had the glory of a victory-as the Thebane confessed by demanding the usual truce for the burial of the dead-but his men had suffered as severely as the enemy, and instead of pushing on into Bosotia he turned back to Delphi. There he offered Apollo the tithe of his Asiastic spoils, a sum of no less than a hundred talents (£24,000), and then crossed over to Peleponnesus by sea.

On the evening before the battle of Corona Agerilans had received from Asia a piece of intelligence which he carefully concented from his army. It was to the effect that his brother-tu-law Peisander had been defeated and stain in a sea-fight off Coldus, and that the cities of Ionia and Carla were one after another revolting against Sparta.

After Agosilaus had left A-la, the Persian satraps had recovered their confidence, and determined to assume the offensive. They

mattee of Condus. vessels, which the king had placed under the command of the Athenian Conon, who had been an oxile in Cyprus since the disaster of Aegospetami (see p. 400). Pharmabarus went on board ship—he was the first satrap who had taken to the sea for fifty years—and set forth with Conon to meet the Spartan fleet. They came on Prisanter off Cuidus, and found him ready to fight, for though an inexperienced seamon he had all the courage of the true Lacedaemonian. The Persians considerably outnumbered the enemy, and obtained an easy victory, for the Ionian captains in the Spartan fleet, sick of harmosts and war-taxes, made no serious resistance. They field

at the first shock, and left their admiral to his fate. Pelsander fell, and half his galleys were sunk or taken.

Pharmabazus and Conon then sailed up the coast of Caria and Iosia, summoning the Greek cities to east off the Spartan yoke and assert their autonomy. Town after town—Cos, yan of Ephesus, Samos, Chics, Mitylene—expelled its har-spartan power most and threw open its gates. Only Abydos, ta sais. where the able Dercyllidas had collected the wrocks of many Spartan garrisons, held out against the victorious admirals. By the close of 494 a.c. it was the sole remaining token of all the conquests of Lysander and Agesilans, and the Spartan empire in Asia was at an ord.

The war in Greece now resolved itself into a series of bickerings for the possession of the roads across the Isthmus. The Corinthians, supported by occasional assistance from Athens and Argos, endeavoured to hold the narrow line-four infles broad from sea to sea-between Combrese and Lechagum. The Laudsempulans, from their base at Sieyon, kept sending out expeditions to burst through and to seize posts in the rear of Curiath, from which a blockade of the city would be possible. But though they broke down the "Long Walls" which connected Corinth with the sen, harried the whole Corinthian territory from end to end, and inflicted endless misery upon its lubabitants, they made little or no progress towards bringing the war to an end. The only thoroughly snecessful operation which they carried out in the whole war was directed at an outlying member of the Theban alliance, and had no influence on the main course of events. It was an expedition of Agostiaus into Agarmania, by which the tribes of that country were forced into submission, and became allies of Sparta (391 p.c.).

Meanwhile the passes in the progress of the war had brought great gain to at least one power. In the spring of 203 n.c. Conceand Pharmhaxus had brought across the Acgean a concertainty of Pheenickan and Ionian ships; after harry—Long waits ing the coast of Lecenia they came into the guiff 369 B.C. of Acgian. As there was no Sparton fleet to fight, Conceobtained from the astrop permission to employ the seamen of his equadron and a considerable sum of money in adding the Athenians

to robuild the fortifications of Peiranus and the "Long Walla," which had remained in rules since Lysender breached them in 404 n.c. Three or four months' hard labour sufficed for their reconstruction, and when this was accomplished the Athenians set to work to build war-ships in the long-deserted slips of their rulend arsenal. By the next year we find them able to send out a modest squadron of ten vessels, the first that had sailed out of Peiracus for twelve years. Two years later they could put Thrasybulus in command of forty, a force large enough to have some influence on the course of the war.

It was not destined that the struggle-the "Corinthian war," as men called it, because its operations centred around the walls of Corinth-should be brought to an end by any events in Europe. Neither party showed any sign of reducing its enemy, and the petty warfare might apparently have gone on for ever. The only incident worth recording in these dreary years was one which had some importance in the history of Greek military art, but no influence on the course of Greek politics. The Athenian general, Inhierates, had applied himself to perfect the equipment and tactics of the light-troops called peliasts. He had endeavoured to assimilate them to the hordite, without loading them with the heavy armour which made quick movement impossible to the troops of the line. Though he furnished them with correlate of quilted lines. and small shields, instead of metal breastplates and large oval bucklers, he gave them a pike and sword even longer and stronger than those of the hoplite. After performing some minor exploits with these troops against the heavy infantry of Phlius and Mantings, Inhierates ventured to measure them against a body of Spartans.

Inhierates description of the caught a more (battalion), four hundred strong, descriptions which had been serving on escort duty, as it defield spattan mera, along the shore below the walls of Corinth, and beset it on all sides with his pelinata. When the Spattans charged, his men gave way; but they returned when the enemy's impetus was exhausted, hung around him, galled him with missiles, and finally brought him to a standstill. Harassed and exhausted, much as their countrymen at Sphacteria had been thirty-five years before, the Lacedemonians halted to defend themselves on an isolated hillock, where they were first worried by the pellasts, and then

broken by a body of Athenian boplites which came up from Corinth, Two hundred and fifty of them fell, the remainder exaped to Lechaeum. Thus a whole Spartan hattalion had been not merely slain off-such things as that had happened beforebut driven to headlong flight by the despised mercenaries of Iphierates. This was a fact which made the atrongest impression on the mind of Groece. It induced every state to pay more attention for the future to its light-armed troops, who had previously been deemed worthy of little notice; it won for Inhierates a reputation which he hardly deserved, and it led to a somewhat unduo depreciation of Spartan courage. The real moral, that hoplites should never be sent out alone, but always accompanied by a due proportion of light-armed troops, seems to have escaped the notice of the contemporary observer. Twenty cases with the same moral could be quoted in the fifth and fourth conturies, yet no general seems to have grasped their meaning before Alexander the Great,

While the war had come to a standstill in Europe, really decisive events were taking place across the Acgean. The Laudasmonians had lost all their possessions in Asia, except Abydos, spartan inand were therefore in a position to resume their old trigues with alliance with Persia; having none of the Great King's 390 B.C. ancient possessions any longer in their hands, they could approach him without being required to part with anything. In 392 B.c. an officer named Antalcidas was despatched to Sardis, and obtained a hearing from Tiribazus, who had succeeded Tithraustes as entrap in Lydia. He pointed out that the war had ceased to bring the Great King profit, and that the Persian floet under Conou was now being used, not to serve Persian Interests, but merely to build up again the power of Athens, whose interests must infallibly bring her ere long into collision with the satraps. Tiribasus was convinced by these arguments; he recalled Conon, threw him into prison t for misusing the forces entrusted to him, and went up to Seen to persuade King Artaxerxes to make posce with Sparta.

But negotiations with an Oriental power are always lengthy, and while the attitude of the Persian court was still doubtful, the sphere raised a new army and fleet and sent them across the

¹ Cf. especially the dienster of Demosthenes in Astolia (p. 821).

^{*} Conon escaped from prison, but died not long after.

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Aggess. This force soized Ephesics, and once more gave Sparta a footbold in Ionia; shortly after an insurrection in Lesbos threw all the cities of that great island, save Mitylene, into Leocdsemu-bian bands (390 s.c).

By this time the Athenians had finished building their new news, and forty ships under Torseybolus acrived in Asiatic waters to check the restoration of Spartan supremacy east of the Aegonia. Throsphilus performed no great military service, but he succeeded in uniting the Byzantines, Rhodians, and Chalcedonians in a naval league with Athens—a union which hopeful men trusted might prove the commencement of a new Delian League. Before the year was ended, however, he was shin by the people of Aspendus, on whose land he had been levying a forcal contribution.

For more than a paor a sporadic neval warfare continued to rage over the whole Aegean, from Aegina to Ephesos, and from Abydes to Rhodes. But here, too, just as in the land war in

attheward Greece, the adversaries acoused to have come to a standard. At last, in the spring of 388 no., Tiribazon returned from Sunn—he had been absent no less than these years—with full purmission from the Great King to carry out his Phillogram policy. To at once made an alliance with Antachdas, who had been his original adviser, and placed the Persian fleet at the disposition of the Lacedaemonian. Uniting it to his own, Antahidas swept the Aegean from north to south, claused the Athenium aquadron book to Petraous, and showed himself undisputed master of the seas.

But Sparts and no longer any desire to preceed with the war; she was conscious that her momentary advantage had been gained money, not by her own strongth but by that of Persis, and

Anticloides, ress anxious to seize a favourable opportunity to put 387 M.C. an end to heatilities. In the spring of 387 a.c. Tiribana tavited all the belligerents to send deputies to a pozos congress at Sardis. All accepted, for none of them had any great wish to protect the war. Athens was frightened by the prospect of the ruin of her newly restored trade and the blackade of her borristy; Argos had gained nothing by a long-protracted struggle; Thebes thought that she had made an end of Sparton interference

in Bosotia, the main object of her declaration of war. When the envoys arrived, Tiribarus laid before them a declaration which he had drawn up in conjunction with Antalcidas. The document ran as follows: "King Artaxerus deems it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, and of the Islands Clazomenae 1 and Cyprus; the other Greek cities, both small and great, are to be independent; only Lemnes, Imbros, and Scyrus are, as of old, to belong to the Athenians. Whatsower states shall not accept this peace, upon them I shall, in conjunction with those who accept it, make war by land and by sea, with ships and with money."

By agreeing to these terms, Sparta gave up all pretence of posing as the defender of Hellas against the barbarian. She surrendered the cities of Asia to the Great King, because she could no longer help to keep them for herself. Resigning herself to the loss of her power cast of the Aegean, she fell back on the old hegemony of Polonomosus, which had been hers from time immemorial. This begemony she felt herself able to maintain, but for its full reestablishment an interval of peace was necessary. If the peace could be bought only by sacrificing the Ionians to Persia, they must be sacrificed; since their rebellion in 394 n.c. Sparta felt no atom of interest in their fato-a disinterested regard for the welfare of Helias was never her foible. The threat of having to face Persia and Sparta combined was too much for the confederates, When their envoys reported to them the terms offered by Tiribazus, one after another consented to accept them. Thebes held out langest, for her envoys refused for some time to subscribe to the treaty, unless they might sign in the name of the whole Beestian League. The Spartans refused to allow this, alleging the terms of the treaty, which said that "all Greek citles, both small and great, should be independent "-a clause which they read into a probihitlon of the hegemony of Thebes in Bosotia. But finding that all their allies had left them, and frightened by the threats of Agesilaus, who declared his intention of at once invading Bosotia, the Thebans signed the inglerious document.

Thus ended the "Corinthian war," a struggle which wrought

¹ The old town of Clazomenae was on the maintand, but a citadel and new quarter had been built on an island connected by a causeway with the shore. Hence Tribaura could call it an island.

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damage to Hellas at large—for it ended in the loss of her Ionic meanters—without profiting any one of the states parameter. Which had engaged in it. Spatia had lest her navide adversaries had not guined by her disasters. The only power which had come happily out of the business was Persia, who had at last recovered the Ioniau cities, lost so long ago as 480-470 p.c., and now found berself once more mistress of the Aegean. But hackly for Greece King Aztaxersas was a most uncolorprising monarch, and never exhed to push to its end the opportunity which was now granted bim.

Aptakinias incurred the discredit of being held responsible for the treaty, and from him it took its name, " the Peace of Antalcidas." Another but a more inglorious Lysander, he wen the approval of his own countrysams, and the curses of all Greece beside for having yokod Sparts to the barbarian, and secured her triumph by sacrificing Oreek cities by the score. His ignoming was shared by the ephore; Agesilaus alone, who advocated the continuance of the war, and no part in it. But even Agestlaus looked upon the peace as profitable to the country. When it was said in his hearing that "the Lacklacemonians had played into the hands of the Medes," he replied, " No; say rather that the Medus are playing into the hands of the Locedamonians." Dut whether the Medes Lacratized or the Lacratemontary Medized, Ephesus and Miletus and all their sister-towns were struck out of the list of free Hellanic communities, and incorporated once more in a Persing satragy.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE GREEKS OF THE WEST, 413-338 R.C.

When the great expedition of Niclas and Demosthenes had been shattered against the walls of Syracuse, it was universally believed that a new period of splendour and prosperity was opening for the cities of Sicily. The unprovoked attack of Athens on their liberties had shown them the danger of civil strife, had taught them to combine, and had proved that when combined they were irresistible. Selinus, Himsen, Gela, and most of the other Sicolot towns, had contributed their contingents to the Syracusan army, and shared in the glory of the great victory. Syracusa, who had borne the brunt of the attack, had learnt that, strong though she was, she was not strong enough to save herself without the aid of her lesser neighbours. Bound together by their late comradeship in arms, and warned by the dangers they had passed through, it might have been expected that the Sicellots would settle down to a life of peace and progress.

This was not to be; within four years after the execution of Niclas, Sicily was to undergo a series of disasters which mained her strength and cut short her energies for ever. Half her cities were to be destroyed by the stranger, the remainder stripped of their liberty, and handed over to a tyrant whose deads recalled the

worst days of the rule of Gelo and Hiero.

When the rejaicings which followed the overthrow of the Athenian armamout had ceased, two schemes engrossed the attention of the Syracusans and their allier. To punish Athens for her interference in the affairs of the West, a Siceliot fleet should sail castward and carry the war into the waters of the Aegean. Accordingly two squadrons were sent forth, in 412 and 4t1 B.O., under Hermocrates, the Syracusan general who had most distinguished himself during the siege. Those vessels, as we have already seen,

shared in the good and evil fortune of the Spartan armaments of Chalcideus and Mindarus (see pp. 377, 391).

Even stronger than the desire for chastising Athens was the determination of the Sicelists to punish those traitor-cities among

themselves who had esponed the Athonian cause. Wors in Sympuse undertook the chastissment of her old Gintly. 412-410 B.C. openies of Naxos and Catana; their fields were! ravaged, and their walls beleaguered, yet for two years they contrived to hold out. Sclinus meanwhile fell on the Segestins, and endeavoured to wreak her venceance on the alien city which had so long maintained herself alone among the Greek communities. But Segests seemed fated to bring evil after ovil upon Sirily. With ruin impending over her now as in 417 u.a., she determined to call in another ally. Where the Athenian had failed the Carthaginian might supposel. Accordingly the Segestane sent musage after message to Africa, to interest in their cause the great Phoenicium city, whose harbour looks forth on the western shore of Sicily.

The Carthaginians had avoided modeling with their Hellenic neighbours since the awful disaster which their army had suffered carthage before the walls of Himera just seventy years ago (see indections in p. 232). But now they were in a worlike model; the

disaster of the Athenians at Symeuse and must the affects disaster of the Athenians at Symeuse and their coursels were dominated at the mement by Hannibal, an ambitious general who had a gradge against the Siceliots. He was the grandson of that Hamilkar who had fallen at Himem in 480 s.o., and had swom to aronge the fate of his amesstor. In 410 s.o. he was one of the two suffets, or supreme magistrates, of Curthage, and he easily perstanded his countryment to listen to the appeal of Segesta, and to enterust him with an army destined for the invasion of Sicily.

Accordingly, in the summer of 410 n.c., a Carthaginian auxiliary force landed at Segesta and draws off the Schmuntines from the

steem of solitons of the tewn. But this was only the prelode solitons to the great invasion. In the following spring Handrian mind innecessary heats which Carthage was not a general of the select of Nicias; he did not falter for a moment in his corpa-

tions, but marched straight on Sellmas almost before his landing was known. The buttering-ram was set to work on a score of points at once, breaches were are long broken in the walls, and a humbred thousand wild Libyans, Spaniards, and Gauls mounted to the assault. For nine days the Selimuntines held the breaches, and sent messenger after messenger to harry on the forces of Synacuse and Acragas, whose sid had been promised them. On the tenth day the defence broke down, the enemy poured into the town, slid a herrible massaurs took place. The burkarians filled the streets with sixteen thousand torpiece, drove off the rost of the inhabitants as captives, and swept away everything in the city that was not too hot or too heavy to be moved.

The Sicoliot army, which had gathered at Acragas to march to the relief of Sellaus, was thunderstruck. In ten days a great and well-fortified city had been struck out of the rell of Greek communities. The generals were scared. Instead of taking the field to onnose Hansibal, they dismissed their army and seat to ask for terms of peace. But the Carthaginian had not yet executed half his purpose. Before the Siceliots had guessed his purpose, he had marched across the island. and laid siege to Himera. The Hinzurgosans, seeing the fate of Selinus impossibility over them, evied aloud for instant succour. But Hannibal was so prompt that no more than four thousand Syracusam troops had time to reach the city. The Greeks strove to keep back the enemy by a vigorous sally, but it failed, and the place in a few days became untenable. The non-combatants were horried away by sea; the Syracusans escaped by land, but ere the town was half evaquated the besiegers burst in. Hannibal levelled the whole place-walls, temples, and houses-to the ground, and executed three thousand explive implites on the upot where his grandfather had been slain in 480 a.c., as a solemn offering to the gods of Carthage.

Within three months after his landing Haunthal sailed back to Carthage, his ships laden deep with captives and spoil, leaving technid him two leaps of ruins where once had stood the two westernment Hallente cities of Bioliy. His return was auxiously leoked for in the next spring, but for return two unknown it was delayed. The Sicoliois, free for a short space from the impending

roln, did not employ their time in getting roody to resist the next wave of invasion. They fell to mutual recriminations over the could war at occases of their military failures in the preceding year. At Syracuse the factions actually came to blows. Hermograces, the hero of the Athenian sings, had been sent into caile, but he had a large following in the city, and was able to make attempt after attempt to force his way back, and to overthrow the faction in power. In the end of 408 n.o. he was admitted within the cates by treachery, but in the street-fight that ensued he was sluth, and his followers were forced out of the half-wor city.

The mantle of Hermogrates fell on one of his partisons, a young Syracusus named Dionysics. He was of moses birth, and owned no family wealth or influence; but he was a man of mark, not morely a guilant soldier, but a ready speaker, and even a poet of some note. The defeated faction placed him at its hand, but instead of conflucture the open war. Dispressus provailed on them to lay down their arms and bide their time.

In the spring of 406 a.c. the Sicellote heard to their dismay that the impossing storm was about to break upon their heads. Han-

nibal, with an even larger namy than he had led in his first eampning, was proporting to land meen their slaires. This time they were somewhat better propared than in 409 s.o., and when the Carthaginian marched reginst Acrogas, the second city of the island, he found it defended by a large confedents army of thirty-five thousand men drawn from every state in Sicily. For seven months the war stood still beneath the ramparts of Aerngas, and battle after battle was fought on its sloping uplands. The Grooks were ill handled by their generals; the Carthaginians were held back by a plague which broke out in their foul and crowded camp, and carried off thousands, including their commander Hampibal bimself. Things were at a deadlock till the winter, when the invaders, now under the command of an officer tamed Himileo, succeeded in cutting off the food-supply of the Sicelists. This brought about the evacuation of the town; the whole population, a great growd of two hundred thousand persons, stale away by night, while the army protected their retreat. The place, with all its wealth that was not partable, fell into the hands of Himileo. The exiled Acrogantines scattered themselves all over

Sicily, the main body settling down on the deserted site of Leontial, which was made over to them by a vote of the Syracusan assembly.

When the Syracusan generals led bone their contingent from

Acragas, they were assalled with a storm of reproaches for their

mismanagement. The attack was headed by Dionysius and the other surviving chiefs of the faction of Hermografes, who now uppy that their time was arrived. Scand by the near approach of the Carthaglaians, the Symcuson assembly deposed their officers, and clocked in their stead Dionysius and a wholly now board. The one faction having failed to conduct the war with success, they throw themselves into the hands of the other. But Dionyslus had in his mind not so much the repulse of Himileo as the seizure of supreme power at Syracuse. His conduct during the next year less many points of similarly to that of Napoleon Benaparte in a similar case. Under the pretence of strengthening the military fixed of the city, he bited many hundred moreovaries, whom he attached to his own person; then he induced the progressor. ansembly to vote him full authority over his colleagues, so that he became practically dictator. The final 406 B.C. step was taken soon after; an alarm was raised that his life was in danger from passesine; an illegal and informat meeting of the assembly, was held, for outside the walls of the city, and nacked with the partisans of Dionysius. They voted their leader a bodyguard of a throssied men, and prorogued his nower for an indefinits period. Syrucuse now found herself in the bands of a tymnt, though Dionysius disclaimed the title, and made great professions of his attachment to the cause of democracy. The Syracusons acquiesced for the monious in the loss of their liberty, because they fult that a strong hand was needed to direct the war against the oncoming Carthaginian army. Himileo was already thundering at the gates of Gela, whose territory was actually contentiaous with that of Syracuse, and in a few months might present himself before the walls of their own city.

The tyranay of Dicayains lasted for no less than thirty-eight years—a pecied of storm and convolsion, civil strice and foreign way—it brought convolues evils on Sicily, but on the whole character of it served his purpose. After long struggles the tyrant Disayster brought the Carthagiaines to a standatill, and at his death left

(405 B.O.

Acrogse and all the other towns which had fallen to the enemy, says Selinus and Himera, once more in Hellenje hands. Dionysius was neither to be counted among the worst nor among the best of tyrania. He often showed unexpected elemency to a vanquished foe: he was not remonally violant, intemperate, lustful, or avaricious; he took good cars of all who served him well, and wrought much for Syrpense as well as for binuself. He was not insensible to gentlande, or incapable of personal affection. Himself an author of some merit, the writer of tragedies which won the first prize at the Athenian Dionyslac festival, he loved to surround himself with literary meas. As a builder, he was almost equal to Pericles; as a general, he hanogurated a new apoch in the Hallonic art of war,

But all these qualities were spoiled by the countervailing vices of Dionysins. His good and stendfast determination to hold on to like tyranny led him again and again through seas of blood. citizens of Syracuse who suffered death at his hands were numbered by thousands rather than by hundreds. The frommeinl exigencies of his wars drove him to grinding extortion; he is said to have taxed the Syracusans every year to the extent of one-fifth of their property, and his confiscations were enormous. He was carable of outbursts of cruelty which shocked the Hellenic mind-flowing prisoners to death, crucifying them, or fixing them to his military His callousness to religious scutiment provoked even greater wrath; he never shrank from plundering or burning a temple, and on one occasion sold to his ensuries, the Carthaginians, the most hallowed treasures of the greatest skrine of Italy. Above all, his suspicions made him hated. Driven into a state of agargahousion by continual plots and outbreaks, he came to trust no man. His splea were always at work, scenting out imaginary consplyacies: his daugeous always full of citizens imprisence on suspicion. He grow so wary that he never stirred abroad without a mercenary guard; he had every visitor to his relace searched for concented weapone, oven to his own nearest relations, and-such is the storywould not even allow a turbur to approach his person with a rasor. The well-known tale of Damoeles illustrates well enough, whether it be true or false, the state of nervous tension to which the tyrant was reduced. That contion, having expressed his envy of the prosperity of Dionysius, was invited to a languet, placed in the sent

of honour, robed like a king, and served with the cholose wines and wlands. But in the milist of the feast bis host balls him look upward. Damocles did so, and found a heavy sword suspended over his head by a single hair, and threstening every moment to fall. "Such," said Dionysius, "is the life of a tyront."

The reign of Dicaystus was one long struggle against the power of Carthage. Four desperate were with that state occupied his coergies. His other achievements, brilliant and Divergius startling though they appeared, were but interludes first war with between the acts of the greater drama. It is strange to find that the first efforts of Ikonysins were the least excessful; though he had been allowed to seize sovereign power precisely because the Syracusan generals and failed to hold back Himileo, yet his carliest campaign (405 p.c.) was quite as unsuccessful as that of his producessors. He lost a battle before Gela, and was. compelled to avacuate both that town and Camarina, whose inhabitauts had to floo by night, and to join the exiled Acragantines at Legation. But chance came to the tyrant's aid : the plague which had raged in the Carthaginian camp in the previous year broke out again; Himilco saw half irla array stricken down, and in fear for his conquests made peace with Discresion, restoring the territories of Gela and Camarino, and only adding that of Acragas to the Carthaginian deminions in Sielly.

For the next five years Dionysius was occupied in a bitter struggle with his unwilling subjects; plots and insurrections broke out again and again. The whole city once fell for a moment into the heads of the rebels in 404 a.c. The tyrant recovered it; but in 403 u.e. a large force from Rheglum and Mossene joined the Syraction exiles, got possession of the mainland quarters of the town, and besinged Dionysius in the island-citadel of Ortygia. But the military skill and unscrapations energy of the tyrant brought him out of the struggle stronger than ever. Not only did he make his through firm, but he fell upon his neighbours, and in a short space conquered Naxos, Cutana, and the Seal tribes of the interior. He then felt himself strong enough to recew the war with him walls of Cartinge, but, as a measure of precaution, first on-larged the fortifications of Syracuse so as to include the whole plateau of Enicolne, taking within the new wall all

the upland where the fighting during the Athenian siege had gone on. Thus he tripled the extent of the city; and though the new quarters were not filled with houses, they were specious enough to serve as a place of refuge for the whole population

of South-eastern Sielly in time of war. Dionyshus' second attack on Carthago opened with a series of victories (397 c.c.), but just as he seemed to have the whole island in his emap, an unexpected fleet and army of the enemy fell on Messene and took it by storm. Dionysias, attacked in the rear, had to abandon his conquests in the west of Sicily, and such back to defend Syracuso from an invasion from the north, In front of Catana he gave battle to Himileo, who again, as in 406 E.a., headed the invadors; there he was atterly defeated, and the enemy pushed on to besiege Symonse. But the new walls stood the city in good stend; the tyrant had been taken by surprise rather than crippled, and his resources were not materially lessened. He stood firmly at boy behind his fortification for many months, till the plague that had twice before smitten the Cartheginians senin camo to his rescue. So fourful was its violence that Hindles and his officers actually fied from it, leaving their army to north wholesale by the ravages of the nest and the sword of Dionysius (895 p.c.). The tyrant then marched out of his stronghold, and took one by one every Carchaginian stronghold in the island, except the towns of Lilybauum and Drepanum at its western extremitty.

Freed from the barbarian, Dionysius at once turned on his neighbours, and subdued every independent state in the island. By 301 a.c. he was marker of the whole of Sigily save the two fortnesses in the west; and his conquests were confirmed to him by a selection peace, in which Carthage formally resigned all she had gained since 410 s.c.

Discipling now torped his arms further afield. The Italiot Greeks were at this moment in a state of depression, owing to the misstance of recent encreel/monts of a new enemy from the north-the Italiots. About 420 a.c. the Sabellon tribes of Control Italy had begun to quit their mountain valleys and to press southward and searand. At the very moment that Nicias was besigning Syracuse they fell upon Curma, the northernmont Italiot city, and

destroyed it (415 n.o.). They reduced Kenpolis and other towns of the neighbourhood to the status of tributaries, and then possible further south. A tribe who bere the name of Lucanians handed the advance; they pressed into the southern puninsula of Italy, took the great city of Possidonia (rive, 895 a.c.), and began to encrosely on the territories of Thurii, Croton, and Metapontom. The Italiate leagued themselves together to resist the opporting wave of barberism, but with poor success. In 390 a.c. their united forces experienced a crushing defeat at the battle of Latts, and the bodies of ten thousand hoplites covered the field. It was when the Kellenic cities of Italy were facing northward to resist the Lucanians that Dionymous fell upon their rear. His progress was rapid and easy; the distracted Italiots were beaton in the open field, blooming their cities were besieged, and generally captured, conquess the and the Syracusan yoke was extended over all the states as far north as Croton, In some cases Dionysins removed the tubabitants bodily, to people the empty spaces within the new walks of Synneuse; in others, where the resistance had augered him. he sold the whole population as slaves. Everywhere he plundered temples and private dwellings with perfect impartiality. Plous Greeks held that the crowning attocity of his life was committed when he took the precious robe of Hora-a masterpiece of the embroiderer's art-which formed the pride of her temple near Croton, and sold it to the Carthaginians for 120 talents (£27,000).

In 483 p.c. Disnysius became involved in a third war with Cartinge; it lasted but a single year, and led to no declaive results, save that Schimus fell back into the hands of the Disnysius burbarlam. But the Carthoginiums could advance no further east, and it was avident that Disnysius' power with Carthoga formed a complete barrier to their making further conquests in Saily. A fourth war, which broke out in 368 n.c., was equally indecisive: the Syracusans setzed all the Carthaghian territory up to the gates of Libybacum, but were unable to take that fortress, or that peace had once more to be concluded on the basis of 154 possibilities, in 367 n.c., just after the decease of Disnysius.

The last twenty years of Dionysins' rule were outwordly full of prosperity. Symmuse seemed the greatest and most flourishing city in the Greek world, and formed the centro of an empire reaching from Croton to Acrages. Twenty thousand veterm Prosperity of mercenaries served beneath the Syracusan banuer, so that Dionysius was even able to interfere with events across the Ionian Sea, and is found soveral times influencing the course of politics in old Greece. His magnificent embassies attracted the admiration of the lovers of pomp and the hatred of the lovers of liberty when they appeared at the Olympic games, He took in hand schemes of extraordinary scope, such as that of building a wall right across the southern peninsula of Italy from ses to sea, in order to keep out the advancing Lucanings. In the midst of all his tolls of state he found time to compase poems and tragedies, and wrote with sufficient merit to win the first prize at Athens, in the Dionysia of 268 n.c. But his life, if brilliant and many-sided, was anxious and wearing; his suspicious gave him no rest, and in 367 n.c. he died, aged not much over sixty, leaving a secure throne, a full treasury, and a veteran army to his son and namesake, Dionysius II.

Dionysius the younger, though not destitute of ability, was far from pessessing the restless energy and grim determination of his fathur. He cared little for military matters, and thought more of the sulendour than the power of the tyrant's position. Vain, fills, and capricious, he was ready to hand over authority to others, provided that he reased the credit, and was not troubled with the cares of administration. But he would not trust any man for long. At first he put the government in the hands of his wife's father. Dien. -a grave personnee of a philosophile turn of mind, who tried to convert the Syracusan tyronny into a model monarchy, and brought over the philosopher Plato to toula Dionysius into an ideal king, The young tyrunt took keeply to philosophy for a short time, but found his teachers too tlessome and exacting, and ere long burished, Ding and sont Plate home. For seven or eight years Dionysius held his father's empire together without any conspicatous failures; for, although indolent and vain, he was neither cruel, reckiess, nor stupid. But he was not the man either to win the loyalty or to awe the minds of his subjects; and when Dion-who had been for Dies invades several years employed in gathering men and money signy, assent in old Greece-speddenty landed in Stelly, a general insurrection took place. First the smaller Sicolict towns threw open

their gates to Dion, then the Syrneusans row, and after a sharp fight drove the tyrant's mercenaries into the citadel of Ortygia. Dionysias, who had been absent on an expectition to Rely, returned to find himself moster of mothing more than the feland fortress. The siego of Ortygia insted for many months, and Dion suffered several reverses before he succeeded in starving out the tyrant's garrison. Dionysius himself escaped to Local in Rely, the only one of his father's possessions which be lead succeeded in retaining under his power.

Dian was now noaster of Symouse, and the insurgents who had aided him to expel his such in-law exactly waited for the grave philosopher to procloim the liberty of his native city. But the compations of power proved too much for Dian; he installed himself in the citadel, and showed no signs of dismissing his troops or re-establishing the democratic form of government. When a demagngue named Horseleides proposed to east down the walls of Ortygla, Dian had him put to death. The Symousane recognized that their efforts had movely replaced an indetent and easy-natured tymat by an austere one. The city was ripo for a rebellico, Marses of when the Adbanian Callippes—a follower of Pinta, Died 388 Ed, who had accompanied Dion on his return from exile—transborously slew his friend and fellow-philecopher (355 a.c.).

Nine years of chaos followed in Sicily. A succession of military adventurers disputed with each other for the possession of Syssense; and so far was liberty from being testored to the state, that when, in 346 n.c., the exided tyraut Disaysius presented himself before the gales of the city, a numerous faction hastened to adopt himself before and the last, at any rate, been better than the numerby which bark succeeded it. But Disaysius land taken to bubbts of draukenness and debauchery, and showed bimself far from being the easy-going prince that the Syracusans had expected. Morrover, he was mable to vectore the deminion of his father over the other Sicilian cities, and his wars with them cost his subjects much blood and treasure. To add to the wors of the Bleeliots, Carthage, who have fellenic neighbours, and seemed Dialy to couper them all, now that no vigorous central power bound the Sicilian cities into a single state.

In these evil days the democratic party at Syramuse secretly sunt to Corinth, their mother-city, to bey for aid both against the tyrent and the Carthaginions. There was a momentary lull in Greek politics at the time—the Sacrod war had just ended—and the Carinthians consented to lead their help to free their daughter-state. They fitted out a small expedition, and gave the command of it to Timeleon, a stern republican, who had taken part in the slaying of his own brother when that brother endeavoured to make limedit tyrant of Corinth.

Timoloon reached Sicily in safety, and in four brilliant campaigns completely liberated the island. He found Dionysius so hard pressed by his enemy Histone, tyrant of Leontini, that he was glad to leave Sicily under a anfe-conduct, when a new ensury came to attack him. The exerciser of Syracuse retired to Corinth, where he long dwell as a private citizen, an adject of curicelty to the whole of Greece. He seems to have borne his fall with considerable equantity. He showed no vain regrets for his last power; and, when not engaged in a drinking-bout, employed his time in giving leutures on singing and recitation, or in instructing the boys of Corinth in the art of reading aloud.

After he had expelled Dionysius, Timpleon was fiercely attacked both by the tyrnot Hiketas and by the Carthagininas, who joined Timpleon liber their forces to belonguer Syrnouse. Timpleon hebb man siedly, them in check till their ill success drove them to

auspeut each other's faith. The Cartinginians abandoned Biketus, who was driven off, and after a white besieged in his capital of Leonitiai and forced to engituante. Then Timeleon was able to turn against the barbarian econy. He advanced into the west of the island with a small army of twelve thousand men, and met the Cartinginians, who outcombered him frefold, on the banks of the Crimesus. Allowing the enemy to advance unmolested for some time, he auddedly fell upon them while their forces were divided by a ravino and the flooded river. The victory was as decisive as that which Gole had men a handred and forty years before under the walls of Jimenn. For thirty years the Carthaginians dared not again assail their Hellenic neighbours

Timoleon laid down his power after expelling from Sicily the remaining tyrants, who had seized on the smaller towns during the years of anarchy. He spent an honoured old ago in the city which he had freed, and had the happiness to die before Syracuse was

again troubled by aspirants for tyranny, or molested by the enemy from Africa (336 p.c.).

While Sigity had been saved by Timpleon, the Italiots had been for less fortunate. When the Dionysian dynasty fell, the cities recovered their independence, but found themselves warm the exposed to the inreads of the Lucaniaus, whom the thatbut power of Dionysius had long togst in check. The lineaders gradually forced their way southward, took the towns of

power of Dionystus had song teept in cheek. The invaders gradually forced their way southward, took the towns of Terina and Hipponium (355 n.c.), and established themselves firmly in the southern penimenta of Italy, where the sub-tribe of the Bruttians, the vanguard of the occoming host, formed themselves tota a powerful state. Local, Rhegiam, and Orokou were barely able to preserve for themselves a small territory close accound their own walls. The Tarontines, further to the north, made a better fight, and beat off the Lucanians for some years by calling in to their aid King Archidamus of Sparta, the son of the great Agesilaus. When he fell in buttle (338 u.c.) he was replaced in command of the Tarontine armies by Alexander, Prince of Epirus, a brilliant warrier, who obtained success after success equiest the Lucanians and Bruttians, and so broke their power that, though always dangerous, they no longer appeared irrusistible to the Italiat states.

It was Bonne, and not the Luconians, who was destined to extinguish the liberty of the cities of Magna Graecia; and the arms of Rome were still for off.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

THE LAST YEARS OF THE SPARTAN DEGEMENT, 387-379 D.C.

The peace of Antalcidas proved quite as profitable to Sparta as the most suggified of her statesmen had ventured to hope. By it she had deliberately secrificed the remeant of her possessions in Asia, but at that cost she had broken up the formidable coalition which nonneed her supremotely in Europe. The terms of the treaty—which announced that "every Hallenic city was to be free and independent"—left her own power untouched, because her relations with her smaller neighbours were lasted, not on bonds of federation, but on separate treaties with each individual state. Moreover, the allied cities were not kept to their allegiance by garrisons, or forced to pay tributes; they were held down each by the Lacontring party wittin its own walls. Ostensibly, then, the allies of Sparta were "free and independent," and the treaty made no difference in their states.

On the other hand, the bonds which had united the enemies of Sparts were broken by the provisions of the peace of Antalcidas. The Bosotian League, which Thebes had tried to keep together by coroing her smaller neighbours, at once flew to pieces. When the peace was proclaimed well-nigh every town in Bosotia threw over the league, asserted its complete independence, and assumed all the attributes of sutonomy 1 in a way which had not been seen since 447 n.c., the year in which Thebes had reconstructed the confederacy. Not contented with seeing her enomy crippled in this may, Sparta induced the remnants of the Plateanes, who had dwell in Attiga ever since 480 n.c., to return to the site of their

¹ For example, they ell began coining money in their own names, which Thebas had not allowed glose the lesgue was referened after the defeat of Athena in 447 a.c.,

reined city, and to rebuild it in spite of Thebes. It was not only in Bosotia that the peace of Antalcidas brought about cleanges; in Pelopanneson, Argos and Corioth had united during the war, and fused themselves into a federal state; they were now compelled to separate, and the Laconizing party in Corinth soon brought back their city to its old dependence on Sparts.

When affairs had settled down in Greece, and the Spartane once more found themselves firmly established in their old position, they soon showed how little they cared for the wording of the treaty of 367 n.c. when it affected sewtines, and her treaty of 367 n.c. when it affected the sewtines, and her treaty of 367 n.c. when it affected the sewtines, and her treaty of 367 n.c. when it affected the sewtines, and her treaty of 367 n.c. when it affected the sewtines, and the sewtines are set to be a sew that the sewtines are sew to be a sew to b

themselves. Ere two years had passed they fell on

their Arcadian neighbours, rased the walls of Mantines, and compelled its citizens to exchange a demorrable for an eligarchic form of government. Not long after they turned on Philms, and restored its exiled aristocracy by force of arms. Both was the way in which Sparta left her neighbours "free and independent."

It was Agesilaus who now directed the policy of his countrymen. He had won unbounded glory both by his Asiatic examplings and by his later achievements in the Corinthian war; this made him the ideal of the citizens. Moreover, his ambition was not political, but purely military; he was therefore able to avoid all conflicts with the ephons, and lived on such good terms with them that they continually lent thermolives to his plans. Agesilaus continued the marrow and joulous policy of which Lysauder had once been the exponent. He cared nothing for the gauerul needs of Greece, and made it the main object of his life that no state should over to allowed to growstrong enough to cause Sparta a moment's measurement.

Ern long this selfish policy was put into practice on a large scale. The Greek cities on the Macedonian coast, since they had been liberated by Bensilas in 422 n.c., had preserved the constitution of the states, headed by Olynthus, had formed themselves into a confederacy called the Chalethan Longue, from the fact that nearly all its members by within the positionals of Ghalethee. This body was stready growing powerful—it could put into the field eight thousand hoplites and a thousand horse—and appeared destined to absorb all the Greek states in its

neighbourhood. Frightened at its progress, the towns of Acanthus and Apollonia, which had no desire to enter the longus, sent an embosey to Sporta to beg the ephors to assist them in maintaining their independence. The Chalcidian League had given no emps of offence, and was putting forth its activity in a district where Sporta had not interfered for forty years. Novertheless, Agosilaus and his followers were quite ready to take up the quartel, for the sole reason that they thought that the league might some day grow dangerous.

There was a party at Sparta which opposed this reckless intervention in so distant a land, on grounds of expediency as well as Barra-de- of public movality. It was headed by the young starm was "an King Agesipolis; for, as was usual, the two royal indiana house had asposed different lines of policy. But Agesilans and the supportors of vigorous action were far the more powerful, and carried a vote in favour of war at the next meeting of the Apolla. If was resolved to raise an army of the thousand men from among the allies of Sparta, for service against Olynthus and her sister-cities of the Chalcidian League. The main body was not to start till the following spring, but two officers, named Endhuidss and Phosbides, were sent forward at onco—the month was now September—with about two thousand mon destined to varrison Acanchus and Apollonia.

The merch of Phospides took blin through Bosetia, and he pitched his camp for one night not far from the walls of Thebes.

While he lay there he was surprised by a visit from Circli troubles Leontindes, one of the two polemorous who were the In Thebes. 396 B.C. supreme magistrates in the Thoban constitution. Leontiader, who was a violent partisan of oligarchy, was engaged at that moment in a hitter struggle with his fellow-polemarch Ismening, the head of the demogratic and anti-Laconian party in Bosotia. With the true Greek recklessness in matters of faction. Leontindes had resolved to crush his gnomy at any socrifice, even though it involved the rule of his country. He came to Phosbidas by night, and offered to place blin in possession of the Cadmein. the citadel of Thebes, in return for aid against Ismenias. Sporten commander was prompt, daring, and utterly unscrupulous : he instantly closed with the offer of Leontindes, and undertook to

carry out his directions. The Theban pointed out that the next day was the festival of the Thesmophoria, during which the citudel was stripped of guards and handed over to the women of the city, who there celebrated certain rites at which men were not allowed to be present. He himself, as polerarch, was in charge of the gates, and would see that they were open at the presencentation. Sports and Thebes were at peace, no one suspected trendsery, and the town would be taken completely unawayes.

The next day Phoebidas carried out this menstrons scheme. He got his troops in merching order, and started as if he was about to proceed northward on his way toward Chalchlies.

But suddenly he swerved from his route, and appeared estaet middey before the cates of Thebes. There he met

Locatiodes, who admitted bim into the town. The streets were empty in the mountide heat, no man offered apposition, and in a few minutes the Spartzus had entered the citidal, and selsed as hosteges the great droud of women who wore celebrating the feathed. Before any one realized what had happened, Locatiodes rode down to the seaster-house, and amounted to the astronished closes of Thebes that their city was in the heads of the Spartnes. So great was the panie that no one deed resist the traitor; he was allowed to seize and imprison his rival Jamenias, and to summon a packed assembly of the people, which voted submission to the ancient enemy. Three hundred prominent members of the democratic party left the city at once, and fied to Athens; but the bulk of the Thebana were so coved that they acquiesced for the moment in the assumption of power by Leontiades and his friends.

Thus were planned and executed the most figurant broach of

international morality that Greece ever know—a trime oven more wanten than the Athenian capture of Mulos (see p. The Spartans 348), though it involved for less bloodshed than that relate the horrid deed. Men hoped for a moment that Sparta, Cadmaia selfish though she might be, would disown her general's action. And, indeed, King Agestpolis and bis followers, when the news arrived, clamoured loudly for the panishment of Phochilas and the evacuation of the Cadmaia. But Agesilaus promptly use to defend the general; he stated his views with the most repulsive and cynical frankness. "We must examine," he said, "the terraneous formula of the terraneous contracts of the terraneous contracts."

dency of the action of Phoebidas. Let us consider whether it is advantageous to Sparta. If it is so, it was highly meritorious in him to carry it out, even though he had no authority or orders from home." The Spartans proved as immoral, though not as brazen-fazed, as their king; they passed a decree which consumed Phoebidas for acting without orders, and imposed a fine on him; but after this display of hypocrisy they veted in favour of the retention of the Cadmela, and sent harmosts to Thebes to take command of the garrison. Issuedas they brought to Sparta, and put on his trial for "Medism" on account of his conduct in 395 n.c. (see p. 426). It is needless to say that the unfortunate statesman was condemned and excented.

The political extinction of the second state in Greece, which perished in a time of pence, and without being able to strike a blow

in self-defence, caused terror everywhere. It seemed The Chalas if unrighteousness was about to prosper, since no oldian war, 381-378 R.O. state dared take Sparts to task, and for three years everything went well with her arms. The Chalchdians, indeed, made a brave defence; they defeated and slew Telcutias, the brother of Agesilaus, who led the first army against them. But King Agesipolis then took the field, captured Torone, and laid store to Olynthus. He died of a fever before the city fell, but Polyblades, his successor in command, received its surronder. The Chalchdian League was then dissolved, and each of its members enrolled separately as a subject-ally of Sparts (379 s.c.). The day was to come, ere that generation had passed away, when Sparts and every other state in Greece was destined to lamont bitterly the destruction of that vigorous confederacy. It had served to keen back the advancing power of the kings of Macedonia-a power which was now left unchecked, and began first to encroach on its Hellenia neighbours, and then to rise into a public danger to the whole of Greece.

The same year that saw the fall of Olynthus was destined to mark the end of the good fortune of Sparta. The city which she occupance had most deeply wronged was fated to be her bane. Thebes had now been grouning for three years beneath

at the yoke of Leonlisdes and his partisans, the polemarch Philippus and Archias. Her citizens had hored at first that some fortunate chance might weaken Sparts, and free them. But when all went well with their oppressor, sheer desperation drove the most reckless of the Thebans into forming a conspiracy. The exiles of the democratic party, who mostly reelded at Athers. got into communication with the malcontouts at home, and between them a daring and hazardous plot was devised. It was to commence with the assassination of Leontiades and the two nolemarchs, and to end with an attempt to storm the citadel and expel the Spartan gerrison. Scren exiles from Athena headed by two young men named Melon and Polopidas, were to undertake the actual slaying of the tyrants, while a citizen named Charon lens them his house as a hiding-place. Phyllidas, the accretary of the polemarchs, who, in spite of his official position, had strong sympathiss with the exiles, undertook to forward the scheme. For this purpose he invited his employers to a supper, promising that they should not only drink deep, but enjoy the company of the most beautiful women in Thebes. He undertook to introduce the exiles into his house, muffled in female apparel, and left the rest of the business to their bands.

On an appointed day the seven exiles passed into Thebes at dusk, disguised as country-folk; they stole one by one into the house of Charon, and remained there till the next Assessmation evening, when Phyllidas was to give his support of the Theban Before the hour had arrived, however, they were startled by hearing their bost receive a summous to appear before the polemarchs. Charon set out in much trepidation, for he feared that the conspiracy had been discovered. But the magistrates had received no definite information; they murely warned him that they had nows from Athens that a plot was on foot, and cautioned bim against engaging in it. At nightfall the unsuspecting polemarchs entered the house of Phyllidas, and gave themselves up to the pleasures of the table. In the midst of the feast, it is said, a courier arrived from Athens, bearing a despatch for Archias which revealed the whole plot. But the doomed man thrust the paper unopened beneath the pillow of his couch, exclaiming, " Business to-morrow"-an expression which became proverbial. When his guests were heavy with wine, Phyllidas introduced the conspirators. who entered the bouse shrouded in ample robes, and with their

faces veiled. They reached the supper-room unsuspected, and were greeted by the half-drunken guests as the women whom Phyllidas had promised to introduce. Then, casting aside their disguise, they rushed, dagger in hand, on the polemarchs and slow tham with repeated klows. But the leader of the oligarchs still remained. Lecutiades had not been bidden to the languet of Phyllidas, and was spending the evening at home. Priopidas and three more rushed to his house the moment that the polemarchs were despatched, and knocked at the door. When it was opened they botst in, and found him just about to retire to rust. Leontiades was prompt and active; soutching down his sword from the wall, he leapt to the threshold of his bedroom and slow the first conspirator as he entered. He fought hand to hand with the others, and was only cut down by Pelopidas after a desparate strangle.

The tyrannicides now ran to the public prison, where they contrived to kill the jailer, and to liberate a hundred and fifty political Theorem and prisoners who were lying in bonds awaiting their

then salled out into the strouts, proclaiming that the tyrants were slain, and inviting all true Thebans to take up arms and join thom. So great was the detastation which the rule of Leontindes had inspired, that the citizens came out in hundreds to join the conspirators. But all might yet have gone wrong if the Spartan officers in the citated had kept their heads, for the discitate officers in the citated had kept their heads, for the discitate officers and of all ying furth, shut the gates of the Gadmoin, and contented themselves with giving shelter to the fugitives of the olicarchic party who can to seek their success.

When the morning dawned the whole city was in the hands of the [usungents, and several thousand men were already mustering for an attack, on the citadel. An informal public assembly had elected Palopidas, Charon, and Malon as Beotacks, and voted its approval of the staughter of the previous night. Assistance soon came to the Thebaus—the exiles from Athens joined than, volunteers arrived from several of the Escatian towns of the pati-Laconian party, and two of the Athenian strategi lud an Attie force across Mount Cithacron to aid in the slege of the citadel. These officers had not obtained any formal authorization from the Ecclosia, but they knew that the bent of Athenian public opinion was strongly in favour of Thebes, and trusted to win approval by the success of their notions. The Spartan forces in the Cadmeia were now closely beset; an attempt of the Platacans to bring aid to them was defeated, and several assents were delivered upon the wall. The stormers were besten back, but their fiergeness esemed to increase after each repulse, and the barmosts, who were men of utter incapacity, lost all hope of ultimate success. After three or four days they made overtures for surrender, which were gladly accordingly the gatrison marched out of the cipadel, leaving that friends the Theban oligarche to be massagred by the mob, and took the road for the Isthmus. At Meyara they mot a large Pelopomnesian army under King Cleombroton, which was hastoning to their suppour. The Spartness were willly enmeed with the officers, who had made such a feeble defeuce in such a strong fortress as the Cadmein. With a severity which can hardly be blamed, they put to death two of the harmests, and sent the third into exile.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE PERSONS OF THERES, 379-371 p.c.

Althouse Thebes had freed herself for the moment, there was no great expectation in Grosco of her proving able to defoud the liberty she had regained. Sparts was at the height of her strength, and unvexed by any other enemy; if Thebes, with Corinth Athens and Argos to back her, had proved unable to everthrow the Laceshamonian power in the struggle of 395–397 n.c., what chance was there of her success when also plunged into war without the nid of even her over Koestian poisshbones?

But however dark their prespects might appear, the Thebans were resolved to fight to the bitter end; even destruction was prefemble to submission to an enemy so translorous and hypoculism as Sparta. Nor was the war so desperate as it seemed; at this moment there was no Lacednessonian general who possessed an atom of military genius save Agoshaus, and Agoshaus was now verging on old ago—he had resolved his fifty-ninth year—and was no longer always in the field. Thebes, on the other hand, happened to have at her disposal the two most brilliant mon that she ever reared—a happy chance, for great pames were always rare in

Bucotin. The first of these was Pelopidas, one of the personance beaders of the late conspiracy—a flory young man, possessing more than an ordinary share of military talent. He was a brillant leader of cavalry, quick to seize an opportunity and prompt at delivering a sudden blow. From his first tampaign he wen the hearts of his soldiers, and never falled to make them follow wherever he might lead. But first among his merits was the fact that, unlike most Greak generals, he was a unselfiely as he was brave, and never refused to co-operate zealously with a colleague, or to carry out plane which were not his own.

When Athens had owned Aristoides and Themistodes and in another generation Cimon and Pericles, those creat citizens had out themselves at the head of counting factions, and done much to neutralize each other's newsers; but to the shrenler cond furture of Thobes, it alsoused that Pelonidae was the bosom-friend of the warrier-statesman Epaminondas, the best man that Resistances Bosotin aver reared. If Poloredas was the right hand of Thabas, Enaminandas was less bodin. He combined intellectual with moral excellence to a degree higher than was reached by any other Greek statesman in any see. Pericles only can fulrly be compared with him, and the great Athenian was decidedly inferior to the Theban in the breaith of his syntoathies: for while Puricles worked for Athens alone, and showed no great regard for Greece, Epsiminopulas was as realogs in what he wrought for the general good of the Hellenic race as in his service to his own native city. Moreover, Ferfeles was at the best an average general. while Eraminendas showed the highest military skill, and revolutionized the whole art of war among his countrymen. Enamineedes came of an ancient but improved shed family, and through all his brilliant career lived a life of honourable poverty. But though poor, he had acquired the best culture of the age; he had studied music, chatoric and philosophy, without becoming vain, affected or improportion). No Greek was ever more free from the vices which beset the statesman; ambition and self-interest never exercised the slightest influence on his actions. His sense of honour was sa strong that he even refused to take an active part in the plat which freed his native city, because it involved violence, treachery and assessination. When, however, the oligarchs had been slain, be was the first citizen of Thebee that came out in arms to join the lossurgents, and his cluntient pleading draw over many adherents to the cause of liberty. But Epicuinoudas was not merely just, patriotic, and unselfish; he postessed the broadest political ideas of any Greek statement that ever lived. It was his aim to induce all the Hellenic cities to live tegether in unity, without that continual strife for pre-emissace and domination which had hitherto been the curse of the race. He did not fight in order to destroy Sparts, or to make Thebes mistress of an empire: he

only desired to carb the former's power of doing berm, and to place

his own city first among the band of her equals. Indeed, his want of that selfish and aggressive local patriotism which characterized the average Greek was the one thing which hampered his influence at home. The Thehans sometimes complained that he loved Hellas more than his native town; and though the tount was untrue, it serves to indicate the heat of his character. In 379 n.c. Epaminocodus was merely known as a man of mark and a friend of freedom; that he was also a great general and a great statesman the history of the succeeding years will show.

Theses had been liberated late in the year, and it was in the very depth of winter that King Gieombrotus led into Bocotia a Poloponesian array hastily raised for the purpose of relieving the garrison of the Cadraeia. When the king found that the citadet had fallen, he displayed great irresolution. After penetrating into the Theban territory and stopping there sixteen days without offering battle, he suddenly dishanded his army and returned home, leaving, however, a force of several thousand man to protect Thespine—the most friendly to Sparta of all the towns of Bocotia. This detechment was commanded by a rash and reckless officer ramed Sphedrius, who now did his best to bring trouble on Sparta.

The Athenians were, on malore reflection, sauch frightened at their own boldness in lawing unofficially aided in the liberation sphotoing of Thebes. To dissum the worth of Sincia they

artempt on punished the two strategi who joined the Bosotians, and sudenvoured to chear the state of all complicity in their actions. Sphodries chose this mement, when Athens was anxious for peace, to Indict on her the worst of insults. He formed a wild scheme for surprising the city by night, and seizing it in the same way that Phochedas had seized Thebes five years before. Accordingly, he secretly draw his men down to the Attle frontier, and made a forced march on Athens. But his management was as had as his intentious; daylight surprised him when he was in the middle of the Thriasian plain, ten miles from the otty, and he then turned ignominiously and retreated to Megara. But his plan steed revealed, and roused the Atheniaus to the wildest weath. They reflected that there was no use in endeavouring to condiliste a city whose generals were espable of 80th acts, and

boldly declared war on Sparta. Thus Thebes was provided with a coverful ally in her hour of need.

In the early summer of 378 a.e. the ephors provailed on Agestlate to take the field. The old king eathered a large array and marched to crush Thebes. He found the passes Aboutter of Cithacron guarded by a mixed force of Athenians campaigns of and Thubsas, but forced a way through with his usual \$75-377 R.C. skill. Descending into the right, he found that the Thebans had drawn a strong line of entrencliments along their frontier; but this hindrance, top, he succeeded in reseing, and so penciment close to Thebes. But the enemy, though they would not give him battle. home so closely on his heats that he could not form the slave of the city, and finally had to retire with nothing accomplished. To the Thebana this year's fighting beought one cause of expitation: in the autumn they surprised and slew their old enemy Phochidas. Next year Agestlans reasoned with a larger army, and again forced his way into the Theban territory; he laid it waste with the princet barbarity, felling fruit-trees, blocking wells, and burning every building in the district; but once more he was unable either to make the Thebans fight or to besiege their city. In short, as a contemporary remarked, the king had only given his enemies an instructive lesson in the art of war, and done them no material harm. These two compaigns lowered the prestige of Sports to a vast degree; her best general, with the whole force of Polopounesus at his back, had proved himself muchle to make any impression on a fee whom he had expected to crush at the first encounter. Moreover, on his return, Agesilaus nest with an accident at Magnrawhich confined him to his bed for many months, and so shock his health that for several years he was not able to take the field.2 Cleambrotus replaced him at the head of the army of investor in 376 n.c., but, having little or no military skill, was not even able

¹ Sphedicias was prosecuted at Sparta for his action, but acquitted on the recommendation of Agesilans, who now (as proviously in the case of Phosphilans) pleased that the offender bud strives to do his best for Lacedaumon.

³ A veln in his log causing trouble, the surgeons eponed it; a flow of blood followed, and was not stangeded till be fainted with weakness and was at the very point of death.

to force the passes seroes Cithaeron, and returned without having set foot in Bosotia.

Meanwhile the Atherians had been prosecuting a naval war against the allies of Sports with some success. They had renewed The world the marilims league with Byzantium and Rhodes which Thrasyluthus had formed in 800 p.c., and had induced several other states, including Chies and Mitylene, to join it. The members of this alliance agreed to furnish thins and money for an attack on Polonoppeaus, and ampointed a foliat board to all at. Athens and direct the way. In order to avoid recalling the edious memories of the Confederacy of Dolos, the name of the war fund was chanced from " tributa" (adoes) to " contribution" (coverer,), and the Athenians solemuly swore never to send out cleruchies to any part of the Aegean. The confederacy ultimately came to number seventy cities, but it was never a very vigorous buly the allies and a bucking four of the ambition of Athens. which made them sluck in providing sidns, and still more unwilling to put money into the common treasury. Their caution grew yet

more marked when, in the year 376 a.c., the Athenian Barillo of admiral Chabries coronletely defeated the Sportan fleet off Naxes, and swept the energy out of the Aggests. After this, the danger from Sports beying passed away, it was exceedingly difficult to extract either ships or contributions from the confederates. When Timotheus, the son of Conon, rounded Capa Malen and carried the war into the Jonian Sea, he was resently brought to a standatill for sheer want of money. Yet he had secured some brilliant successes, having beaten a Corinchian fleet off the Acarnapian coast, and enlisted Corovin and Cophallenia. in the maritime league. The campaign, however, was very costly : the Athenian treasury and run dry-even after the unporsular expedient of a stringent income-tax had been adopted-and hardly un abol could be aguessed out of the allies. Athens now came to the conclusion that she had done enough to punish Sparia for the misdeed of Sphodries, and began to think of concluding peace. Thebes, it was urged, had shown herself quite enpuble of defending her own borders, and there was no use in protracting the reac for her benefit. Indeed, the Thebans were growing quite unpopular at Athena, owing to the rigour with which they were treating their Cleuraboutus in 374 a.c., they had fallen upon the The Thebane various places which still adhered to the Spartan alliance. After Polopidas had gained a buttle at Tazyra. and heaten the Laconizers and their Peleponnesian aliles in the oren field, the separatist towns had fallen one by one. Theerise and Tonogra had their walls destroyed, while Plataca was raced to the ground, and its inhabitants driven into oxile. This maltrestment of the Platacons youred much indignation at Athens, where a friendly feeling for the small state on their frontler had never consed since the day of Marathon. Having reduced all the neighbouring towns save Orchomenus, the Thebans now formally reconstituted the Boentian League, which had been in abevance for the thirteen years since the peace of Antalcidas, and assumed their old presidency in it.1

The Spartage were by this time discusted at their ill success both by sea and land, and frightened by signs of growing discentent among their allies in Polonomesus. Accordingly Aportion they professed themselves ready to treat for hence. A peace, 674 B.C. congress was held at Athena, and terms of accommodation drawn up. based on those of the peace of Autalcidas, and providing that "all states should be free and independent." This formula satisfied every one except the Thebans, who wished to have some security and not the anneadon of the cities they had corred into joining the Bosotion League. Ecominoudes, who was acting to behalf of his native city, would not sign the trusty; but Atheus and the other allied newers refused to back up his demands; they left him in the luych, and ratifled the terms of peace, thereby leaving Theben alone at war with Sparts.

But the treaty was destined to prove not partly but whally abortive. The Athenian admiral Timothens, being recalled on the conclusion of peace from his station in the Ionian Sm, committed on his yeturn voyage some eats of bestility against Zacyothus, a Spartan ally. This the Spartans highly resented, and the Apella 2 voted "that the Athenines had done lajustice, and that

It is not quite certain whether Plabas and the other places fell in 874 a.c., just before the tenaty, or in 878 a.c., just offer it. The Sparian public assembly (see p. 06). "

war should again be declared on them." This new conflict, however, was not carried on with any great vigour; it lasted for three years without bringing about a single engagement of importance

Stage of by land or sea. Its chief incident was the siege of Gereyra. Coreyra by a large Spartan armament, which failed to \$75-778 S.O. take the city, and sailed away in great disorder just in time to escape an Athonian fleet under Liphicrates which was sailing up to relieve the place (\$78 a.c.). Iphicrates, though he did not catch the heatile fleet, showed kinnelf in this campaign as good a commander by sea as he had been by land in the Curinthian war (see p. 432). He had maste the western coast of Pelopounesus, and annihilated a small squadron of ships which Dionysius of Syracuse had some to the assistance of Sparts.

At less, in 372 n.c., the negotiations which had failed two years before were once more received. A congress met at Sparta, and Athenamakes drew up terms very similar to those which had been

Peace with fermerly agreed upon. But again the old difficulty Sparts.

\$71 R.C. arose. The Thetans claimed to treat and sign as representing the Boectan League, while Sparts refused to recognize its reconstruction, and hald by the provisions of the peace of Antaleikas. A stormy seems took place at the council board. King Agreeians taunted Epaminondas with refusing to leave the cities of Boecta their rightful liberty; the Theban answered by saroustically inquiring when Sparts intended to grant significating to the torouships of Laconia. Agesilans then lost his temper, and exclaiming that if the Taebans wanted was they should have it, snatched up the treaty and crased their name from the list of signatories. Athens and the other allies of Thebre, however, accepted the terms offered them, tatified the agreement, and sant leane their fleet (aummer, 871 n.c.).

The war had now once more become a duel between Thebes and Sparts, and, the issues being simplified, the conflict seem came chambereiss to a head. A few weeks after the treaty had been broades signed, King Cleambratus set out to invade Boootis. STRO. Instead of attempting to force the passes of Cithaeron, he crossed the Corinthian Gulf, and ontered Phoeis. He then advanced into Boeotia, not by the valley of the Cephissus, the natural route, but by the rough hill-raths along Mount Helicon, close to the

sen-shore. Thus he was able to reach Lengtra in the Theepian territory, only eight miles from Thebes, without having been molested by the enemy. Eparationedar, who commanded the Boostians, had been expecting him to appear further north, and had only just time to throw binaself between the leverters and Thobes. The armies encamped over against each other on the stope of Hellcon, and a battle was obviously imminent; the best chance of success seemed to lie with the fipertans, for they considerably outnumbered the enemy, and knew that many of the troops in the Boestian ranks were ill-affected towards Theles.

Epaminondas, indeed, found some difficulty in inducing his colleagues the Docotorchs to consent to give battle. They mistrusted their army, and brought forward nunserous numberies and umens which portended ill success to their arms. Enaminoudas was oblighed. like Themistocles before Salaguis, to turn graciemoney himself. A divine saving tromised that "the Spartane should be defeated at the tumbs of the maidens:" and he bade his Culleagues observe that they were drawn up near the graves of two Bosotian dunisely who had once slain themselves, after having suffered patrage at the hands of certain Lacobermonians. This convinced the Bostorche; but Epsentuondes' own confidence by not in resolucies, but in his two military skill. He had grasped a new principle to the art of war, and was auxious to apply it; it had occurred to him that there were other manners of bringing an army into action beside the orthodox method, which had provailed in Greens from time immemorial. All generals had been wunt to acrance their hoplites in a sloply straight line-groundly of uniform depth from end to end-to place what cayalry they nessessed up the flanks, and then to fling the whole at the energy's line, aiming at striking him with a level front and bringing every man into action at the same moment. Ecominoulas had determined to try a new system-modern military guthers would call it the attack on sobelon-which he had himself devised. would strangthen one of his wings, place his best troops in it, and launch it at the opposite wing of the enemy before he set his centre in motion; the centre again would start a little before the

¹ Plutanch gives Cleombrotus 11,600 mm; Diodarus gives 6010 to Krendnondas. But these figures must be understated.


remaining wing, so that battle would be joined on the point where he was strongest long before the weaker part of his army had come into action. If the leading wing were victorious, the enemy would have no opportunity of retrieving the battle in any other part of the field, and would be in a hopeless case, even although two-thirds of his army were still jutact.

This was the principle which Eparainendas was about to put into practice. He therefore determined to strike hard at the right wing of the hostile line,—in which he knew the native Spartans would be placed, according to the ancient usage which gave them the post of honour. If they were once routed, he was confident that their allies would not stand firm, and that the battle would be galoed. Accordingly he formed his own left wing out of his Theban troops, the only part of his army which he could shoroughly trust. They were ranged in a massive column, no less than fifty, men deep, instead of the usual eight or twelve. The Bostian allies, who were not to be relied upon for any very zealous service, were drawn up in the ordinary line formation, and formed his centre and right wing. His cavalry, which was good and numerous, advanced parallel with but somewhat in advance of the left whog.

King Gleombrotus was as anxious to fight as his adversory, though for a very different reason. He had been effect tempted for mismanaging his etunptique in 378 and 376 a.c., and wished to prove that went of fortune and not want of courage had brought about his failure. He drow up his army in the usual Greek fashion, the line twelve deep from end to end, with the Lacoulan caveley on the right wing, and the allied caveley on the loft. He himself took his post in the middle of the right wing, surrounded by the seven bundred native Spartans who secred with him, and fanked by the Lacoulan Periosel. His line of battle stretched out at each out beyond the shorter from of the Bosotian army, and seemed likely to surround it when the encounter came.

In the early afterocon the Spartan commanders, flushed, it is said, with wine after their midday meal, led down their army into Bastle of the plain. The Thehans moved out to meet them Associate at a rapid pace, their left wing far in advance, armo, according to Eparainoudas' new order of battle. The fighting opened by a cavalry charge on the extreme left flank.

by which the Beestian horeomen drove the Laconian off the field. Then the heavy column of Theban hoplites came lote action: it have down with perfect accuracy on the point when the king and his native Spartans were stationed. The first shock of the charge thrust is deep into the line of the enemy. Clearmbroaus himself full, and was horse off the field by his budy-guard, but for a moment the hattle stood still. The Spartan line held together like iron, and would not give back a foot, while the Pericecl beside them began to close in on the flack of the Theban column. This movement was checked by Pelopidas, who had been stationed in



the rear of the Thebans, in command of three hundred chosen haplites, known as "the Sacred Band," with special orders to move out and protect the main body in ones of any such attempt. Meanwhile the critical moment of the fight had come; the Sportnes, though they fought and fell every men in his place, could no longer resist the pressure of the massive Theban column. "Give me a step more," wied Epamicondus to his men, "and the day is ours!" With one final heave the Thebans burst through the enemy's line, and rolled it up to right and left. The day was won. In the few minutes of desperate fighting four hundred out

of the seven hundred Spartage had fallen, including nearly every officer in the field. Over a thousand Laconian Periossi lay dead health them, and the remeater of the right wing rolled back in confusion towards the Spartan camp. The result which Hapaminondes had foreseen immediately came to pase: the Pelapounesham in the centre and left wing of Cheombrotus' army would not stand firm, when they saw their dreaded masters beaten from the field. Although the Boeotian centre had hardly come into touch with them, and the right wing was still some way off, they gave ground and retreated in good order to the camp. The few surviving Spartan officers tried to make them caum, to the fight, pointing out that they still outnumbered the Boeotians; but they utterly refused to face the enemy in a second struggle. Then it became excessivy to acknowledge the defeat, and the heralds went forth to ask from Raminondes a truce to bury the deed.

So ended the day of Leccito, the first battle in which a Spartan king and army bad been worsted in fair fight by inferior numbers in the open field. It gave the death-blow to the military system which had ruled in Greece down to that day, and cent the whole fabric of the Spartan domination in ruins to the ground. Never again was the Polopomesian confederacy to muster in force at the command of its suserein for a commange beyond the Isthmus, nor a king of the race of the Heraclidae to set a host in buttle array

on the plain of Bosotia,

CHAPTER XL.

THEBRS PREDOMINANT IN GREECE, 371-362 R.C.

THE name of the battle of Lengtra set all Greece in commotion: every city in the land began at once to cast about and revise its rollies in view of the altered aspect of officers. Sparts sparts after alone affinited to treat her defeat as one of the nedinery chances of war; when the fatal tidings reached the city, the subors prohibited all public signs of gricf. The festival of the Gymponaldia was at its height, but they refused to allow it to be interrupted. When they sent to each home ton names of those who had fallen, they added an order that the women were to refrein from oven lamoniations. Next day the relatives of those who had been slain were to be seen in the streets with calm and scrope countenances; while those whose some and brothers survived hid themselves in shame, because their kinsmen had transgressed Spartan custom, by escaping with their lives from a last field. A few days later the ephons called out an army to march to the relief of the ferce in Bocotia, which was now blookaded in its entrepoled camp. To provide an adequate come of Spartons they were obliged to anoth into the field every citizen up to fifty-eight yengs of age. But this last levy of Lacedaction was not fated to fight, for they met their friends already on their musch home, and returned with them.

Epaminous as had refused to allow his troops to storm the camp of the defeated army. Knowing the protound discouragement which pervaded the Pelopomessian bost, he preferred to allow it to break up, without wasting any lives in further lighting. Many of the demoralised allies desarted their commons without

delay; the remainder were so ill disposed that the Spartau officers humbled themselves to selt for a fron departure. The moment that it was conceded they slunk off by night, and retrested by forced marches till they met the force that had been sent out to succour them.

The leminary with which the Theban general treated the enemy seems to have been caused in a large measure by the fact that, just

after Lenetra had been fought a new army had arregred in Breetin. This force belonged to Jason. of Pherse, a personage whose movements had of late enews important. The great but faction-ridden race of the Thessalians was for the moment united under his band, and constituted a nower whose attitude Thebes was bound to watch with the keenest virilance. Jason was the son-in-law and successor of a citizen of Pherae, named Lycophron, who had rande himself tyrant of his native town about 405 n.c. When he died he left his principality and his large army of moreomeries to Jason, who, in a chequered and eventful raism of about twenty years, gradually reduced all Thesasly under his scentro. In 373 a.c. Pharsalus, the last indorandent city to the land, fall into his hands; he then recurrenteed the Thesestian Langue, which had long been a more name, and had himself formally greated Tions, or generalissimo of the confederation. By his firm but just rule he bound together thirty bickering cities tuto a nowerful federal state. When united, the Thessalians were the most numerous race in Greece, so ere long Jason could take the field with eight thousand home, twenty thousand honlites. and a great multitude of light troops. His strength was very threatening to his neighbours, and it was all-important to Thebes to know what his intentions were with regard to the war with Sparts. He finally declared himself on the Thebau side, and when the campaign of 371 a.c. opened, set out southward, appropriate that he was about to join Eneminandss; but, whether intentionally or not, he came just too late for the battle of Leustra. arrived be refutued from attacking the Spartons, and advised their free dismissal. His army was so large and his intentions so doubtful that the Thebesis did not breathe freely till he had departed. It did not reassure them to learn that on his returnmarch he had sacked the Phocian town of Hyampelis, and seized

the strong fortress of Hemelea-Trachts, the outwork of the pass of Thermanylan.

Uncortainty as to the future conduct of Jason kent the Thoban severament from committing itself too incautiously to the presecution of the war with Searts. For the present that did nothing more than make things sure at home. Maximinendas marched amainst Occhoraceous, which had close to Searts to the last, and then against Theorine, whose continuent had been withhold from the army that fought at Louetra. Both places submitted; then the Thebans, inconsed at the disloyalty to Bocotic which early of them had displayed, tillied of putting their inhabitants to the sword. But Examinandas brought his countrymen to a better mind: Orchomeous was marely deprived of its walls, and the Theseians were banished instead of slain. Meanwhile, the states which bordered on Bootla had taken the results of Lenetra to heart: the Pheciaus, Leerlans, Bubosans, Actolians and Acareamans all concluded treaties of friendship and alliance with Thebes. and promised the aid of their troops in the next compaign against Sparta.

At one city only were the Theban ambassadors received with coldness, and decied a friendly hearing. The Athenians, though they had so lately been leagued with Thebes, showed marked diagust at the complete triumph achieved by their former allies. They would have preferred a balance of power to the complete triumph of either party.

The next year (370 n.c.) was crowded with important events both in the Peloponnesse and in Northern Groce. When the spring came round, Jason of Pherse announced his intestion of appearing at Delphi during the appearanting Pythian fastival. Osteosibly he was morely about to do sacrifice to Apollo in lumour of the union of Thesasty, and countless victims were calleded for the hecatombe which were to mark his gratitude to Heaven. But he was also to be accompanied by a large army, and the states of Courtal Greco were much alarmed at the prospect of his arrival. The Delphians themselves are said to have inquired of their oracle "what they were to do if Jason touched the temple-treasure;" the nesswer came that "the ood himself would see to the mattee." And, indeed, Jason mover

reached Delphi. As he sat in state at Pherae giving sudience to petitioners, seven young men approached him in the guise of littigauts, and while he listened to them sprang upon him and slew him with dagger-thrusts. His throne fell to his brothers, Polydorus and Polyphron, men of little merit or distinction, who showed no signs of carrying out his ambitious schemes.

Meanwhile the Pelopopoposna was full of stir and change, for the ancient state-system of the conjuguia had at last broken un. and Answers in many districts at once lecal autonomy was asserted. Peloponoseus. The Mantingens rebuilt the wells which had been cast down in 385 n.c. (see p. 498). In Teges civil war broke out. and the Lecondzine party were massacred by their opponents. The Elelans took the field to conquer the small neighbouring states whom Sparts had prevented from falling into their hands. In Argos the confusion was at its worst. The rival factions, however, justead of combining to declare war on Saarta, fell to blows with each other: the ollegronic party was crushed, and the decrocrais began a series of massacres, in which no less than twelve hundred citizens were slain without any pretence of trial or judement. This shoughter, known as "the rejure of Club-law" (warrangeds), was the worst outbreak of mob-violence ever known in Greece, and cost more lives than even the great Corcyrean andition.

For the first time in their history the Spartans made no rigorous attempt to strike down their revolted allies, before help from the north should reach them. The ephors found themselves reduced to the resources of Laconia alone, and were unable to put more than a few thousand troops into the field, for many of the Periocel were discovered to be disaffected and untrustworthy. So great was the want of mee, that the survivors of Leuctra were allowed to retain their full rights of citizonably, which they had forfaited by their flight from the field; but, as King Agesllaus observed, "on this one occasion the laws must be allowed to sleep." Only one stroke was attempted against the robal states. Agesilaus, though now sixty-seven years of age, led a small army against Mantinea. So low were the spirits of the Spartans follow, that he was considered to have done well when he drove the Mantineans within their newly built walls, and ravaged their territory.

Isolated revolts of Peloponnesian towns had been common enough, and if the rising of 370 n.c. had been like those of 421 and 395 s.c., Spartn might have hoped for better Foundation of days. But the rebal towns of Arcadia now showed Messlopolis. a disposition which they had never before arhibited: instead of striking for local independence, they began to federate themselves. Mantinea and Terrea, acting for cace in union, joined with well-pich all the smaller states in the land to regive the ancient Arcadian Longue, which had uncitically cessed to exist ever since Sparts, became the ruler of Paleronnesus.1 Nor was the union merely formal; the telbes and elties resolved to sporifice their local ties, and to join in building a federal capital, which all should acknowledge as the centre and pledge of Accadian upity. A spot was chosen in the valley of the Helisson, a tributary of the Alphons, in the largest and most fertile plain of the land, and there the ground-plan of a specious city was marked out, by a body of commissioners chosen countly from the various states. They pamed it Megalorolls, " the great city," as an augury of its future strength and power. Within it place was assigned for settlers from various parts of Arcadia, while the Parthesian tribswithin whose boundaries it was built-were invited to remove thither en masse. For the future government of the country, it was provided that a numerous delegation from each city should assemble from time to time at Megalopolis, to settle all federal business: this body was-unhappily for the future of the leaguemade of unwieldy size, no less than ten thousand in number. In addition, a federal army and revenue was established; the states agreeing to tax themselves in order to maintain five thousand hoplites, called the Engritti, as a standing force. Two only of the Arcadlan states adhered to Sparta and refused to come into the learnes—Hernen, whose former prominence in Western Arradia was overshadowed by the new capital; and Orchomonus, who charished an ancestral hatroil for the Mantineans. Isolated in the midst of their faderalist neighbours, those states had much ade to preserve their independence.

It must have existed to some purely formal fashion till about 400 n.c., as noine are found heaving its title down to that date, though it is never monitoned in history after the second Messenian war, 644 n.c. (see p. 78).

In the late summer of 870 s.d., when Central Greece had been freed from all danger of disturbance by the death of Jason of Brammondas Pherae, Epaminoudas led down into the Pelopounese in Felopounese and all the other new allies of Thebes served side by side with his Beectian troops. His arrival served to show which states had finally proken with Sparta, and which were still resolved to hold with their old susception. The Areadians, Eleians, and Argives at once joined him in arms; the Achalans preserved an impossive neutrality; only the people of Corinth, Sieyon, Epidaurus, Bermione, and Philius shut their gates, and malutained their loyalty to Sparta.

Epaminendas had resolved not to wante time in reducing the allies of Sparts, but to march straight on the enemy's straighbold in the valley of the Enrotas, and bring the war to a close by crushing the Lacednemonians or forcing them to accept terms of peace. The Argives Elelans and Arcadians joined him at Manthee, and the invasion of Laconia was at once taken in hand. Not less than seventy thousand men set out on the expedition; it was the largest army that Grees had soon since the muster at Platness in 479 s.c. The season was late, and Epaminoudus' legal term of office as Bocotarch was just at its and; but his colleagues, persuaded by Pelopidas, agreed to continue the campaign under his leaderable, and to allow him the glory of ending the work which he had begun at Leuctra.

The situation of the Lacedoemonians was now apparently hopeless. Sparia was a long straggling town, unprotected, by wall or Pagating at ditch; she was not off from her few remaining allies, Sparts. unable to put two thousand citizens into the field—

so low had the number of the Spartiates sunk—uncorksin even how far she might depend on her own Periocci, and assailed by fees who had the gradges of many generations to satisfy. Nevertheless the ophoru showed no signs of yisiding; once more they gave the conduct of the war to Agosilsus, and bade him do his best. Amid the waiting of the women, "who had never before seen the smake of an enemy's camp fire," the last army of Lacedamore was put into the field. The old king, in spite of the risk of rebuillion, promised freedom to every Helet who should take up

arms-this gave him six thousand troops; he called out such of the Periocci as were faithful, contrived to gather round him some scanty reinforcements sent from Carioth and Orchemenus and stood at hav behind berricades thrown across the outlets of the town. Resisting with equal frappers the counsels of the timid. who hade him make peace, and of the desperate, who wished to sally out and and the Spartan case in a new Thormsoylee, he maintained a cautious defensive resition. Eraminondas circled round the town, looking for an unguarded entry, but every street bristled with spears, and when he attempted to force his way in, near the temple of the Dioscori, he mat with a bloody remiles. Impressed by the courage of the enemy, or perbane unwilling to "put out one of the eyes of Greece," the Theban pessed on down the Europas valley without delivering a general assault on the town. Burning village after village of the Periocol, he finally came to the sea, and destroyed Gytheum, the naval arsenal of the Scottage. Then turning north-westward, he crossed Mount Tavectus and massed on into Messonla.

Here he had a long-projected task to execute. Rofess the invasion beams, he had procluimed his intention of rescuing Messecia from the Spartan yoke and re-establishing remostles of its ancient independence. He had summoned to life side the descendants of the Messenians who had been driven by Lysauder from Naunacius (see p. 400), and even those of the earlier exiles who had settled in Sicily (see p. 231). Now he was able to fulfil his promise; marching to Mount Ithome, the ancient sanctusey and citadel of the land, where Aristodemus had fortified bimself in the first Messenian war, he laid the foundations of a city on its southern slope, and marked out the walls of an Agropolis on its summit. The Helets rose in arms to join their exiled brethren who bud returned from the west, and all united to buil Enaminouslas as the founder of a new nation. Messeno became the sister-town of Mezalopolis, and exhibited a strength and vigous to which the Arendian city never attained. From the first the new foundation completely served its purpose; the sower of Sparts, new stopped short at Mount Taygetus, and the old masters of Messenia were never able even for a moment to reconquer the lands of their revolted serfs.

The spring of 339 a.e. was already at hand when Epaminendar returned from his Peloponnesian expedition. He had thus outstayed the legal term of his office by nearly four mouths—an informality for which his political opponents in Thebes endeavoured to impeach him on his arrival; but they were heated down by the voice of public approval, and Epaminendar was re-elected Bosetarch for the current year.

Athens, as we have already mentioned, had received with marked disfavour the news of the battle of Leuctza: but sullan though she might amear at the success of her late Adhesa joina allies, it was not expected that her envy would lead Sparts. 2770 31.0 har into breaking off all her recent ties, and intainer herself to the waning cause of Sparts. Such, nevertheless, was to be the case; after endeaversing to vain to induce the Pelonganesian. cities to form a frague of neutrals, lesterd of folding the Theban alliance, she finally took the decisive sten of receiving a Sportan embassy which cause to pray for help. All the old pleas that Circum. had alted in a similar orisis fast a hundred years before (sou p. 253). were adduced to move the nity of the Atheniane, and fell upon not unwilling cars. The Ecolesia by a large majority voted an alliance with Sparts, and Indicrates -- now well advanced in years, but still . shie to take the field-was commissioned to lead an Athenian contingent into the Pelapamesus. The terms of accommodation with Sparts, in order to mark the absolute condity of the two contracting powers, contained the absent provision that the command of the allied foreig, both by sea and land, should be entrusted atternately to Sparten and Athenian officers at intervals of five days.

The strength of the new trenty was put to the test when Equationedax set out for a accord towasion of Pelapounesus in the Expandingodax summer of 300 n.c., about three months after the contine conductor of his first raid. The allies resolved to 300 R.C. ordervour to hold the line of the Isthmus against him. Accordingly they hastily repaired the old trampart which ran from sen to sea, and set themselves to guard the two reads which led to it, the Adhenius holding the eastern path along the gulf of Aegina, the Lacedauronians the western one on the shore of the gulf of Cerinth. But Examinondax, by a skilful attack made in the dusk of dawn, completely broke through the line on

the Swartan side, and made his way late the penjagula. Arendlans Argives and Eleinus marched up to join him, and their united nemy laid siere to Sievon, one of Snarty's fow remaining allies. That city ere long opened its enter to them : but they were loss successful in an attempt on Enidaurus, and suffered a decided reverse when they attempted to take by surroles the great and strong city of Corintin. Here Enaminendes was because to a standatill: the enemy refused to give battle, but were yet an strong-they had just been rejujoreed by some mergenery troops sent by Dionysius of Symouse—and so firmly lessed on the fortress in their rear, that they could not be neglected. Hence the summer went by without any decisive event, and all that Fauminouries had sained was the possession of Sleven, and the security that Messene and Megalopolis might finish their walls namplested. while the Lacedaemonian army was emuloyed in the north. On his return home he was coldly received and not re-elected Reastereh.

The next year saw Thebes encaced in a new series of complications, which distracted her attention from the affairs of Polonomeaus. and caused her to strike less vigorous blows against Polopides in Sparts than she would otherwise have done. Polyphron and Polydorus, the brothers of Jason of Photae, had met with violent deaths, and their place was now held by their kinsmon Alexander. The new tyrant was not destitute of ability, but he was an reckless and savner that he soon shattered the confederacy which Jason had taken so many years to organize. The nobles of Larissa broke out into rebellion, and called in the King of Macedonia to their help, so that for the first time in history Macedonlars troops were seen within the borders of Hellas. Other towns summoned Thebes to their aid. Disregarding their old alliance with Josep, the Thebans sent an army across Mount Others, to settle the affairs of Thesselv. Polonidas, who was in command, drays the Macedonians from Lariesa, and compelled the tyrant of Pherse to acknowledge the independence of the cities. which had revolted from him (368 n.c.). But this tuterference was

³ His essentics accessed him of having spaced the flying Spartens in the flight at the Lethous, whom he might have shale them all—a charge nather to his enalt than otherwise.

² Sun-in-law of Jason and also a distant relative.

to be the beginning of many troubles for Thebes. Alexander never forgave it, and waited his opportunity for revenge. When Thussely was quiet, Pelopidas marched on into Macedonia, and compelled its monarch to omelode peace, and to give as hostages for his fidelity thirty noble youths, including his own brother Philip, destined just thirty years after to enter Thebes as a conqueror instead of a capative.

While the Thecan arms were occupied in the north, the war in Peloponnesus had not slackened. But its incidents had not been such as Epaminendas would have desired. The two chief allies of Thebes—Arcadia and Elis—fell to strife over the allegiance of the Triphyllans, whom the former acknowledged as members of their league, while the latter claimed them as ancient subjects. The Arcadians were thus left unaided, when their general, Lycomedes of Mantinea, took the field against the Spartans. After obtaining two considerable successes, Lycomedes found himself faced at Midea by a Laconian army under Architeamus, the son of King Agestlans, a young man who possessed all the vigour and some of the genus of his father. The Arcadians suffered a complete defeat, "the Teacters" which was rendered very bloody by a holy of Celta, lent

"the Tearless
Batter" to the enemy by Dionysius of Syrnessa, who gave no nos S.O. quarter to the flying masses. Of the native Sparkans not one man fell, hence they named their victory "The Tearless Buttle" (308 n.o.).

The Thobans oid not appear to average the slaughter of their silies, because they had other work in hand in the north. Alexageminosetas under of Phorae had just kidnapped Pelopidas, and in Thessalv. Thessalv on state business. To reacon their favourite general, the Thebane sent seven thousand men against the tyrant; but this force suffered a check, and only oscaped destruction because its leaders besought Epaminondas, who was serving in the ranks as a mere haplite, to take the command out of their hands, and recease the army. That great general extricated the troops, and got them safety back through the passes of Othrys. On hearing of this mismaningal business, the Theban assembly deposed the incompetent generals, fined each of them ten thousand drachman, and gave the command to Epaminombas. After receiving returned

forcements he marched again into Thessely, and in a few days reduced Alexander to such straits that he surrendered Pelopides and asked for turns of peace (winter of \$68-7).

The result of the "Tearlass Buttle" raised the Spartage from the becaless delection into which they had falled since Levetre. and encouraged thous to persevere with the wer, secondary They were also buoved up by hones of aid from Sas, 367 B.c. Persia, for Arioberzanes, satrap of the Hellespout, had just sent them a sum of money and two thousand mercenery troops. But their expectations from this number were not fulfilled; in the next year the Thebane sent Pelonidus as ambassador to Sues, and induced the Great King to withdraw his naturage from Specia and transfer it to themselves. The sending of this embasey was one of the few unworthy steps taken by Thebes during her becamony: for she utilized the favour of kine Artaxerres II. by getting him to issue a rescript, in which, as guaranter of the torms of the peace of Antalcidas, he presumed to distate to the Greeks, and companded the Arcadians to relinquish their pretensions against Elis, the Locednemonians to acknowledge the independence of Messene, and the Athenians to lev up their waynavy. Naturally the states concerned disregarded these commands: for, as Antiochus the Arendian indigenntly remarked, "the Great King has an infinite number of belows, cooks, cun-bearers, and door-keepers, but of men fit to face Greek boulites not one." But though Artaxerzus was wesk and far away, the Thebans were strong and near at hand, and their arms were ready to support the terms of the rescript.

In 367 n.c. Epaminondas, now again Becetarsh, made his third inread into Peloponessa. Concerling measures with the Argives, he forced the lines of Corinth by a joint abtack from measurements, cutside and from within. Then marching into Achain in Actain is induced its cities—who had higherto been neutral.

—to join the Theban alliance, on the understanding that their internal constitution should not be meddled with. The Theban government, however, broke these terms, and sont garriance and hormosts into the towns, in spite of the remonstrances of Epansincedas. This ill-faith bad its deserts, for the Adminis soon reso in arms, drove out their garrisons, and joined the Spartans as zealous allies; thus the results of the campaign of 367 n.c. were entirely wested. But the Thebans were perhaps consoled by a fortunate chance, which enabled them in the same authura to edza Oropus, the frontier town of Attica, on the Euboic strait—a place over which Breetlan and Athenha had waged countless conflicts.

This less greatly irritated the Athenians, who called on their Pelopomesian allies to aid them to recover Ordpus; but the Spartage and Corinthians had too much to county

them at home, and refused to sitt. Their apathy provoked the Athenians into a treacherous attempt to seize the Acropalis of Coriath, which met with a well-deserved failure. The incident, however, so frightened the Coriathians that they retired from the war, obtaining from Thebes terms which allowed them to pressive neutrality. Their neighbours of Philus

and Epidearus at once followed their example.

Sparts would have felt the defection of Carinth very deeply, if

she had not succeeded in replacing ber by Elia, a vet more powerful. The Eleians and Arcadians, after four years' ally. Transfella and Arcedia bickering about their frontless, bad at last broken 305 B.C. Into onen was. As Arcadia was violently hostile to Searta, the Elejans immediately made rence and alliance with that nower. This somewhat changed the aspect of affairs in Pelopopnesus: the friends of Thebes-Argos, Argadia, and Messone-being no logger much more newerful than her enemies-Achaia, Elis, Lagednemon. The first conflicts of the new war, however, were decidedly in favour of the Arcadians, and next year they felt themselver so strong, that they ventured on an action which had not been attempted since the days of Pheiden of Argos, three hundred years ago. It was the year of the Olympic festival, and the usual multitude had gathered from every part of the Greek world to attend the great celebration. When the opening day drew near, the Areadians marched down the Alpheus valley, and suized Olympia, procisiming that they, and not the Elclans, should for the future preside over the games. This roused Illis

mattie of citry; the whole force of the state, strengthened by volunteers from Addata, moved on Olympia, where they found a large Arcadian and Argive army waiting to oppose them. In the midst of the festival—"the

charlot-race was over, and the wrestlers were containing between the stadium and the altar. — the Bleians burst into the secred precincts, driving the rooted Areadians before them. But the latter rallied among the buildings, casting missiles from the porticoes and from the roof of the great temple of Zeun, and at last brought the Bleians to a standard. Next day the condict was renewed, the Areadians defending themselves behind barricades composed of the costly tents and bootles which the holiday-making public had created. They finally drove off the enemy, and completed the interrupted festival; but no blessing rested on a triumph which the majority of the Hollense regarded as sterilegious, sluce the Elelans were the rightful guardings of the annulum.

To maintain their hold on Olympia, and protect the subjects of Elis whom they had taken into their league, the Arcadians found themselves compelled to keep their standing army, the five thousand Reseits, continually in the field. This cost so south money that the finances of the confederacy gave out, and in a moment of need the coperals hald hands on the termile treasure at Olympia, and expended much of it on pay and warlike stores. The majority of the federal council voted approval of the measure, but several states-chief among them the great town of Mantinenrefused to condone the sacrilege. Thus strife gross in Arcadia. The council ordered the imprisonment of the magistrates of Mantines. on which that city shut its gates against the troops of the isagre. Public opinion, however, was so much on the side of the Mantipenes, that the majority submitted, and not only acknowledged their fault, but actually made peace with Elia, restoring Olympia and religiousishing all claims to its guardianship (263 a.c.).

The Arradians occuluded this peace without asking or obtaining the consent of their allies of Thebes, although they had Bosotian troops serving in their midet. This slight was deeply felt by the Thebens; even the equably-minded Epaminordus denounced it as little better than treachery. But their indignation carried them into unjustifiable lengths; a Theben officer, conspiring with the magistrates of Teges, selved and threw into prizon a number of the notables of Mantinea and other places, who were visiting Teges for a feast in commemoration of the peace with Elia. The prisoners were soon released, but the mischief was done, and the reparation

came too late, for Montines made peace with Sparts and broke

away from the Arcadian League.

This grisis startled the Thebans, and roused them into sending a great army into Peloconnesus in the next spring. Engineenday once more bended it, but his old collegents was no logger at his side: Pelopidas had fullen in battle a few months before. For the third time Alexander of Phone had come into conflict with Theless and Polopidas, hurning to avenue the personal insults the tyront had not upon him in 368 p.c., had obtained permission to lead the attack upon him. As his army left the sates of Thobes an colinso occurred, and the southenvers furbade the expedition to precent. Unable to get the man to follow, Pelcoides rade off almost alone to Thessalv, and summoned the subjects of Alexander to revolt against their master. The moment that he had been inited by a few thousand men he marched to attack Pherse. The tyrant met him at Cynoscenhalae, with a great army of mercenaries which doubled the force of the insurgents. But the vigour of Pelonidas carried all before it; he broke the enemy, and was pressing them hard when he caught sight of Alexander endeavouring to tally his enords. Forentting the duty of a enormi, Felonidas somne forward to cut the tyrant down, but he was encorn-

Death of passed and skin before his followers could force their e94 B.C. may to his help. The Thesanians mourned him as the founder of their liberty, and buried him with great pomp on the seeme of his last victory. Alexander was stripped of all his possesions save Pheras, and reduced to impotence; shortly afterwards he was mordered by his wife and his brothers-in-law.

For the Pelopomesian campaign of S02 u.c. both sides mustered in great strength. Epaminoundus crossed the Isthmus with a great Epaminoundus forests. Epaminoundus crossed the Isthmus with a great footh, was joined at Nemea by the full force of Argos. Than levestee of was joined at Nemea by the full force of Argos. Than levestee at turning west, he picked up the conflugents of the Areadian Longue and Meascap, and advanced with thirty thousand men to Toges. In that position he lay between Sparts and her new alties the Mantingane, and forced them to communicate with such other by circuitous and difficult mountain ways. However, the Lacednessonions resolved to succour Mantines; they phaced the aged Agesilaus once more in command, and despatched

movement Enaminendas had calculated. When he heard that Accelians was well started on his long march, he broke on his camp at Teges and pounced upon Scorts. He was within an acc of taking the city without a blow, "like a nest when the parentbirds are away." I but his clover combination was frustrated by treachery. A desetter left the Theban count by night and reached Agesilana, to whom he revealed the whole scheme. The old king hurried back at full speed, and by superhuman exertions reached Sourth first before the enemy arrived. Now, as in second astock 370 g.c., he occupied the main outlets with troops. and shood on the defensive. Enaminousles, attacking savaral redute at once, sponseded in thrusting one column as far as the market-place: but as the others were receiled, he was forced to withdraw, and to give up all hones of taking the town by asseult.


Histily changing his plan of enerations, the Thelan now resolved to make a deals at Montines, before the Sporters had time to reinforce it. Accordingly his array slipped away by night, and merched on the unsuspecting city. But chance again intervened; the Athenians but despatched a considerable contingent, some six thousand men, to join the Spartans, and the cavalry at the head of this army had entered Mantinos just before the Thoban horse nuneared before its gates. Though weavy with their march -thuy had come forty miles by mountain roads that day-the Athenians sallied out, and fell mon the enemy with such vigour that they drave them book on Teges.

The Sportana had followed Epanniaondas, and now slipped past blm and joined the Mantineaus and Athonians. A force from Elis and Achaia also arrived, so that the allies mustered twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse-on army less by one-third. than that of the Theban, yet enpable, under cautious management, of keeping him in check. But man counsels provailed in the canna. for the Mantinean generals wished to fight, to preserve their territory from plunder. Accordingly, when Ecaminocales advanced from Tegen, the silied host drew itself up and offered him battle. their right wing resting on Mantanes, their left on a wooded height to the southward. The Mantinerou and Spartans held the right,

¹ Xenophon, Helles, vii. b. 8.

the place of honour, the Athenians the left, while the Eleison and Achnians formed the centre; they were drawn out in a continuous line with a thousand envalve on each flank.

Epaminondes had advanced from Tages somewhat late in the day, and when the enemy saw him holding back and halting his men beneath the hills which face Manthias, they made the erro-



கிட்டை A. Manfingang and Spertans B. Elejans and Achaluns t, Athalans . நீட்ட D. Gaactings E. Araadises, Mangerians etc. P. Argiosa G. Cabasans...

neous but natural deduction that he was not about to fight till the morrow. Accordingly the make of the hupiltes were braken, and the horsemen began to unbridle their herees. The Thehan had expected something of the kind, and when he saw the enemy about to retire, suddenly fluing his army upon them at a run.

His order of battle was the same which had given him victory at

Louetrs. The bulk of the cavalry were massed on his left; next came a heavy column of Bocotians, many shields deep, white advanced parallel with the cavalry; while the manner cantre and right wing, composed of the Arcallans, heavy of Argives, and Mussenians, hung back, and moved more slowly. The Eubocaus, formed in a Satached body, climbed the hill on the

enemy's right, and threatened the flank of the Athenians.

All went as Ryaminousias had wished. His cavalry on the left drove the Spartan horse out of the field; text the Recotion column, which he bimesif headed, ploughed through the Mantinean and Spartan racks "like a war-galley ploughs through the waves with its beak." But a desporate Spartan named Anticraces, standing firm among his flying comrades, singled out the great general, and thrust him through the breast with his pike. When she news ran down the line that Epsialnousias had fallen, his victorious troops halted in their career and made no attempt to complete the victory. Indust, they allowed the Athenians to gain some advantage on the extreme right, a success on which the allies afterwards grounded a preposterous claim of victory in the main battle.

Epaminonclas was carried out of the fight with the broken apear still fast in his wound. His attendents bere him to a rising ground to the rent, which commanded the whole battlepath of field. When he recovered consciousness he naked if Epometonian this shield was safe, and cast his dying open over the scene. He sent in heate for Iolaibus and Daiphanine, his destined successors in command; the answer came that both had been slain. "Then," said the dying here, "you had better make pence." So saying, he bade the spear-head be drawn from his wound; a flow of bleed followed, and he breathed his last.

Be died Eparminendas, and with him the greatness of Thebes; never were the fortunes of a city and its leading statesmen more closely bound together. The Thebess themselves seem to have looked to the inture with dread, for they obeyed their general's dying words, and concluded a pence with their onemics ere the summer was over. Athens, Elis, Achain, and Mantinen signed on

¹ Xenophon, Mellen, vis. b. 20.

the one side; Thebes, Argos, and the Arondian League on the other. Sparts had to be left out of the agreement, for the ephons obstinately refused to acknowledge the independence of Messene. The great war, however, was at an end, and the noise of arms which had sounded all over Greece died away into a petry bickering for border-farts on the slopes of Taygetus.

CHAPTER KLI

PROM THE PRACE OF SEC DIS. NO BUILD'S PARSE DAVISORS от овеков. 362-352 г.с.

The predominance which Thebes had enjoyed in Greace for the nine years which followed the battle of Lauctra had never amounted to a formal haromony. Ilke that which Sparia had once exercised Nor had it involved the organization of a large bedy of strictly dependent office, such as Athens had cathered around her in the days of the Confederacy of Dolos. Thebes had taken the lead merely because she was the strongest state among the cuemies of Sparta, the central power on which the others least for support. Examinendas, the guiding spirit of the time, had deliberately accepted this position, and laboured to make his pative city not a " tyrant state," but the first among many souals.

When, therefore, the war came to an end, after the battle of Mantinea, the Greek states found themselves lacking an acknowledged lender, and went coch upon its own way, without having to new meand to the wishes of any suggests or superior. The Metery of the succeeding period, therefore, was singularly destitute of unity

and cobasion.

In Pelopounesus the annals of the next few years are almost a blank. Since Sparts had ceased to be the coutre of Greece, the tale of her netty wars with her neighbours seems to have ceased to interest the historians of the ancient world. Breedally was this so after the death of the seed Agestians, the last link who connected her with the elections past. That great warrior died not in the valley of the Eurotas, but on the sands of Libys. Sparts was in dire need of money for her war with Measure, and when Taches-on Egyptian prince who had rebelled against Persin-offered bor subsidies in return for a

force of Greek hoplites, Agesilaus counselled the acceptance of the tender. He went to Egypt himself, with the promised attenues, and at the age of eighty-four conducted his last campaign on the banks of the Nila. Having quarrelled with Tachos, he deposed him havour of his countin Nectanebis, who thereupon prosented him with two bundred and thirty talents for his services. Agesilaus set out to take the money home, but died on the way in a desert havon on the Libyan coast. In spite of all his courage and skill, he had been the evil genius of his country, and had brought upon her all the west that the excelc had foretold "for the "lame reign" (winter of 361-60).

Among the other Poloponnessan states the Arcadian League should have taken the first place. But that body practically went to places within twenty years of its foundation, owing to the jealousy which the other towns felt for Megalopelis, the new fuderal capital. That city was so left to itself that in \$53 a.c. it succumbed to an attack of the Spartans, and was only restored to freedom by the aid of a Thelian army. The other states so systematically support the strength of their younger rival, that at last, as a sarcastic post observed, "the great city became a great desert." (imple protein form) to theck their bickerings, the Arcadians soon reduced themselves to a state of complete insignificance.

A new cvil began to appear in Pelapannesus about this time, in the form of desperate attempts at the establishment of tyrannies. The success of Dincysius of Syracuse on one side of the sea, and of Jason of Pherne on the other, set many ambitious men on the old tack, though tyrania had practically consed out of the land for two hundred years. Euphron of Steyen was the first who attempted to ensure his country by force of arms; he failed and was assussinated (367 n.a.). Throughanes of Corinth (circ. 360 u.c.) were a greater celebrity from the circumstences of his death. After he had safely established himself in power, his brother Timoleon and two of his friends obtained na Interview with him. When they were in private, they selemnly summoned him to give up the tyraony; when he refused, Throleon stepped asside and wrapped his free in his mantle, while the other two cut his brother down.

Thus Corinth recovered her liberty. Other cities in other parts of Greeces were not so fortunate; Eubosa, in particular, fell almost callinely into the hands of tyrants.

Of the various states which had engaged in the war of 371-362 s.o., Athens had, with the exception of Thehen, fared the best. Although she had lest Ordpus, she had made conquests Outbreak of far eventer worth: in 305 n.o. she had suppopulation scale wer.

in conquering Sames, which had fallen into the hands

of Persin, but, instead of freeing her old allies, established in the island a large cleruchy of her poorer citizens. She had also nicked up a good many outlying possessions on the north coast of the Assess. including part of the Thracian Chersonese, the Macedonian towns of Pydon and Methone, and the more important city of Potidaes. Since the final rain of Sparts. Athens remained the only payal power in Greece; for Thebes, though so powerful on land, only ours sent a fleet to sen (363 i.e.). If the Atherians had been wise. they would have admitted the towes they had lately conquered into the maritime league which they had founded in 378 m.c. But the old memories of the Confederacy of Doles were their bane; they were never able to get out of their heads the idea of re-establishing an empire, and preferred ruling unwilling subjects to obtaining willing ailies. The Asiatic towns which had joined with Athens to form the league of STS n.c. looked on in disapproval as the actions of their great ally became more and more arbitrary. The planting of a cleruchy at Sames, a gress violation of use of the fundamental clauses in the trenty of confederation (see p. 402), was purlicularly offensive to them. But they did not break out into open strife with Athens till 357 u.a., when all the objet cities of the league-Chice, Byzantium, Blodes, and Gos among themsimultaneously declared war upon her. Hoping to cow the confederates by a vigorous attack on the strongest of them, the Atheninus opened the war by an attempt to seize Chica. The voteron meneral Chubriss, the victor of Naxos, led sixty vessels lute the harbour of that city, and endeavoured to effect a landing. But, pushing too for ahead of the main body, he was slain, and his armament retired with loss. The victorious allies then laid tiego to Semos, in order to expel the Athenian elecuolus; to relieve the place, the old generals Iphicrates and Timothous—the former must have been seventy years of age-led out a record fleet; but on arriving at Samos they found the enemy too strong, and retired. Fre this cautious action they were impouched by their polletance Charge, and tried by the Reclesia, which, unmindful of old services. treated them both harslily. Tolderates, though acquitted, was decrived of his command, and Timotheus sentenced to a ruinous fine of a hundred talents. Having thus got rid of the generals of the elder generation, the Athenians put the conduct of the war into the hands of their accuser Charge an able but volatile and untrustworthy man, whose character somewhat recalled that of Alcibiades. The new commander made no proceess with tho reduction of the allied towns, and, finding money rup short, said the services of his anny to Arthborns, settens of the Hellesport, who had just revolted against his master, King Ochus. By successful expeditions against the Persians he filled his military chest, but meanwills the war against the allies stood still.

Presently the Athenians heard that the Great King, in wrath at the ald given to the rebel secret, was fitting out three hundred

Phoenician galleys destined to aid the allies. Struck End of the with four at the news, they disculsted Chares, asked Bocial war, the perdon of the king, and made wears with their enomics. Rhudes, Chios, and all the other revolted allies were allowed to withdraw from the league, but Athena retained Samos and the cities along the Thracian and Macrdonian coasts, which were reckened her subjects and not her confederates (955 n.c.). The newly gained independence of the states, which now threw off their connection with Athens, was not long enjoyed by two of the chief cities: Ithedes and Cos were conquered within two years by Manshlus, prince-satrap of Carla, and thus passed into the vascalage of Persia.

While Athens was engaged in the Social war, another sec of troubles had been distracting her attention. She had fallen to blows with Philip, King of Macedonis, and was rapidly losing to him her scattered resessions along the north coast of the Aegean.

It is strange that the Maccdonian kingdom had not commenced at an earlier date to interfere with effect in the concerns of the Greek states, which lay in a struggling line along its coast. But though king after king had codeswoured to turn the wars and civil strifes of the Hellenic cities to account, not one had as yet made any permanent conquests. It was not from want of resources in the kingdom nor of ambition in the kings, but from the various cylis which, beaut a semi-barbarous state at the period of its development towards a higher civilination.

The Mucedonlaus, though they seem to have been not very distant kinamen of the Greeks, had always been considered foreignors. Yet they were not savages like their neighbours to cast and west, the Thracians and Illyrians, but lived Macedonians. in the fourth century much the same sort of life that the Hellenie tribes had lived in the tenth. They formed a limited monarchy of the ancient surt, where the king sought the counsel of the nobles, and had his resolves for ratification before the assumbly of the people. Though some of the Macedonian tribes were cough highlanders, yet those who dwelt in the plains of the Axine and Hallacmon were not unacousinted with city life, and had founded the considerable towns of Access and Pella. Three handred years of contact with the Hollenic colonies on the coast had profoundly influenced the Macedonians, more especially their upper classes: they had caught from their neighbours some timeture of Greek manners, and learnst to appreclate the amenities of civilization. The unfority of the nobility had adopted Greek names, such as Archelaus, Pausapies, Lysimoubus, Ptolemacus. They had begon to call their national gods by Greek titles, and were usually seminated with the Greek language.

The royal family were the leaders in the Hellenization of Macedonia; they had claim to a remote descent from the Dorina princes of Argen. King Alexander (see pp. 195, 221), The Macedone of Control of the army of Marxes, so far vindicated deside kines, who served in the army of Marxes, so far vindicated deside kines his Greek padigree that he was permitted to take part in the Olympic games, a privilege never granted to a harkarian. Archelaus, the grandeen of Alexander, was oven more distinguished as a lover of things Greek; he autoriained in his court the poets Agathon, Cheerilus, and Eurlpides, employed Zeoxis to cover the walls of his palace with freezons, and invited—though in vaire—the

The few Fragments remaining of the Macedonian dislicet show that it remembled Acolic Grock, but the most must have been very mixed.

philosopher Socrates to come to Pella and instruct the youth of Macedon. After the death of Archelaus (399 n.o.), the kingdom was for many years distracted by civil wars, and during the reign of Amyntos, the father of the grent Philip, it seemed likely that the Illyriams from the taland and the Chaleddinn Lengue from the coast would actually divide Macedonia between them. Sparta saved the kingdom of Amyntas by destroying the Chaleddinn League, and within a few years Macedonia had so far recovered her strength that the actually made an attempt to conquer Northern Thossely (see p. 477), which was only repulsed by the arms of Pelopidas.

The weakness of Macalonia up to this time had been caused by the progeness of her people to civil wars. The succession to the crown had been settled by the sword quite as frequently as by hereditary right; any member of the royal house, if he could find a poweful hedy of followers, relight hope to tear the sceptre from the last hing's heir. The numerous and waritte cobility of the land were as groud and captions as the baronage of the Middle Ages, and any slight relight cause them to take up areas in the cause of a pretender. Hence the throne of Mapolonia was a thoray seat, and haven was that king who died in his had.

seat, and happy was that king who died to his bad.

We have already mentioned that Philip, the third son of Amyn-

tos, was given as a heating to Polophias while yet a boy, and taken to Thobes. He spont several years there in betour-rabile of able espicivity, allowed to turn the time to second a succession. In neight choose, but debatred from teturning borne. Philip was a had of extraordinary parts; not only did be become versed in Greek literature and philosophy, and master the Greek tongon so theroughly as to be reckoned one of the first orators of his age, but he gained an insight into Greek statecards and a knowledge of the art of war such as none of his contemporaries attained. Theben was in these years the centre of Hellenia

of chservation to such use as did the young Macedonian exits.

After spending some three or four years in Thebes, Philip was called bank to Macedon by the mislortance of his house. His closes teather, King Alexander II., had been murdered, and Alexander's successor, his second brother Perdicess, was, after a short

politics, and Epuninouslas the first general of the age, but it was not every lod of sixteen who could have turned his opportunities reign, slain in buttle with the Hlyriana. Pardicess left a son, but the boy was very young, and Philly was appointed his guardian and resent of the kinedom (359 n.a.).

It was no easy task which Philip had to take up, at the early age of twenty-three. Two pretenders of the payal blood disputed his nephew's grown, while the filtyrians, who had just slain manufactor his brother Perdicens, were bronking in on the northwest frontier of the kinedom. But the young rescut was quite able to come with the difficulties which beset him. Nature had endowed him with every quality which a ruler of Macaden needed. The rudget of his subjects could not but admire the prince who slowes led his army in moson, and was the best horsemen, the holdest evin mer. the beenest hunter, in the land; nor was he liked any the worse for loving the wine-our over well-a national fulble. But Philip was not a more soldier: from his youth up be preferred dissimulation to force. Re had studied the subtleties of Greek state craft. and took a keen intellectual pleasure in outwitting an adversary, especially when that adversary was a Greek politician. All methods of arriving at an end were equally good to him; he disawned a treaty or broke an oath with a frank levity which astonished even the most calleds of the elatermen of Grosce. Corruntion was him favourite weapon; he had fithemed the depths of Greek venality. and always commenced a war by biring some faction-leader among his enomies to level him sid. "No town is impregnable," he said. "If once I can get a mule-load of silver passed within its guto," Phillip's deep cumning was long unsuspected by his contemporaries. on account of the free, courteous and open deportment which he displayed; it was hard to believe that a man could look so honest and mean so ill. Not were his good qualities all assumed. He was poyer gruet for caucity's sake; he was a firm friend and a liberal menter; his courtesy and good-pature were genuine and not assumed; and if he desaised Greek Schloveness and vensitiv, he had a real admiration for Greek culture and civilization.

Within two years after Philip had assumed the regency of Macedonia, he had cleared away both the pretendent who chimned the crown, and inflicted a crushing decrease in the Illyrians. Having thus won unbounded and had himself and the configuration in the control of the control

problaimed king (858 n.c.). His next step was to reorganize the national army, which had hitherto been a mere tumultuous tribal gathering. The numerous and fery nobles were encouraged to join the king's boose-guard, and honoured with the title of his "companions" (\$\frac{\pi}{\text{con}}\), while the picked men of the tribal levies were encogimented into light and heavy corps of infantry. Taking to heart the system of Epaminoudus, the king formed the core of his army out of regiments trained to fight in deep columns, and armed with a ponderous pike treble the length of the Greek lance—so long, in fact, that the spear-heads of the third and fourth rank projected in front of the charging column as well as those of the first. This heavy pholanx never failed to hear down the ordinary Greek line of hoplites by sheer weight of impact.

Philip's ambition, when he had firmly sented himself on the throne, was first directed towards securing Macedonia a harbour, the sim which so many of his predecessors had value

amphipota sought to attain. He determined not to mulest at first the Chalcidian cities, which lay in a commact body in the centre, but to make an attempt either on one of the scattered Athenian nossessions, or at some lablated autonomous town. Chance enabled him to do both ; he found the Athenians plotting an expedition against the city of Aumbhoolis, on which they had nover ceased to nourish designs since it revolted to Brasidas sixtyfive years ago. Phillp at once opened negotiations with there, and offered to put Amphipolis into their hands, if they would give him in exchange their part of Pydna on the Thermale Gulf. The Athenians agreed, for the exchange was manifestly in their favour. and looked on while Phills laid slege to Amphipolis, which fell into his hands in a few weeks. He then presented kimself before the gates of Pydos, which was surrendered to him; when this was done he promptly disavowed his agreement, and kept both places in his own hands. Knowing that this meant instant was with Athens, he fell on Potidaca, the most important Athenian possession in these parts, and seized it before any success could arrive. Instead, however, of keeping it bimself, he banded Potidans over to the Olynthians, the leading Chalcidian state, and thus embroiled. them with Athous.

Just at this moment the Social war broke out, and while the

Athenians were encuered in it they had no leisure to number Philips or his accomplices of Olynthus. Tans the Macedonian Resondation of king was able for three years to presente his designs. without molestation: he soon showed that they were likely to lead him far afield. Now that he presessed Amphipolis and its all-important bridge over the Stromon, the road to Thrane was in his bands. Crossing the river, he plunged into the bills. and conquered one by one the Theadan tribes as for cost as the Nestua. The main purpose of this expedition was to cain possession. of the mines of Mount Pangaous, the richest gold-producing melon known to the ancient world. When the district was subdual, the king bollt in its midst a new town, named after himself. Philippi. which served at once as a centre for the mining, and as a fortress to keep down the Turgeians. Within a few years the gold was coming forth so rapidly that the king derived from the mines no less than a thousand talents per annum (£244,000). Mence come the shundant columns of staters, which first accustomed the Greeks to a national gold currency, and nelocked for Philip the cutes of an many hostile towns.

White Philip was conquering the Thracians, and Athens was contending with her reculaitrant allies, Thebes, the power which had lately been predominant in Greece, was involving herself in a maze of troubles from which she had now Phools and Thebas. no Rosminondas to deliver her. Thebes and Phocis. had been hitter energice of old, and though the Phoelans leined the Theban affigues after Leucire, they did so from pecessity and not from clinica. In 362 a.c. they lead so far let their real feelings appear that they had neglected to send a continguat to the allied army which fought at Mantinen. The Thecans born them a grudge for this, and waited for an opportunity of repaying it. The chance came in a few years; the Delphians necessal certain Physican landholders of having trospassed upon and tilled waste ground dedicated to Analla, and brought the case before that venerable but effete body the Amphietyonic Assembly, which still sat from year to year, and sometimes interfered in politics. The Amphictyons, being wholly under the control of Thebes and Thessaly, voted that a hoinous sacrilege had been committed, and fullicted a heavy five on the Phocians. The fine was left appaid; whereupon it was doubled, and the Amphictvons threatened the recalcitmant state that, unless instant satisfaction was made, its lands should be declared exchanted to the god, and become the present of the temple.

This brought matters to a crisis: the Phocians were a vicorous and high-spirited people, who would not endure to be builted by The Phoneses their enemies under this hypocritical pretext of religion.

soize Deighi, Led by two ambitious chiefs named Philorofilus and Opemarchus, they quietly armed, and when all was ready for war, seized Delphi and its temple by a night sururise. Philometus sought out and slew the Delphians who had been the accusers of Phonis, and then competted the priests to set the oracle working at his dictation, so that Apollo pronounced a blessing on the capture of his sanctuary. It seemed efficacious, for when the Locritus of Amphissa, the next peighbours of Delphi, came to drive out Philomelus, they suffered a bloody defeat.

The Phocian leaders were quite aware that their action involved a war with Thobas and Thessalv, and knew that their own lovies

Cuttomics were quite insufficient to cope with those formidable the "Secret powers. But the seizure of Delphi put the engranua war," segar, temple-treasures in their hands, and the men who had £3,500,000 t in hard builtion at their disposal were not likely to want mercenaties. Accordingly when the Amphicayons mes, and put Phoels under the ban for secriloge, Philometus retorted by a manifesto in which he justified his action, and promised high pay to every honlite in Greece who would join the Phocian ranks. Then began the "Secred War," which, in spite of its name, was not a cristale of all Greece against Phocis, but morely an attempt of the Thebane, Thesealians, and Locrians to crush their neighbourstate. The Phochens, indeed, got quite as much sympathy from the outside world as their enemies. Sparta would have belied thom had she been abio; and Athens, when free from troubles of her own, was not indisposed to co-operate.

When actual hestilities commenced, the Phociaus proved quite able to hold their own. Philomelus, indeed, fell in battle in the first year of the war, but his successor Oceanarchus kept the field with ten thousand mercenaries at his back, and not only protested

It is extraordinary that, out of the encrusons coinage struck from the temple-money, only a few triobals and copper places survive.

Phoois, but carried the war far into the enemy's country. In Thessely he bribed the tyrants of Phorae, the successes of cessors of Alexander, to desert their national lesgae, Concernbus, and take his part; aided by liberal supplies of Delphie temple-treasure, they proved strong enough to hold the Thessellaus in check. Mesowhile Commarchus full on Bagotis, and—to the great surprise of thouse who remembered the days of Epaminondas—beat the Thobans in the open field. Then, turning on the smaller members of the Thessello-Theban confederacy, he harried the lands of the Locrinus, Dorinus, and Cetaeana, till not a farmstead was left unburnt in all their valleys.

Thus utterly discomfited, the enemies of Phoeis took a fatal step: they asked the assistance of Philip of Macedon. It was Thesalians, the nobility of Lariss, who actually invited him to cross Mount Clympus and trespass on the soil of Helias; but the Thebans, who did not discount the invitation, must take their share

of the blace.

Of Inte Philip had been flourishing exceedingly. Attens had been brought so low by her defeat in the Social war that she was unable to protect her outlying possessions, and saw Mathies—her last port in Macedonia—taken in 364 n.c., after a long slegs, in which the king lost one of his eyes by an arrow. Philip's plans enlarged as his power grow greater; he increased his army, commenced to build a fleet, and strengthened his frontier against the barbarian tribes of the inland; not least armong his successes he counted the fact that his charlet had been victorious at the Olympic games. Now he was ready to take any chance that came up for obteining a footheld in Greece.

When Philip novament against Phena, he found himself opposed by Phayling, the brather of Communities, who had marched north

the order to join the Phonesons. This general Philip drove back, but presently Onomarchus himself came on the sonne, with the main semy of the Phoniana.

Fidelip for Theasoly, 863 K.C.

He met the Macedoniums, routed them in two augmentants, and draw Philip home across the mountains. Then turning back to Booolia, he stormed Coraneia, and induced Orchemenus to desure the Thebaus and declare itself independent. This was the high-water mark of Phoclan success during the ten years of the Sacred way.

Within a few months of his first check, Philip again appeared in Thesealy with a new army of twenty thousand mea. Onomerchus marched against him, and mot him hard by the port Battle of The fortune of war had changed; the of Pagasao. Pagoons, \$440 B.C. Macedonian phalanx broke through the Photian morcenaries; Onomarchus himself fell with six thousand of his men, and Philip then expelled the tyrants of Phorne, and declared their city free and nutonomous; but, under the pretence of military necessity, he occupied with Macedonian garrisons the city of Pagasae and several places more on the Magnesian Feninsule, thus making

Meanwhile Philip's success had frightened all those states to Greace who were not committed to the Theban alliance. That a barbarian king should march far into Hellenic soil,

himself master of the keys of Thesnaly.

Thermoppins, and plant his garrisons almost on the Eubosan Strait, appeared intelerable to all who were not bilished by hatged of the Phycians. Accordingly, whou Philip moved southward to complete bis victory by occupying Phocis, he found Thermonylpe held by an Athenian army and feet, while troops from Achain and Sparts joined the wrecks of the Physing army, which had rallied round Phaythus, who had been appointed general of the Phocha League in place of his deceased brother. There were still plenty of supe and tripods unmalted in the semple-store at Delphi, so Phayillus could ore long bire and send juto the field as large a moreonary host as that which had perished with Onomarelous as Paguase,

Binding Thermopylas impregnable, Phillip turned back, foiled for the first and almost the last occasion in his life by an Athenian armament. Seeing that the times were not yet ripe in Central Greece, he let the Sacred war shift for itself, and went off on quite another quest. His compaign had brought him the possession of the Thresalian fortresses, and with that result he was, for the present, satisfied. Meanwhile there was work for him to do further north.

CHAPTER XLIE,

PRILIP AND DEMOSTHENES, 352-344 B.C.

For five years after his check at Thermopylae, King Philip refrained from carrying his arms into Greece, and allowed the Sacred war to drag out its weary length without his interference. Although the Phoclans had lost their footbold in Thessaly, yet in the south their strength was little diminished; Phayllas, and after his death his mephew Phalescus, the son of Onomerchus, still contrived to hold Thebes in check, and even to maintain a hold on the captured Boostlau towns of Coroneia and Orchomenus. As long as the temple-treasure lasted, it seemed that the Photien lealers and their marconaries were likely to hold their own; but after five or six years of war the great heard was appreciably diminished, and men bagan to reflect that some day it would run dry. This reflection encouraged the Thelens to persist, although meanwhile they were bearing all the brunt of the war, while the Thessalians and King Phillip had slackoned in their first zeal when their own immediate objects were attnined.

The Macedenian measureh had turned his restless mind once more to achomes of Thracian conquest. Her the year which saw his Thessalian campaign had reached its each we find him pushing his border eastward along the north cross of the Augest, and seizing now the territories of some native kinglet, now those of an isolated Greek city, now an outlying Athenian factress. His furthest raid took him as far as the shore of the Euxine, but his power was not actually established beyond the neighbourhood of the city of Asaus. The Athenian possessions in the Thracian Chersonese and the indopendent cities on the Propontis were still untouched. In the following years Philip pushed for westward; he bent the Illyrians in battle, built forts among them, compelled many of their

tribes to do him homage, and then ferced the princes of Epirus to acknowledge his supremacy.

[李59] B.O.

This rapid development of Philip's power to cast and west left the Greek office of Chalcidico-Olynthus and her eister towns-in a perfectly isulated condition, occupying a precarious position of independence in a slip of territory enclosed between the sea and the Macedonian border. Philip had treated them with acrupulous unbleness ever since Olypthus had joined him against Athens, and committed horself to his side by accepting the gift of the Athenian town of Potidaea. But as the king became more and more powerful, the Chalcidians began to grow uneasy; they saw him annex city after city of their Hellenic neighbours, and began to suspect that all they had gaiped by allying themselves to Philip was the privilege of being devoured a little later than the rest. It was not likely that the sovereign who had so readily laid hands on Amphipolis and Pydna, Marones and Pagasae, would refrain for ever from designs on Olynthus. Accordingly the Chalcidians began to retire from their friendship with Philip; they concluded a peace with Athens in 352 p.c., and a little later gave harbourage to a rebel Macedonian prised-the king's step-brother-who fied to them for

refuge. These steps showed Philip that he could no assertate with longer rely on the friendship or neutrality of Olynthus and her confederates when he rando his next sitack on Greece. While his Thrucian and Hlyrian campaigns were in progress he left them alone, but after all had been made secure to cost and west, his armies began to gather in a menacing fushion on the burders of Chalaidies.

Seeing the end at hand, the Olynthians sent an embassy to Athens, to beg their former enemy to lend them instant assistance: The Athenians had of late been conducting the way against Philip in the most careless and half-hearted way; they sent a small force of mercenaries now past again to lagrass his army in Thrace, but seemed to care little what successes he gained so long as the war lay for from the gates of Athens. While he was seizing their northern possessions they had given their whole attention to an unnecessary and futile expedition to Euboen, destined to drive out the tyrants who occupied Chalcis and Ordes. Although their general Phoeion won a brilliant victory at Taxovago over the confederate Eubocans, the general result of the campaign was utter Callure and usoless expense (350 p.c.),

When the Olyothian gavoys reached Athens the question came before the Ecclesia whother things should be allowed to drift on, as they had done for the last ten years, or whether a vigorous offensive war should be begun against Philip. In favour of the latter alternative were made the three great orations of Demosthenes. whose name begins from this moment to be more and more closely identified with all the phases of Athenian politics.

Demostlenes was a member of the wealthy middle class; his

father, who had been the awner of a shield factory, died, leaving blen in the hands of guardians who mismanaged and Barty life of dissipated his inheritance. When he came to years Demosthenes. of discretion, Domosthones plunged into a series of lawsuits with the freedulent trustees, and acquired, while preging his private wrongs, the taste for public speaking which was to make him the greatest political crator of the oge. But at first his success was not equal to his energy; his awkward bearing, over-mode dulivery, and imperfect articulation spoiled the effect of excellent discourses, and he came down from the Bema lamenting that "while any drunken sea-captain could get a hearing, he, who had really something to tell the Athanians, was houted down in a moment." His friends encouraged him to persist, assuring him that however bad his manner neight be, yet the matter of his speeches was worthy of Pericles. Accordingly Demosthenes set himself to acquire the arts of the public speaker; he did not diedein hints on elocution from his friend the actor Satyrus, and practised declaration under the most unfavourable circumstances. A tradition says that be would go down to the sea-shore during storms, and strive to make his votes heard above the roar of wlad and waves, in order to learn the pitch recessing for addressing the beisterous assembly of his follow-citizens. When he was able to set furth his views with a auitable delivery, the intrinsic merit of his speeches made itself felt at once, and he soon became the leading crater of the wor-party of Athens.

Demosthenes had fed his imagination on the great deeds of Athera In the previous generation; his favourite reading was the history of Thuoydides, and the sim which underlay all his political action

was the restoration of his native city to the leading place among Hellen's states. His first important political barangues were devoted to advocating the reorganization of the fleet, which had fallen into a deplorable condition of inefficiency in the Social war (364 a.c.). A liftle later he is found encouraging the Athorians to send help first to Megalopolis (352 a.c.), and then to Rhodes (361 a.c.), in order to vindicate the old claim of Athera to be the friend and helper of all oppressed cities. Indeed, the chief fault of his policy was that he often strove to induce the impoverished and languid city of his own day to carry out the schemes that would have suited the Athera of 420 a.c. Not being, as the statement of the elder generation had been, a soldior as well as a politician, he was proper to lose right of military necessities in his zeal for attaining some obsershed political end.

As the character and designs of King Philip gradually grew plainer, the polley of Demosthenes tonded more and more to resolve itself into an anti-Macedonian crusalle. His cration on the state navy has received the name of the "First Philipple," because of the drift of its contents; and in his later speeches the name of Philip is mentioned with ever-increasing frequency, till his misdoings

become the sole burden of the orator's discourse.

When the Olynthian ambassadors begged for the assistance of Athens, Demostheres unged not only that previous gradges should object that a force and an alliance concluded with them, but descreted, that a large Athenian army, not more moreonaries, and the alliance handless should be sent to attack Macro-

doofs. He only successed in half his project; the alliance was made, but the success seat was hopelessly inadequate—first a small fleet of thirty-eight ships under the erratic Charce, then four thousand moreomary paltasts headed by Charldinnes, a Redocan general taken into Attle pay, who was more than once suspected of playing his employers false. Thus insufficiently added, the Chalcidian towns felt one by one into the hunds of Philip. The Olynthians alone dared to face the king's army in the open field, but they were twice rental, and after the second hattle two traitors, bought with Macelonian gold, opened the gates to the victor. Philip beant Olynthus, and sold many of its citizens into slavery, in return for the ingratitude which he alleged that the

state had shown hits. Some of the smaller Chelcidian towns abared its fate.

The Athenians seem to have been more surprised than veged at the fall of Olyuthus; in spite of the harangues of Damosthenes. It was hard to interest them in a wer so far from home. A large party in the state only thought of the material interests of Athens, and were ready to secrifice everything else, if only her trade and commerce were left untouched, and these could best be seened by making peace with Philip on such terms as he chose to give. Aucthor section, though not influenced by such sordid methyes as the first, thought that Athens was too weak and exhausted to go crussding against Phillip for the public good of Greece, and discounseed all vigorous action as profittens and doomed to fullage, This party was headed by Photico, the last Athanian who combined successfully the functions of orotor and general. Though braye and bonest, he was a hopeless peasurest; he was too much of a philosopher to be in burmony with the multitude, and moreover held democracy in such contempt that he believed that no good thing could ever come from the Athenian Ecclesia. nerticularly detested the fiery and emotional harangues of Demosthence, and opposed him so bluntly, yet so officiently, that the orator was wont to say, whenever his powersary mounted the Beens. "Here comes the cleaver that will linek my periods to pieces."

The Athenians had expected, when Olyathus fell, that Philip would turn his areas against the Thereian Chersonese, the last of their porthern peacessions. They were afraid too that, now that so many scaports were in his hands, the king would endeavour to send out ships to melest their commerce; on one occanion, indeed, seem Manedonian privateers had actually made a discourt on Attion, and carried away the Paralus, one of the two state-guileys, as it hay sechered of Marathon. But they were agreeably surprised when Philip, instead of urging on the war, showed an unmistakable inclination to make peace. Though straible to discover the king's motive, the endporty of the Athenians were enger to humour his best, and, on the motion of a speaker named Philiperates, as embassy of ten members was sent to Pella, to have the trains on which he wished to treat. Among the envoys were Philiperates, the merce of the motion, the envoys were Philiperates,

Acachines. Philip received them with great courtesy, dazzled them with the spisodour of his court and the strength of his resources, and seems to have recured the enthusinetic admiration. of several of their number by the simple expedient of bribing them. heavily. The embassy returned to Athens full of the klug's praises, but anable to report that they had agreed on terms of peace. Before coming to an agreement, Philip had determined to extract all the benefit he could from the war; knowing that Athens would no longer molest him on the eve of peace, he rushed off to Thrace, and to a harried companies completed the subjection of the prices of that country. Meanwhile he had sent ambassadors to Athena, who kept his energies aroused by protracted haggling over the terms of pacification. When Thrace was conquered his conditions were at last formulated; they amounted to a recognition of the status que. He was to retain all his conquests, new and old; Athens was to give up all claim to her lest posses-

sions, and keep only what was still in her hands. Philographs. Mcroover, the pacification, though it was to extend to all other allies of Athens, was not to include the Phocians. The Atherians only assented to this last clause because Philogrates and Assobines, who had fingered Philip's money. solemnly assured them that the stipulation was morely formal, the king laving no intention of injuring Phocis, but being much more likely to turn his arms against Thebes. Under this impression the Ecclesia ratified the terms of peace, and sent off the ten envoys to Pella for the second time, to administer the corresponding eath of alliance to Philip. The majority of the ambassadors, in spite of the remonstrances of Demosthenes, lingered so long on thely voyage that they took three weeks in resolting the Macedonian capital; there they waited a month map, because Phille was still absent in Thrace. Finally, when he appeared, they did not insist on his ratifying the treaty at once, as Demosthenes urged them to do, but accompanied him into Thessalv, and only administered the cath to him at Pherae. For this dilutory action the surbassadors had the best of reasons; they were carrying out their corrupt agreement with Phillp, who had paid them to keep his intentions hidden from the Athenian people till it was too late to oppose him,

The object of the king's advance to Pherse was demonstrated the moment that the peace had been signed. Within a few days he was at Thermoppins, and had solved the peace, which the Phocians were unable to defend now that of Phocians of Athenian force came to their sid. The mountains

barrier once pierced, the realetance of Phocis suddouly collapsed. Pholosous, finding bluned at close quarters with the Macedonians, determined to surrender without a blow. He obtained permission to depart with his eight thousand merceoseties, and such of the Phocians as thought it wise to follow him. Taking ship he passed away, first to Poloponuesus, then to Orete, where he fell at the siege of Cydonia.

The Phonons, thus basely described by their leader, threw themschool at the mercy of Philip; twenty-two cities one after another opened their gates to him when he presented himself before their walls. Remounlaying the fate of Olyathas, they availed with no small apprehension the doors that might be meted out to thom as the planderers of Dulphi.

The king's intentions proved to be less harsh than might have been expected; It was not his detestation of Physian impicty, but his desire to hold the gates of Greece, that bud brought him to Theresopyles. Advancing to Delphi, he summound the Amphigtyonic assembly to meet in its old sent, which it had not seen for ten years. The delegates came, burning to avenge themselves on the Phocians, and proposed the most savage measures against their conquered fees; the Ostoona delegates, for example, wished to cast all Phoelau moles of military age over the precipices of Parnassus. But Philip restrained their fury, and toned down the sentence to a communityely mild shape. The towns of Photis, except Abox, were to be dismantled, and their inhabitants forced to dwell apart in villages of not more than fifty hearths. The whole race was disarmed, a strip of their frontier-land was made ever to the Bosotlans, and they were commanded to pay fifty talents a year to Apollo, till they should have restored the entire sum which they had taken from the Delphian treasure-a consummation which would arrive in about two bundred years.

The other resulves of the Amphictyons were far more important than their decrees against the conquered enemy. They transferred the two Phocian votes in their assembly to King Philip, thereby making him a recognized member of the Helienic state system, and gave him a share in the presidency of the Pythian games, a distinction which he was Greek enough to value as not much less important than a great political success. For the future the king was theoretically acknowledged as the equal of his Helienia might-bours, and might claim a right to aspire to the same begennony among them that Sparta, Athens, or Thebes but once cujuyed.

Delphi was soon full of festal pomp, when the Thobans and Thessalians joined the king in celebrating the Pythian games. But at Athens there was wrath and dismay, for the people had now discovered why Phillip had been so maxious to make peace, and were curelog their own stopidity and the treachery of the envoye who had aided the king to brodwink them. For a moment there was actually some prospect of their renewing the war with Macedon, so bitter was their impotent rage. But Domosthenes, who was now in greater credit than ever, between he had opposed the policy of his colleagues in the embassy, set his face against a war which must be entered into without allies and without preparation, and suggested in diverting the engar of his follow-countrymen on to their trencherous ambassaclors. Philocontes, the head of the embassy, fled from Athens the mounts that he was impenched. Academies about his trial, and by a most skilful defence just succeeded in escaping on adverse verdict; the dieastery was an evenly divided that a transference of sixteen votes would have entailed his condomnation.

Philip was now free to extend the scope of his ambition; the conquest of Phocis and the peace with Athens custod him to turn his arms in new directions. His first operations touded to dissiblusionize his old friends the Thessalians, who had fendly imagined that they would be quit of libra now that the Secret was was over. Instead of withdrawing his gurrisons from the places near Thermopylas and on the Papsacan Gulf, the king took advantage of some slight civil disturbance, and occupied the citadels of Phorae and other cities. Then "Decarchies," after the pattern of those of Lysander (see p. 409), were put in power, and Thessaly found

¹ Philip was so proud of the rickery of his chariot at the Olympic games, that he commemorated its success on the whole of his gold colonge.

itself practitally incorporated with the kingdom of Maceden. The free noness into Southern Greece which Philip had goined by seizing Thermopylae was next turned to account, and the Macedonian

arms were ere long seen in the Pelepoonseus.

The Peloponue dans had only themselves to thank for the lutroduction of the stranger into their well-guarded peninnula. It was their own appeal which gave him the chance of entering. The first offenders were the oligarchic lemence in party at Rie; finding themselves beset by an exiled Petaporesane. democratic faction, who had bought the services of the mercenary bands that had once followed Phalaceus, they recklessly sought ald from the king, and concluded an offensive and defousive allience with him. The Macedonian auxidaties who came to their ald were soon employed elsewhere; Argos and Messina were at war with Sparts, whose able king Archidinates (the son of the great Agesilaus) was pressing them hard. They proffered themselves as allies to Philip, becrowed his troops, and by their aid drove the Sportage back into the valley of the Eurotes (344 B.C.). It was in valuathat Demostheres crossed into Puleponnesus and visited Argus and Messene, to warn their statesmen against niliance with the Macedonian, and to remind them what had been the fate of Phillip's friends of the Olyathian Longue, Content with their momentury triumph over Sparts, they refused to look forward, and naid no keed to the Athenian orator. They thought that they had utilized for their own purposes the aid of the Maccdonian, and had no conception that they had bound themselves personally to the erryice of a master.

CHAPTER XLIII.

THE END OF GREGIAN PREKDOM, 844-336 R.C.

The embassy of Demosthenes to Poloponnesus marks the beginning of a new struggle between Philip and the Athenians. It did not quit Philip to precipitate a rupture, till he had established a firm fucting in Central and Southern Greece. The Athenians, on the other hand, had made up their minds not to fight unless they could onlist powerful allies; but although each payty avoided an open declaration of war, they spent five yours in constant bickerings, and endeavours to raise un troubles for each other. It cannot be said that the Athenians showed thomselves a whit more scrapulous than the king; they had learns to most Phillip with his own weapons, and Demosthenes was always attring them up to counteract overy move of their operay. His expedition to Pelonconesos. though it proved fruitless, was very offensive to Phillip, who sent an envoy to complain that it was hard that the ambassadors of a friendly power should go about endeavouring to form alliances against him. The Athenian Ecclesia made no further reply than. to send a commission to Polla, charged with the duty of demanding back some places of which they estimed to have been unnefully deprived in the pence of 346 p.c. The king treated the commissioners with studied rudoness, but took no further notice of his quarrel with Athens.

Philip was too much engaged on the western side of Greece to be ready for a new war on the Angern. He was just about to Philip in invade Epirus, where he had determined to everthrow

Retina King Arybbas, and to place on his throne a rival olalmant, Alexander, the brother of his own Eplant wife Olympias. Having accomplished this, he pushed his arms

as far southward as the Ambracian Gulf. Meanwhile the Atheriana were not idle; they harboured the expelled king of Epirus, sent treops to sid of the Ataranahana, who were threatened with invasius, and despatched emissaries into Thesardy to forment a revolt against Philip in that country. This leat move brought the king home in basic; he crossed Mount Findus, appeared suddenly in the plain and oversweef all the maleontont towns, whom he punished by placing over them as "tetractis" four Thesasian nobles of his own party, whose rule was nothing more than a tyrming to disguise.

It is strange that the king was not even yet provoked into declaring war on Athons; he bore patiently with her intrigues, and even offered to corrender Hadosesse, an island provideson the Off Thessely which the Atheniaus claimed as their **Followson, own. The only reward for his produces was that in the next year he had to submit to an even more flagment violation of nontrality. News was brought him that Diopelthes, the Atheniaus general in command in the Thrucks. Chersonese, had not only been undenting his therehant vessels, but had actually invaded Macedonian territory, pillaged the country, and sold his prisoners as slaves. This could not be passed over; the king at once sent a percentagory demand for satisfaction to Athena, and simultaneously began moving his main army to the direction of

The moment had now arrived at which the Athenians were forced to choose between peace and war. If they retailed and position Diopsithes, the present troubled and instrucere peace enight be protracted; if they refused, they must force the consequences and arm for a long and hitter struggle. The party of material interests, and the followers of Phoeiau, who opposed the war on principle, joined with the corrupt friends of Philip in urging the Ecolests to appears the king. But Demosthenes came forward, and in his two great speeches, the first "Concerning the Demosthenes" Checkenese," the other known as the "Third Phi-"Mark Palislippis," bore down all opposition. He recognitulated 10, "Mark Palislippis," bore down all opposition. He recognitulated 10, "Mark Palislippis," bore down all opposition are recognitulated bis broken cathe and agreements, and buddy hade the Athenians pay him back in his own celn. "Philip," he said, "pretends to keep

the peace while his armies are solving or destroying Hellenic cities one after the other. Let Athens too keep the peace in name, but imitate the king by prosecuting a vigorous war to reality." Then he proceeded to expound plans for concluding altiances with Philip's enemies, for raising a permanent force for foreign service, and for providing funds by a stringent property tax.

The oratic carried the Ecolosia away with him. Dispetibes was thanked instead of being recalled, and Philip was laft to do his worst. Hostilities at once broke out in Thrace, though was was not formally declared by either party. Demosthenes, whose activity during the next three years was untiring, sailed at once to Bysantium, and succeeded in enlisting in the Athenian altimose that important city, new threatened by Philip's Thracian conquests. His next move was to cross into Euboea and conclude an altimose with the Chaloidians, who had taken above and conclude an altimose with the Chaloidians, who had taken above and the extension of Philip's Indusque in their ideand through his partisans the tyrants of Orius and Eretria. In the end of the year Domesthenes sailed, in company with Callias of Chalois, to Western Green, and obtained the promise of aid from Achala, Acarnania and Louens, while the more important cities of Corinth and Megara gave in their adherence a little later (winter of 341–340 n.c.).

Meanwhile Philip had turned from the conquest of Inner Thrace,\(^1\)
where he had been engaged at the outbreak of hestilisies, and
Biogen of marched against the Hellenia cities of the Propontia,

Portistion and Porinthus and Byzantium. He intended to soize Hyzonzam.

340 B.C. them, and then to block the passage of the straits to the Athenian corn-ships from the Burian, as Lyvander had done seventy years before. He first labt siege to Perinthus, a strong town scaled on a rocky poincola jutting out into the sea. This slege occupied him for many months; he met with a most obstinate resistance, for, even after the walls had been stormed, the citizens resistant behind barrleades built across their steep and parrow streets. Reinforcements flowed into the town from Byzantium; the Persian satisfap of Asia Minor, Jenkous of the

¹ He had founded in \$10 s.c. the town of Philippolis, on the Upper Strymon, as his output in this direction, and seems to have been in those parts for most of the year 941 u.c.

appearance of a new power in their neighbourhood, sent men and money across the water, and an Athenian general took charge of the defence. Folled in many attempts to break into the town, Philip suddenly raised the siege and marghed up Byeautlum, which he trusted to find anguarded, for its citizens had sout a large contingent to the aid of Perinthus. The Byzantines, however, were on their guard; the king found the walls manned, and discovered that he had only exchanged one aloge for another. He persisted, however, in his enterprise, fixed his engines before the ramparts, throw a boom across the Golden Horn to prevent the ships of the besieged from getting out, and brought up his own fleat from the Ægean to form the blockede on the side of the san, One desperate attempt to escalade the land-well on a dark night falled, it is said, owing to the sudden appearance of a light in heaven (perhaps the Aurora Borealis), which the Byzantines took as a special teken of divine aid.

Mounwhile the Atheninus, unceasingly attered up to action by Demosthenes, were carrying all before them to the south. With the aid of the Chaletdians, they swept the troops of Photion Philip and of the tyrants of Orens and Ecstria out of Patierys. Ruboss. Then landing in Thessaly, they stormed the feetress of Passasa, and made rules of a great number of the king's merchant vessels. When the news of the siege of Byzantium arrived, they at last declared open war on Philip, and preparations were made for an expedition to the Bosphorus. A setundron sent chend under Chares drove off the Macadonian fleat, but did not raise the slege. A larger force was then placed under Physica, who, though he had opposed the declaration of way, was far too patriotic to refuse his best bely to his native city in her hope of danger. With a hundred and twenty triremes behind him. Phoclon passed up the Hellespont and sought out the Macedonians. Philip then gave up the siege in despairhis make were thinned and his mon demoralised-and plunged inland out of the reach of the enemy. Protectly he was forced in the bour of dianster to take every presention to hold down his wild subjects in Inner Theres.

Philip for the around time in his career had suffered a humiliating check, and the joy at Athens over the defeat of the ancient enemy was correspondingly great. Demosthanes, who had so constantly predicted the possibility of a victory which most men considered unlikely, was at the summit of his carser. After the victories in Bubesa, his joyful follow-citisens had voted him a golden crown for civic virtue, and no one for the future ventured to dispute his ascendency with the Eccletia. All the decrees he proposed passed without a question, even one which devoted to the war-chest the Theoric found, or earn annually set apart by the state for public fastivals and occurrencies. Perhaps the anost nearly of Demosthenes' measures was a reform in the machinery for providing the state annual which worked so well that not a ship was lost or disabled during the whole course of the war.

For nine months Philip was lost to sight after his requise from Byzantium. Posted in the Thracian inland, he was fighting hard to preserve his dominions from the wild Scytilians and Tribelli, who lay along his nothern frontier. It was not till late in the summer of 339 n.o. that he emerged from the northern darkness, victorious but well-nigh disabled for active service by a wound received in battle with the Triballi. Minapubile the Athonians had been harasting the cosat-line of his wide possessions, but had also decisive measures to attack him at home. Some of their allies, among them the ungrateful Byzantines, had grown convinced that the war was practically over, and had actually sent home their contingents after making a decimation of nounality. Unfortunately the triumph of the Athonians was destined to be short-lived, and events were ripering for an unforcesen disaster.

The new troubles spring from an anexpected quarter. The orator Accelines, in spite of his narrow escape from a condemna-Accelines at tion for treeson in 343 s.c. (see p. 506), and retained

Attention delegates at the Amplifictyonic needing of 339 s.c. While acting in this capacity at Delphi, he had a violent afterention with the deputies of the Lections of Amphiess. Whether carried away by the unhappy inspiration of the moment, or subarped—as his enemies declared—by Macedonian gold, Acsobiacs suddenly necessed the Lections of having committed ascrilege against Apollo. They had, so he declared, imitated the evil deeds of the Phosians, by tremessing on waste land sucred to

the god, and building houses, burns and potters' kilns upon it. Stirred up by the center's fiery periods, a great mob of Delphlans, accommunied by most of the Amphiciponic deputies, went down to the detatable ground, and burnt or cast down all the buildings While they were thus engaged, the Loorians, armed and in great wrath, came up from their city of Amphasa, fell upon the mob, wounded some, asptored many, and drove the rest in rout back to Delphi. Next day the Amphietrens proregued their ordinary meeting, and called a special assembly to take auto consideration the sacrilege and violence of the Locrtune. The special assembly was of a most unrepresentative kind; Demostheres had persuaded the Athenians to withdraw their delegates, while the Thebaus stayed away because they were old friends of the Amphissians. The main part of the delegates who appeared were from the Thessalian, Octaven, and Mallan states, who were all more or less under Macedonian influence. They put the Locrisus under the ban, declared war on them, and soon afterwards appointed King Philip thair commander-in-chief, and begged him to take charge of the business. It seems likely that the whole of this comedy had been arranged beforehend, that Associates had been paid to stir up a disturbance, and that the Amphictons had from the first no other purpose than to find an excuse for beinging Philip's army down into Central Greece.

The king was quite ready to take up the game; the beads of his columns were seen passing the dolles of Othrys, and he himself—the moment that his wound was healed—came phints release southward to assume the command. When he maked a new healed

renched Thermopylae the anxiety of the Athenians assets. became painful; it was quite impossible to know whether Philip would really more against Amphisms, or whether he was siming at Athens, having secured by on agreement with the Thehans the permission to pass through the neutral territory of Bucetia. The doubt was seen solved; one autumn evening a courier renched Athens with the news that the king's vanguard had seized and was fortflying Elatein, the diamentled Phecisa city on the Bocotian frontier which commanded the road down the valley of the Cephiseus. Demostheres has left us a vivid picture of the construction which the tidings gaused. Some ran to drive

the buyers and sellers out of the market-place, some burnt the wicker booths which encumbered it, others caused the trumpeters to sound the plants round the city, others rushed to the houses of the strategi to bid them assemble. The Ecclesia met almost before daybreak, but when it was guthered no man dayed face the crisis, till Demosthenes stood forward and comforted the desponding arowd by a vigorous harangue. While bidding them take all possible measures for the defence of the city, he pointed out that the danger was perhaps not so close as they imagined. Everything depended on the Thebans; if they were secretly allied with Philip the war must come into Attion, but if they were not, it might still be kapt for off. He himself voluntpered to set out at once, to implore the Thebans not to grant the king a free passage, or, if possible, to induce them to join the Athenian alliance. It is the greatest testimony to the power of his cratery that he actually succeeded in corrylog out the more difficult of the two alternatives, Macadonian ambassadars shoot forward in the Theban assembly promising all manner of bribes, the Bosotians and the Athenians had been ill neighbours to each other for the last thirty years, and a powerful army hung on the fronticy ready to cross it the moment that Philip's requests were refused. Yet the contac lighteest the Thebane to send away the king's ambassadors and conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with Athens.

Fighting at once began on the Bosetian frontier, and for several months on inducisive struggle was carried on upon each of the two

was in mostes which lead from the Phonian hills towards as 3.0. The Lecinus of Amphiese, emported by ten thousand mercanaries hired by Atlans, watched the southern route near the Gulf of Gerinti—that which Chombroius the Spartan had used in the campaign of Louetre (see p. 444). The whole home-levy of Athens and Thobes held the narrow front in the velley of the Cephiesus between the spare of Chōuls and Paranasus, where so many battles had already taken place in Greek history. Bre long they were juined by large centingents from the states which Demosthenes a your before had drawn into the Athenian alliance—Corinth, Magara, Achais, and the rest; the whole army would seem to have numbered somewhat over thirty thousand man. Philip's free

was about the same; he had calculated on assistance from Poloponnesus, but his allies the Rielans and Argives preferred to wait till the fortune of war ran definitely in his forour before committing themselves. In two partial engagements the confederate army had the best of the fight, and it was with good hopes of victory that its generals—the Athenians Chares and Lysicles and the Thehan Theagenes—drew up their forces in front of Charconeis for a decisive battle, on the 2nd of August, 388 s.c.

The details of the struggle are not so well known to us as those of many less decisive conflicts in Greeian history. We gather that in the confederate bost the Thebans held the right wing, the Athenians the left, while the casespeels, Cariathians and other smaller contingents formed the centre. In the Macedonian army the king fixed the Athenians, and his son Alexander-a youth of eighteen who now saw his first field-had the Thebans opposite him. It would seem that Phillip had resolved to throw the main weight of his army upon the enemy's right; he dreaded the Decetian pholony which had wrought such wonders at Corondo, Louetra, and Mantines, While the king fought cautiously with the Athenians, and even gave ground before their first attack, his son delivered a series of Jurious charges upon the Thebans. The memories of Epareloundss and Polopidas were not dead, and the Bosotions made a gallant fight; but their short sponts were unable to cope with the onermously long pikes of the Macedopian phalana, while their cavalry was outnumbered and driven off the field. the Theban general was slain, the three hundred chosen hoplites of the "Secred Band" fell to a man, and then the Bosotlans broke before the cavelry of Alexander. The rout of the confederate right left the centre exposed, and era long it was driven off the field. Finally the Atheuleus, who had been waging a not wusuocessful fight with Philip, were almost surrounded, so that to escape capture they had to disperse and fly. A thousand of them were slain, two thousand taken prisoners; the Thebaus' less mainly in dead, was even greater, and the allies in the centre also suffered heavily. So ended this well-fought batale, for which Greece had no cause to blame her soldlers; but she might well sak berealf in shame why Atheas, Thobes, and Corinth were left almost alone to

fight the battle of Hellonto liberty. Elis and Argos, Arcalia and Messens, were standing apart in soldish prudence; Thesially souther horsenies to help the Macedonian stranger. Once more the narrow spirit of local ambition had proved the evil genius of Greece; but now it was no passing trouble which it had brought upon the Hellens, but the doom of permanent subjection to the balf-barbarian kingdom is the north.

Philip had now achieved the ambition of his lifetime; Athena and Greece were at his feet, and his exultation burst furth for the Athena sub- moment in the most unseeraly guise. The evening msia, asa a.c. after the victory he apent in a royal drinking bout, and at night he is said to have recled off to the battle-field and to have danced among the corpses, while he trolled out as a song the presmble of a decree of Demosthenes which happened to have the rhythm of a verse. A bystander recolled him to his botter sold by reminding him that "the gods had given him the part of Agamempon to play, though he seemed to prefer to take up that of Thersites." But when the king had sobored down, he showed an even greater moderation in the hour of victory than he had displayed in 345 E.c. after the conquest of Photie. When Thebas surrendozed to him, a few days after the battle, he only claimed from her a treaty of alliance, the recognition of the netonerny of the smaller Borntian cities, and the right to place a Macedonian garrison in the Codmela. Athens fored even better; the citizens, buryed up by the hopeful energy of Demosthence, who would not despoir even in the hour of disaster, and prepared for a fierce resistance beltiad their walls. But when Philly sout back their prisoners without a ransom, and let it be known that the only thing he required was the cession of the Thracian Chersonese and the signature of a treaty acknowledging his hegeneous, the desire to resist died away. When the peace had been signed Philip gare to Athens, as a pledge of life good will, the town of Chopus, which the Becotlans had taken from her thirty years ago (see p. 480).

Megara and Covinth followed the example of Athens in promptly submitting to the king, and he was each able to summon within the walls of the latter town a congress of all the states of Green, Not a single city refused to send her delegates to do homage to the king save Sparta alone, who retained all her ancient pride, though she had now become a small and decayed state, oppressed by ware with her Argive and Messenian neighbours. There was something grand in the struggle of the Spartane against the overwhelming odds that Phillip brought against them. Though all Greece followed the Macedonian humors, King Agis III, led out his little army with as much confidence, and fought with as dogged a courage, as had Leonidas or Agesilaus in the days of old. Sparta paid for her obstinacy by seeing Thyren and the Sciritis, the prizes of her ancient victories in the sixth and seventh conturies (see p. 76), term from her grasp and given to her Argive and Arcading enemies.

The congress which mot at Corinth under King Philip's presidency, in the autumn of 338 m.a., was the most representative body which Greece had ever seen. Even the great assembly of 481 n.c., which had gathered on the news of the approach of Xerxes, had counted less members. It was only the strong band of the master that could gather together the delegates of every Hellenic state for a common end; of their own accord the blind and selfish cities would never have combined for any purpose, however great and good. The king haid before the deputies the draft of a document which practically formed Greece into one great federal state, under Macedonian presidency. Every city was to be "free and autonomous," but in the same some that Antalcidae had used the word lifty years before (see r. 450). Each was bound to Macedon by a stringent treaty of alliance, but a very considerable degree of local freedom. was allowed; for example, Philip did not call for the banishment of Demosthenes or any other statesman who had opposed his plane, or impose new constitutions on unwilling states. A federal council was established to aid the king in administering the land, and the Amphictyons-who had twice corved Philip so well-were constituted the supreme legal arbitors between state and sinte, All this seemed fair and wise; but the other aspect of affairs was marked by the establishment of personent Macadenian garrisons at Thebes, Corinth, Chalcis, and Ambraola, and by the clause

Architamus, the father of Agia, was aloin in Thaty on the same day as the battle of Chaptonela (see p. \$49).

which declared Phillip supreme commender of the warlike forces of the whole confederacy, and made disobedience to him intotrengon.

Thus Greece received a formal constitution—a thing which neither Sparts, Athens, nor Thebes had ever been able to force upon her. It was a far better one than might have been expected from the sustecedents of the man who drafted it, but Philip's vertatile mind was canable of unexpected auts of moderation and even of generosity. In spite of econstonal outbursts of Macedonina barbarism, he had become very Hellenie in his methods of thought, and—so for an was computable with his own ends—paid a sincore attention to Greek prejudice in drawing up the treaty of Corintà. If fairly worked by a conscientious ruler, it would have been a far more just and promising basis for the union of Greece than were any of the arrangements which Sparta and Athons had tried to

force on their reluctant neighbours,

To provide the new Greek federation with a common end, likely to stir up national enthusiasm but not to prove dangerous to his own hegemony. Philip gave out that he was about to take up the old plans of Cimon and Agosilaus, and to lead the whole force of Greece enstanted for a grand attack on the old national enemy, the Persian king. How far the project excited genuine seal in Greece we cannot exactly tell, but sea and land contingents were voted with alacrity by the congress, and it was calculated that, if every state did its best, two hundred thousand men could be collected to everron Asia. The scheme was to take effect in 386 a.c., the intervening year being devoted to the necessary proparations.

But Philip was pover destined to cross the Hellesbout. He was to enjoy the fruits of his victory for less than two years, and to die without having accomplished any of his now plaus. The summer of 836 n.c. was come; a Macedonian force under the generals Attalus and Parmenio had actually oressed into Mysia, and all Greece was filled with the proparations for the invesion, when the news suddenly arrived that Philip had been assassinated. It was not the outraged patriotism of any of the Greeks that had inspired the deal, but the private grudge of one of the king's own aubjects.

Philip, in violation of Hallenic usage, had married several wives,

both Greek and foreign; but his recognized consort was the Epirot princers Olympias, mother of his heir, Alexander the Great. This lady the king had just divorced and sent back to Epiros, to the great wrath of her flery son. In her stend he had taken as his chief wife Cleopatra, the nices of his general Altalus. The friends of Olympias and Alexander were much enmaed with Phillip for wrecking the hopes which they had built on their favour with the late queen, and east about for a means of revenge. They found a young Maccilonian noble named Pausanias, who had just suffered an outrage at the hands of Attalus, the new queen's uncle. The young man had sought justice from Philip, but it had been denied him, and he was filled with ungovernable resentment against both king and general. It required small persuasion to turn his angur into sotion. Phille was orielynting at Aeroc the marriage of one of his daughtees. On the second day of the festival there was a splendbi procession, in which, as mon noted with disapproval, the king's image was presumptuously borne along to company with those of the twelve great gods of Olympus. He bluself walked in the procession growned and robed in white, but quite approtected, for he had bidden his guards to beep apart, "because he had sufficient accurity in the good will of all Greece." Munder of As he entered the theatre, Panannias sprang out from Philip 336 B.C. amone the spectators and thrust him through with a short sword which he had hidden under his closic. The king fell dead; the assessin tried to make off, but attended in his flight, and was out down before he got to his feet.

So died King Philip, in the forty-seventh year of his ago and the twenty-fourth of his roign, when all the world was expecting from him even greater explosts than he had already performed. Greece thought for the moment that she was once ruces from Athenian patriots, forgetting the mercy that had been shown them two years before, began to get ready their sacrifices and librations. But a man who had grasped the real lesson of the times rebuked them. "Nothing," said Phonion, "shows greater meanness of affirit than expressions of joy on the death of an enemy. Remember that the army you fought at Charconsia is lessoned by only one man."

He was right. Philip was dead, but Philip's army and Philip's

system were alive, and, what was more, the Greeks were perfectly unchanged. Their petty jealousies were as lively as ever, their border-feurls as venomous, their statesmen as venal and short-slighted. In spite of all our sympathy for individuals such as Demosthenes, we cannot feel that the chaotic state-system which had provailed since the death of Epominondas deserved to survive. Greece under Philip would have been happier, richer, and botter governed, than that Greece,—spit up into twenty blekering etates, which combined with kalcidoscopic variety into new political forms every three or four years,—whose history we have been investigating.

The Greek craying for local autonomy had received a deadly blow by the Macedonian conqueet, but in return much was offered both to the nation and the individual. Phillp was ready to give much; his son Alexander both had and gave infinitely more. If a man consented to forget that he was an Athenian or a Corinthian, and merely to remember that he was Hellene, what could afford him greater pride than to watch the great empire of the East overrun by an army which, if guided by a Macedonian prince, was largely officered by Greek generals, and composed in two-thirds of its strength of Greek hoplites and peltasts? What could be more inspiring than to see that the old Hellenie genius for colonizing was not extinct; to behold the conquerors laying hands on every province from the Aerena to the Indus, and covering them with Greek cities as great and as vigorous as any that had ever existed in the Hellonic fatherland? For the individual who consented to enter the service of the Macedonian the prixes were unnumbered and unlimited. For soldier and general, for poet or painter, for scribe or rhetorician, for merchant or scaman, there was instant, bonourable, and lucrative employment.


Those who threw themselves into the new life of the days of the conquest of Asia looked back on the old times of the "balance of power" and its endless wars as something potry and absurd. Shortly after Alexander had won his crowning victory at Arbila, news came to him of a battle in Greece. A king of Sparta had fallen, and with him five thousand brave men more; but Alexander turned to his generals and said, "It seems that while we have been conquering the Great King, there has been some 'battle of mice' in Arcadia." When the empire of the world was being won in the East, fights between Greek and Greek at home, for a border fort or a strip of meadow-land, seemed mere sbullitions of jealous fully.

Historians have rightly felt that with the battle of Chactoneia ends an epoch. From the time of Philip enward the bistory of Greece no longer stands alone, but becomes part of a larger whole. The causes which set the course of events working are no longer to be found in Greece herself, but must be sought far afield. A singe of Athens or a sack of Corinth follows in strict consequence of some political change in Asia or ligypt. The history of Greece, in ahort, cannot be written except as a part of that of the whole Hellenized world from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Indus. The styln of Polybius must replace that of Thucydides. The subject is no longer the simple chronicle of events around the Aegean that we have recorded hitherto, and needs another method and a separate volume.

KINGS OF SPARTA.


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
The first seven or eight generations are legendary rather than historic.



KINGS OF PERSIA.

(Only those whose nomes are in capitals were rulers of the Persian Empire.)









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